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THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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[no textual material on p. i]

THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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PREFACE

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Before 1941 the countries of Southeast Asia were inward-looking and self-sufficient. The impact of war followed by common problems of reconstruction reminded them that they were fellow components of an entity that was not merely geographical. The growth of nationalism and the outbreak of militant communism have intensified this new awareness. Yet Southeast Asia, new in the consciousness of its component States, is by no means a new creation. It has existed in different cultural syntheses and varying closeness of association for more than a millennium. But the acceleration with which its destiny is now unfolding is turning evolution into revolution, and if we believe that the future of the region will be shaped neither by predestination nor blind chance we must hold that it can be influenced for good or evil by colonial policy, by the national leaders, and by the peoples themselves. How these will direct their thought, their emotions, and their actions will depend greatly on how far their goodwill is informed by knowledge of the immediate and remoter past of the region throwing light on the present and indicating alternatives for the future. To inform is to influence, and while it may or may not be true that *tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner*, the dispelling of ignorance and the establishment of a new sense of proportion are necessary first steps towards the removal of harmful prejudice.

The present state of description of the Far East cannot be compared in depth or extent with that of Europe or America. Popular interest in this technological age tends to focus on the Western centres of research and development and to neglect the rest of the world. In many universities, indeed, the illusion persists that the Far East is treated in their curricula in ratio to its importance. The Scarbrough Commission, appointed in 1944 to examine the facilities offered by universities and other educational institutions in Great Britain for the study of Oriental, Slavonic, East European, and African languages and culture, 'unanimously reached the conclusion that the existing provision for these studies is unworthy of our country and people'.[1] Typical of the situation is the fact that

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[1] G.B., Foreign Office, *Report of the Interdepartmental Commission of Enquiry on Oriental, Slavonic, East European and African Studies* (1947) p. 8.

000classicists, who contest with enthusiasm (and sometimes with venom) the latest textual emendation of an obscure Greek or Latin author, are quite content with the latest edition of Gibbon in which the great historian's references to China, based on authorities long obsolete, are uncorrected, and the invention of printing is referred to the Han Dynasty and the Chinese use of the compass in previous centuries is discussed under the heading of A.D. 532! Until the balance is redressed, world history will remain as universal, as accurate, and as up to date as Ptolemy's geography.

Because modern science has developed almost exclusively in the West, many Western humanists, as well as scientists, consciously or unconsciously feel that the East is relatively unimportant. They thus ignore the great contribution that Asia has made to human culture in practical fields as well as in philosophy and aesthetics. Nor will the minutest knowledge of the behaviour of the atom teach a scientist Tamil or Tibetan; an expert acquaintance with the age of Pericles or the Italian Renaissance will not compensate for complete ignorance of the civilizations of T'ang or Angkor, and a mastery of the disciplines of the social sciences, achieved in an alien setting, will not of itself enable a man to form with any reasonable likelihood an idea of what a group of Cambodian peasants, Japanese fishermen, or urban Chinese will think or do in any given circumstance.

In the case of Southeast Asia a large body of literature does exist, much of it of high quality, but the process of comparing and contrasting the histories of the separate countries in the light of world movements and making the results actual in surveys of broad sweep has scarcely begun. The result is that the significance of the region, both actual and potential, is hardly suspected by those who deal in global generalizations and whose eyes in a fine frenzy are rolling (unconscious of colossal blind-spots) east and west from China to Peru.

Among phenomena clamouring for realization in terms of a single comprehensive study is the overflowing from the southern lip of China's vast bowl of population of eight to ten million of its people into Southeast Asia.[1] Indians, too, have overflowed into the region, but since the Second World War their numbers have diminished

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[1] Differences of opinion regarding the actual number of Chinese in Southeast Asia are discussed at length in the chapters on demography and the subject is referred to again in the Postscript.

and they are now less than one and a half million compared with the 000
Chinese eight and a half or so in a total population approaching one hundred and sixty million. Nor can they compare with their fellow immigrants in wealth and influence. The Chinese in Southeast Asia are of the greatest political, economic, and social significance to the region and, indirectly, to the world as a whole, but until now no comprehensive study of them has been attempted. The considerations that have led me to venture to provide what is at least an outline of the subject are as follows.

To carry out the research necessary for an adequate history of the Chinese in the seven countries of the region (counting 'British Borneo' as one), together with a basic study of Chinese emigration into Southeast Asia and its causes, to collate the material, and to write the work itself would, in all reasonableness, take some seven or eight years. Moreover, the qualifications for embarking on such an enterprise should include, first, an extensive background knowledge of China and the Chinese, secondly, a close acquaintance with the several countries of Southeast Asia and their histories, and, thirdly, at least a working knowledge of a score of languages
and dialects. Since no person of the necessary qualifications, 114
leisure, or ambition appeared to be forthcoming, and the need for 121
a primer on Chinese affairs in this region was urgent, I decided to 122
be greatly daring and to try my hand at a single impressionistic volume. My qualifications fell far short of the desideratum, but among them were two years of study in Canton, a period of attachment to the Hong Kong Government, and an intimate contact with the Chinese in Malaya, as a Colonial official, for over a quarter of a century.[1] I had visited the countries themselves at different times (the last occasion being as consultant to the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East in 1947), and I had an acquaintance with the Chinese written language and the Cantonese and Mandarin dialects as well as a working knowledge of French, Spanish, Italian, and Malay, with some German, Portuguese, and Dutch. I had also served an apprenticeship in the subject by writing a study of the Chinese in one country of the area.[2]

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[1] Many appointments, held during this period, included those of magistrate, Protector of Chinese, Assistant Director of Education (Chinese), and Director-General of Information. Under the British Military Administration (1945–6) I was Colonel, Principal Adviser on Chinese affairs.

[2] *The Chinese in Malaya* (London, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948).

000 The time it was possible to devote to the research, the writing, and the revision has been under two years. I can claim, however, that the application has been intensive.

A survey of this sort accomplished in so short a time had obvi-
127 ously to be in the nature of a *tour de force*. I had, for the most part,
128 to rely on secondary sources and, as was to be expected, there were many gaps in my information. At the best, the impressionism promised to be an imperfect mosaic with some cracked tesserae and blanks ~~in the~~ pattern filled in with the cement of speculation. The information available, too, varied considerably with the countries. However, I hoped to compensate for the limitations of my method as far as possible by obtaining the help of experts in the several countries and fields of knowledge through criticism of the work section by section before publication. This hope proved well founded, for through the good offices of Chatham House and the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and by exploiting my personal friendships, I was able to appeal with success to a number of experts in Great Britain, the United States, the Netherlands, France, Canada, South Africa, and the Far East to scrutinize my first drafts, and to supply some of my deficiencies. The comments and suggestions received were of the highest value. I was relieved to find that, on the whole, the essential structure of my individual studies was not undermined by errors in detail. In two cases, indeed, I had courted disaster by trespassing on ground with which I was acquainted only in the most general and imperfect way, but here I was rescued by timely criticism and advice. (A number of my mistakes proved to be derived from the secondary authorities on which I had relied, and I had in some instances to make a choice when these authorities were in conflict.) I have considered carefully every suggestion received, and in the majority of cases have amended my text in the light of the comments made. When, as infrequently happened, my advisers differed, I had also to make a choice between them or to steer a middle course. If errors remain, they are my own.

000 The brain of the historian (says Edouard Chavannes) is a prism through which are refracted the luminous rays that are the facts; and (he adds) what is important to the reader is to determine the index of refraction of this prism. The above personal details, together with the unconscious self-betrayal of the text, should help the reader in this task.

I am most grateful to those who have assisted me in this way, 115
and I am flattered that persons of eminence should have considered 127
my text worth the trouble they have bestowed upon it. My thanks
are due to Mr B. R. Pearn for reading the entire work, and to the 122
following who read one or more parts of it—Mrs Patricia Barnett, Sir Paul Butler, Mr Chu-pei Chen, Mr Richard Couglin, Mr F. S. V. Donnison, Miss Cora Du Bois, Professor J. J. L. Duyvendak, Professor Raymond Firth, Mr Tom Harrisson, Mr J. D. Higham, Sir Robert Holland, Mr A. F. P. Hulsewé, Mr N. R. Jarrett, Mr George McT. Kahin, Mr Paul Kattenburg, Professor Raymond Kennedy, Professor R. D. Kollewijn, Dr K. P. Landon, M. Roger Lévy, Sir Raibeart MacDougall, Mr J. V. Mills, Mr R. S. Milward, Mr O. H. Morris, Professor Karl Pelzer, Miss Catherine Porter, Mr Ifor B. Powell, Mr W. A. C. Smelt, Sir Robert Smith, Mr R. T. Tan, Professor Arnold Toynbee, Dr B. M. Vlekke, and Mr W. A. Ward. I am indebted also to Mr R. A. D. Forrest, lecturer in Tibeto-Burman languages in the University of London, for writing an appendix on the dialects of South China especially for this work, to Dr Janus Poppe for considerable help with Dutch texts, to Miss A. C. J. Willems of the Netherlands Information Bureau in London for assistance of a similar kind, and to Mr Leonard Unger and the American Geographical Society for permission to reproduce the map showing the distribution of Chinese in Southeast Asia. I have also to thank Mr Richard Adloff, Dr Virginia Thompson Adloff, Mr Leonard Aurousseau, Professor C. R. Boxer, Mr R. S. Busuego, Mr H. M. Cheng, Mr I. C. Cheng, Mr J. S. Furnivall, Miss Ellen Hammer, Mr Edw[illegible] Haward, Mr Cecil Hobbs, Dr Arthur Hummel, Mr G. W. Irwin, Mr Loke Wan-tho, Mr J. N. McHugh, Sir Frederick Maze, Dr Lennox Mills, Dr Th. Moll, Mr A. S. B. Olver, Mr E. Osborn, Mr H. T. Pagden, Mr L. N. Palar, Mr Harry Price, Mr Tan Cheng-lock, Mr Tan Siew-sin, Mr G. G. Thomson, Dr Tjoa Sik-ien, Mr M. V. del Tufo, Dr H. van der Valk, Dr Wabeke, Sir Richard Winstedt, and Mr Guy Wint for assistance of several kinds. My indebtedness to libraries is, of course, great, and in particular I would mention the courtesy and help I received from the staffs of the New York Public Library, the Library of Congress, Washington, the British Museum Reading Room, and the respective libraries of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Royal Asiatic Society, the Mi[illegible] Temple,

115 and the Colonial Office, and, notably, from Miss Barbara Kyle,
127 librarian of Chatham House, and her staff who seemed never at a
122 loss to produce the most out-of-the-way books and periodicals,
and from Miss K. M. L. Simpson, press librarian of Chatham House, whose staff were unfailing in providing cuttings on all sorts of subjects and at the shortest notice. The entire work has been edited by Mrs Dorothy A. Cannell with a care that has increased its precision and improved the diction.

Finally I should thank Miss Margaret Cleeve, the Research Secretary of Chatham House, and Mr W. L. Holland, the Secretary General of the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations, for their invaluable assistance. Without them and the machinery of their institutions I should have been unable to solicit the help of the above-mentioned experts and the project would have been stillborn.[1]

In order to bring the survey as up to date as possible, a Postscript is added, written in the course of a visit to all the countries of Southeast Asia in the second half of 1950. This visit was made possible by a grant for the purpose from the Rockefeller Foundation to the Institute of Pacific Relations.

August 1950 VICTOR PURCELL

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121 [1] Since the main object of this study is to throw light on contemporary happenings, more attention has been paid to the history of the past two or three hundred years than to the earlier Chinese contacts with Southeast Asia. Indeed, as in my work on the Chinese in Malaya, interest in the Chinese begins in earnest from the time when they formed more or less settled communities in the region, and minor account is taken of trading voyages or isolated travellers.

The story is brought up to the moment of writing, which differs, of course, in the several parts. The section on Indonesia, for example, stops just before the second Dutch 'police action'; for Malaya the narrative is taken to February 1949.

That the authorities are mostly European rather than Chinese is due to the fact that the analytic and descriptive habit is of only recent growth among the Chinese of Southeast Asia.

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A NOTE ON NOMENCLATURE AND SPELLING

THE nomenclature of areas, countries, towns, peoples, &c., is constantly 101
changing to meet the requirements of politics or the caprice of fashion. 103
The word 'Indonesia' seems to have been used for the first time in 1850 by J. R. Logan to describe the Malay Archipelago, and in recent years it has been appropriated by both the Indonesian nationalists and the Dutch to describe what, before the Second World War, had variously been known in English-language books and journals as the Dutch East Indies, Netherlands India, and the Netherlands Indies.[1] Siam in 1939 changed its name to Thailand; in 1945 it changed it again to Siam, and in May 1949 back to Thailand once more. Since in this work the period covered is mostly the time when Siam was officially correct as the name of the country, 'Siam' and 'Siamese' have been retained throughout. 'Malaya' was coined well over a century ago but has come into general use only in the present century. The name 'Straits Settlements' is obsolete; the 'Malayan Union' lasted for less than two years: 'Insulinde', once a popular literary name for present-day Indonesia, is almost forgotten.

National, racial, or regional feeling influences usage greatly. At one time the principal people of the Madras Presidency were known generally as 'Klings' (from the ancient kingdom of Kalinga), but objection by this people to the name because of its modern associations led to its replacement by 'Tamils'; later still the preferred name was 'South Indians'. 'Asiatic', for so long universal, is now disliked in Asia and 'Asian' is taking its place.

Southeast Asia is in many ways an unsatisfactory term. It is cumbersome, inaccurate, and indefinite in its scope. 'It is hardly (says the Secretary of the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names) a geographical name.' Yet the region is becoming more and more a political and economic entity and a name is badly needed to describe Burma, Siam, Indochina, Malaya,

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[1] Nederlandsch Indië was the Dutch official name. Amry Vandenbosch, *The Dutch East Indies* (1944) p. 1, says, 'About seventy-five years ago, a German ethnologist by the name of Bastian applied the term "Indonesia" (realm of the Indian Islands) to all the islands of the region, including the Philippine Islands, Formosa, British Malaya, and Madagascar, as well as the Dutch East Indies.' But J. R. Logan, in his article 'The Ethnology of Indonesia,' in the *Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia*, vol. iv (1850) p. 343, says: 'The Indian Archipelago must remain, but the shorter form Indonesia may be usefully employed on several occasions.' The *Oxford English Dictionary*'s first reference to 'Indonesian' is from *Nature* (1881). A. Bastian's use of the term is in the form, *Indonesien oder die Inseln des Malayschen Archipel* (Berlin, 1884), and he almost certainly got the term from Logan, or Logan's copiers. An article (in Chinese), 'Explanation of the Term "Indonesia" ', by Lin Hui-hsiang, *Journal of the South Seas Society*, vol. iv, pt. i (March 1947) p. 18, ascribes the original use of the word to Logan, and it was, indeed, this article which prompted me to the investigations here summarized.

101 British Borneo, Indonesia, and the Philippines collectively. Will the in-
103 ventors of names turn their minds to it? For my part, I offer for consideration the name INDOSINESIA.

Spelling is often more fluid even than place-names. It has varied astonishingly in European works in the last century. (Who, for example, would recognize Kabaw (the valley near the Chindwin river bordering on Manipur) as Kubo, or Mengoon as Ming'un?)

Wishing as far as possible to follow authority in nomenclature and spelling, I ascertained the general policy of the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names. This committee accepts the official forms of all foreign names which are written in the Roman alphabet, but with all the diacritical marks in use in the foreign alphabets. (This last usage I have not attempted to adopt.) Names officially written in other alphabets are transliterated according to established tables. Any names officially written in non-alphabetical script are transcribed by the committee according to established systems.

As regards transliteration and transcription there is, apparently, a large measure of Anglo-American agreement. During the last two hundred years a conventional Roman alphabet has developed until now, under the name of the R.G.S. II alphabet, it is used by the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names, the United States Board on Geographical Names, the Canadian Board on Geographical Names, and the corresponding New Zealand Board. During the war the British and American staffs agreed to use the modernized Hepburn system (Romaji) for Japanese, the modified Wade system (later Giles (H.A.) as modified by Lionel Giles), and the General System of the Siamese Royal Institute. The Permanent Committee issues a number of publications giving guidance in the matter. Generally speaking (the secretary of the committee states), we should be safe in accepting the official map of a foreign country provided that we know that it is accepted in most of the country's departments of government, and provided that the latest edition is available to us. This is the procedure I have endeavoured as far as possible to follow, but I have made some exceptions in deference to common usage.

So far so good, but there remain many problems still to be solved. There is, for example, no international, or even national, agreement on the spelling of 'Southeast Asia'. In this name Southeast is variously written South East, South-East, Southeast, South-east, and even southeast or south-east. The British Admiralty continues to use the hyphen and has issued sailing directions for 'South-East Alaska' and for the 'North-East Coast of Siberia'. SEAC, on the other hand, referred to itself as the 'South East Asia Command'. American usage favours Southeast Asia and this form, pending international agreement on the subject, I have decided to adopt throughout. I have also, following contemporary French diplomatic usage, adopted 'Indochina' (Indo-China should be reserved for the whole peninsula) and also (with less certain authority) 'Cochinchina' and 'Vietnam'. But in the last case I have omitted both the circumflex and the hyphen used by Viêt-Nam.

A special difficulty arising in the course of this work has been that many

of the authorities quoted or followed use obsolete forms of place or per- 101
sonal names (e.g. Sooloo for Sulu; Theebaw for Thibaw). I have usually 103
(but not invariably) retained the spelling of the original in quotations and
often, in order not to lose contemporary colour, in the ordinary text, but
where necessary the modern form has been inserted in brackets.

In the romanization of Chinese names (other than place-names in 104
China) I have allowed myself some latitude. For example, I have dispensed with the circumflex in Chêng Ho, though I have kept the sign over the 'u' in citing the *Tsŭ Erh Chih* of Sir Francis Wade. I have also used diacritical marks in certain Vietnamese proper names. The personal names of Chinese have been hyphenated as a general rule (e.g. Chiang Kai-shek); but if I have lapsed occasionally into Tan Kah Kee, &c., it is because I have seen it spelt thus for a whole generation. Moreover, many Chinese prefer to romanize their names in their own way. I have, in fact, followed diplomacy and convenience rather than consistency. In the case of romanization of Chinese dialect forms I have relied mainly on my own knowledge.

The names of Siamese persons offer a special difficulty. Luang Pradist and Pibul Songkram have half a dozen romanized forms as well as alternative names which conceal their identity from the ordinary European reader. (I have endeavoured to ascertain official Siamese usage, but there has been inconsistency in the replies.)

Throughout I have endeavoured to follow the rule of universal good 103
manners—to call a country or a person what they prefer to call themselves.
Because of ever-changing usage this is not always easy. Moreover, national, 104
racial, or regional sensitiveness is such that to defer to it one would often have to sacrifice accuracy. For example, it has been suggested to me that I should eliminate the word 'China' in such combinations as 'Kapitan China' for the reason that it is obnoxious to the Chinese, especially in Indonesia, where the Japanese during the occupation represented it by Sino-Japanese characters of derogatory meaning. But in this instance I could not sacrifice historical fact to contemporary resentment.

The long and the short of it is that after a manful attempt to be logical and consistent I have given up the struggle. Having made a ruling, I found myself reversing it half-way through, and sometimes being reconverted to my original position later on in the book! The result is that the survey is bristling with inconsistencies. In my disgust I feel very much as T. E. Lawrence did when in the preface to *Seven Pillars* he wrote, 'I spell my names anyhow, to show what rot the systems are'.

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Chinese

ABBREVIATIONS AND NOTES

113 *BEFEO* = *Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient*
JASB = *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*
JBRS = *Journal of the Burma Research Society*
JRAS = *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*
JRASSB = *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Straits Branch*
JRASMB = *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Malayan Branch*
JRASNCB = *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, North China Branch*
JRGS = *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*

The *Journal of the Indian Archipelago* is sometimes referred to as *Logan's Journal*.

128 CURRENCY

435 The Spanish dollar varied in value, according to the price of silver, between 3*s.* 6*d.* and 4*s.* 6*d.* 4*s.* can be taken as a mean.

436 The rupee = 1*s.* 6*d.* sterling. On 1 April 1947 the currency of Burma ceased to be linked to that of India.

In 1906 the Straits Settlements dollar was fixed at 2*s.* 4*d.* The Straits Settlements dollar was later replaced by the Malayan dollar with the same value, but the sign SS$ is still sometimes used for convenience. M$ is now usual.

At parity there are 11 Siamese bahts (ticals) to the pound sterling.

The official buying rate of the Indochinese piastre in 1949 was 12·55 to the United States dollar.

The official rate of exchange for the guilder (Indonesia) is 10·691 guilders = one pound sterling.

The peso (Philippines) = 50 United States cents.

804 WEIGHTS

128 One picul = 133⅓ lb.[1]
One catty (kati) = 1⅓ lb.
One tahil (tael) = 1⅓ oz.

MEASURES

1 hectare = 2·471 acres.
1 mow = ⅙ of an acre.
1 orlong = (about) ⅔ of an acre.

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[1] But the *Statesman's Year-Book* [illegible] which reference should be made for up-to-date information regarding currency, weights and measures, &c.) states that in the Netherlands East Indies 1 picul = 136·16 lb. avoirdupois.

INTRODUCTION

SOUTHEAST ASIA has known its 'empires' of Sri Vijaya and Majapahit, of wide but indefinite sway, and its great kingdoms of the Khmers and of the Thais; but long before the arrival of the Europeans the peninsula of Indo-China and the Malay archipelago had broken up again into isolated fragments. The Spanish, the Dutch, the British, and the French brought large areas under their control and gave them a political and administrative unity they had never known before. Now, under the pressure of new-born nationalisms, the grip of the Western powers is relaxing, and it seems certain that fragmentation will take place all over again. Yet what is happening is no mere repetition of an ancient sequence; nor is it a reversion to a previously existing state. 184 178

Evolution, said Herbert Spencer in his celebrated definition, is a change from a relatively indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a relatively definite coherent heterogeneity.[1] He was thinking primarily of biological organisms but he extended the idea by analogy to human society (an operation with many pitfalls). Yet in some striking way his definition does seem to illuminate what is in process in this Southeast Asia area. Side by side with integration goes differentiation; the scission of wholes into parts, and parts into smaller parts. The old states of East, Central, and West Java and of Sumatra—Jambi, Melayu, Minangkabau—and the Malay kingdom of Malacca were separate, isolated entities with only fitful contacts and associations, yet similarities of race, custom, and language gave

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[1] *First Principles*, 6th ed. (London, Williams & Norgate, 1900) pp. 351, 367. Spencer adds, 'accompanied by integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion', but Dr Joseph Needham in quoting this definition ('Integrative Levels; a Revaluation of the Idea of Progress', pp. 233 ff. of *Time: the Refreshing River*) (London, Allen & Unwin, 1937) says that it is important to note that much of Spencer's argumentation depended on assumptions about energy which antedated the modern statistical interpretation of the second law of thermodynamics. Commenting on the definition as a whole, Dr Needham says: 'We may smile at what we may suppose to be the presumption of such a cosmic formula, but we may find ourselves smiling on the wrong side of our faces if, as is not unlikely, Herbert Spencer has hold of the right end of the stick.'

It is perhaps a tactical error to appeal to Herbert Spencer in a period when his ideas are widely regarded as obsolete; but any theory which appears to make some sense of a situation where others fail to do so cannot be disregarded for any such consideration. Spencer derived his definition from the German biologist, von Baer.

184 178 them a certain homogeneity:[1] under the Dutch and the British, the Javanese, the Sundanese, the Amboynese, the Achinese, the Peninsular Malays, and some others have become aware of their identities and, while they share the common aim of independence, they have asserted their claims to separate nationhood.

Evidences of scission are patent over all the area, from the Karen and Arakan secession movements to the division between Annam and Cambodia: the higher integrative level to which the area is tending is not so immediately to be seen. Nevertheless, it exists, and is, in the view of the writer, essentially that of Western political, social, economic, and technological ideas. The whole of the Far East, indeed, is asserting its independence of the West in terms of the principles that the West has taught it—self-determination, human rights, democracy, female emancipation, constitutionalism, economic planning, and industrialization, and this is true even when the insurgents appeal to the inverted-Hegelian, Karl Marx, or to the Communism of Mao Tse-tung. It is so in spite of the efforts of these Far Eastern peoples to give such aspirations a local and national appearance. Just as in Rome the new *jus gentium* was eventually hailed as the natural law and Rousseau in France harked back to Man the Noble Savage, so have the Chinese played the same game from the time when Confucius and Mo Tzŭ under traditional appearances introduced ideas that were essentially new. In 1865 Prince Kung relied on historical argument to advocate the introduction of mathematics into the purely literary civil service examinations (mathematics, he said, were a Chinese invention), and in Java the Nationalists interpret each phase of their revolutionary campaign as the realization of the native pro-

[1] Sir Richard Winstedt, in a letter to the writer, classifies the similarities between the peoples of Malaysia as follows:

(*a*) Homogeneity of race modified by different admixture of negrito, Indonesian, and Mongol blood according to the time and place of migration and by geographical isolation in forests.

(*b*) One language family—modified by the same conditions and by acceptance of Hinduism and Islam on coasts.

(*c*) *One identical body of primitive beliefs* brought down from Central Asia where Babylonian influence had introduced cultural features like haruspicy (taking of omens from livers of animals), god-king, respect for the number 7, the incantation, the pyramid, &c.

(*d*) One material culture. (This also was affected by the influences of the Yuēs (bringers of bronze), of Chinese of the Chou period (especially in Borneo, *vide* Dyak testiles), Indians, Arabs, Portuguese, Dutch, and British.)

phecy of Chayabaya.[1] But the fact remains that, in spite of the traditionalist imprint on the revolution, what these peoples are aiming at, consciously or unconsciously, is not the recovery of a fabulous age but the achievement for their country and people of a new integration. The recently independent countries of India, Pakistan, Burma, and the Philippines aim at large-scale development of their resources in terms of Western techniques; they insist on industrialization (especially the establishment of heavy industries as a foundation of political power), and they talk of reconstruction and development and of raising the standard of living for the millions of their population. At every international conference, from Lake Success to Havana and Baguio to Lapstone, this is the burden of the refrain, be the discussion on trade, health, currency, or civil aviation. Nor is it purely on the material level that this revolution is planned; it demands at the same time reforms of political and social organization that will bring the Far Eastern nations into an equality with the West. The long-term question is whether it is possible to graft Western technology and institutions on to Far Eastern society without altering its essential nature.

China Proper and her neighbours—Tibet, Annam, Korea—all belong to the Far Eastern Civilization (Main Body) of which Dr Arnold Toynbee says, 'the moment of the breakdown may be equated with the break-up of the T'ang Empire in the last quarter of the ninth century of the Christian Era'.[2] As the 'universal state' of the civilization he gives the Mongol and Manchu empires, and he speaks of the history of the existence of the civilization after its breakdown as 'the survival of Far Eastern Society in its petrified state'. But at the same time he points out that, in general, the breakdown of the civilization is not necessarily followed by a disintegration that runs into dissolution. This would suggest that China is in a condition when her institutions have not the vitality or resilience to meet the challenge of external forces.

Commenting on this passage in the original draft, Mr Tom

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[1] Chayabaya is a legend-prophecy amalgamating legends of Siva, Adam, and Allah (*not* Mohammed) in Java into a single national legend of a Javanese millennium and a prophecy of a return to it. It assumed protean forms each of which is invoked as political expediency demands. So far as I am aware, the only exposition of Chayabaya is that of Dr C. C. Berg, of Leyden University, which in 1950 had not yet been published.

[2] A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1934–46) iv. 86–7. vi. 306. D. C. Somervell's abridgement of the work, 1947, p. 361.

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Harrisson (whose approach is primarily that of the anthropologist) remarks that it 'always seems dangerous to equate the culture of the ruling dynasty with the whole of a huge country', and adds that some areas of China have, perhaps, never had a culture at all in the sense intended by Professor Toynbee and they cannot be said to have decayed in the least, but rather to have advanced in historical times. The answer to that is that what is referred to here is a single, integrated culture codified in the ancient canonical writings, permeating the whole of the Chinese people who emigrate overseas (the aboriginal tribes of China do not come within our purview), and expressed down to this very day in the family institutions and moral system of the Chinese both in China and overseas. 'China' in the present text is, however, nearly always the Mangi of Marco Polo, namely South China, and only part of it at that, namely the province of Fukien and Kwangtung and parts of Kwangsi and Kiangsi, and not the Cathay, or North China, of the Venetian traveller. The culture, none the less, is that of China as a whole, and the languages (especially Cantonese) are nearer than those of the north to the ancient language of China.

The reader may feel a protest against the affirmation of the continued advance of the West rising in his mind when he recollects the recent strong, often violent, reaction against the West that is so apparent in Asia—the retreat from the English language as a medium of instruction in post-liberation India, or the cry of 'the West must go' in Burma. The answer is that these incidents are partly the normal 'die-hard' gestures of resistance to change, and partly the expressions of resentment of economic control or political pressure by Europeans as persons, politicians, administrators, or companies. For the revolution set in train by Western ideas is now directed, as we have said at the outset, against Western individuals and nations. The West itself is in a state of flux, shaping its industrial civilization to the standards set largely by America, but challenged by Russia, and the Far East flows willy-nilly with the contemporary current. It is indeed a case, in a special sense, of 'Westward the course of empire takes its way'.[1]

This triumph of the West, however, is affirmed here in no spirit of exultation but with deep anxiety. As there rise up before us the

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[1] 'Of all the civilizations, dead or living, of which we know our own is the only one which is possibly still not in decline.' A. J. Toynbee, *The Prospects of Western Civilization* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1949) p. 5.

symbols of our age—the Petrol Pump, the Pylon, the 'Dust Bowl', 184
the Automat, 'Mass Media', the chilling Neon Sign—there is a 178
shrinking of the soul and a poignant yearning for the glory that was Angkor and the grandeur that was Chang An. Yet it is in its effective organs—the Assembly Line, the Tennessee Valley Authority, 'E.R.P.', and the Research Stations—that our robotic civilization throbs; not in the cult of lost causes or impossible loyalties, nor in our academies, our museums, nor our half-empty cathedrals.

At least it is the material aspects of our civilization which appeal to the awakening consciousness of the peoples of the Far East. Whether they will adopt capitalist, socialist, or communist social organization as a means of securing the coveted gadgets of the West that mean a higher standard of living is another matter. Dr Joseph Needham, for example, says that there is no reason to think that the Chinese will not make as convinced socialists as anybody else, but that there are certain directions in which Chinese thinking might have a profound effect upon the nature of the society of the future, perhaps in the matter of juristic security of the individual, and in the forms which the numinous will take in that society. However, there is far less reason to believe that they will adopt democracy, and Communism, being dictatorial, they will probably find more natural and acceptable than democratic socialism.[1]

This survey is of the Chinese in the regions of Tropical Asia, 121
and often in the course of our narrative the question already posed 177
as to the power of this and other peoples to absorb Western ideas without changing their own essential nature will arise either tacitly or explicitly. In other words, can the basic institutions of these peoples meet the impact of Western industrial civilization or of Marxism without disintegrating?

Chinese civilization is based on ancestor worship, the family 000
system, on Confucianism (which incorporates these principles), and on Buddhism and Taoism. The staunchest supporters of these religions could scarcely deny that Buddhism and Taoism as moral forces are in complete decay in China and have been so for a very long time.[2] Whatever their surviving effectiveness they cannot by

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[1] J. Needham, 'Confucianism after 2000 Years', in the *Manchester Guardian*, 29 August 1949.

[2] To realize the formalism and religiosity into which Buddhism had declined by last century, one has only to observe the *chü-jen* (M.A.) of the late Ch'ing dynasty who, to prepare his character for office, suddenly takes an interest in practical benevolence. He ostentatiously burns incense and gives alms. If he sees

000 themselves form a pillar of the Chinese social system. This leaves only the family system as a core of resistance, for much of Confucianism, too, has fallen into formalism or, more often, into disuse.

178 While political structures of the wider integration (except, so far, Communism) have in post-revolutionary China shown no great effectiveness, the clan and the family have demonstrated a remarkable resistance to change. Yet even these institutions have undergone considerable modification, especially in south China under the influence of the emigrant communities to the Nanyang.[1] Moreover, the experience abroad of Chinese women has made them discontented with many features of the old marriage system. But the influence of example and sometimes of education, which is operating in Southeast Asia, is of small effect as compared with the impact of militant Communism on these institutions in the Communist areas of China—and before long the Communists may overrun the whole of that vast country.[2] All the evidence from Communist China goes to suggest that the age-old 'familism' of the country is not able in this crisis to withstand the force of Communist propaganda. Take, for instance, what an English university lecturer and his wife from Peking, who escaped from the Japanese in 1941 and spent over two years among the Communists, have to say:

> Most spectacular of all has been the success of the Women's Mass Association. Before 1937 the social status of women in country districts of North China, like the rest of the country, was controlled by patriarchal familism. . . . The liberation movement spread like a forest fire through the villages.[3]

Evidence on every hand confirms this experience: the case of hard-working, filial peasant girls carried off to be 'indoctrinated' at Communist schools and returning a year later with a militant sense

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a fish in the markets floundering on the hooks, he pays its price and restores it to its native element; he picks struggling ants out of a rivulet made by a recent shower, distributes moral tracts, or, better still, rescues chance bits of paper inscribed with the sacred written character (be it only a discarded bill) from being trodden in the mire of the streets. W. A. P. Martin, *Lore of Cathay* (London, 1901) p. 317. Analogies could, alas, be found in our Christian civilization.

[1] This word, which will recur often in this survey, means literally 'Southern Ocean', but is applied to the whole area of Southeast Asia and even to Australia and other territories to the southward where Chinese emigrants are located.

[2] Written in February 1949.

[3] Claire and William Band, *Dragon Fangs* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1948) p. 128.

of equality with their fathers and brothers and refusing to accept 178 a system they had never questioned a year before. On hearing these things we might even inquire whether the intense conservatism of China is not rather the *vis inertiae* of dead or moribund forms and not a force for the renewal and remoulding of living tissue.

Yet many Chinese and several leading European authorities 000 adhere to the belief that the present crisis may bring forth a Confucian revival. Sir John Pratt, for example, tells us that many of the best elements in the Kuomintang, together with the intellectual, industrial, and other leaders, may link with the Communists in finding a way for saving the country from destruction; 'they cling [he says] to the hope that the Confucian harmony, which is still the basis of Chinese thought, would soften the worst features of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, and that communism in becoming Chinese would become more human'.[1]

'Confucian harmony', perhaps, will have its softening influence, but can there by any large-scale revival of the teaching of the Sage as a positive movement? There have been attempts to bring this about, but none has succeeded. The Four Books (the Analects, the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, and Mencius), which contain the body of the Confucian doctrine and which were the substance of the traditional curriculum, are not taught in the modern educational system and have not been taught for many years. How then is this teaching to be transmitted? Certainly if the Communists can work on the women of China in the mass the whole face of Chinese society will be changed. In such circumstances a Confucian revival would be unthinkable.

Much of what has been said above may sound controversial, but it all turns on the meaning of words. Sir George Sansom in his new book, *The Western World and Japan*, says, 'In a limited sense the Japanese came under Western influence, but . . . what was finally adopted was, if Western in shape, thoroughly Japanese in colour and substance.' If we try to apply this to China in accordance with our own definitions, it is the shape and the colour which remain Chinese while the substance becomes more and more 'Western'. After all, modern capitalistic England has very little in common with feudal England, yet the shape and the colour of the two ages have strong similarities. What matters politically is

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[1] 'The Chinese Cauldron', *Everybody's Weekly* (29 January 1949).

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000 that the Chinese Communists consider the present revolution as an indigenous movement—*not* Russian-inspired—and at the same time they have no difficulty in regarding themselves as orthodox Marxists.

183 In the area covered by this study the main trend of European
177 colonial policy has been in the direction of encouraging the forces of native conservatism to resist innovation. European colonial
178 administrators frequently evince an affection for feudal institutions, a reverence for Mohammedanism, a respect for *adat* law and for princely succession and privilege in excess of that of the native aristocracies themselves. It happens sometimes that existing institutions which had been crystallized by European intervention are sustained only by foreign authority, and in extreme cases, if the sustentation ceased, would dissolve into nothingness as in Poe's *Case of Dr. Valdemar* when death had occurred but dissolution was temporarily suspended by a hypnotic trance.[1]

000 So much discussion of the general considerations governing the area of our inquiry has been necessary to give a background for our survey of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. But before proceeding to give an outline of our subject, there is one further observation we should make. This is that the survival of particular forms of organization is one thing; the survival of the race or community is another. It is likely that whatever happens the Chinese, both at home and overseas, will retain considerable social and cultural coherence, besides a strong sense of being 'Chinese'. It is his patience in adversity, his adaptability, his determination, his good humour, and his resilience that makes the individual Chinese, male or female, such an admirable biological specimen, and it is his social qualities (given proper treatment) that make him such a valuable unit in this Southeast Asian society. At the present time the Chinese of the Nanyang are in a dilemma, but this work should show that it is their superiority in resource, ability, and industry to the people among whom they live rather than their vicious propensities that makes them constitute a 'problem'.

The cartoon for our picture stands before us in bold charcoal

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[1] Poe's description was more vivid but perhaps a little too strong for the present context. British policy in British India favoured 'modernization (e.g. Dalhousie's policy), while in the Indian States it generally favoured 'traditionalism'.

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strokes. First the genesis of the Sinic culture in the angle of the Yellow River; then its extension to the north and south by debarbarization of the natives; the period of the feudal states; consolidation under the Ch'in and Han empires; the expansion and contraction of China's area with dynastic rises and declensions. There was an overland extension into Tongking well before the Christian era, but this was not a prologue to a reaching forth beyond mountains and seas; the ebb and flow, the *Sturm und Drang* of China's sequence of disorder, reintegration, consolidation, apogee, decline, and disorder again went on for many centuries to come within the limits of the Great Wall and the mountains of Yunnan. China's civilization was self-sufficing, each phase a complete episode, a kind of justification by rhythmic completion like the antithetical periods in her own literary language. Pressures developing within the empire might force internal migration; this migration might set border aborigines on the march; but their traditional manœuvring space was sufficient for the denizens of the Middle Kingdom.

Thus it was that the Chinese as a race were in the first millennium of our era unenterprising, unadventurous; they feared the black gulf of the barbarian outer world as the people of medieval Europe did the unknown oceans with their horrid monsters. Those few Buddhist pilgrims who ventured forth beyond the confines of the Middle Kingdom had, indeed, like Horace's first sailor, hearts 'bound with oak and triple brass'. They were the 'single spies' long before the era of the tribute-missions from abroad. Between the two phases there intervened a long period when it was the Indians, the Arabs, and the Persians who came to China, and Canton had its turbulent foreign quarters in the eighth century A.D.

The tribute-missions began as the gestures of the princes of the countries of the Nanyang sending envoys to the Chinese capital with gratulatory or ceremonial messages to the Chinese court. They were always received as humble emissaries conveying the submission of their masters to the Son of Heaven. They brought presents, of course, usually of native produce, and the emperor, out of the benevolence of his heart, bestowed presents upon them in return. It happened that these return presents were often more valuable than those brought from Java, Borneo, or Malacca, as the case might be; but even if they were only of equal value it was clear that here ready established was an embryonic foreign trade.

000 So in extending the practice, the kings of Pegu or Ayuthia need not be suspected of mere obsequiousness, although their motives in sending missions were diplomatic as well as commercial. Later (the dynastic histories record) the incursions of the Portuguese and other barbarians into Southeast Asia caused an interruption of the tribute, but before this dilatory vassals had occasionally been reminded of their manners by punitive expeditions from the Dragon Throne.[1]

After the establishment of the Ming dynasty, the emperor Yung Lo[2] and his successor dispatched to the West a series of great expeditions of up to sixty-two ships filled with as many as 37,000 soldiers. They got as far afield as Ormuz on the Persian Gulf, the east coast of Africa,[3] Calicut in India, the east coast of Java, and Ceylon. They went as armadas and returned as argosies. The most famous of the commanders was the Grand Eunuch, Cheng Ho. Either he or his associate Grand Eunuchs carried out seven voyages between 1405 and 1433, bringing the glory and, when necessary, the terror of the Imperial Ming name to all the potentates of the archipelago and far beyond.[4] A prince of Ceylon and a local chief in Sumatra who failed to submit to the Emperor's power were seized and carried off to China; a Chinese pirate with a lair in the archipelago who tried to combine humble submission to the Emperor with theft of the tribute consigned to his Imperial Majesty was run to earth and taken to Peking for a lingering execution.

167 Other, more orthodox, Chinese traders had in the interim been feeling out on their own *in partibus infidelium* in search of gain. They went down to the Nanyang with the northeast monsoon about February and returned with the southwest monsoon in April. From about the thirteenth century they began to form settlements in such places as Tumasik, or Old Singapore, Malacca, and Java. In the earlier days they lived where they chose, but in more modern times these overseas Chinese were relegated, it must

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[1] See J. J. L. Duyvendak, *Chinese Discovery of Africa* (London, Probsthain, 1949) (in the press) who says, 'Recognition by the Chinese Court gave "face" to these minor Kings. Also, it was the primitive form in which officially-sanctioned trade could be carried on. As early as the Han dynasty the Chinese sent ships overseas to collect precious objects.'

[2] In Giles's romanization Yung Lê.

[3] Duyvendak, op. cit.

[4] Cheng Ho did not personally take part in all the voyages—certainly not in the second (1407–9).

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be confessed, to what were often sorry ghettoes. Those who settled 167
intermarried with the native women and laid the beginnings of a new race whose culture remained Chinese. Individuals rose to positions of eminence in the native courts, and one Chinese, Peja Jummeraad, was chief justice in seventeenth-century Siam.

It was the arrival of the Europeans, however, which created the conditions favourable to Chinese settlement on a larger scale. The Spanish, the Dutch, and the British subdued large areas and established the security necessary for profitable trade and a bearable life. Nevertheless, friction between themselves and the ruling race in the Philippines and later in Java resulted in Chinese rebellions and the large-scale massacre of this people, showing that the security was only provisional; but they were soon back again in their old numbers as if nothing had happened. Broadly speaking, the Chinese became the middlemen, the intermediaries between the Europeans and the native peoples. Their popularity with the ruling race fluctuated according as they were valued for their services or feared for their political or economic power; the nature of their function was such as to bring them increasingly under native suspicion.

It is here that we should refer briefly to the case of the Chinese 487
in Burma which was apart from the main course of Chinese migration—apart, that is, before the maritime arrivals of the nineteenth century. The trade route by way of the Shan States had been open at least from the time of the Mongol dynasty. The staple import from China for centuries was silk, raw and manufactured, just as the staple import from Burma into China was cotton. The study of the commerce of this route is one of the most fascinating features of this survey, for the change in the nature of the commodities about the middle of last century is a striking index to the advance
of the industrial West. Before this time China was the factory of 000
Southeast Asia, and, indeed, of countries far remote. Chinese textiles, destined in great degree for Mexico, poured into the emporium of Manila: not only manufactured silk and cotton nankeens were loaded on to pack-mules and carrying-coolies for transport over the passes of Yunnan, but also iron *quallies*, or pots, and brassware. By the second half of the nineteenth century the flow of goods changes, and it is Manchester cottons, Bradford woollens, and Birmingham pots and pans which go to China, and the flow of nankeens and *quallies* the other way has practically ceased. It is

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000 like watching a stream change its watershed. But remember at the same time that it was a stream, not a river, for the overland route never gained the importance the British hoped and the principal routes of commerce continued to be by sea.

167 We return now to the main story of Chinese migration: the seasonal influx of a few Chinese traders and labourers cannot compare with the mass movement we are about to describe. It needed the nineteenth- and twentieth-century capitalistic imperialism to open up the colonial countries for the supply of raw materials to the Western industrial machine. Chinese labour has now found its fullest scope in the tin mines and the rubber plantations of South-east Asia; Chinese artisans were in demand for the urban handicrafts; Chinese merchants and shopkeepers flocked in to the centres to expand the retail trade. In some countries the number of Chinese was multiplied several times; in Siam they were said to have passed he two million mark by the 1930s; in Indonesia at this period a million and a quarter were distributed through Java, Sumatra, and the Outer Islands; in Malaya they reached their greatest numbers, nearly two and half millions, by 1941 and outnumbered the Malays for the first time. In bringing in Chinese for Malaya's mines and plantations and opening the doors to Chinese traders, the British had created for themselves a political problem of the first magnitude and one that will loom large in our pages to come. This was the era of the 'battalions' as distinguished from the small expeditions, and, long, long after the 'single spies'.

000 Meanwhile another evolutionary process was at work in the Far East. Peoples were becoming aware that they were separate culture-groups as well as being (as they thought) separate blood-groups—namely, that they were nations. For Japan, insular, centralized, with a compact social system, the transition from race-consciousness to nation-consciousness was not a difficult one: for China it was otherwise. Separated immemorially by mountain and river, by lake or marsh, the prefectures, the districts, and the villages were self-absorbed. At most a common dialect would give them a qualified sense of brotherhood: usually it was the family that was the largest social unit. At the same time they were aware, of course, that they were all members of the Blackhaired Race and not to be confused with the barbarian devils—but that was scarcely more of a bond of union than being human is to the modern world of *homo sapiens*. In 1840 British troops on their way to the 'Opium

War' with China were camped on the Esplanade at Singapore and not a murmur was heard from the Chinese of the town; seventeen years later Lord Elgin, on his way to Peking to dictate terms to China in the Second China War, was fêted by the Chinese merchants of Singapore; the British advance on Peking in 1860 would have been impossible without the help of Chinese carrying-coolies from Canton. Though the ferment of nationalism had begun to work in the minds of the mandarins of the Ch'ing dynasty, it was not they who were to lead the Chinese into the camp of nationhood.

In October 1911 came the Chinese Revolution.

Although Sun Yat-sen was elected provisional President of the Republic at Nanking in 1912, he had to stand aside for Yuan Shih-k'ai who later attempted to restore the empire in his own person. Sun Yat-sen was for years alternately in uneasy control of Canton and in exile. It was only after his death in 1925 that his Three Principles of the People became the bible of the Revolution. But already in 1909, under the Manchus, the principle of the *jus sanguinis* had been adopted as part of the organic law of China and this was incorporated into the First Principle of the People—Nationalism. The people of China were a single pure race, said Sun Yat-sen. In 1926–7 Chiang Kai-shek made his great drive northward, purging his party of its Communist elements in Shanghai and giving China an apparent unity. China became a San Min Chu I nation, with the Three Principles as the basis of constitution, law, and education.

It was in the Nanyang that the revolutionaries had found much of their early encouragement, both moral and financial. The overseas Chinese supported the Kuomintang and for their educational drive they adopted *Kuo Yü*, the National Language, as the medium of instruction. Everywhere in Indonesia, Malaya, Siam, Indochina, Burma, and the Philippines, Chinese of all ages, but especially the children attending Chinese schools, were reminded day in and day out that they were members of a 'single pure race' and were citizens of *Chung Hua Min Kuo*, the Middle Flowery People's Kingdom.

Though somewhat behind the Chinese, the peoples of Southeast Asia were not slow in discovering that they, too, were ripe for nationhood. It seemed only too clear that a race must consolidate itself as a nation or cease to exist. Japan had given the lead to

000 Asiatic nations, and as early as the time of the Russo-Japanese War the Annamites had planted lotuses in their fields in her honour. With the Annamites, the Siamese, and the Indonesians the movements were internal and did not at this stage threaten conflict with adjacent peoples of a similar mind. But with the Chinese it was different. They were living in the midst of native peoples, holding fast to economic power and at the same time creating a nationalistic *imperium in imperio.* Hitherto through the centuries there had been no special problem of the Chinese (even though their functions had aroused resentment) and within three generations Chinese settlers had been absorbed into the native community. Now it was otherwise. The increase in immigration, the improved means of transport between China and the Nanyang, the approach to equalization in the sex ratio (more Chinese women were accompanying their men) were key factors in the change. Intermarriage, so far a guarantee of absorption, was decreasing; in Malaya it had practically ceased for more than a generation so that the barrier between the races was complete. It was no wonder that there was now a Chinese problem.

Nor was the problem limited to a single clear-cut issue. Communism had come to China early in the twenties, and its adherents had formed the left wing of the Kuomintang. After the purge of that party by Chiang Kai-shek in 1927 they had split off into their own organizations. Southeast Asia had, besides its merchants and traders, a large proletarian community of Chinese for whom Communism had a promise and an appeal. Wages (though much higher than in China) were low; conditions were far from ideal; trade-union organization was rudimentary and machinery for bargaining barely existent. In Malaya, in particular, land-hungry Chinese squatters with no security of tenure were ready to support any movement which would guarantee them the possession of this land. A determined minority of fanatics, such as the real Communists were, had a great field to exploit.

668 Before the Second World War, Communism in Southeast Asia had been kept in effective check by the Governments; but during the Japanese occupation of the countries of Southeast Asia, Chinese Communists took part in resistance movements, notably in Malaya where they formed guerrilla units. As such, they became the temporary allies of the South East Asia Command, but directly after the Japanese surrender they demonstrated their intransigent

hostility to the Military Administration and, after it, to the civil 668
Governments of the Malayan Union and Singapore which succeeded it.

Before the war, the Kuomintang had found its chief support in the mercantile class of Chinese. During the Japanese occupation of the Nanyang this class, being urban and static, was an easy prey for Japanese exactions and for this reason its members, after the liberation, were denounced by the Communists as 'collaborators'. They, themselves, had either remained underground and unnoticed because of their lack of property or, in Malaya, in the case of about 3,000–4,000 only out of a total population of over two million, had become guerrillas in the jungle. The post-liberation result of the situation in this country was that many of the old leaders of the Chinese community were, at least temporarily, discredited and the Communists claimed credit for all resistance to the Japanese. After a while, however, the Kuomintang and the San Min Chu I Youth began to reassert themselves, but they had lost much of their pre-war vigour. The course of the civil war in China and the deterioration of the National Government's position had much to do with the change.

In Indonesia and Indochina, where the purely proletarian ele- 609
ment among the Chinese was much smaller, the developments after 186
the Japanese had surrendered placed the Chinese in an unenviable
position. In Indonesia the 'middleman' nature of so much of the 668
Chinese activity had made them unpopular with the natives, and during the periods after 1945 when the Dutch were in conflict with the Indonesian Republic neither side was able to afford them adequate protection from the aggression of local communities. Uncontrolled elements in the population (often soldiers) massacred the Chinese in considerable numbers. They were, in particular, accused of espionage for the Dutch. It seems, however, that it was the Dutch who afforded them the best protection and with whom, generally speaking, Chinese sympathies therefore lay. In Indochina, where there was also a considerable animus against the Chinese trader and money-lender (i.e. goods-lender), the community suffered greatly in the disorders and in the civil war which was still continuing in 1949. The French, to afford them protection, and to suit their own strategic dispositions, concentrated them in a few centres, notably in Saigon-Cholon where there was much overcrowding. At the same time many other Chinese

668 moved to Vietminh-controlled areas, and the Vietminh could 609 claim a considerable number of supporters among the younger Chinese.

186 The advances of militant nationalism in some others of the Southeast Asian countries had made the widespread fear of Chinese economic encroachment a ready source of political capital. In both Siam and the Philippines measures to diminish the Chinese share of the retail trade which had been initiated before the war were now intensified and an anti-Chinese plank was inevitable in the platform of every political party. Chinese Communists were said meanwhile to be actively assisting the Hukbalahaps, the agrarian insurgents in Luzon.

668 This was the dilemma in which the Chinese still found them- 669 selves in the fourth year after the Japanese defeat. But in one country, Malaya, their difficulties as a community became most acute when the Malayan Communist Party, consisting itself mostly of Chinese, decided in June 1948 to start an active terrorist campaign against the British. The constitutional experiment of the Malayan Union followed by that of the Federation of Malaya had left the Chinese generally in a state of political apathy (since the new constitution greatly favoured the Malays at their expense). When the terrorists, who were largely the old guerrillas of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army, struck, it was the Chinese themselves who provided most of the casualties on both sides. Many *Towkays* (Chinese business men) were intimidated into contributing to the Communists' funds or supplying them with goods and, being largely isolated, were not in a position to resist these demands. This in turn brought them into conflict with the British authorities. The Chinese squatter community, too, being on the fringe of the jungle was readily utilized by the terrorists and suffered accordingly when British troops and police took reprisals against their villages, burning down their houses and destroying their crops. Many squatters were banished to China. The great 000 danger the British ran was that harsh measures might antagonize large sections of the population, for the government of a great majority by a small minority must ultimately depend upon the consent of the governed. Large-scale measures of varying success were in progress against the terrorists in 1949 when the defeat of the Chinese Nationalist armies by those of the Communists in China and the collapse of the Kuomintang Government gave new

heart to the terrorists in their 'hide-outs' in the almost limitless 000 jungles of Malaya.

Such is the outline of the story we shall have to tell. What, then, is the philosophy of this Chinese migration?

If they had been called upon to deal with the Chinese of Southeast Asia, the great historians would have treated it according to their enlightenment and the age they lived in. Gibbon, for example, if he were restored from the grave, would assuredly regard the activities of all modern Chinese as a progressive falling away from the Chinese Age of the Antonines, the dynasty of T'ang. It is unlikely that he would show any undue sympathy for the colonists who were so little steeped in the national culture. Mommsen would find no Chinese Caesar overseas, and would assuredly disdain these simple annals. Macaulay, brought back to life, most probably would have dutifully accepted the task of writing the history of the Chinese in the Nanyang were it imposed upon him, and he would assuredly have devoted his opening chapters to describing the squalid sufferings of the pioneer coolie in his blue trousers, rope-soled shoes, and broad-brimmed hat, his naked body sweating under a tropical sun, and more chapters to an imposing picture of his magnificent mansion,[1] his fleet of shining motor-cars, and (maybe?) his bevy of concubines after he had got on in the world.

But we must pass from this diverting speculation to an inter- 121 pretation of our task stated in our own terms. It is to make actual 167 an important and striking phenomenon of recent times, the overflow of the Chinese in large numbers into Southeast Asia, to demonstrate the problems caused by this overflow, and, if possible, to help place the general historian, the politician, the administrator, the diplomat, and the merchant in a state of mind congenial to a better understanding of the Chinese overseas. This understanding may suggest an approach to the practical questions of the area in the next decade or so which will benefit both West and East.

If one fact has impressed the writer of this survey more than 000 another in the course of his study, it is the feebleness of the attempt made by the Colonial Powers and the indigenous Governments in this area to understand the overseas Chinese and their problems.

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[1] The lesser, but less awestruck, Lytton Strachey would probably make a sly reference to the electro-plated vacuum cleaner or thermos flasks, for ornament and not for use, in the drawing-room of the self-same mansion.

000 The Governments, at the best, have left Chinese affairs to small specialist departments. (This may have been excusable to some extent in countries where the Chinese were a small minority, but certainly not in Malaya where the Chinese were the majority community, and yet where 90 per cent., or more, of the officers of the civil service were, and are, without a knowledge of the language and customs of the Chinese.[1]) If in the future any headway is to be made in the understanding of the Chinese, this situation will have to be drastically remedied.

What the writer has said of the Chinese in Malaya is true of the history of their brothers and sisters in this larger area:

> When men are felling trees, draining, breaking the soil, living from hand to mouth, there is no room for the refined and subtle activities which lend themselves so readily to descriptive treatment, to 'flame-pictures', to antithesis, to irony, and satire—the sallies of the council chamber, the fireworks of controversy, the battle of ideas, the excitements of literature and art, which can only spring into being when a long developed economy has brought men leisure to think and to create. The nexus of cultivated influences and the play of personalities are well-nigh absent from the story of Malaya. The main subject matter here is not individuals and doctrines but masses and their behaviour, the movement and interplay of races, tribes, clans, labour forces, and other groups. The drama is the struggle with nature, with the jungle, with malaria, with tropical heat, it is in the rivalries and broils of secret societies, in the competition for life of men with men. . . .

If we except the deified type of the overseas pioneer, Toh Peh Kong, or the similarly deified Cheng Ho of the Ming dynasty, there are no heroes in the story of the Chinese in Southeast Asia and there is no hero-worship. Nor will the reader hear as he reads a muted symphony of passionate endeavour: what harmonic accompaniment there is is in 'The still, sad music of humanity'. Chinese civilization is not Faustian; its ideal is the harmony of society with nature, not the subduing of it. Confucianism, however, insists above everything that the race shall multiply, and this multiplying has compelled the main effort of the races to be the struggle for existence, and has created social disharmony. The question of the hour is whether capitalism or communism will appeal to the Chinese of China and Southeast Asia as the means to survival, and, if the latter is the choice, to what modifications will it be subjected by the genius of the race.[1] 000

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[1] The author understands that in 1950 seven out of every ten Cadets of the Malayan Civil Service were learning Chinese. A twelfth-hour reform!

What now follows is a summary of the distribution of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, an account of the earlier contacts, and of some aspects of the subject common to the area. The separate country studies will then ensue followed by a concluding chapter with a summary and a balance-sheet. 121

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[1] In a cable of 6 October to Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Chinese People's Government, thirty Chinese associations, schools, and newspapers in Batavia expressed satisfaction at the formation of the new Chinese central Government and promised it support. *The Times*, 7 October 1949.

PART I

THE AREA AS A WHOLE

CHAPTER I

THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

162 At the present time the number of persons regarding themselves as of Chinese race in Southeast Asia—Burma, Siam, Indochina, Malaya, British Borneo, Indonesia, and the Philippines—probably exceeds 8½ million in a total population of about 157 million. This means that the Chinese account for only 5 or 6 per cent. of the total, but, as will appear from the following pages, their importance, economically and politically, is out of all proportion to their numbers and is likely to be increasingly great.

The table on p. 2 represents the distribution of the Chinese in this area with what is thought to be a fair degree of probability.[1]

Having committed ourselves to this table, we should now try to justify it. There has been a great deal of loose statement regarding the number of Chinese in Southeast Asia, especially in Siam and the Philippines, which has been due to political motivation as well as to misapprehension. The validity of our arguments in attempting to arrive at something near the real figure will depend rather on a general knowledge of what has been happening in the area in the last few years and a feeling for the probabilities than on an application of demographic equations to statistics of varying value.

The first difficulty arises from the definition of 'Chinese'; the second from the up-to-dateness or otherwise of the censuses or enumerations.

The census officials in Burma, Malaya, British Borneo, Indonesia, and the Philippines have always apparently regarded 'Chinese' in an ethnographical sense, or rather, any person regarding him or herself as a Chinese, or who is so regarded by the head of the household or the enumerator completing the return, is so accounted for
641 in the census. In Siam and Indochina, however, persons born in
162 the country have been regarded as citizens of the country unless

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[1] But see discussion in Postscript.

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their births have been registered with the consulates of their country of origin (in Indochina there was no Chinese consulate before 1935 and in Siam before 1946). In Burma the census report for 1931 stated that for some years it had been the custom for the male offspring of unions between Chinese men and Burmese women to assume the race of the father and for the female offspring to assume the race of the mother, so that, if we are to regard all offspring of the second generation of mixed marriages as Chinese, a considerable compensation has here to be made to the existing figures.

Ethnic[1] Chinese in Southeast Asia

Census figures in ordinary type: estimates in italics

	Chinese				*Total population (all races)*	
	1921 or circa	*1931 or circa*	*1937 or circa*	*1947*		*1947*[2]
Burma . . .	149,000	194,000	..	*300,000*	16,824,000 (1941)	*17,000,000*
Siam . . .	260,000[3] (1919)	445,000[3] (1929)	524,000[3]	*2,500,000*	14,464,000 (1937)	*17,359,000*
Indochina . .	293,000[3]	418,000[3]	326,000[3] *467,000* (1940)	*850,000*	23,030,000 (1937)	*27,000,000*
Malaya . .	1,172,000	1,704,000	*2,379,000* (1941)	2,615,000[4]	5,849,000[5] (1947)	5,849,000
British Borneo[6] .	..	..	..	*220,000*	..	*878,000*
Indonesia . .	809,000 (1920)	1,233,000 (1930)	..	*1,900,000*	60,727,000 (1930)	*69,000,000*
Philippines . .	44,000 (1918)	*72,000* (1933)	117,487 (1939)	*120,000*[7]	*18,846,800*[8] (1946)	*19,511,000*
			Total: Ethnic Chinese (say	*8,505,000* *8,500,000*)	All races (say	*156,597,000* *160,000,000*)

[1] Except where marked 3 (see below).

[2] In this column all the totals by countries, except for Malaya where the 1947 census is followed, are those of the United Nations Statistical Office for mid-1947, cited at p. 13 of *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East 1948* (Lake Success, United Nations, 1949).

[3] 'Legal' Chinese (i.e. according to local law), i.e. Chinese citizens, or 'Immigrants from China'.

[4] Federation of Malaya 1,885,000; Colony of Singapore 730,000.

[5] Federation of Malaya 4,908,000; Colony of Singapore 941,000.

[6] 1921 census for North Borneo gave only 38,000; 1931 census gave North Borneo 48,000, Brunei 3,000, Labuan 2,000; an enumeration in 1939 gave 124,000 Chinese for Sarawak; 1947 census gave Sarawak 145,000. (Labuan was returned to North Borneo in 1946. 1941 estimate gave North Borneo Chinese 59,000.)

[7] An estimate of the Immigration Bureau (1948) gave 101,000 but 120,000 is here given to allow for illegal immigration, &c. (see text below).

[8] Estimate of Immigration Bureau.

Let us now consider the situation country by country.

In Malaya, at the census of 1947, 2,615,000 Chinese were counted. In this country 'Chinese' is more ethnographically exact than in any other country of Southeast Asia because since large-scale immigration from China began over half a century ago there has been no miscegenation of any importance. Before then it was comparatively small.[1] 162

Siam, which next to Malaya has probably the greatest number 162 of Chinese in the area, offers far greater difficulty. The Siamese 167 census of 1937 placed the *immigrant* Chinese at 524,000. It is common knowledge, however, that the number of persons in the country who in appearance, custom, language, and sentiment are of the Chinese race is far greater than this. Indeed, now that the 'Chinese question' looms large in Siam, it is often whispered (and sometimes in responsible circles) that the number of Chinese in the country is 'over four million'. This figure the writer believes to be a great exaggeration. For one thing, the 1937 figure for 'legal' Chinese was probably not far from the mark,[2] and even if we included all persons of the second and even third generation (at which stage assimilation to the Siamese was usually complete) we should probably not reach a figure for that time greater than two million.[3] Since the census of 1937 the immigration of Chinese into Siam has been strictly controlled and was in 1949 subject to a quota of 200 per annum. Even allowing for a considerable illegal entry and a natural increase of 1·5 per cent. per annum it is not thought likely that the present figure is more than two and a half million—in all probability it is appreciably less. A different test that we may apply is this. For reasons of prestige the Chinese National Government has tended to state the number of its nationals abroad (and China, as we know, follows the *jus sanguinis* and not the *jus soli*) at the highest possible figure, but the official *China Handbook*, 1937–43, compiled by the Chinese Ministry of Information in Chungking, gives the figure as two and a half million for 1943, though the *Chinese Year Book*, 1943, compiled by the Council of International Affairs, Chungking, states it as three million.[4]

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[1] The main reason is the Mohammedan religion with the alternatives of 'pork or no pork', 'dogs or no dogs'. Mr del Tufo doubts whether the number of Chinese Malay 'crosses' exceeds one or two in a thousand of the whole population.

[2] The Siamese census of 1947 gave Chinese in Bangkok, 284,519, Chinese in the provinces, 508,172, total, 792,691. These were Chinese holding aliens' registration certificates.

[3] This is the figure given by Mr Leonard Unger in his article 'The Chinese in Southeast Asia', *The Geographical Review*, vol. xxxiv, no. 2 (1944) p. 199.

[4] Mr Unger (ibid.) reasonably says of the Chinese in Siam: 'If to the immigrants are added a second generation and those individuals in a third generation who still speak the language and keep up the customs of, and main-

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In the Philippines Filipino nationalism has for many years tended to magnify the number of Chinese in the islands since this was a matter of political capital, and before the Americans came certain Spanish interests had reasons of their own for stating the number as high as possible. But the numbers undoubtedly decreased during the war with Japan and since the liberation the Philippines Government has refused to allow the return of Chinese displaced persons except as part of a small annual quota.[1] Early in 1948 the Philippine Immigration Bureau gave the total number of Chinese in the islands as 101,000, but although to this figure a certain percentage should be added for illegal immigration (which is much easier to accomplish than in Siam, the Philippines being so near to China) it is thought that by adopting a figure of 120,000 a sufficient allowance has been made both for this and for any error in enumeration.

In Indochina where 'immigrants from China' are the only ones included in the census returns as Chinese, there have nevertheless been partial attempts in 1921 and 1931 to count the number of second generation *métis*, or offspring of Chinese fathers and Annamite or Cambodian mothers, and, making the necessary compensations and adjustments, we get a figure for 1937 of 326,000 'legal' Chinese plus 141,000 *métis* and a total of 467,000. This figure incidentally is about 40,000 in excess of that given by the *China Handbook*, 1937–43. (The official French figure for 1931 had been 418,000 'legal' Chinese, but the numbers had dropped considerably by 1937.) The official estimate by the Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer was 850,000 Chinese in Indochina in 1947.

Other difficulties turn on the variation in the years of the available censuses. Malaya and Sarawak are the only two countries in the area which have taken censuses since the Japanese surrender.[2]

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tain a loyalty to, their ancestral homeland, the total rises to about one million. This approaches two million if there are also included those who might be called "ethnic" Chinese—offspring of mixed Chinese and their parentage who show in their physical appearance and cultural characteristics an affinity with Chinese.'

Ta Chen, *Emigrant Communities in South China* (London, Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 264, quotes Lin Yu, 'Twin Loyalties in Siam', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. ix, no. 2 (June 1936) p. 191, as giving 2,500,000 as the number of ethnic Chinese in Siam and adds 'or about one-fourth of the population of Siam'—which involves a considerable under-estimate of Siam's population at the time of writing (1935).

[1] See Appendix III.

[2] A census was taken in Siam in 1947, but the only details of Chinese published so far are those on p. 3, n. 2.

For the other countries we have only censuses and enumerations of 162 differing stages of remoteness. The problem is how to bring the figures up to date by estimation.

We may take it that in the undoubtedly favourable conditions afforded by Southeast Asian countries generally, a 'natural' Chinese population would increase by 1·5 to 2 per cent. per annum (and, remember, at compound interest). But one has to be careful because these immigrant populations are often not natural, i.e. they may have a lop-sided sex ratio and the age structure might be grossly distorted. Thus, to take an extreme example, you might have 800 men, 100 girls under 10, 50 women between 15 and 45, and the others women over 50—giving a crude birth-rate about 10 per mille—and natural increase nil! The Chinese in Malaya have increased by 1·8 per cent. per annum since 1931, and with a 1 : 1 sex ratio and settled conditions that figure might pass 2 per cent. But elsewhere sex ratio must be considered. All in all, it seems pretty safe to assume a 1·5 increase. But since the definition of 'Chinese' rules out any close estimation of their numbers, this rough-and-ready formula we have arrived at should be applied only where no estimate based on other considerations is acceptable. This is the case only with Indochina, British Borneo, and Indonesia and here it has, subject to known factors, been utilized.[1]

Mr Unger's map (reproduced as a separate folder)[2] will assist us to gain an idea of 'ethnic' Chinese in the region. It must be kept in mind (a warning repeated in Part VII, The Chinese in Indonesia) that it represents only the chief areas of concentration and has no reference to the comparative numbers of the Chinese and native population—the former being only 5 per cent. of the latter.

In Southeast Asia the Chinese are scattered through the countries 361
in which they live, in large towns, villages, peasant farms, planta- 162
tions, and mining communities. Sometimes the Chinese have come to an area already well populated and developed; sometimes they have opened up an almost uninhabited region. Java, perhaps the most densely populated area in the world, has at least three-quarters of a million Chinese, if not considerably more; the coastlands of Western Borneo, almost uninhabited before Chinese

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[1] I am indebted for these views to conversations with Mr M. V. del Tufo, Superintendent of the 1947 Census for Malaya.

[2] By permission of Mr Leonard Unger and of the American Geographical Society.

361 162 immigration, are also the site of a large Chinese immigrant community. Burma and Siam exhibit similar contrasts within themselves: between the densely settled delta of the Irrawaddy and the almost uninhabited Northern Shan States (where the Bawdwin mines are located), the two focuses of Chinese settlement in Burma; in Siam, between the thickly populated Menam delta and the Isthmus of Kra, almost empty until the advent of the Chinese.[1] In central Siam the Chinese live closely associated with the Siamese people by whom, until recent decades, they were completely absorbed within a few generations. In Siam about half the Chinese live in the lower delta of the Menam, in the neighbourhood of Bangkok; the remainder of the race are scattered through the country, living in villages and towns rather than rural communities and tending to concentrate in the more commercialized districts. A notable concentration of Chinese, consisting of the more recent immigrants, is to the southwest of Siam, where they work in the mines, on the rubber plantations, and as merchants in the villages.

162 442 443 Apart from the concentration in the Kra Isthmus region, the chief occupations of the Chinese in Siam are the various forms of retail and wholesale trade. The Chinese, in fact, control most of the retail trade in the country. In particular they have the lion's share in the rice distribution and milling, and there is scarcely a commodity from pepper to sugar in which they are not interested as middlemen. They also make up a large part of the class of skilled craftsmen.

167 Most of the Chinese in Siam originally came from Hainan, Mei Hsien, and Chao Chou (including the city of Swatow) in east Kwangtung. The last-named group is apparently in the majority, especially those from Chin Hai, Yao P'ing, Chi Yang, and Chao An.

162 In Malaya the Chinese have a special significance in that they are here the majority community and have been so since before 1941. In that year there were for the whole of Malaya 2,379,000 Chinese as compared with 2,279,000 Malays, though, excluding Singapore, which is virtually a Chinese city, the Malays still outnumbered them. By 1947 they had still further strengthened their position so that they accounted for 2,615,000 of the population, whereas the Malays were now 2,544,000. This outnumbering of the native population (though the Malays themselves have multiplied their numbers several-fold within the last few decades by natural

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[1] Unger, op. cit.

increase and by the reinforcement of Indonesians, mostly Javanese) 162 has given rise to one of the most perplexing political problems in the Far East.

Malaya's Chinese are largely urban and are occupied in trade, [361] but they also supply the bulk of the labour in the tin mines of which they own about a third. There is a large Chinese labour force on the rubber estates where, however, before the war with Japan, they were outnumbered by the Indians. In addition to these occupations, the Malayan Chinese are actively engaged in every branch of the trades and crafts, from agriculture (squatters) and pig keeping and poultry rearing (which they almost monopolize) to the building and skilled artisan trades, tailoring, dressmaking, and cobbling, and managing or working in oil mills, soap factories, shipping firms, sawmills, and many other undertakings. The pineapple industry is entirely a Chinese enterprise.

Most numerous of the Chinese tribes in Malaya are the Hokkiens, after them come the Cantonese, followed by the Hakkas (Khehs), Tiuchius, and Hailams (Hainanese), and in much smaller numbers by the Kwongsai, Hokchius, Hokchias, and others. The Hokkiens, being the pioneer community in Malaya and the principal merchants, are more numerous in the Settlements of Singapore, Penang, and Malacca, and the Cantonese more numerous in the remainder of the country.

A census was taken in 1947 for the first time since 1931 and tables and abstracts from this census, together with some observations of the Superintendent, Mr del Tufo, are included in Chapter XXV of this survey. The facts revealed are of key importance and those regarding the sex ratio are highly significant.

In Java the Chinese live throughout the island, usually in cities [361] and towns rather than in the rural areas, and they are the middle-class merchants who control much of the wholesale and retail trade. Commerce and transport occupied 61 per cent. of the Chinese in Java in 1930: sugar processing, food industries, and timber were next among their occupations. In Batavia the Chinese formed 15 per cent. of the total population.

The people of south Fukien were among the earliest immigrants 167 to Indonesia, especially Java. Some of the families have been there 162 for almost two centuries (the founder of the Tsai (Tsoa) house landed in Java five generations ago, in 1753).[1] The Hakkas and the

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[1] Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 266.

167 people from Chao Chou (including the city of Swatow), the Teochius, and from southern Kwangtung, followed the Hokkiens. 162 The Hakkas began to settle in West Borneo between 1740 and 1745, and were followed thither by Teochius. At first they were employed in gold-mining or were agriculturists, engaged in cultivation of rubber, pepper, and tobacco; but towards the end of the nineteenth century, when both plantations and mines grew up under European management, the Teochius and many Hakkas moved on to colonize Bangka, Billiton, and east Sumatra.

162 The Chinese of Indonesia, especially those of Java, have a much more noticeable admixture of native blood than have the Chinese of the other Southeast Asian countries.[1]

167 Chinese immigration into Indochina was directed principally towards Cochinchina and Cambodia and comparatively little towards 162 Annam and Tongking which were already thickly populated, or towards Laos which was hard of access and little developed. In Cochinchina and Cambodia, however, the Chinese pervade every phase of economic life. The largest concentration of them is in the city-continuum of Saigon-Cholon. In these countries they have a virtual monopoly of the rice trade, just as they have in Siam (though attempts have been made to limit their share of the trade in both countries, especially in Siam). They are also engaged in pepper planting and vegetable gardening, but have taken practically no part in the newer estate agriculture of rubber, cotton, tea, and palm oil—indeed as aliens they were barred from the lands most suitable for this purpose.

As in other countries of the area, the trade depression of 1929–32 had a greatly restricting effect on immigration to Indochina, but in the few years before the Allied war with Japan this was recovering.

It has been convenient to summarize the distribution and occupation of the overseas Chinese country by country, but it should be remarked that this distribution is always dictated by economic considerations, as, for example, the belt of mining activity which extends from Burma round about Moulmein to the southward along the west coast of the Malay Peninsula through Siam and Malaya and then crops up again in the Dutch islands of Bangka and

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[1] When attending a meeting of the Chung Hua Hui at Leyden in 1946, at which a hundred or so Indonesian Chinese resident in the Netherlands were present, the writer was struck with the dark complexion so common among them which was in marked contrast with the lighter complexion of the Chinese of most of Malaya, except parts of Penang and Malacca.

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Billiton, among the bauxite deposits of the Rhio Archipelago off Singapore, and finally among the oil wells of Palembang in Sumatra. 167 162

The Chinese of the Philippines form a group somewhat isolated from the main body, so to speak. They have traded with and emigrated to these islands for some centuries and they persevered in their intercourse in spite of the intermittent severity and grudging tolerance of the Spanish. When, however, in 1898 the Americans assumed control of the islands, they extended to them the exclusion laws against Chinese immigration which were already in force in the United States. When the Filipinos took over the administration of their own country the term 'exclusion' (which had been subject at least to some liberal exceptions under the Americans) was more and more literally interpreted. But although 609 167 162


PRINCIPAL PLACES OF ORIGIN IN CHINA OF THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
HUNAN
KIANGSI
CHINA
FUKIEN
Foochow
Kweilin
Chüanchow
Amoy
Changchow
KWANGSI
KWANGTUNG
Chaochow
Swatow
Canton
Hong Kong
TAIWAN (FORMOSA)
INDO-CHINA
HAINAN
TRIBES
HOKKIEN
CANTONESE (KWONGFU)
HAKKA (KHEH)
TEOCHIU (HOKLO)
HAINANESE (HAILAM)
KWONGSAI (KWANGSI)
HOKCHIU
HOKCHIA
HENGHUA
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The Hakkas often inhabit the same areas as the Cantonese, Hokkien, and other tribes.

The following authorities, among others, have been followed: (1) Linguistic Map of China, *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cii, no. 2 (August 1943) p. 5; (2) Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 23; (3) W. J. Cator, *The Economic Position of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1936) p. 28 (map).

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Chinese

609 their numbers are at present not very great in comparison with the
167 Filipinos, the economic position of the Chinese in the Philippines
based, as ever, on their control of trade (they owned, before 1941
162 at least, three-quarters of the rice-mills), has been maintained in
the face of determined attempts by Filipino Nationalists to oust
them from it.

121 So much will serve as a general introductory survey of the distribution of the Chinese in Southeast Asia: in the first chapter of each country study contained in the successive parts of this survey, the subject will be dealt with in much greater detail.

167 The sketch-map of the principal places of origin in China of
the Chinese in Southeast Asia, reproduced on p. 9, has been de-
162 signed by the author and executed by Geographia Ltd., and is subject to the following considerations. The shading indicates roughly the distribution in China of the several tribes represented overseas, but in the case of the Hakkas, of whom small communities are to be found throughout Kwangtung intermingled with the Cantonese,[1] only the areas most densely populated by them are shown in the map. Nor must it be assumed that the overseas Chinese come equally from all over the shaded areas. The fact (as Dr Ta Chen has pointed out) is that the communities from which the emigrants are drawn exist side by side with non-emigrant communities, and enjoy a higher standard of living than the latter.

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[1] See L. Richard, *Comprehensive Geography of the Chinese Empire and Dependencies* (Shanghai, Tu-se-wei Press, 1908) p. 207.

CHAPTER II

EARLY CHINESE CONTACTS WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA[1]

CHINA's intercourse overland with the countries on her 177 southern border is of a much greater order of antiquity than 175 her contacts by sea. Her soldiers were in Tongking and Annam in the third century B.C.; thereafter they penetrated to Cambodia, then to Siam, the last-named being reached by sea. Here there was a halt for a considerable time before her navigators went on to Malaya, Sumatra, and Java. The process took many centuries, and for long intervals there is a complete lack of information regarding the Southeast Asian countries.[2] Merchants

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[1] Much of our information regarding the earlier history of Southeast Asia is derived from Chinese sources, but we should in this chapter be on our guard against identifying Chinese *knowledge* of the region with Chinese *contacts* with it. No doubt, of course, some of the information was obtained from Chinese who had actually visited the countries of the region, but much also was at second-hand and, at that, recorded often a considerable period after the time to which it relates.

In recent years a great deal has been added to our knowledge by the researches of orientalists and archaeologists, but these additions have often been independent and disassociated from one another, and the problem of the identification of geographical names has meant that places—often whole countries—have moved their location all over the map as learned discussion has displaced or refixed them. There has for long been a crying need to systematize the existing knowledge of Southeast Asia and to give more certainty and coherence to the early history, and this is what Sir Roland Braddell has been attempting to do since 1935 in his series of studies on 'Ancient Times in the Malay Peninsula' in the *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*. ('An Introduction to the Study of Ancient Times in the Malay Peninsula and the Straits of Malacca, continued as Notes on Ancient Times in Malaya'; *JRASMB*, vol. xiii, pt. 2, vol. xiv, pt. 3, vol. xv, pt. 3, vol. xvii, pt. 1, vol. xix, pt. 1.) Our concern is not directly with the subject of these inquiries, but we shall keep these studies closely in mind when outlining Chinese contacts with the southeastern areas of the Asiatic continent. What we shall have to say will often be in repetition or in summary of the remarks made in the separate country studies, but this is with the intention of giving the reader at the outset a glance over the entire area.

[2] This seems to be true as a generalization, though the *Han Shu*, vol. xxviii, speaks of voyages in the Han dynasty to Jihnan and Hsüwenhopu taking five months, to Touyüankuo taking four months, and to Ilumeikuo taking about twenty days. See Feng Ch'eng-chün, *Nan Yang Chiao T'ung Shih* (History of Chinese Relations with the Nanyang) p. 1 (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1937). (The place-names are here given in mandarin, but the foreign investigator who endeavours to identify ancient Chinese place-names in Southeast Asia would be well advised first to give the characters their phonetic equivalents in ancient

177 from the West passed across Central Asia into China in the Han and later dynasties by routes that skirted the northern and southern
175 slopes of the Tarim river basin, but they also came into the empire by way of the south, up the rivers of what is now Burma and across the hills into the present Yunnan, and by the longer sea route to the south coast. As early as the second century B.C. there appear to have been Chinese trade routes through Yunnan to the Irrawaddy and Salween valleys. For a time the main port in the south was in the future Tongking, and it was not until later centuries that it was supplanted by Canton. It was to Loyang that in A.D. 166 came an embassy of Westerners claiming to be sent by their King, who is supposed to have been the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (An-tun).[1]

Our earliest and surest information is of the Chinese intercourse with the countries sharing a land frontier with China on the south-west, and first of all in point of time comes Annam.

During the Han dynasty there existed a kingdom known as Nan-Yüeh (Nam-Viet) which extended from the region of Canton far into the Indo-Chinese peninsula to the present central Annam.[2] In 111 B.C. this kingdom was conquered by the Chinese and was divided into nine districts, one of which, Chiuchen (Annamese Cu'uchan), corresponds roughly to the present province of Thanh-hoa in northern Annam.[3] It is likely that Chinese suzerainty ex-

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Chinese according to Karlgren's *Analytical Dictionary of Sino-Japanese* (Paris, 1923).

[1] See Kenneth Scott Latourette, *The Chinese: their History and Culture*, 3rd ed. (New York, Macmillan, 1946) p. 123.

Among the recent finds at Go Oc Eo was a gold medal bearing an image of Antoninus Pius with a date which corresponds to A.D. 152, showing that at an early date Funan (the ancient State in southern Annam) had connexions, direct or indirect, with the western Mediterranean. See G. Coedès, *Les états hindouisés d'Indochine et d'Indonésie* (Paris, E. de Boccard, 1948) pp. 38–9, 89.

[2] The recently published work of Professor Olov R. T. Janse, *Archaeological Research in Indo-China* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1947), greatly extends our existing knowledge of the Chinese remains in the region. Professor Janse's historical summary is here followed.

[3] Édouard Chavannes, trans., *Les Mémoires Historiques de Se-Ma T'sien* (Paris, Laroux, 1895–1905) i. 87 and ii. 168, cited by Janse, op. cit. p. xvi. And Léonard Aurousseau, 'La Première Conquête des Pays Annamites', *BEFEO*, vol. xxii, pp. 137–264, and vol. xiv, pp. 9, 13. Cited by Janse at same place.

Wang Wen-yuan (op. cit. p. 4), citing Wang Ton-lin, *Histoire du Peuple Chinois* (in Chinese), and H. Maspero, 'Étude d'Histoire d'Annam, III, Commanderie de Siang', *BEFEO*, vol. iii (Hanoi, 1918) pp. 11–28, gives a somewhat different account of this early period. He says that in the year 214 B.C. the first Emperor of the Chin dynasty, Shih Huangti, sent 500,000 Chinese—soldiers, tended even farther south, though in an indefinite way. However, to date there has been no archaeological evidence of any Chinese settlement of the Han dynasty farther south than a spot immediately below Thanhhoa in the provinces of Nghean and Hatinh.

After the native chief of Chiuchen had yielded to the Chinese without putting up any resistance, he was retained in his position with the title of T'aishou.[1]

The new masters of the southern territory, the 'Sons of Han' as they called themselves, ruled at first with moderation, allowing to the natives a considerable degree of freedom, but about the beginning of the Christian era they adopted a sterner attitude. At least this was so in the case of Tongking where, according to Chinese records, the Emperor Hsi Kuang (A.D. 1–25)[2] 'transformed the people through the rites and by justice', and it is most probable that the Chinese attitude towards the natives of Chiuchen was the same. It was this heavier hand of alien government, aiming at securing the rapid sinicization of the subdued barbarians, which no doubt aroused the spirit of resistance, for in A.D. 40 Cheng-Tse (Tr'ung-Trac in Annamese), the daughter of a native chief of Tongking from Mileng (Annamese, Milinh), stirred up a rebellion which succeeded temporarily in driving out the Chinese, and the native chiefs of Chiuchen joined in the struggle.

In the present state of knowledge it is impossible to establish with precision the dates of the earlier Chinese settlements in Chiuchen, but Professor Janse thinks it very likely that some pioneers ventured to immigrate thither in the third century B.C., and this is the time when the Chinese began to infiltrate into northern Indochina, especially Tongking. In any case there must have been a considerable intercourse between southern China and Thanhhoa at the end of the third or at least at the beginning of the second century B.C. To a certain extent this supposition can be corroborated by archaeology (e.g. from examples in the 'Huai Valley' style).

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peasants, and those condemned to banishment, to take possession of Nam-Viet 'the land beyond the southern border'. After the conquest the country was divided into three commands, that of Nanhai, corresponding probably to the present province of Kwangtung, that of Kweilin in the present-day Kwangsi, and that of Shiang in Tongking and north Annam. These (says Wang Wen-yuan) marked the foundation of the first important Chinese colony in Indochina.

[1] H. Maspero, *BEFEO*, vol. xxxvii, pp. 263, 264, note 5, cited by Janse, loc. cit.

[2] H. A. Giles lists seven Emperors from A.D. 1 to 25, but not this one.

177 Professor Janse makes the following interesting observations on
175 the period:[1]

> It can be assumed that the first Chinese who ventured into the country and mingled with the natives were journeying merchants or artisans. Even to-day Chinese peddlers are highly regarded among the natives because of their skill in commerce and craftsmanship. As they are generally fairly well-to-do, they are much sought after by the families of the aboriginal chieftains. Thus many of these modern settlers bring with them into Tongking and Northern Annam Chinese crafts and customs. What is happening to-day in this respect has certainly been going on not merely for centuries but for millenia. . . . In the wake of these tradesmen certainly came the civil and military mandarins, accompanied by the less welcome tax-collector, and by political refugees.

At this early time (Henri Maspero points out) the entire territory was covered with marshes and forests in which elephants, rhinoceroses, and tigers abounded and in which the aboriginals lived by hunting and fishing, eating pythons and wild beasts killed by their bone-tipped arrows. To this diet they added small crops from their primitive rice-fields which they prepared by burning down a part of the forest before the rainy season, without cultivating or irrigating the area. Only around the centres of administration, under the influence of the Chinese governors, especially the prefect Jen Yen, had they begun to till the soil in the manner of the Chinese.[2]

Such was the land which the Chinese called the 'Kingdom of the Naked'. It was not until after the victorious campaign of Ma Yuan at the beginning of the Christian era that the Chinese settled on any large scale. Archaeological evidence of this is to be found on the brick tombs of the later Han discovered in Thanhhoa. Among the most fascinating funerary objects unearthed by Dr. Janse are models of farm-houses or, in some cases, probably manor-houses, consisting of quadrangular yards surrounded by walls and a variety of buildings. Some are even provided with furniture, such as ovens, troughs, &c. They give an excellent picture of early Chinese settlements in Annam.

It will be convenient here to discontinue the outline of Sino-Annamese contacts and to resume it in the part of this survey dealing with Indochina, turning our attention to the question of the antiquity of Chinese intercourse with Malaysia far away to the south. According to the consensus of opinion, the date of the first Chinese association with these regions goes back to the third and even fourth centuries B.C. Dr Heine-Geldern in 1934 pointed out the stylistic similarities between some of the prehistoric stone sculptures of the Pasemah region in southern Sumatra and those standing at the tomb of the Chinese general Huo K'iu-ping in Shensi province in China, erected in 117 B.C. This, he says, seemed to indicate more or less intimate contacts with China, to be dated probably in the second and first centuries B.C. A decade later the same authority again referred to his own statement and pointed out that since then Chinese objects of the Han dynasty had actually been found in Indonesia. Moreover, a considerable number of Chinese sepulchral pottery vessels of the Han period had been excavated in Sumatra, Java, and Borneo, and one of them, from Sumatra, bore an inscription dating it 45 B.C.[1] From these finds, De Flines inferred, no doubt correctly, that Chinese colonists or merchants must have lived in Indonesia as early as the Han period. Also from Sumatra comes a bowl engraved with designs of persons in Chinese dresses and of horses in Han style, and other pieces of evidence included a Chinese bronze dagger-axe (*ko*) which was said to have come from Sumatra, and another from Java.

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[1] op. cit. p. xvi.

[2] H. Maspero, op. cit. p. 12, cited by Janse, op. cit. p. xvi.

> Taking all into account [Dr Heine-Geldern writes] one may come to the conclusion that direct Chinese influence in Indonesia goes back at least to the early Han period, that is at the very latest to the 1st century B.C. However, the ornamental designs of the Dyak tribes of Borneo and of the Ngada of Flores are so clearly related to Chinese designs of the late Chou period that one can hardly avoid the inference that Chinese contacts started as early as the beginning of the third century B.C., and probably earlier.

The investigation of this very early period of intercourse is almost exclusively a monopoly of the archaeologist and of the anthropologist, and what conclusions are to be drawn from the finds must remain a matter of some delicacy to the non-expert in these fields. Nevertheless it is important to note the difference of opinion between some of the schools of thought concerning the degree of Chinese influence on the regions of Southeast Asia. Speaking of

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[1] R. Heine-Geldern, *Prehistoric Research in the Netherlands Indies* (New York, Southeast Asia Institute, 1945) p. 147. See also the same author, *The Archaeology and Art of Sumatra.*

177 195 the intercourse of a much later period, the second Sung dynasty onwards, Fay Cooper Cole remarks:

> These early contacts were primarily for trade and, while they did help to shape the history of Malaysia, they seldom were intimate enough to introduce Chinese methods, such as the potter's wheel; few Chinese words entered the language; and the influence of their political and religious ideas was nil.[1]

To this we may object that Chinese methods of agriculture, at least, through these same contacts had a profound effect on the economy of the Southeast Asian countries. None the less, Hindu influence upon Southeast Asia has been culturally much more important than Chinese, and in the sphere of navigation in the first centuries of the Christian era it was the Arabs, the Indians, and the Persians who made their way to China and the Chinese who, generally speaking, stayed at home. There was a colony of Arabs in Sumatra at a very early date, and they had a counting-house at Canton as early as A.D. 300.[2]

Latourette says that 'Chinese merchants seem not to have ventured very far afield, and to have left chiefly to strangers the initiative in foreign trade, but outsiders found China a profitable country with which to deal'. Lack of enterprise is also attributed to the Chinese by Groeneveldt, the pioneer writer on Chinese intercourse with Southeast Asia, who remarks:

> A careful perusal of the geographical literature of the ancient Chinese has shown that they have not gained their knowledge of South-eastern Asia by bold voyages of discovery: slowly and cautiously they have crept along its shores, probably not venturing to a country before they have become acquainted with it through others.[3]

And Kuwabara (cited by Braddell) says, 'the Chinese trading ships before the T'ang era were inferior in all respects to those of the South Sea countries'. Although it must be conceded that the Chinese were behind the Middle Eastern races in enterprise or curiosity, the remarks of Groeneveldt apply in a measure to all other peoples who have come into Southeast Asia. Were their explorations of the coasts of Borneo (asks Mr Tom Harrisson) any slower or more cautious than those of the Portuguese? On the contrary there is every indication that there was a regular trade on a mass scale for centuries back. Certainly by the fourth and fifth centuries Chinese ships were feeling their way along the coasts and over the seas to meet the Arabs, Persians, and Indians part way.

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[1] Fay Cooper Cole, *The Peoples of Malaysia* (New York, Van Nosstrand, 1945) p. 27.

[2] Braddell, op. cit. *JRASMB*, vol. xx, pt. 2 (1947) p. 8.

[3] W. P. Groeneveldt, *Notes on the Malay Archipelago and Malacca; Miscellaneous papers relating to the Indian Archipelago* (London, Trübner, 1887) i. 126–262.

The reason for Chinese comparative dilatoriness in utilizing the sea routes on their own account may have been their sense of national sufficiency, and the feeling that they had nothing of great value to obtain from the regions of the south, but none the less their influence spread out over the land routes through the agency of the Arab and Indian traders. 'It is clear that at the time when the European barbarians of the north were conquering Rome, a southward movement in the Far East was taking place—the flow of the cultured Chinese into Malay lands, and the spread of Chinese civilization in Malaysia.'[1] At the same time the main colonizing activity was by Indians. Individual Chinese pilgrims and travellers, such as the Buddhist monk, Fa Hsien (or Fa Hien), went overland to India, visited Ceylon by sea, and arrived in what was either Java or Malaya in A.D. 413, and I-tsing, much later, in A.D. 692, reached Lang-ya-si, identified as Langkasuka, a kingdom in the Malay peninsula. Fa Hsien found no Chinese in Java or Malaya (whichever it may have been), though his eyes filled with tears, he tells us, at the sight of a Chinese taffeta fan, for he had been away from home for thirteen years.[2]

It is not perhaps remarkable that the Chinese of the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries left most of the colonizing initiative to others, for, quite apart from their self-sufficiency, these were the Dark Ages of Chinese history when warfare and foreign invasion were almost incessant. Nevertheless, in the first Sung dynasty (A.D. 420–

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[1] G. Nye Steiger, H. Otley Beyer, and Conrado Benitez, *A History of the Orient* (Boston, Ginn & Co., 1926) p. 202 and passim.

[2] *Fa Hsien Fo Kuo Chi*, the record of Fa Hsien's voyages, has been translated by Samuel Beal as 'An Account of the Buddhist Countries' (London, Trübner, 1869), by J. Legge (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1866), and re-translated by H. A. Giles (Cambridge University Press, 1923). Rémusat's French translation is earlier (1836).

Giles gives the track of the voyage of Fa Hsien from Ceylon to China as being via the Straits of Sunda, whereas W. A. Grimes (*JRASMB*, vol. xix, pt. 1 (February 1941)), a meteorologist, basing his views on a study of the winds near the equator, considers that he went via the Straits of Malacca. This is also the view of Bradden, who thinks that Fa Hsien's *Ye-po-ti* was not Java but Malaya. (*JRASMB*, vol. xix, pt. 1 (1947) p. 25.)

177 79) missions from these southeastern countries made their appearance in China, and after the Liang dynasty (A.D. 502–57) envoys 175 came from over the sea every year for the purpose of getting an almanac and of acquitting themselves of the duty of tribute in greater number than in any former time.[1]

Reference in Chinese history to countries and places in these territories does not necessarily mean that they were known to the Chinese by direct contact. An early voyage, however, was in A.D. 607 when the Emperor Sui Yang-ti sent a mission by sea to Siam to open up commercial relations with that country.[2] But the sprinkling of references to places, probably in this Southeast Asian area, of obscure identity which may be found in the History of the Liang Dynasty (502–57) is succeeded in the History of the T'ang Dynasty (618–907) by information regarding definite countries which has a much surer feel. For example, we hear (and believe) that between 756 and 779 three envoys of Java arrived in China and that in the year 813 further envoys arrived at the capital with presents of four negro slaves, parrots of different colours, pinka-birds (not identified), and other gay trifles. The Emperor honoured the envoy with the title of Left Defender of the Office of the Four Inner Gates, and when the recipient wanted to waive the title in favour of his younger brother, the Emperor praised him for his unselfishness and bestowed a title on both of them.[3]

We are now definitely in the era of the tribute-bearing missions which soon took on the character of trading expeditions since the Emperor invariably presented to the envoys gifts equal to or greater in value than those they had brought. The missions were very numerous and a mere recital of them would not add much to our enlightenment. They had always, of course, a purely diplomatic appearance, especially those sent on the accession of a new Emperor or a new dynasty.

Between 1209 and 1214 a book was written by Chao Ju-kua, a member of the imperial family of the Sung dynasty (960–1280) and superintendent and commissioner of Customs at Ch'üanchowfu, a coast town to the north of Amoy. This book, based on information gained from merchants from India, Persia, Syria, and Arabia, gives facts concerning the countries and peoples of the West, including Spain, and of the Chinese trade with the Malaysian islands. (Some details from this work are cited both above and later in this chapter.)

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[1] Braddell, op. cit. *JRASMB*, vol. xix, pt. 1 (1941) p. 21.

[2] *Chau* [*sic*] *Ju-kua* (late Sung Dynasty): *His work on the Chinese and Arab trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries*, translated from the Chinese and annotated by Friedrich Hirth and W. W. Rockhill (St. Petersburg, Academy of Science, 1911) p. 8. The name of the work in Chinese is *Chu Fan Chi*.

[3] *T'ang History*, Book 222, Part 2, Groeneveldt, p. 140.

In the History of the Sung Dynasty we have a detailed account of Java, including the observation: 'Their houses are handsome and are adorned with yellow and green tiles: when Chinese merchants arrive they are received as guests in a public building and what they eat and drink is copious and clean.'[1]

In 1291 Angkor was visited by Marco Polo and the Lady Kutai, whom the Mongol Emperor of China was sending as a bride for the Khan of Persia, there to behold the fast-fading glories of the Khmer empire.[2] Five years later, one Chou Ta-kwan was a member of the Chinese mission sent to acquaint the King of Cambodia with the accession of Yüan Cheng, the new Emperor of China and grandson and successor of Kublai Khan. To this same Chou Ta-kwan we owe a vivid and detailed account of the Khmer empire.[3] What concerns us here, however, is his remarks concerning his own countrymen who visited or were resident in Cambodia. Here are some of them rendered into English from Pelliot's translation.

> The Chinese who follow the sea as a profession take advantage of their being in this country to dispense with wearing clothes. Rice is easy to obtain, women are easy to find, the houses are easy to run, personal property is easy to come by, commerce is easy to engage in. Thus there are constantly those who direct themselves towards this country.
>
> In this country it is the women who are skilful in commerce. Thus a Chinese who arrives down there and take a wife profits in addition by her commercial aptitude.

This Chinese chronicler (says Mr Brodrick), with the typical prejudice of his people against frequent washing, wrote that, 'the people are often ill, owing to their too frequent baths and the incessant wasting of the heat'.

According to Chou Ta-kwan, the embassy to Cambodia in 1296 was entirely successful and homage was rendered to China, but (says Pelliot) '*peut être est-il trop intéressé dans l'affaire pour que nous accordions pleine créance à ses dires. En fait il n'y a aucune trace que des relations officielles régulières aient suivi la mission de 1296*'.

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[1] Book 489. Groeneveldt, p. 141.

[2] A. H. Brodrick, *Little Vehicle* (London, Hutchinson, n.d. (1949?)) p. 156.

[3] 'Tcheou-Ta-Kouan, Mémoires sur les coutumes de Cambodge' (trans. by Paul Pelliot), *BEFEO*, vol. ii, no. 2 (1902).

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177 There is certainly no mention of Cambodia in the History of the
175 Yüan Dynasty.

It is first in the Yüan dynasty (A.D. 1280–1368) that action combines with colour to make real the machinations of Chinese imperial politics in these waters. In the year 1292 the Emperor Kublai Khan, no doubt envious of the growing influence of Java in further India and the eastern part of the archipelago, sent an expedition against the Javanese State of Singosari. He ordered the Governor of Fukien to send Shih Pi, Ike Mese, and Hau Hsing to collect from Kiangsi and Kiukiang soldiers to the number of 20,000 who were to be embarked in a thousand ships for the Southern Ocean. Shih Pi sailed with 5,000 men from Ch'üanchow, probably via the Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank (to give them their modern names), Annam (Giau-chi), and Champa, encountering bad weather on the way, and in the first moon of the following year they passed the Natuna Islands to a place which was probably Billiton in Java where the fleet stopped to cut timber to make small boats suitable for going up the rivers. An internal feud was in progress between native potentates and in this Shih Pi took sides, routing the army of Daha (Kediri).[1]

But Shih Pi lost 3,000 of his men (largely, it seems, through sickness) and for this he was disgraced and ordered to receive seventeen strokes. But in 1295 he was restored to favour, and he died, high in honours, at the age of eighty-six.

The Ming History records that at this time Java was subdued,[2] but the truth is that the great expedition had failed and no new one was undertaken. The military expeditions of the Mongols had nowhere more than a temporary influence.

The empire of Sri Vijaya, which endured for many centuries, had its capital in Sumatra in the neighbourhood of Palembang. It included the Malay Peninsula under its sway. Eventually it decayed under Chola (Coromandel) raids, the revolt of Melayu (Jambi), and attacks from neighbouring kingdoms. The Sung chronicles have many references to Sri Vijaya's wars. The empire eventually disappeared and was succeeded by Jambi. Jambi in turn (between

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[1] For an account of the complex politics and strategy of this expedition see E. S. de Klerck, *History of the Netherlands Indies* (Rotterdam, W. L. & J. Brusse, 1938) i. 139–40.

[2] Book 324. It appears from Chinese records and the account of Marco Polo that Tuban, Sedayu, and Tjanggu were at that time prosperous commercial towns. De Klerck, op. cit. p. 140.

1338 and 1365) succumbed to Majapahit, whose seat of government was in Java. Majapahit was warlike and destructive: it sacked ports in Borneo, Surabaya, Ceram, and Lombok, and finally subjected Sri Vijaya's colonies in the Malay Peninsula.[1]

Palembang, near the east coast of Sumatra, fell into Chinese hands on the decay of Sri Vijaya and remained under them for about two hundred years. The Chinese who lived there followed piracy as a calling, using the port as a retreat and strongpoint. This town, then, was one of the earliest places in Southeast Asia where the Chinese settled in any numbers. San-fo-ts'i is a rival for the distinction (if, indeed, it were a Malayan territory distinct from Sri Vijaya), and when it faded in importance about the same time as Sri Vijaya, several thousand Chinese from Fukien and Canton who lived there began to govern themselves. In 1377 they had as their leader a man named Liang Tau-ming from Namhoi in Kwangtung.

Meanwhile, in 1349, Wang Ta-yuan, a Chinese merchant, writes of Tumasik, or Old Singapore.[2] His account gives the very definite impression that here also was a fairly large settlement of Chinese. This is the first colony of Chinese in the Malay Peninsula of which we have any record.

In a later chapter in the history of the Chinese in Malaya we shall discuss the question whether the Chinese formed any permanent settlement in the Malay kingdom of Malacca, which was founded about A.D. 1400 and endured until the Portuguese conquest of 1511. The chances are (we shall decide) that the merchants who visited the place were merely seasonal visitors, coming down from China with one monsoon and going back with the other. But it was in the early years of the Malay kingdom that the Emperors of the Ming dynasty began to send expeditions to the Southern Ocean and beyond on a grand scale.[3]

In 1403, says the Ming History,[4] the Emperor sent the eunuch

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[1] See Sir Richard Winstedt, *Malaya and its History* (London, Hutchinson, 1948) p. 29 ff.

There are maps showing the probable extent of Sri Vijaya and Majapahit accompanying H. Otley Beyer, 'The Philippines before Magellan', *Asia*, vol. xxi (1921).

[2] See p. 282.

[3] In summarizing the Ming voyages the writer has to be much on his guard. The facts and translations of the authorities of last century, particularly Rockhill, have been subjected to the searching scrutiny of Professor Duyvendak, and many errors and slips have been revealed.

[4] J. J. L. Duyvendak, 'The true dates of the Chinese Maritime Expeditions in the early fifteenth century', *T'oung Pao*, xxxiv (Leyden, 1939).

177 Yin Ch'ing as envoy to Malacca with presents of silk brocade.[1] But
175 more noteworthy was the visit a few years afterwards by the famous Grand Eunuch, Cheng Ho, later deified as Sam-po-kung.

Altogether Cheng Ho and his colleagues, the Grand Eunuch Wang Chin, and the assistant envoys, the Grand Eunuchs Hung Pao and Yung Chen, together with the Senior Lesser Eunuch Chang Ta, commanding the fleet, made seven voyages, in 1405, 1407, 1409, 1414, 1417, 1421, and 1431 (these being the years in which the expeditions set out).[2] The account published by them in 1431 is in their collective name, but it is not clear which of them took part in the several voyages. The following is abstracted from their account as quoted by Professor Duyvendak:

Voyage I

In the third year of Yung Lo (1405), 'commanding the fleet', we went to Ku-li (Calicut) and other countries. At that time the pirate Ch'en Tsu-yi and his followers were assembled at San-fo-ts'i (Palembang) where they plundered the native merchants. We captured the leader alive and returned in the fifth year (1407).

Voyage II

In the fifth year of Yung Lo (1407), 'commanding the fleet', we went to Kua-Wa (Java), Ku-li (Calicut), Ko-chih (Cochin), and Hsien-lo (Siam). The kings of these countries all presented us as tribute with local products, precious birds, and (rare) animals. We returned in the seventh year (1409).

Voyage III

In the seventh year of Yung Lo (1409), 'commanding the fleet', we went to the countries visited before and took our route by the country of Hsi-lan-shan (Ceylon). Its King Ya-lieh-jo-nai-erh (Alagakkonara) was guilty of a gross lack of respect and plotted against the fleet. Owing to the manifest answer (to prayer) of the divine power (the plot) was discovered and thereupon the king was captured alive. In the ninth year (1411), on our return, he was presented (to the throne as a prisoner). Subsequently he received the imperial favour of returning to his own country.

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[1] Ming History, Book 325.

[2] 'What are today called the Indian Ocean or the Nanyang were formerly called the Nan Hai (Southern Sea) or the Nan-hsi Hai (Southwestern Sea). The sea to the south of the Gulf of Siam was given the special name of Ch'ang Hai.' Feng Ch'eng-chün, *Nan Yang Chiao T'ung Shih* (*History of Chinese Relations with the Nanyang*) (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1937) p. 91.

The fourth voyage (1414) was to Ormuz and other places and 177
the fleet returned in 1415. In that year the king of the country of
Man-la-Chia (Malacca) came in person with his wife and son to 175
present tribute. On the fifth voyage (1417–19) the envoys visited Ormuz again and also Aden, Mogadisho, Calicut, &c., bringing back zebras, lions, camels, and ostriches. Ormuz figured once more in the sixth voyage (1421–2) and in the sixth year of Hsüan-ti (1431), 'starting once more for the barbarian (countries) in order to make known the imperial commands', the fleet sailed for the Western Ocean, returning in 1433.

The object of the voyages was to enhance the prestige of the Ming dynasty and, incidentally, to keep a look out for any rebels against the dynasty who might have taken refuge in the Nanyang. 'The Imperial Ming dynasty', proclaimed the high envoys, 'in unifying seas and continents, surpasses the Three Dynasties and even goes beyond the Han and the T'ang. The countries beyond the horizon and from the ends of the earth have all become subjects (of the Imperial Ming). . . . The barbarians from beyond the seas . . ., have come to audience bearing precious objects and presents.'

Says Professor Duyvendak in another place:[1]

> These embassies must have been stupendous undertakings; fleets are described of 62 vessels carrying 37,000 soldiers; more than 20 countries in the Indian archipelago and the Indian Ocean were visited; chiefs and kings, like those of Palembang and of Ceylon, were deposed and sent as captives to China, and members of the expeditions went as far as Aden and Mecca, bringing messages from the Chinese court. Most surprising of all, these fleets were commanded by eunuchs, of whom none is more famous than Cheng Ho, known as San-Pao-T'ai-Ch'ien.

The dynastic histories have a good deal to say of Java during the period of Cheng Ho's voyages. The denizens of the country were divided into three kinds of people—first, the Chinese who resided there temporarily and whose clothes and food were fine and nice; secondly, the traders from other countries, who resided there for a longer time, and who also were quite civilized and clean; and thirdly, the natives of the country, who were very dirty and were fond of eating snakes, insects, and worms, and who slept and ate together with the dogs. From Grissé, in 1411, a Chinese from Canton sent representatives to the Chinese court and a letter offer-

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[1] 'Ma Huan Re-examined', *Proceedings of the Royal Academy of Science* (Amsterdam, 1933). (On the *Ying yai sheng lan*, ascribed to Ma Huan.)

177 175 ing produce of the country as tribute. Tuban was the native name of a place near Grissé where more than a thousand families lived, all under one chief. Amongst them were many Chinese from Canton and Changchow (near Amoy) who were settled there. Fowls, goats, fish, and vegetables were cheap there. Surabaya was another place where there were many Chinese. Later it seems that Tuban was deserted by them because of its insecurity (there being numerous robbers) and all trade went to a new place, Yortan (situated in the present district of Paduran), but it subsequently disappeared.

There is in the Chinese records a large number of references to the Chinese in Java ~~and~~ Sumatra in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries on the eve of the European incursions into these waters. Many pirates are mentioned, including Ch'en Tsu-yi who was seized by Cheng Ho. Later on, in the reign of Chia Ching (1522–66), another notorious Cantonese robber flourished. Besides his main business of robbery, he had a large commercial establishment in which many Hokkiens were employed.

Regarding the Chinese navigation of these seas, it has been remarked that their junks always sailed with the trade winds, going with the northeast monsoon and returning home with the southwest monsoon. On the outward voyage it was the custom to follow the Asiatic coast, but on the home trip the ships of Amoy probably sailed along the west coasts of Borneo, Palawan, Luzon, and Formosa. Moreover, the sailing directions in Chinese books indicate that ships bound for the Sulu Archipelago, eastern Borneo, and, in later centuries, even for Banjermassin and Java, first crossed over to the island of Luzon and sailed southwards through the Philippines.[1]

This opinion is consistent with that of Sir Roland Braddell who says:

> Summarizing, we suggest that both *a priori* reasoning and such data as we possess lead to a very early knowledge of Borneo on the part of the Indians and Chinese and that in the case of both of them probably, but the latter certainly, they must have been familiar with Borneo before they became familiar with Java, the navigation to which was far more difficult and more dangerous.[2]

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[1] G. N. Steiger, op. cit. pp. 202, 203. See also p. 679 of this Survey, and the remarks on Chinese navigation of Southeast Asian waters in J. V. Mills, 'Malaya in the Wu-pei-chih Charts', *JRASMB*, vol. xv, pt. 3 (December 1937).

[2] op. cit. *JRASMB*, vol. xix, pt. 1 (February 1941) p. 72.

Let us now go back for a while and consider the early history of the Chinese contacts with Borneo in more detail, keeping in mind the implications raised by Dr Heine-Geldern's revelations of the finds there and in Indonesia.

The credit for bringing Brunei to the official notice of China seems to have been due to neither the Chinese nor the Borneans, but rather to the enterprising Arab traders of Canton and Ch'üan-chow. It is not known just how early these Arabs began trading in Brunei, but in 977 a certain Abu Ali and two other Arabs came to the Chinese court as envoys from the king of Brunei. From the twelfth to the fifteenth century accounts of Brunei, Sulu, Mindoro, and others of the Philippine Islands became more numerous. Before 1225 Chinese vessels were making trading trips to nearly all parts of the Philippines. Apart from Sulu, which had always maintained closer relations with Borneo than with the Philippines, the most important trade centre appears to have been Mindoro.[1]

The traditions of Borneo and Sulu indicate that a Chinese province was established some centuries ago in the neighbourhood of the Kinabatangan River, and the province had dominion over the Sulu River. It is mainly accepted, too, that a daughter of a Chinese 'prince', who was in all probability the governor of the province referred to, came from the Kinabatangan River to marry the second sultan of Brunei, and from that couple originated the royal family of Brunei of the present day.

The statement that the Dusuns are 'half-Chinese' is frequently made by residents of Borneo. This theory has led to much controversy. In the middle of the last century a traveller in Sarawak, a Mr Witti, expressed himself strongly against any supposed Chinese mixture in the blood of the Dusuns, saying, 'I think no Chinese colonies ever existed in the north of Borneo', but the same traveller in a journey up the Pagalan River speaks of a tribe that was 'probably the result of an infusion of Chinese blood with the aboriginal races of Borneo'.[2] Regarding the Dyaks, Earl remarks that the Chinese of his time supposed them to be descended from a large body of their countrymen left by accident on the island, but this belief, he says, was entertained solely on the basis of the Chinese legend of the Kuni Balu snake whose stone was stolen by the

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[1] Steiger, Otley Beyer, Benitez, op. cit. p. 205.

[2] Cited by Ling Roth, *The Natives of Sarawak and British North Borneo* (London, Truslove & Hanson, 1896) i. 24.

Emperor of China by the agency of Chinese who formed a chain from the snake's lair to waiting junks. The stone was recovered by the snake, but the human chain of Chinese remained to colonize the country. Another legend of this nature concerned the origin of the Bolupih race from a Chinese native union. C. A. de Crespigny could see no similarity between the natives and the Chinese except a turning-in of the upper eyelid in childhood, whereas St John observed that the 'features of many are very like the Chinese—perhaps a trace of that ancient kingdom that tradition fixes in this neighbourhood'.[1] In the present century I. H. N. Evans has pronounced strongly against the theory of Chinese admixture with the Dusuns though he admits Chinese admixtures on the Klias Peninsula and the Kinabatangan River.[2]

But whatever the truth regarding the Chinese colonization of Borneo in remoter times, it is certain that by the early nineteenth century a considerable admixture of the races was in progress. Intermarriage between Chinese men and Dyak women was common and St John, at the request of the Raja, opened a school for the benefit of the offspring of such unions.

> Truly speaking (St John adds) the Chinese women up here are themselves the offspring of mixed marriages, but having been brought up in all the manners and customs of the Chinese, are looked upon as Chinese.

The settled agricultural tribes between the Brunei and Murudu Rivers were considered good examples of Chinese and natives intermarrying.

Of special interest to the students of Chinese contacts with Borneo is the evidence afforded by native agricultural methods and the 'sacred jars'.

Sir Spenser St John describes the methods used by the native

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[1] Ling Roth, op. cit. i. 57: ibid. p. 59.

[2] I. H. N. Evans, *Among Primitive Peoples in Borneo* (London, Seeley Service, 1932) p. 274 ff.

Mr Tom Harrisson comments: 'How is it possible to conclude that the theory is not true, while at the same time admit Chinese admixtures on the Klias Peninsula and the Kinabatangan River? Such traditions do not persist unless there is some reason for them. In fact, they are to be found in some form or other, over a much wider area of Borneo, and were recorded by some of the very earliest travellers, such as the anonymous writer in the *Chinese Repository* of 1834, and Earl in 1837. The most that can be said is that the matter is not proven either way. . . . St John in 1858 found remains of extensive pepper gardens in the Madihit, ten days by canoe, through rapids etc., right up the Limbang and right in the interior. The oldest Muruts could then just remember these Chinese. The present inhabitants of the area have *no idea* there were ever Chinese there—a good example of the negative negative.'

people of Tumposok where he first saw natives ploughing. The 177
plough was of a very simple construction, serving rather to scratch
the ground than to turn it over, was entirely of wood, and was 175
drawn by a buffalo, and its action was the same as if a pointed stick
had been dragged through the land to a depth of about four inches.
After ploughing, they used a rough kind of harrow. 'I think this
superior agriculture', says St John, 'is obviously a remnant of
Chinese civilization.'[1]

Tangible evidence of Chinese contact with Sarawak is afforded 177
by the 'sacred jars', undoubtedly of Chinese origin. The 'jar cult'
played an important role not only in Borneo but also among the 415
Moi of southern Indochina, in the Philippines, in Formosa, and
various other parts of the Indonesian region. (Dr Heine-Geldern
remarks that Professor Janse's recent discoveries in Indochina may
help to solve the origin of this cult.) St John describes the several
kinds of jars existing in Sarawak. The best known were the Gusi,
the Rusa, and the Naga. The most valuable, the Gusi, was a green
colour, about 18 inches in height, and was, from its medicinal
properties, exceedingly sought after. One fetched at Tawaran the
price of £400 to be paid in produce. The Naga was a jar two feet
in height ornamented with Chinese dragons. This was at this time
worth only £7–8; while the Rusa, covered with the figures of some
kind of deer, was worth £15–16.[2] Another jar, the Ningkah, mentioned
in another contemporary account, fetched $150.[3]

These jars were the principal commodity in the Chinese trade 177
with Borneo and other islands. This trade may have been of the
'silent' variety, when Chinese junks, laden with silk, beads, iron, 175

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[1] It is interesting to compare this description with that of a native plough of supposedly Chinese origin in the Philippines (see p. 613), and there is a reference to another plough not of local design in Malaya (see p. 314).

[2] Ling Roth, op. cit. ii. 284.

Every Dyak tribe possessed some jars according to their riches or importance, though, as one European lady remarks, 'no one would suppose from their appearance that they were worth more than the common earthenware water-pots we use in our bath-houses'. They were, in fact (to judge from examples in the Sarawak Museum), of as cheap a quality as the Chinese trader could persuade the natives to purchase. Examples of these jars are illustrated in Plate 159 of N. Ottema, *Ceramiek Handboek*, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam, J. H. de Bussy, 1946).

One special jar, owned by the Sultan of Brunei, was supposed to have magical qualities, and Bisayas used to come with presents for the Sultan to obtain in return a little water from the jar with which to sprinkle their rice-fields to ensure good crops.

[3] L. W. Helms, *Pioneering in the Far East* (W. H. Allen, London, 1882) p. 153, cited by Ling Roth, op. cit. ii. 280.

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177 copper pots, and many kinds of jars arrived off the coast and made their presence known by beating on gongs. The natives would 175 bring to the beach whatever they had to trade and then retire to a distance. The traders would take ashore what they considered the proper equivalent in terms of their own goods, and if this proved satisfactory they took the native articles and moved on to the next settlement.[1] But whether or no this method of trading was usual in later times, it seems that in the time spoken of by Chao Ju-kua (12th–13th centuries) buying and selling were carried on in a more friendly and civilized way. After a ship had arrived and had been boarded by the natives they mingled freely with the ship's folk. The custom was for native traders to assemble in crowds and carry the goods away with them in baskets, 'and even if one cannot at first know them and can but slowly distinguish the men who remove the goods there will be no loss'.[2]

More impressive, aesthetically speaking, than the jars are the pottery and china revealed by the pick and spade in mineral exploration. Mr Helms records that on one occasion his party found a number of paving tiles four inches thick, "beautifully made of pebbles, concrete, quartz, etc. They had been polished, were clearly very old, and made by people of a higher civilization.' Were these, by any chance, relics of Chinese settlement?

The coming of the Europeans caused a break in the trading relations between China, Borneo, and the other Malaysian islands which had gone on for so long. In the year 1530 one of the functionaries in the capital addressed a memorial to the throne respecting the discontinuance of the tribute from Borneo. This memorial says:

> During the period Cheng-te (1506–1521) the Franks (Portuguese) had been violently spreading their influence and the tribute had ceased. A few years afterwards the natives had tried to begin sending it again, but it was evident that their regard for the Chinese empire had suffered very much.

Finally, let us summarize what is known of Chinese intercourse with the Philippines prior to the Spanish period.

It is at a comparatively late date that the Philippines are first mentioned in Chinese history; and the fact is the more striking (says Laufer) since some of the adjacent isles to the south are touched upon much earlier. In the fifth year of Hung-wu (1372) the first embassy arrived in China with tribute, and the Emperor reciprocated by dispatching an official with presents of silk gauze woven of gold and coloured threads to the king of the country. But (Laufer warns us) 'From this first mention of the Philippines in Chinese history we should not be so narrow-minded as to infer that Chinese intercourse with the Philippines dates from just the year 1372; on the contrary, the fact that there was a Philippine embassy in that year points to a long commercial intercourse between the two peoples which had escaped the knowledge of the court historiographers at Peking.'[1] The statement made in the Imperial Geography of the Ming (*Ta Ming I Feng Chi*) that no investigation of Luzon had been made by previous generations is contradicted by the fact that Philippine tribes are described in Chao Ju-kua's work of the thirteenth century.

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[1] Fay Cooper Cole, op. cit. p. 28.

[2] G. N. Steiger, op. cit. p. 205.

Since Laufer wrote there has been considerable further investigation of the subject, and the present state of knowledge can best be summarized in the words of Dr H. Otley Beyer:

> It is improbable that many Chinese ships were engaged in this trade with the Philippines during the early period (at least before the late 11th–12th century part of it) and it is unlikely that there were any Chinese residents in the islands at that time . . . [re 12th–14th centuries] Chinese merchant colonies began to establish themselves in a few places where a fairly strong or well-organized native government gave prospect of protection. . . . With the death of Cheng Ho, however, and the passing of the Yung Lo regime, this Chinese attempt at dominions overseas also passed away . . . [re A.D. 1430–1450]. As Mohammedan influence spread eastward through the southern Philippines, and northward from Borneo into Luzon, the Siam and Indo-China trade was at first cut off, while the Chinese merchant vessels were forced to seek new trading routes leading around the eastern side of Luzon, and into the eastern Visayan Islands etc., where Islamic beliefs had not yet penetrated. . . . While the Chinese settlers intermarried freely in the country, built good houses, and taught their families better ways of living, they were not otherwise interested in converting or spreading new ideas among the native folk. Their influence was chiefly economic, and aside from the brief period of Yung Lo's empire, made no attempt to meddle or interfere with native political constitutions, social customs, or beliefs. . . .[2]

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[1] Berthold Laufer, 'The Relations of the Chinese to the Philippine Islands', *Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections* (quarterly issue), vol. l (September 1907) p. 251.

[2] H. Otley Beyer, *Early History of Philippine Relationships to Foreign Countries, especially China* (Manila, National Printing Company for the University of the Philippines Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, 1948).

121 167 177 What has been given above is only a brief outline of a vast subject of which the facts are, for many periods, largely unprecipitated. In an attempt to confine this survey to manageable proportions and to give it a contemporary focus, we have adopted the principle that our interest in the Chinese of Southeast Asia begins in earnest only when they had formed permanent settlements, and it is true to say that the majority of such settlements still remaining, outside Annam and Tongking, were founded within the last 350 years. Nevertheless, we should not forget that the stream of Chinese immigration into the region, swelling into spate in the second and third decades of the present century, was but an expansion of long pre-existing rivulets of intercourse.

167 175 177 After the great military expeditions of the early Mings, the urge to imperial expansion overseas appears to have gone out of the Chinese. The self-contained spirit of the Middle Kingdom reasserted itself and the Emperors were content with adventures by land. It would indeed be harder to explain why the urge arose at all than why it subsided so soon. The fact remains that whereas the colonization of the Europeans followed in the wake of their fleets and soldiers or to lands obtained by treaty from the native rulers, the Chinese in the last three and a half centuries have entered Southeast Asia either as visiting merchants or as suppliants for permission to remain from the Javanese Sultans, or from the Spaniards, Dutch, British, or French. They came no more as haughty emissaries of the Dragon Throne, armed to the teeth to enforce the imperial will, but as humble and peaceable shiploads of traders, artisans, or coolies, waiting, like Czech or Italian peasants on Ellis Island, for permission to enter the land of promise. But their meekness and peaceableness were in the long run to be far more forceful than the militancy of the Europeans; for where the latter came in their tens the Chinese came in their thousands, and when the Europeans have gone, they will remain.[1]

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[1] While this Survey was in the press there appeared 'The Khmer Empire and the Malay Peninsula', by Lawrence Palmer Briggs, *Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol. ix, no. 3, May 1950, which adds valuable source material for Sino-Southeast Asia contacts.

CHAPTER III

EMIGRATION TO THE 'NANYANG'

THE overseas Chinese are almost exclusively drawn from the 167 southeastern provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien, and Kwangsi— the great majority from the first two. This has mainly been 162 due to population pressure and to the contiguity of these provinces to Southeast Asia.[1] This emigration was accentuated by internal troubles in China. In the Ming dynasty there had already been substantial emigration to the Nanyang, but a new wave was set up by the civil strife consequent on the change-over from the Ming to the Ch'ing, or Manchu, dynasty.[2] For example, the anti-Manchu pirate and patriot Koxinga, who had occupied Formosa, made descents on the coasts of Fukien in order to replenish his stores and at the same time embarrass the Manchu Government. Partly to cut off his supplies and partly to intimidate the population of these regions whose sympathies were anti-dynastic, the Manchus made the latter forsake a zone of country from about eight to thirty miles deep on the coasts of Kwangtung, Fukien, and Chekiang. This zone was denuded of its crops and its villages were burnt down. A reference was made to this in the reign of the first Manchu Emperor when governors were ordered to give houses and land to such persons who had moved into the interior 'so that they might be satisfied'. The harsh treatment they received was undoubtedly an encouragement to many in these parts of China to seek refuge overseas.

Contacts with Europeans were also a subsidiary encouragement 175 to emigration. The first European efforts to trade were centred in Kwangtung. In 1516 Perestrello came from Malacca to China; in 167 1517 de Andrada arrived in Canton and received permission from the 441 viceroy to trade. The attitude of the Portuguese soon aroused the hostility of the Chinese and their trading depot was attacked and destroyed in 1522. They retired to Lampa in Kwangtung where

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[1] Population pressure in China, especially in the nineteenth century, is instructively dealt with by G. E. Tyler, 'The Taiping Rebellion, its economic background and social theory', *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. xvi (1933) pp. 545–614.

[2] See J. J. L. Duyvendak, 'Chinese in the Dutch East Indies', ibid. vol. xi. (1927) pp. 1–15.

175 they maintained a trading post for the next fifty years. Another expedition reached the coast of Fukien in 1518 and established depots
167 at Ch'üanchowfu, north of Amoy, at Foochow, and at Ningpo in
441 Chekiang. Between 1545 and 1549 an imperial edict for the extermination of the Portuguese was enforced wherever possible. Nevertheless Macao was founded as a trading post in 1557. The Portuguese paid rent for the Macao Peninsula until 1849. During the eighteenth century Macao was the chief port for the Western trade in China. The Spanish next opened up direct relations with the Chinese, using Manila as their base, but the trade between the Philippines and Amoy was almost entirely in Chinese hands. The port of Amoy from 1730 to 1842 was closed to all foreigners except Spaniards. The Dutch made attempts to open up trade at Canton in 1604 and 1607 but were defeated by the Portuguese interests at Macao. Though they eventually occupied Formosa, they were driven out by Koxinga in 1661. Further efforts made by the Dutch to obtain recognition of their trade were without success, and it was not until 1762 that they were able to establish a factory at Canton. The English made their first essay to join in the trade in 1596, but it was a failure. They tried in 1647 to operate under Portuguese auspices, meeting, however, with little success. The East India Company renewed the attempt to trade with Canton in 1664 and 1674, but were foiled, mainly by the Portuguese. The Company did, however, succeed in 1667 and 1670 in trading at Amoy and Formosa, but their factory in the latter place was closed in 1681. In 1685 an imperial decree opened all the ports of China to foreign trade; but Canton and Amoy remained the principal trading entrepôts.

A circumstance which tended towards centring the foreign trade on Canton and eventually confining it to this one port was the establishment of a monopoly by the Chinese Government. In 1702 an official called a Hoppo, or emperor's merchant, was appointed at Canton and became the sole broker for all purchases and sales. Two years later the Hoppo had to admit certain other merchants into a share of his monopoly. Henceforth the trade increased in bulk and flourished, though subject to very severe restrictions and a rigorous disciplining of the foreign merchants, most of whom had to withdraw to Macao in the non-trading season. In 1757 an imperial edict prohibited all foreign trade at any port other than Canton. Attempts to improve the conditions of trade and to establish relations on a proper footing led to the sending of embassies to

Peking by the Dutch and the British, but without concrete result. 175
The situation continued down to the First China War of 1839–42. 167

It will be seen, then, that Chinese contacts with foreign traders were practically confined to the Kwangtung and Fukien ports, 441 though the intercourse was even then a restricted one. It was not the policy of the Spanish or of the Dutch (except at the beginning) to attract the Chinese to their colonies; it was only after 1786, when the British began to make settlements in the Malay Peninsula, that the Chinese found an unqualified welcome. The capitalistic development of colonies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had not yet begun, and there was no demand for coolie labour on a large scale before then. The Americans first traded with Canton in 1784, but it was not until 1848 that the first Chinese immigrants arrived at San Francisco.[1]

Such were some of the circumstances which induced, or paved the way for, Chinese emigration to the Nanyang. Our task must now be to investigate the factors which discouraged this emigration.

Ancestor worship was a strong force in discouraging the Chinese 167 from emigrating. The spirits of the dead needed the constant attendance of the living to ensure their welfare, and those who deserted the vicinity of the graves of their ancestors and left their spirits without sacrificial offerings and ritual attention were guilty of unfilial conduct. Thus it was at all times that only those who were forced by dire necessity left their native villages, and they were regarded as outcasts and vagabonds. It was natural, therefore, that a great many refugees and criminals should have been included among the emigrants.[2]

Religion was reinforced by Government policy. The Emperors took the view that the loss of subjects was not a loss to be compensated for by any trade advantages. Under the Mings the law was not so strict as it became later under the Ch'ings (the Manchus were also more orthodox Confucians than the Mings—and aliens are frequently more orthodox and conservative than the people

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[1] So it is commonly stated, but in the correspondence relating to a project to send Chinese to Trinidad in 1806 ('Notices of Pinang', *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, vol. vi (1852) pp. 145–72) it is mentioned that Chinese had already been taken to Nootka Sound in North America. The writer has so far been unable to discover the facts of this matter.

[2] H. Gottwaldt, *Die Uberseeische Auswanderung der Chinesen* (Bremen, Max Moessler, 1903), insists that 'only the scum of the Chinese go abroad'.

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167 they live amongst). The Laws of the Ch'ing dynasty, section ccxxv. are explicit:[1]

> All officers of government, soldiers, and private citizens, who clandestinely proceed to sea to trade, or who remove to foreign islands for the purpose of inhabiting and cultivating the same, shall be punished according to the law against communicating with rebels and enemies and consequently suffer death by being beheaded. The governors of cities of the second and third orders shall likewise be beheaded, when found guilty of combining with, or artfully conniving at the conduct of such persons . . .

Thereupon ensues a long list of penalties, but the officials who had offended by allowing the emigration to occur were to be pardoned if they afterwards succeeded in securing the offenders and bringing them to condign punishment.

The Manchu policy was dictated largely by the consideration that emigrants from the disaffected south would almost certainly be anti-Manchu and, once out of reach of the Manchu officials, would undoubtedly be plotting among themselves and with their friends inside the country for the overthrow of the dynasty. Those who enlisted under Koxinga would be a case in point. And in maintaining this policy the officials were helped by the sentiment of the Chinese that all beyond the confines of the Middle Kingdom were barbarians and were not to be consorted with. The law could never be enforced because economic stress and hope of gain were the more powerful forces, but the principle was held in theory until 1860 when it was disposed of in the treaties with foreign Powers, though the law was not actually repealed until 1894. The officials reaped a big harvest from it, for they collected large sums from returning immigrants as a price of inaction, and they also made levies on the same account on the families in China of emigrants overseas; for in China responsibility is a very far-reaching principle.

The attitude of the Government being as it was, it can readily be understood that little attention was paid to the misfortunes and persecutions of overseas Chinese. The massacre of the Chinese in the Philippines in 1603 and 1639, and in Java in 1740, caused no great concern to the Chinese Emperors. There are instances of reprisals in the Ming dynasty, but even these are few and far between.

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[1] Sir George Thomas Staunton, *Ta Tsing Leu Lee; being the Fundamental Laws of the Penal Code of China* (London, T. Cadell & W. Davies, 1810).

We shall see how the value of the foreign trade was too great an inducement for officials and others to ignore, and the profits to be obtained by the Chinese themselves when they made trading voyages led to connivance on the part of the Governors: in 1567 the Governor of Fukien allowed his provincials to go abroad to trade with all foreigners except the Japanese, who were the arch-pirates of the period and who ravaged the Chinese coasts. Traders had, however, to get licences to leave the country.

In 1717 the Emperor K'ang Hsi summoned those of his subjects who had been residing in foreign countries to return to their homes, but consented to pardon all who had been abroad since the beginning of his reign some fifty-six years before. His successor, Yung Cheng, allowed the inhabitants of the coast provinces to go abroad to trade under licence on condition that they subsequently returned home; but in 1728 he forbade those who were unlicensed to come back at all.

A proclamation by Ch'en Hung-mou, Governor of Fukien, in 1754, continues the story of the official attitude towards emigration:[1]

> . . . A large proportion of the maritime population of Fukien is beholden for its subsistence to trade beyond the sea. The southern seas having at an earlier period been closed to trade (by a law that) provided that all persons who had gone abroad before its enactment might return home within three years, but that no one should go abroad after its enactment should be allowed to return at all. In the fifth year of the reign of Yung Cheng (1727) this interdict was removed, and there has been, from that time, a movement of traders from the Inner Land abroad unceasing as the welling of a spring. Feeling, however, that there must be some who, with sea upon sea between (China, and) the distant (land where they were), could not have returned home within the appointed time, the late Governor-General, Hao, first in one memorial, and then in a second, moved His Majesty to allow such persons to return; which proposition was sanctioned. But in the 14th year of Ch'ien Lung (1749) there occurred the case of Chen I-lao. . . .

Chen I-lao was a native of the district of Lung-ch'i, who having unauthorizedly proceeded from Kwangtung to Batavia had become headman of the Chinese at that port, and had there collected duties on foreign trade. As he could not belong to the class of honest

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[1] Sir Thomas Francis Wade, *Tzŭ Erh Chih*, Documentary Series (London, Trübner, 1867), gives the Chinese original of the proclamation and a translation on p. 33 of the Key.

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trader (says the proclamation), but was the sort of man who would be laying hold of some pretext or other to give trouble, as soon as this came out he was tried (by the Chinese authorities) and sentenced to banishment; and since then such traders who are still detained abroad, being filled by his trial with doubt and fears, have not ventured to return home.

> . . . the Governor, humbly reflecting [the proclamation goes on] that it is because of our Emperor's treatment of the natives and foreigners as one, that the trade of the foreigner is enabled to continue, as thread joined to thread, uninterrupted; that alike cherishing those from afar, and benefiting by his bounty the (native) merchant, his Majesty shows a consideration that leaves nothing untouched, did (as the records show) explain the matter in a memorial. . . .

The result of which was that those Chinese residing abroad, providing that their reason for not returning within the allotted time was 'the inability to close their accounts' were to be permitted to return to their homes and to bring with them any wives or concubines they had acquired abroad, together with their children.

This represents the situation until the First China War of 1839-42. The war has been stigmatized as the 'Opium War', and indeed opium was its occasion, but among the objects of the British was to force the Chinese Government to permit diplomatic contacts and to improve the insupportable conditions under which foreigners were required to trade. The Nanking Treaty which followed the war was unilateral: that is to say, the Chinese undertook to make concessions to the British without obtaining corresponding advantages. The Chinese gained no right to send consuls abroad, but at this time they did not want to do so. Treaty ports were established under the treaty, but the determination of the Chinese Government not to allow diplomatic intercourse led to a further war in 1858-60, in which Great Britain was partnered by France.

Morse[1] and MacNair[2] give in detail the history of how the Chinese were eventually brought to recognize the principle that their nationals had a right to emigrate. The Second China War was concluded by the Treaty of Tientsin. The French made their own separate treaty, and the Americans, though not participants in the war, also obtained a treaty of their own. The Chinese recognition to the three Powers of the right of their people to emigrate took place about the same time (by the two conventions of Peking, 1860), but, owing to some complications and difference in procedure, the first incorporation of the principle in a treaty was in the Burlingame Treaty of 1870 with America when the Chinese Emperor 'cordially recognised the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the free migration of aliens and subjects respectively from one country to another for the purpose of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residence'. A similar principle was embodied in agreements with Great Britain and France, but the method of promulgation was to be by imperial decree to the high authorities in every province, who should issue proclamations within their jurisdiction. The first official recognition of the right of the Chinese to leave their homeland is found in these proclamations.[1]

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[1] See H. B. Morse, *International Relations of the Chinese Empire. The Period of Conflict 1834-60* (London, Longmans, 1910) passim.

[2] H. F. MacNair, *The Chinese Abroad* (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1925).

It was but slowly that the Chinese began to see the advantages of having diplomatic and consular representatives in foreign countries where they had nationals or with which they had trading relations. The first permanent legation was established in London in 1877. The minister was accredited both to London and Paris. A Chinese legation was opened at Washington in 1878, in Tokyo in the same year, and in 1879 at St. Petersburg. Consuls were established at various ports in the next decade or so.

But the sentiment of the Chinese against emigration persisted throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, and it still persists. The popular attitude can well be illustrated by extracts from two American writers—the first referring to about the middle of the nineteenth century and the second to its last quarter:

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[1] George F. Seward, *Chinese Immigration* (New York, Scribners, 1881), chap. vi, discusses the emigration of Chinese to the Nanyang and the question of their disposition to emigrate. His thesis is that, through growing northern influences and more amalgamation with northern stock, the people of the southern part of China are losing their migratory tendency. When they are not recruited, as for the more distant continents, they go only to nearby countries. Emigration to California was an episode only; the Chinese naturally go where the native peoples are less vigorous than they. In spite of great inducements held out to them, their numbers in the Dutch East Indies have remained small. During the same period in which Europeans changed the face of America, the Chinese in Java had made a lodgement only. They have not mongolized it.

This was written before the large-scale emigrations of the twentieth century, and the 'loss of migratory tendency' has certainly not been true so far as Southeast Asia is concerned. Nevertheless the thesis is worthy of consideration in the other respects.

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167 . . . if they [the Chinese emigrants] return with wealth enough to live upon, they are liable to the vexatious extortions of needy relatives, sharpers, and police, who have a handle for their fleecing whip in the law against leaving the country, although this clause has been neutralized by subsequent acts, and is not in force, the power of public opinion is against going.[1]

II

To the foreigner, acquainted with the experience of other lands in modern times, the simple, obvious, indispensable recipe for the relief of many of the ills to which the Chinese are subject, is emigration. . . . But this is an expedient which the Chinese themselves will never adopt, for the reason that it will take them away from the graves of their ancestors, to which, by the theory of Confucianism, they are inexorably linked. Generally speaking, no Chinese will leave his home to seek a fortune at a distance unless he is in some way driven to do so. His ideal in life is to be

'Fixed like a plant on his peculiar spot,
To draw nutrition, propagate, and rot.'

Generally speaking, no Chinese leaves his home not intending to return. His hope is always to come back rich, to die and be buried where his ancestors are buried.[2]

But in noting these impressions of competent observers we should bear in mind that they are speaking of China as a whole: the sentiment against emigration in the specifically emigrant communities of the Kwangtung and Fukien seaboard was certainly not great, if it existed at all: indeed there is reason to believe that, in the last few decades at least, they regarded themselves as having a privileged entrée to the good things that came from the Nanyang.

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[1] S. Wells Williams, *The Middle Kingdom* (London, W. H. Allen, 1883) i. 279.

[2] A. H. Smith, *Chinese Characteristics* (New York, Fleming H. Revell, 1894) p. 165 [illegible].

CHAPTER IV

SPECIAL ASPECTS OF CHINESE SOCIETY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MOST readers of this survey will be acquainted, at least in a 121
general way, with the problems of China itself and with 178
the direction in which the people of that country have
moved in the last fifty years. What will be attempted in this chapter 184
will be to illustrate the way in which the Chinese of Southeast Asia have in some respects deviated from the central pattern under the influence of local conditions. We shall select for this purpose the special aspects of the family, marriage, religion, and education, with some remarks on the opium question. As regards politics, Chapter XXXI, dealing with Chinese political organization in Malaya, brings out the developments which are typical of the area as a whole, and to this the reader is referred should he wish to gain a general impression of the matter before proceeding to the separate country studies.

The Family. An excellent starting-point for our chapter is the 167
work of Dr Ta Chen, who, in 1934 and 1935 was in charge of 591
a group of investigators studying the emigrant communities in eastern Kwangtung and southern Fukien under the auspices of the International Research Committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations.[1] The area selected for study was a region from which many of the emigrants to the Nanyang originated and where their families mostly live. It is on the sea coast of the two southernmost maritime provinces and consists of ten *hsien* (counties). Roughly speaking, it includes a long strip of territory beginning at Chao An (formerly Chao Chou), passing through Swatow on the Kwangtung border, and through Amoy, and ending at Chuan Chou (Ch'üan-chow) in Fukien. It is an area of a little less than 5,000 square miles with a total population of a little over 4·6 million in 1935.[2]

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[1] Ta Chen (the name is properly Chen Ta, Chen being the surname, and it is thus given in some library catalogues), *Emigrant Communities in South China: a Study of Overseas Migration and its Influence on Standards of Living and Social Change*, English ed. by Bruno Lasker (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940).

[2] Though all the *hsien* have sent emigrants to the Nanyang the area does not constitute the sole source of emigration to the south, even from these two provinces. For example, Mei Hsien and vicinity, the principal home of the Hakkas and the largest source of Hakka emigration, is not included in this area.

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Here two distinct aggregations of Chinese live side by side—the non-emigrant and the emigrant community—from which a large proportion of the emigrants to the Nanyang are drawn and the income of whose families is (except under unusual circumstances such as the later war with Japan) augmented by remittances from their menfolk overseas. These two communities in a clear way illustrate many of the differences that distinguish the stay-at-home Chinese from those who have sought their fortunes abroad.

Judged from the natural and socio-economic facts, the non-emigrant community was (at the time of Dr Ta Chen's investigations) typical of farm life in south China. The principal occupation was the cultivation of rice, and this was supplemented by many subsidiary occupations, including poultry raising and fruit growing. After the harvest, men and women of the poorer classes picked up fuel and burned charcoal in the mountains for sale in the village market. It was a simple pattern of livelihood not differing in any essential from that of thousands of villages in any other part of rural China. The emigrant community, too, had a variety of occupations, but these did not yield them sufficient income to maintain their present style of living. To quote an experienced physician with Western training who had for many years resided in such a community: 'The children of the well-to-do emigrant families are well fed and clothed. They are easy-going and usually without a definite occupation. If by mischance the family's business in the Nanyang should be bankrupt, these people will be obliged to support themselves by begging.'[1] This statement was thought to be something of an exaggeration, but to bring out the variable factor in the life of an emigrant community. (There were, of course, also families with no sons abroad living in the emigrant community. In these families the pattern of livelihood was much the same as that in a non-emigrant community.)

Before proceeding with a summary comparison of these two sets of families, it is appropriate to remark that those who emigrated from China usually did so to improve their social status. They were, on the whole, therefore, drawn from the less prosperous families, and the process to be described was not merely that of subjecting identical social material to different influences.

In the non-emigrant community, out of 725 families studied, 650 were engaged in growing rice. One hundred and thirty of these owned

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[1] Ta Chen, op. cit. pp. 59, 60.

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the land they occupied, 280 owned part of it, and 240 rented all the land they used. Crop sharing was the most widespread form of tenancy, the crop usually being divided equally between the owner and tenant at harvest time. The farm holdings varied in size, a poor family occupying three or four *mow*, a middle-class family from eight to ten, and a well-to-do family about fifteen (2·5 acres). In the non-emigrant community about one-half were engaged in rice growing, 3·6 *mow* (0·6 acres) being the average per family. The poorest tilled one or two *mow*, those of the middle class seven or eight, and the well-to-do about ten. Proprietary farmers constituted about 1 per cent. of the total number of farmers, part owners about 5 per cent., and the remainder were tenants. Crop sharing also was the rule here, from two-fifths to one-half of the crop going to the landlord at harvest time.

Other occupations followed by the non-emigrant community included the timber business and the trade in incense sticks. Income was supplemented in some villages by planting a crop of wheat after the rice harvest, growing vegetables and sugar-cane, and rearing poultry, and the girls and married women spent part time on drawn-thread and embroidery work. Emigrant families added to the remittances they received from overseas in several ways. Trade attracted a great deal of the interest and energy even of families that depended mainly on agriculture for their livelihood. For the returned emigrants, residence abroad had usually meant a change of occupation according to their inclination and the opportunities available in the foreign community. A larger proportion were engaged in trade after their return to China than before leaving for the Nanyang, that is to say about half the total—shop assistants (there were no apprentices among them), merchants, and pedlars being added together. This was due to the greater opportunity for trade offered in the Nanyang than at home, and the ambitious Chinese naturally chose the opening with the greatest chances of profit. Nevertheless, there was still a large number of labourers among those who returned home, representing those who were labourers before they left and those who had struggled to emancipate themselves from working with their hands and had failed to do so. Farming showed a startling decline as an occupation among the returned emigrants, having fallen to last place.

Among the subsidiary occupations followed by the emigrant community were those in which women and girls could add to their

167 591 incomes by work at home or in local workshops. The drawn-thread and embroidery work engaged in by the girls and middle-aged women in their spare time earned them about twenty cents a day per person. Others wove cloth at small weaving-shops or sewed in tailors'-shops, earning about thirty cents a day. None of these occupations were, in fact, particularly remunerative. Older women were engaged in making joss-paper or in knitting fishing-nets. Apart from farming and trade, the men were engaged in relatively few occupations—there were coolies, barbers, carpenters, schoolteachers, and fishermen.

167 434 591 We come now to the subject of remittances from the Nanyang regarding which there has been much conflicting evidence. No satisfactory estimate of these remittances has been made for Southeast Asia as a whole, and in any case their value has varied greatly with the fluctuation in trade.[1] There had been a time when the ownership of a few rubber-trees had meant affluence, when Chinese importers in the Nanyang could undersell those of all other nationalities and still make a large profit, 'and when they had the native peasants so under control through indebtedness that they could sell them almost anything at any price'.[2]

[464] There had been times when labour was so scarce that Chinese coolies could in a few years accumulate savings enough to start in business and when employees of Chinese retailers could force up wages to the point where it was more economical for the employer to take them in as partners. But by 1935 all this had changed. New immigration restrictions, motivated by the depression, had cut large numbers of Chinese labourers off from labour opportunities abroad while, at the same time, life had become, perhaps, a little more secure in this time of general débâcle for a certain privileged few—for example, the small retail traders already established in the Nanyang who had less competition to meet from their countrymen and who could circumvent the new head tax on males by bringing women and children from China to take the place of male assistants. (This investigation, we must remember, dates from a time when Southeast Asia was only just beginning to recover from the trade depression of 1929–32.)

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[1] In 1941 about SS $10 million was remitted to China from Malaya, but there is nothing to indicate how much of this was in the ordinary way of trade.

[2] This is placed in quotation marks to indicate that it represents the views of Dr Ta Chen.

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Dr Ta Chen gives a table (p. 83) of the sources of income of 100 emigrant families from October 1934 to September 1935 which shows that the average monthly remittance per family was 81·4 per cent. of the total income, ranging between 75·5 per cent. for incomes below $20 per mensem, and 84·1 per cent. for incomes between $125 and $250. This enabled the emigrant families to maintain a much higher standard of living as a whole than those families which had no source of assistance from abroad. 167 434 591

Apart from the purely economic effects of overseas migration upon these communities of east Kwangtung and south Fukien, there is evidence to show that intercourse with Southeast Asia was having a considerable modifying effect on the social institutions, religion, and general outlook both of the emigrants themselves and of the families in China whence they came and to which usually they eventually returned. 178 167 591

In China the social unit has immemorially been the family, and it remains so except to the extent that it has broken down in Communist areas under the influence of Communist ideology. The system which has as its object the perpetuation of the family tree, to a considerable extent subordinates the individual to its needs. But in these emigrant communities in China and in the Nanyang itself, it has had to undergo a great deal of modification to survive. Where resources permit, a dual family system has grown up, whereby one section lives in China and the other in the Nanyang. This dual, or joint family, takes a number of forms which may vary; in the case of a well-off family (to give an example) the head of the family aged 61 lives in Siam, his wife (aged 58) lives in the ancestral village in China and is the acting head of the family, the first concubine (56) is a Siamese and lives in Siam, the second concubine (44) is in the village, and the third and fourth concubines (both Chinese, aged 30 and 19) are also in Siam, and the children of the unions are, except for the son by the wife who is with his father in Siam, all with their mothers, either in Siam or in China. An example of a middle-class family is of a father aged 77 in the village, his son aged 50, the head of the family, in Singapore, and his wife (the acting head of the family) in the village in China. The head of the family had his concubine in Singapore, and the offspring, either of the head of the family or his brothers (who belong to the family) were either in Singapore or at home. A third case of a lower-class family is a more simple pattern with the head of

167 591 178 the family in Siam, his wife (acting head of the family) in the village in China, and most of the children of the marriage in China.

434 167 591 178 Such arrangements obviously call for careful financing. The emigrant abroad, after deducting what he needs to meet his expenses, usually remits his savings periodically to his home in China for the support of the family there and to meet extraordinary expenses, such as of a marriage in the family. At the same time the family home in China is a kind of insurance for the emigrant, for he can always return there if he is unemployed.

The influence of the emigrant on the age-old ideas and customs of his home village has been great. If he has had much foreign experience he almost invariably condemns the traditional family arrangement. In the words of a returned tin-miner from Malaya:[1]

> The joint family is an obnoxious social institution. When a member of such a family earns money he is obliged to support all the rest of it and to carry a heavy economic burden. I have had a very bitter experience and always felt that I am virtually the slave of my family. They are of no help to me at all.

167 178 582 593 A critical attitude towards the family and marriage systems is very general among returned emigrants. They remark that living in the modern world is a complicated affair, and that the joint family is no longer practicable. Many of them felt (in 1935) that an early disintegration of the family in south China was inevitable. Moreover, many of the emigrants have seen what marriage may mean in modern Western life when love and courtship enter into the marriage preliminaries and the union is (or should be) based on affection. An emigrant inevitably contrasts this with the Chinese system wherein the husband and wife are often unknown to one another before marriage. Stubborn and resistant as the traditional family system is, there is evidence from all over the Nanyang that as regards marriage the traditional procedure is in retreat before the modern marriage, and that the joint family system is being strained in some cases almost to breaking-point. Again, in the Nanyang itself, the increased mobility of members of the family is a force threatening to loosen its bonds.

In spite of these tendencies, marriage custom among the Chinese in the Nanyang at the time of the outbreak of the war between Japan and the Allies in 1941 generally followed Chinese traditional

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[1] Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 142.

custom.[1] All this ceremonial was very expensive and involved the 167
family in a burden of debt.

One result of the Revolution in China was to initiate a changing 178
attitude towards family institutions. Books IV and V of the Civil 582
Code of the Republic of China deal with the family and succession. 593
The law was promulgated on 26 December 1930 and came into force on 5 May 1931. Polygamy was abolished, and though concubinage in many cases continued, the concubine was now a mistress without legal rights.[2] According to the new law the parties to a marriage were empowered to make the marriage agreement of their own accord, the sole restrictions being that a man who had not completed his eighteenth year and a woman not yet sixteen must obtain the consent of their parents or guardian. No registration of marriage was provided for.

In the Straits Settlements a Chinese Marriage Committee, appointed in 1925 by the Government, recommended that there should be registration for both new- and old-style marriages.[3] The old-style marriage would be valid if the marriage ceremony was carried out with all the essentials required by custom in the district of China from which the bridegroom and bride or their ancestors came, or by such modified custom as was observed by the Chinese residents of the Colony for that district. The committee found it impossible to submit proposals for legislation as to what forms or ceremonies should constitute marriage, because the evidence disclosed the fact that there were no essentials for Chinese marriages in the old style common to all the districts of south China or to the locally born descendants of emigrants from these districts, while the new style of marriage did not require any particular form.

The evidence taken by the committee revealed a practically unanimous opposition among Chinese residents in the Straits Settlements to any divorce legislation.[4]

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[1] For a description of these customs see G.B., Colonial Office, *Report of the Commission on Mui Tsai in Hong Kong and Malaya*, Colonial no. 125 (1937), and Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, pp. 148–50.

[2] cf. M. H. van der Valk, 'The New Chinese Criminal Code', *Pacific Affairs* (1936) pp. 76, 77. Under the new Chinese Criminal Code which became operative in July 1935 husband and wife are equally liable to a year's imprisonment for committing adultery, and moreover the person with whom the adultery is committed incurs the same punishment. Complaint can be laid only by the injured spouse.

[3] *Chinese Marriage Committee*, Singapore 1926.

[4] The position in the Federated Malay States, however, was temporarily revolutionized by the Secretary for Chinese Affairs Enactment which was passed

167 The new-style marriage, based on the consent of the parties, and
178 often arranged by themselves, has gradually been spreading in
popularity among the better educated. The cost of the wedding
582 and its preliminaries has also been much reduced. This is a con-
593 sequence, too, of the growing equality between the sexes.

871 *Education*. It was only by dint of continual defeat at the hands of
212 foreign Powers that China realized that her traditional literary sys-
167 tem of education, which had endured for over a thousand years,
did not fit her to withstand the assaults of her enemies. At long last she decided to adopt an educational system on modern lines. The greatest obstacle in doing this was the classical language. The literary language in which all education was conducted had become completely divorced from the spoken language, and it needed many years of study before a student could obtain anything like command of it. Whilst it remained, a democratic system of education was out of the question.[1] So it was that in 1917 there occurred the most revolutionary happening in the history of Chinese education, the initiation of the *pai hua* movement.[2]

Pai hua, or written vernacular, had existed in China for centuries. Most popular novels were written in it, but it had never obtained the recognition of the literati. Corresponding, as it did, to the spoken language, it was much more easily learnt than *wen li*, the Chinese literary language, though it was clumsier and more discursive. So when Dr Hu Shih maintained that the literary language should be abolished in schools and that *pai hua* should be elevated to the rank of a literary medium, the proposal was considered as threatening the very foundations of Chinese culture. But the movement obtained powerful political support and in January 1920, the Minister of Education ordered that the spoken language should be used in the teaching of Chinese in primary schools. The form of *pai hua* approved for this purpose became known as *Kuo Yü*, or the National Language.[3]

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in 1899 and repealed in 1932. By this enactment the Secretary for Chinese Affairs had powers to decide the custody and guardianship of women and children, and to order divorce, separation, adoption, and betrothal.

[1] Dr W. A. P. Martin estimated about 1880 that the proportion of Chinese who could read and understand what they read was about one in twenty.

[2] For a full exposition of the subject see Victor Purcell, *Problems of Chinese Education* (London, Kegan Paul, 1936).

[3] See Hu Shih, *The Chinese Renaissance*. The Haskell Lectures, 1933 (University of Chicago Press, 1934).

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The adoption of *Kuo Yü* as a medium of instruction in schools is about one-half of the story of education in China under the Kuomintang: the other half is the adoption in 1928 of the Three Principles of the People of Dr Sun Yat-sen as the foundation of the education system. 871 212 167

The overseas Chinese of the Nanyang adopted with fervour the new style of education which the Revolution had brought into being. They started and ran their own schools, and the resultant rise of Nationalist feeling made the Governments of the several countries more and more apprehensive of the creation of an *imperium in imperio* in their midst.[1] Such was particularly the case in Malaya and Siam, and the crux of the friction between the China-born Chinese and the local administration has been their differences regarding the aim and control of this education. This will emerge in the course of the individual country studies of our survey.

The majority of the emigrants had little or no schooling before going abroad. It is reasonably certain that until quite recently the average emigrant was not a man of education at all, or at most he had had a very inadequate schooling before emigrating.

Religion. On going overseas to the Nanyang the Chinese took with them their religious beliefs. Be the principle of Buddhism, Taoism, or Confucianism effective or ossified, there can be no doubt at all that the world of spirits, demons, gods, and heroes is still a very real thing to the majority of Chinese and goes with them wherever they go. Dr Ta Chen notes that among the items of household expenditure other than food, clothing, and shelter, that for religious practices predominates over all others both in the emigrant and non-emigrant families of east Kwangtung and south Fukien. ('These expenditures', he says, 'are a good index of the prevalence of religious concern.') Scepticism has assuredly grown with the advance of education, but for the majority it would seem that 'keeping in' with the Great Unseen was as much a matter of insurance as of piety and ethics. 771 167

Broadly speaking, the religion of the villagers of south China consists of the worship of Shen, Fu, and Yao in addition to the cult of their own ancestors. Shen and Fu are spirits from Buddhism and Taoism (especially the popular, corrupted, and confused aspects of

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[1] See Cyrus H. Peake, *Nationalism and Education in Modern China* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1932).

71 67 the two religious systems); whereas Yao, a ghost, is from primitive ancestor worship via Confucianism. In one emigrant community in south Fukien Dr Ta Chen's investigators found that of 224 persons questioned, 154 expressed belief in Shen and Fu, 60 had no religious preferences, 5 believed in Christianity, and 5 seemed to be wavering between acceptance and rejection of Shen and Fu. 9 Comparative popularity would, we may be sure, depend largely on results; for, like the Roman gods, a Chinese god is expected to render a return for respect accorded and the offerings made to him. A Roman observed his rites with scrupulous adherence to the letter of the law, expecting that if he did not the gods would make it an excuse to wriggle out of the bargain, and the Chinese regard their gods in much the same spirit.[1]

Amongst the most popular goddesses in the Buddhist pantheon both in China and overseas is Kwan Yin, the goddess of mercy, 'she who hears the sounds (prayers) of mortals—she who looks down on the world and hears its cries'. She is the counterpart of the Taoist goddess T'ien Hou Sheng Mu, Holy Mother, queen of heaven, and she is credited with attributes similar to those of the Virgin Mary. Kwan Yin was originally the Buddhist male god, Avalokiteswara, who changed his sex to female some centuries after his arrival in China.

Another popular god among the overseas Chinese is Kwan Ti, the god of war.

Each craft or guild has its own patron saint—Wu Ku Lao Yeh for farmers, Chiao Sheng Lao Yeh (whose festival is on the 7th of the 5th moon) for carpenters, Shui Hsin Lao Yeh for incense-stick makers, Kwan Ti, the god of war, in his capacity of god of wealth, for tradesmen, and T'ien Hou Sheng Mu, the Taoist queen of heaven, for fishermen and sailors (but overseas her name is changed to Ma Tsu (Ma Chew Poh)), which is also popular in Amoy. In many Cantonese houses the image of the household god of the earth, T'o Yei Shan or Tei Chu, is placed *underneath* a table! The god is not worshipped in Hokkien households.

In addition to the worship of the standard deities of the Buddhist and Taoist cults, the Chinese of the Nanyang have special deities of their own which are worshipped by them only overseas or in the emigrant communities from which they sprang. The outstanding examples are Sam Po Tai Shan for the Shen, and Toh Peh Kong (Hokkien), Ta Pai Kung (Mandarin), or Tai Pak Kung (Cantonese) for the Fu. 771 167

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[1] See Ta Chen, op. cit. chap. x, and Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, chap. vi. There is an instructive article, 'Chinese Contemporary Cults', by Clarence Burton Day in the *Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol. vi, no. 3 (May 1947), which covers a number of the gods and heroes worshipped in south China and the Nanyang.

Sam Po Tai Shan is none other than the spirit of the famous Grand Eunuch Cheng Ho of the Ming dynasty who visited Malacca in the early years of the fifteenth century.[1] He is particularly worshipped in Malacca. Crawfurd remarks, 'Sam Po Kung (Sam Po Tai Shan) is evidently a name to be conjured with among the illiterate classes. The miracles which he performed to save his countrymen from the perils of their travels in unknown lands are among the marvels of romance, illustrating, in a striking way, one of the factors in a genesis of a myth.'

Toh Peh Kong, however, is the most popular hero among the overseas Chinese. But one may search for him in vain in the standard books on Chinese religion.[2] In Siam he is known as Pan Tou Kung. He probably derives from Tu Ti (earth god), but overseas he is primarily the spirit of the pioneers. The Chinese pioneers of the early days suffered terrible hardships and were honoured in memory by those who came after them. Toh Peh Kong seems to be the personification of the pioneer spirit generally and is not the deification of a special person as Sam Po Tai Shan is of Cheng Ho.

A worship of very long standing in Malaya is that of Wang Yeh, who has the spiritual function of visiting the universe as the representative of heaven. The early settlers brought the worship with them from Fukien province.[3]

Opium and other narcotics. The use of the poppy and coca leaf goes back to time immemorial.[4] In 1783 Warren Hastings pro- 276 167

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[1] See pp. 22, 23.

[2] In particular the monumental work by Henri F. S. Doré, *Recherches sur les superstitions en Chine* (Shanghai, Tu-se-wei Press, 1911–38).

[3] Wang Yeh was worshipped from early days but the Wang Kang Festival in Malacca wherein five images of this deity were carried does not seem to have originated until 1886.

Chinese Mohammedans exist in the Shan States and in Indonesia, though in the latter country their numbers are not great. Chinese Christians are not very numerous in Southeast Asia, though in Malaya, for example, they increased between 1901 and 1931 by one-half (50·2 per cent.) to 30,738, while during the same period the Chinese population increased by only 45·5 per cent. Among the Churches the Roman Catholic Church has the strongest hold.

[4] Opium comes from a certain variety of the poppy plant grown principally

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nounced opium to be 'a pernicious article of luxury which ought not to be permitted, but for the purposes of foreign commerce only'. A debate in the House of Commons on the eve of the First China War (the 'Opium War') of 1839 showed that the great majority of the members of Parliament were prepared to countenance the opium traffic as a necessary evil, but a few enlightened voices were lifted against it, including that of Macaulay. The fact, however, that opium-smoking was a vice to which the Chinese were addicted made it valuable as a source of revenue to the Governments of Southeast Asia. The usual method of obtaining this revenue was to farm out the sale of the drug to private persons or firms. Administrators (including Raffles) had grave misgivings regarding the effect of opium-smoking on the health of the Chinese community, but it was not until about the beginning of this century that the various Governments began to take steps towards controlling the sale of the drug.

A Commission appointed in 1907 in the Straits Settlements to ascertain the extent to which opium-smoking was indulged in, whether its prevalence was on the increase, and what means should be taken towards its restriction or suppression, made a report to the following effect:[1]

The habit in the case of the majority of smokers in Malaya was acquired during residence in these parts. The labour in Malaya was mostly drawn from the impecunious farmer class, and the ruling price of chandu in China, though low compared with the price in Malaya, was sufficiently high to place it beyond their reach while they were in their native land. Moreover, the influence of the elder over the younger members of the families of China, one of the most striking characteristics of Chinese family life, was removed in Malaya, and thereby a powerful deterrent to the acquisition of the opium habit disappeared. Nor was the view commonly held among the Chinese of Malaya that the habit was injurious—indeed the general sentiment was to the exact contrary. It was regarded as a panacea for many common ailments and was often recommended by Chinese doctors. These facts, in the opinion of the Commissioners, largely contributed to the commencement of the habit.

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in India, China, Persia, Greece, and Yugoslavia. Cocaine is derived from an entirely different plant, the coca leaf, grown in South America and Java in particular.

[1] *Report of the Opium Commission* (Singapore, 1908), vols. i and iii were published as Cmd. 4321 and Cmd. 4322 (1909).

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Those *habitués* who were questioned said that they had started to smoke 'as a remedy for sickness', 'as an antidote to sorrow', or 'from bad example'. Brothels were a common place in which Chinese learned to smoke.

The Commissioners summed up their views as to the motive for the habit in these words: 'We are firmly convinced that the main reason for taking to the habit of smoking opium is the universal tendency of human nature to some form of indulgence.' Or, less sententiously expressed, they did it because they liked it!

A man was less likely to become an inveterate opium-smoker than a drunkard.

As to the evil results of opium-smoking the Commissioners took a moderate view. As regards the physical evils, with the exception of medical practitioners who held strong views opposed to opium, the medical witnesses were practically unanimous in expressing the opinion that opium-smoking in moderation was relatively harmless. Even if the indulgence were carried to an excess, there was (so said the witnesses) no organic change in the body. The general impression, however, was that in tasks requiring severe physical exertion the smoker was not equal to the non-smoker; in the case of the skilled artisan, opium-smoking made little or no difference to his relative value; opium-smokers and non-opium-smokers in an industry worked the same number of hours and earned the same wages.

These views (in the experience of the writer) represent the general views of European administrators who, on the whole, incline to consider opium-smoking as a symptom rather than a cause of misfortune. Education and improved living conditions in the last forty years have had more effect in decreasing the number of smokers than any other factor.

While the Commission was unwilling to recommend prohibition (which in any case would be possible only by international agreement, as the poppy was then cultivated in India, China, Turkey, and Persia), it recommended the abolition of the opium farmer and the establishment of a Government monopoly for the manufacture and sale of chandu.

The international control of the manufacture and sale of deleterious drugs has a very extensive literature of its own, and all that we need do here is to refer to the main facts.[1]

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[1] See Herbert L. May, 'Narcotic Drug Control', *International Conciliation*

276 At the time of the Hague Convention in 1912, with provision for the gradual and effective suppression of opium-smoking, all the countries where the problem existed, except China and the Philippines, were using some form of Government monopoly. Most of them had advanced through successive stages from partial to complete control. On the other hand, only a few years prior to 1912, China and the Philippines had skipped most or all of the steps and had jumped straight to (theoretical) prohibition. But what stood in the way of giving prohibition any real effect was the failure, so far, to secure effective control of production. The policy in the Dutch and British colonies was a progressive reduction of opium-smoking (and with it the revenues derived therefrom)[1] side by side with improvement of the preventive measures against illicit importation and sale of the drug.

Efforts to solve the problem of opium-smoking in the Far East were accelerated by the pernicious policy of the Japanese in encouraging the habit in the territories which they occupied. In 1943 the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, and in 1945 the French and Philippines Governments, declared their intention to introduce a policy of absolute prohibition. As a result of this declaration, the only countries in which opium-smoking was still not prohibited at the close of the Japanese war were Siam and certain states in India. At its fourth session, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations adopted a resolution inviting all countries in which opium-smoking was still

(May 1948). This pamphlet gives a concise account of the matter and of the progress of international control. The *League of Nations, Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and other Dangerous Drugs; Summary of Illicit Transactions and Seizures*, for successive years, gives data which show the difficulty of preventing smuggling. See also U.N., Economic and Social Council, *Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Limitation of raw materials 6 April 1948* (E/CN/7/107) and of *25 April 1948* (E/CN/7/121).

The first step in the international campaign against narcotics took place in 1909 when an International Opium Commission met in Shanghai on the initiation of the United States Government which was seriously worried by the problem in the Philippines. In 1912 the Hague Opium Convention bound the parties to adopt measures for the control and regulation of raw opium, prepared opium, morphine, heroin, and cocaine. In 1925 the League of Nations appointed an Advisory Committee to exercise general control of the traffic; in 1925 the Geneva Agreement on Opium was signed; the same year saw the Geneva Convention; the Bangkok Agreement on Opium Smoking was signed in 1931.

[1] For the progressive measures taken in Malaya see Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 190–1. Between 1928 and 1933 the Malayan Governments reduced the opium sold from 1,344,000 taels to 612,000 taels.

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permissible to take immediate steps to introduce the necessary measures to prevent the manufacture of and trade in prepared opium for the purpose of smoking. 276

It remains to be seen how far this complete prohibition can succeed. Everything turns on the ability of the Governments to control smuggling and, in the final issue, on the effectiveness of international control of the manufacture and distribution of narcotics. It is not only opium that is the problem, but also an increasing number of even more harmful substitutes.

A number of other matters have strong claims for inclusion as 'special aspects of Chinese society in Southeast Asia', but it is thought desirable to limit this chapter to its present dimensions (for enough has been said to illustrate the general nature of the deviations from the central problems in China itself) and to start in the next Part the detailed narrative of the Chinese in Burma, Siam, Indochina, Malaya, British Borneo, Indonesia, and the Philippines.[1] In journeying with them for three centuries or more through jungle and defile, over the mountain passes of the Shan States or through the myriad islands of the Philippines, in sojourning with them in tin mine, on rubber estate, or in godown, in listening to what they have to say and what is said of them, we shall learn much and prepare ourselves better for our final task of assessing the advantage or the detriment of this people to the countries in which they have come to work or trade, and often to settle, and of adumbrating (if we dare) the future of the race in Southeast Asia. 121

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[1] The order is arbitrary.

[p. 54 is blank]

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PART II

THE CHINESE IN BURMA

CHAPTER V

DEMOGRAPHY

162 A CENSUS was taken in Burma in 1941 but the returns were lost
during the Japanese occupation of the country and only a
two-page statement of the total population by districts has
survived. We have therefore to rely mainly on the 1931 census for
information regarding the Chinese. Of that race 193,594 were
enumerated at the census, 127,049 being males and 66,545 being
females. But although these figures account ostensibly for all the
Chinese in Burma, it appears necessary to add a certain number,
especially of Sino-Burmese, to include all those who are pre-
[144] dominantly Chinese in race and characteristics. The census report
for 1931 stated that it had been the custom for some years for the
male offspring of these unions between Chinese men and Burmese
women to assume the race of the father and the female offspring
that of the mother, which would mean that many thousand half-
Chinese females were counted as Burmese. Moreover, since 1931,
in addition to natural increase and migration, other important
162 factors have affected the number of Chinese in the country and the
167 facility of identifying them. One is the displacement due to the war.
[722] In 1948 UNRRA reported that of nearly 19,000 Chinese displaced
from Burma by the war, 4,652 had been repatriated to Burma by
June 1947 and 14,000 odd were awaiting repatriation. Unauthorized
infiltration of Chinese into Burma via Bhamo, Lashio, &c., also
took place. The opening of the Burma Road in January 1939 was
followed by a marked increase in the Chinese population, but this
[425] was offset by the exodus of 1942. As regards enumeration or estima-
tion of numbers, the laws passed in Burma since the war prohibit-
641 ing the transfer of land to aliens have encouraged Chinese to claim
Burmese citizenship—indeed many persons of Chinese *race* in
Burma had for long regarded themselves as Burmese citizens and
had no more interest in China than U.S. citizens of the second or

641 third generations have in their European ancestral homes.[1] One authority stated in June 1948:[2]

> 162 441 . . . The best information based on information given by various Chinese Guilds would place the total number of Chinese through the whole of Burma at approximately 300,000. In the absence of any reliable census, this has generally been accepted as the closest possible estimate.

Another person entitled to speak with authority states:

> 162 167 From personal observation in 1946–7, I should say that the Chinese in Burma were no more numerous than they had been in 1939. Most of the racketeers brought in by the Burma Road had gone off to Shanghai. . . . I should think that 19,000 is an underestimate of the numbers that left in 1942. I saw many thousands on all the trains and stations going north from Rangoon to Myitkyina. If 200,000 was a correct figure in the 1930s I should think 300,000 is the top figure in the 1940s.[3]

162 609 648 In mid-1948 the Burmese Government announced that the registration of all foreigners in Burma would shortly begin, but this undoubtedly was held up by the disturbances within the country. Both before and after the Second World War Chinese nationals were asked to register with the Chinese consulate-general in Rangoon. Pre-war registration records were all lost during the Japanese occupation, while the number who had registered with the consulate since it reopened in 1945 did not exceed 30,000 by June 1948.

162 Of the 194,000 Chinese enumerated in 1931, 104,000 were shown as born in Burma and 90,000 in China. There was, according to the 1921 census report for Burma (para. 65), a tendency among the Chinese born in Burma to give their birthplace as China. The author of the report of the 1931 census said it was impossible to estimate the error this produced in the statistics, but it was probably not large. This tendency, however (the writer understands on the best authority), did not survive the troublous times in China in the 1930s.

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[641] [1] By the Constitution of the Union of Burma, 1946, Burmese nationality was accorded to all those of whom both parents belonged to an indigenous race of the Union, or who had at least one grand-parent of such race, or who were British subjects claiming at least eight years' residence in the Union and intending to stay there.

[2] Note from the Chinese Embassy, Rangoon, quoted in a letter to the author from Mr J. S. Furnivall.

[3] G. E. Harvey in *British Rule in Burma* (London, Faber, 1946) p. 69 fn., says that there were 'a couple of hundred thousand' Chinese in Burma in 1942.

The following table shows the number of *immigrants* from China in the two censal years (*but nearly 25,000 were of races other than Chinese*): 167 162

TABLE I[1]

Burma: Immigrants from China 1921 and 1931

Natural division in which enumerated	*1921*	*1931*	*Increase*	
			Actual	*Per cent.*
Total Burma (Province of)	102,344	114,270	11,926	11·7
Burman total	74,282	86,249	11,967	16·1
Delta	40,785	49,181	8,396	20·6
Coast (Arakan)	585	622	37	6·3
Coast (Tenasserim)	7,527	7,626	99	1·3
Centre	5,902	8,267	2,365	40·1
North	19,483	20,553	1,070	5·5
CHIN	23	53	30	130·4
SALWEEN	430	377	−53	−12·3
SHAN	27,609	27,591	−18	−0·1

The total population of Burma according to the 1941 census was 16,823,798, showing an increase of approximately 12 per cent. since 1931. The *Burma Handbook*[2] for 1943 in this connexion states:

> Apart from the increase in areas, it is not safe to assume an increase of 12 per cent. in respect of any particular group or district; it is probable that the number of Chinese has increased more than 12 per cent. as a result of the opening of the Burma road in 1939. . . . The current situation in 1943 is different again from that of 1941: many of the Chinese have no doubt made their way out of the country in 1942.

The following table is abstracted from the census of 1931: 162

TABLE II

Chinese in Burma in 1931

Total population of Burma		14,667,146
Total Chinese in Burma		193,594
	Total population	*Chinese*
Arakan Division	*1,008,535*	*978*
Akyab	637,580	689
Arakan Hill Tracts	21,418	..
Kyaukpyu	220,292	140
Sandoway	129,245	149

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[1] *Census of India, 1931* (Rangoon, Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing and Stationery, 1933), xi, pt. 1, p. 63. See p. 6 of pt. 1 regarding the non-Chinese immigrants from China.

[2] Issued by the Government of Burma (in exile) (Government of India Press, Simla) p. 198–200.

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	Total population	*Chinese*
Pegu Division	*2,549,637*	*54,001*
Rangoon	400,415	30,626
Pegu	489,969	7,552
Tharawaddy	508,319	2,687
Hanthawaddy	408,831	5,352
Insein	331,452	5,413
Prome	410,651	2,371
Irrawaddy Division	*2,334,774*	*25,950*
Bassein	571,043	6,280
Henzada	613,280	2,624
Myaungyma	444,784	7,330
Maubin	371,509	3,610
Pyapon	334,158	6,106
Tenasserim Division	*1,872,668*	*27,593*
Salween	53,186	166
Thaton	532,628	4,982
Amherst	516,233	11,287
Tavoy	179,964	3,741
Mergui	161,987	3,835
Toungoo	428,670	3,582
Magwe Division	*1,722,044*	*3,196*
Thayetmyo	274,177	698
Minbu	277,876	627
Magwe	499,573	1,289
Pakokku	499,181	502
Chin Hills	171,237	80
Mandalay Division	*1,696,332*	*6,050*
Mandalay	371,636	3,153
Kyaukse	151,320	347
Meiktila	309,999	384
Myingyan	472,557	727
Yamethin	390,820	1,439
Sagaing Division	*1,918,058*	*11,123*
Bhamo	121,193	2,545
Myitkyina	171,524	4,112
Shwebo	446,790	811
Sagaing	335,965	229
Katha	254,170	2,715
L. Chindwin	383,434	475
U. Chindwin	204,982	236
Eastern States	*1,565,098*	*64,703*
N. Shan States	636,107	60,550
S. Shan States	870,230	3,899
Karenni	58,761	254[1]

According to the census of 1911, there were then 122,000 Chinese in Burma, 1,200 of these being Yunnanese Muslims. During the decade 1921–31 the number of Chinese residents increased by 30 per cent., from 149,000 to 194,000, whereas the Indians increased

[1] Details by race for the Naga Hills and the Wa States were not available.

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by only 15 per cent. There were in 1931, however, 1,018,000 162 Indians, five times the number of Chinese in Burma.

Of the total of 193,594 for 1931, 86,361 were Fukienese or Cantonese, 40,688 Yunnanese (including 685 Panthays), and the remaining 66,445 were from elsewhere in China south of the Yangtze. In 1931, 68 per cent. of the Chinese other than Yunnanese were enumerated in the Delta; most of the remainder were found in the Tenasserim part of the coast area (15 per cent.), and in the centre (9 per cent.). The numbers of Cantonese and the Fukienese recorded were 33,990 and 50,038 respectively, but it was probable that most of the 'other and unspecified' Chinese amounting to 41,875 were also Cantonese and Fukienese.

The Chinese fan out from Rangoon along the railway and steamer lines. Nearly half of the Chinese in Burma are to be found within a hundred miles of the capital city. In 1921 the Irrawaddy delta had 64,276 Chinese residents; in 1931 the number had increased to 86,144. Moulmein had 5,603 Chinese in 1911; in 1935 more than 12,000.[1]

In Burma the overseas Chinese do not occupy the predominant position that they do in Malaya, Siam, Indochina, Indonesia, and 162 the Philippines, and they are decidedly second to the Indians in 463 the commercial life of the country. In 1931 they were classified by occupation as follows: traders and merchants, 41 per cent.; carpenters and workers in metal and leather, 38 per cent.; semi-skilled workers, 9 per cent.; clerical workers, 5 per cent.; miscellaneous, 7 per cent. Only 21,436 (18,802 males; 2,634 females) were shown as engaged in the exploitation of animals and vegetation. (Apart from a few market gardeners, there were no real Chinese employed on the land itself.) Chinese general merchandise shops are found in 444 nearly all cities and towns in Burma, and in many towns the Chinese were the sole agents for the sale of petroleum products. 366 Since the Second World War they have taken the place of many 438 Indian shopkeepers, the number of Indians having greatly diminished. But they do not have a grip of the rice trade as they have in Siam, Indochina, and the Philippines, this being very largely in the hands of Indians—mostly Marwaris, Maimanis, &c. The Chinese are active bidders for fishery and ferry rights in many streams.

In Rangoon Chinese business men promote their common in- 000

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[1] J. L. Christian, *Modern Burma* (Berkeley, University of California, 1942) p. 270.

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441 In Rangoon Chinese business men promote their common interests
through a chamber of commerce which before the war
439 elected a member (who had to be a British subject—though the
members voting were not necessarily so) to the Burma legislature.
The Chinese Overseas Bank, the Bank of China, and Chinese
insurance, shipping, rice, and mercantile firms maintained five
branches along the Burma Road and the payment of Chinese customs
could be made through these branches. No Chinese registered
steamers were engaged in the Burma trade.[1]

464 Chinese labour was principally employed in the Shan States and
it was largely Yunnanese who came to work here in the dry season.[2]
316 The one occupation in which the Chinese contributed a substantial
465 portion of the labour force and worked for members of another race
was mining. In the case of Chinese employed by the Consolidated
Tin Company at Hermingyi, Tavoy District, many worked on a
piece-work system with a minimum of supervision. The Chinese
mining labourers preferred the tribute system by which was paid
to the owner of the mine so much for every picul of tin mined by
162 themselves.[3] Agricultural and forest labour accounted for only 6 per
cent. of all Chinese employed in Burma at the census of 1931.
463 Chinese and Indian immigrants had a considerable share in certain
464 trades, such as carpentry, furniture-making, and the slipper industry.
However, the Burmese craftsman was in the majority and
worked also as a cart-maker, goldsmith, worker in lacquer, and—in
the Delta—as boat-maker.[4]

'Literacy', said the 1931 census, 'implies being able to write a
212 letter to a friend and to read the answer to it', and by this standard
162 there were 52,000 literate and 75,000 illiterate Chinese males in
Burma; for females the figures were 10,000 literate and 57,000
illiterate. As regards literacy in English, 5,000 Chinese males and
936 females satisfied the census test.

There were in 1931 slightly more than two males to every female
162 among the Chinese in Burma proper, and this led to a considerable
144 amount of intermarriage between surplus Chinese men and women
of the indigenous races. The fact that the custom was (as stated
on p. 55) for the male offspring of such unions to assume Chinese
race and for the females to assume the race of the mother would

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[1] Ibid., pp. 271, 273.

[2] Virginia Thompson, *Labor in Southeast Asia*, p. 1.

[3] J. Russell Andrus, *Burmese Economic Life* (Stamford University Press for the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1947) p. 275.

[4] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 34.

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account for the number of Chinese males born in Burma being 144 stated as more than the number of females.

Chinese immigration into Burma may conveniently be divided into those who come overland, who may be called Mountain 167 Chinese, and those who come by sea, who may be designated Maritime 162 Chinese. Of the 194,000 total in 1931, more than 60,000 lived in the Shan and Wa States along the Chinese border. Of the total of 114,000 'immigrants from China' in 1931 (as has been noted above), nearly 25,000 represented immigrants from China other than those of Chinese race. Presumably all those immigrants came overland from China, and were mainly Shan-Tayoks and Shans, but a few Maingthas were included. Many of them would be caravan traders who would return to China after the census. [439] In Bhamo district, of the 10,161 immigrants from China, only 1,523 were Chinese, the remainder being mainly Shan-Tayoks.[1] The Yunnanese are mostly found in the northern Shan States. Between 1921 and 1931 they increased by 14 per cent. while speakers of Yunnanese increased by 21 per cent. In 1921 there were 4,382 Yunnanese, or 77 per cent. of the total number, who spoke languages other than Yunnanese; in 1931 there were only 577, or 1 per cent. of the total number.[2] Chinese other than Yunnanese increased by 40 per cent., while [198] speakers of Chinese languages other than Yunnanese by 67 per cent. Taking the Chinese in Burma as a whole, they increased in number by 30 per cent. between the two censuses, while speakers of the Chinese *language* increased by 46 per cent. The big increase in Chinese speakers was due to the reduction of the number of Chinese who spoke other languages from 27,548 in 1921 to 15,957 in 1931. These facts are of some cultural and political interest.

There is no present likelihood that Chinese immigration into Burma will amount at any time to an 'invasion' or a 'flood'. For those Chinese who come by sea, Indochina, Siam, and Malaya are intermediate, or at least nearer, and they have in the past offered greater opportunities to the Chinese immigrants. As for the over-

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[1] *Census of India, 1931*, xi, pt. 1, 63.

[2] Yunnanese Muslims are usually called Panthays. They showed a reduction in number at the 1931 census. Most of them were enumerated in the southern Shan States (438), northern Shan States (125), Katha (241), Myitkyina (53), and Rangoon (51); the remainder were scattered. Yunnanese other than Panthays increased by 15 per cent. In the northern Shan States 87 per cent. were enumerated; most of the remainder were in the southern Shan States (1,026); and in the districts of Myitkyina (2,270), Bhamo (2,116), Katha (1,431), Mandalay (549), Shwebo (213), and Rangoon (136).

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162 land route, which has existed from time immemorial, this leads
through undeveloped areas of Yunnan, where the Chinese could
167 settle and be within their own country.

The illicit infiltration that took place before 1940–1 was not regarded
as a menace in the sense that it would lead to problems such
[275] as exist in Malaya. The administration kept a wary eye on the
Chinese because they ran the illicit opium and gambling-dens, tea-
276 shops, liquor-shops, &c. The common folk did not resent them at
548 all. They offered dissipations and they were not so parsimonious as
the Indians. It was only in 1940–1, when the Deputy Ministers and
648 other officials of the Kuomintang came into Burma and 'behaved
as if they owned the place', that public opinion (including that of
609 the resident Chinese) was aroused. The fear commonly expressed
was that, under pressure from the United States, the British Government would force the Burma Government to give virtually independent control of the line of communication through Burma to various Sino-American bodies, and that under cover of this the Chinese would establish permanent control over Burma. One high authority has stated to the writer: 'Nothing made the moderate Burma politician so keen on independence as the way the British and United States Governments compelled Burma to give facilities to a Chinese regime that everyone in Burma knew was rotten.'

When the Chinese armies came into Burma there can be no doubt that they behaved as if they were in a conquered country, and throughout the later campaigns their commanders frequently issued proclamations implying, and sometimes saying openly, that the British were gone for good and that the Chinese were now in control. Without any sanction from the Burma authorities they erected on the recreation ground at Lashio an enormous monument commemorating Chinese victories. Later, in January 1946, after all Chinese troops had been withdrawn, a battalion suddenly appeared at Waingmaw, just across the Irrawaddy from Myitkyina, and it was reported that the rest of the division was marching down from Paoshan. A British brigade, however, was available to counter this move and, after some tense days, the intervention of General Chiang Kai-shek resulted in the Chinese troops being ordered back.

648 This incident considerably alarmed Burma politicians regarding
Chinese intentions. The fear was less of infiltration than of ex-
102 ploitation and conquest. It is noteworthy that schools and training
centres in Chungking used maps showing all northern Burma and

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parts of Assam as *China Irredenta.*[1] If China should disintegrate, as most educated Burmans have expected during the previous eight years, then what they feared was an irruption by large fragments of defeated armies, well enough armed and organized to destroy much of the country.

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[1] The writer, while on a visit to Chungking during the Second World War, saw a map issued by the Chinese Military Academy at Chengtu showing *China Irredenta* and including Malaya with the date of its loss by China given as 1896! (Why 1896 it is not possible to say. On 1 January that year the Federated Malay States came into being, but that had nothing to do with China. The claim, if tenable, must date from the voyages of Cheng Ho in the early fifteenth century.)

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CHAPTER VI

THE CHINESE IN BURMA PRIOR TO 1850

175 648 THE story of the Chinese in Burma stands apart from that of their fellows in other territories in Southeast Asia. It resembles that of the Chinese in Indochina, or rather in Annam, in so far as the contact with these countries goes back a very long way and, until fairly recent times, the main approach to both of them was overland. But the similarity should not be exaggerated. For one thing intercourse between China and Annam was nearly a thousand years earlier than that between China and Burma; there were no trade routes between China and Annam of anything like as great consequence as those between China and Burma, and while Annam was successfully conquered and occupied for a great part of the first millennium of the Christian era, the invasions of Burma were on the whole a failure. The greater differences in the nature of the Chinese intercourse with Burma and that with the Philippines, Siam, Malaya, and Indonesia will appear in the course of this chapter.

[487] [177] Because of the difficulty of communication between China and Burma their connexion has never been close, despite the racial affinity of their inhabitants. It has been far easier for Burma to communicate by sea with India than by land with China, as is shown by the powerful influence which India has had over Burmese culture over a period of many centuries in contrast to the feeble effect of Chinese culture; thus, although the two countries have a basically common religion, yet the Hinayana Buddhism of Burma is distinct from the Mahayana Buddhism of China, and has been derived from the west and not from the east. Politically and economically Burma has long been more intimately linked with India than with China, and the political relationship between Burma and China has never been satisfactorily defined.

175 167 For the sake of descriptive convenience, the Chinese in Burma can (as has been said in the preceding chapter) be divided into Mountain and Maritime Chinese. The former, sometimes reinforced by military expeditions, made up a greater part of the total for many centuries, and even now there are over 40,000 Yunnanese residing on the Burmese side of the border and these must nearly

all have come by land. The earlier immigration, however, was very 175
impermanent and largely seasonal, and, numerically speaking, could
at no time compare with the later movement of the Maritime 167
Chinese, whose era begins with the extension to Burma of British
power in the nineteenth century and the opening up of the country
to trade on a scale hitherto unknown. The history of the Mountain
Chinese is to a great extent the history of the caravans; that of the
Maritime Chinese belongs more to the general development of
Southeast Asia.

Burma was the natural bridge for racial migrations and the temporary home of most of the peoples who inhabit the great Indo-Chinese peninsula. The Burmese themselves are believed to have come down from the hills of the northern Shan States into the plains of Burma from A.D. 839 onwards.[1] Even at the present day the Chinese (mostly Shan-Tayoks, Chinese Kachins, and Lishus) are moving southwards into the hill country of north Hsenwi State,
though on a small scale as race migrations go. It is recorded that [648]
during the T'ang dynasty a Burmese embassy, accompanied by a representative of the Shan kingdom of Nanchao in what is now Yunnan, visited China. Christian supposes that the presence of the kingdom of Nanchao as a barrier State, combined with China's remoteness, accounts for the paucity of China's influence on Burma before the time of Kublai Khan. Burma's racial affinities were with China, but her cultural ties were with India.[2]

For many centuries the bulk of Burma's trade with China had 175
passed along the Taiping river, in earlier days through Kaungsin, 439
until the influence of that place was overshadowed by Bhamo from

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[1] G. H. Luce, 'Burma's Debt to Pagan', *JBRS*, vol. xxii (1932) pp. 120–7, cited by Christian, op. cit. p. 22.

[2] Christian says (op. cit. p. 22, fn. 20): 'The entire problem of Burma's contacts with China is dealt with in E. H. Parker, *Burma with Special Reference to Her Relations with China*, Rangoon, 1893. See also G. H. Luce, "The Ancient Pyu" *JBRS*, vol. xxvii (1937) pp. 239–53, for sources on Burma's relations with China to the fall of Pagan, 1287. In Kuo Tsung-fei, "A Brief History of the Trade Routes Between Burma, Indochina and Yunnan", *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. xii (1941) pp. 9–32, the major emphasis, with reference to Chinese sources, is on Sino-Burmese overland contacts before 1600. A Japanese account of the period before the Manchu dynasty is Jinichi Yano, "Biruma no Shina ni Taisuro Chōkō Kankei ni Tsuite", *Tōyō Gakuho*, vol. xvii (1928) pp. 1–39.'

It is outside the purpose of this study to describe Sino-Burmese contacts except in so far as they bear on the economic and social life of the Chinese community in Burma, but the above note is inserted in deference to those whose interests lie in the field of the historical investigation of the trade routes.

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175 439 the fifteenth century onwards.[1] The caravans which passed over this route were essentially the same in the fifteenth as in the nineteenth century.

175 648 722 In 1284 an army of Kublai Khan marched against Pagan to enforce the payment of tribute refused by the Burmese three years before, when they had put to death the embassy sent by the Emperor of China. In 1287 Pagan was destroyed, and for a time Burma was under Chinese suzerainty. In 1298 there was another invasion, but the Chinese were expelled in that same year.[2] Burmese authorities seem generally to take the view that after 1298 Burma was independent, but a British historian, Mr B. R. Pearn, remarks: 'I do not think that the successor states to the Pagan Kingdom were tributary to China till about 1600; tribute appears to have ceased in the declining days of the Ming dynasty.' A Chinese embassy visited Burma in 1405.[3] In 1449 the Chinese attempted the conquest of Mogaung, but were successfully resisted.[4]

After the Ming dynasty was overthrown in 1644, China became the prey of freebooting armies which ravaged her outlying provinces and made periodic incursions into Burmese territory. Early in the reign of Pindale (1648–61), a Burmese army had been defeated by the Chinese at Wetwun, near the modern hill-station of Maymo, and the invaders had laid waste the country almost up to Ava itself. In 1650, however, the factors of the East India Company at Fort St George received news that the Burmese had 'defeated their plundering neighbours and that the country was likely to be settled and in a peaceful condition'.[5] Yunhli, 'the last of the Mings', proclaimed Emperor of China at Canton, was attacked by the Manchus, but escaped to Burma. Here he met 20,000 men under the Gover-

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[1] D. G. E. Hall, *Early English Intercourse with Burma* (London, Longmans, 1928) p. 121.

[2] Khin Maung Gale, *New Times of Burma* (30 November 1947), says: 'In that year Burma went her own way and was after that as little dependent on China as she will be dependent on the United Kingdom after 4 January 1948.'

[3] Henry Yule, *A Narrative of the Mission sent by the Governor-General of India to the Court of Ava in 1855* (London, Smith Elder, 1858) p. 53, says that 'the army sent by the Great Khan to subdue the city of Mien (the Chinese name for Burma) was commanded by a valiant captain, and consisted principally of jesters, with whom the court was always furnished'. The invasions were along the Chinese trade route.

[4] Édouard Huber, 'Une Ambassade des Chinois en Birmanie en 1406', *BEFEO*, vol. iv, no. 142 (January–February 1904).

[5] D. G. E. Hall, op. cit. p. 60, citing Foster, *English Factories*.

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nor of Yunnan, was defeated in 1662, surrendered, and was taken to Peking and strangled.[1]

After the surrender of Yunhli, the Burmese and the Chinese appear to have remained at peace for more than a century, and no sooner was war at an end than the highways from China to Bhamo were frequented by traders and travellers. The Dutch factors in Ava developed a large clandestine trade with the Chinese merchants from Yunnan. It was not long before they came to realize the immense possibilities of opening up trade with western China through Bhamo (in later days to be a focal point on one arm of the famous 'Burma Road'). Out of this project a quarrel arose between the Dutch and the Court of Ava which brought a final breach in 1679 and the closing down of the factories. The Burmese Government prohibited their direct trade with Chinese merchants.[2]

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Immediately before the next war of 1765 the trade seems to have been of considerable importance. We read of large caravans of 300 and 400 oxen, and others of 2,000 ponies, carrying silk and other merchandise between China and Bhamo.[3] About 1750 a large colony was mining silver at Mao-lung (probably Bawdwin) and the chief merchant, visiting Ava, persuaded the King to send to Peking one of those complimentary embassies which the Chinese regarded as tribute bearers. Two hairpins of silver and gold and a gilt pagoda mounted on an elephant were sent as presents. The Emperor Ch'ien Lung entertained their envoy at a banquet and at his departure gave him a gold slab inscribed in the imperial hand, 'Happy Pacification of the Western Jewel'. But the 'Western Jewel' was far from being pacified; the Mao-lung colony was dispersed, the merchants were executed, and the envoy returned to find his King a captive in Pegu and Ava a smoking ruin.[4]

Misunderstanding now arose between certain Chinese traders and the Burmese officials at Bhamo. An enterprising trader, Loli by name, requested permission to throw a bridge across the Taipeng at the village of Namba. The Burmese officials refused to

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[1] John Anderson, M.D., *A report of an Expedition into Western Yunnan via Bhamo* (Calcutta, Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, 1871) p. 23.

[2] D. G. E. Hall, *Europe and Burma* (London, Oxford University Press, 1945) p. 34.

[3] Anderson, op. cit., citing Burney, 'Translations of the Burmese Chronicles', *Asiatic Society Journal*, vol. vi, p. 121 ff.

[4] G. H. Luce, 'Chinese Invasions of Burma in the Eighteenth Century', *JBRS*, vol. xv, pt. 2 (August 1925).

175 grant the request on their own responsibilities and referred it to the
Court of Ava. Loli was annoyed at this and became impertinent,
648 whereupon the Burmese officials seized him on suspicion of being
439 a Chinese officer in disguise. He was taken to Ava as a prisoner, but
was later released. He was then told that he could carry on with his
trading and build the bridge. On returning to Bhamo, however, he
found that his goods had been tampered with. He demanded compensation,
which was refused. About this time another Chinese
trader at the head of a Shan caravan of 2,000 ponies had sold goods
on credit to a Burmese who had refused to pay. These incidents
coming together stirred up Chinese feeling which was further inflamed
175 by the intrigues of Burmese refugees in China. A Chinese
army thereupon marched into Burma and besieged Kaungton in
648 1767, but the campaign ended in a Burmese triumph. Another
722 Chinese army dispatched in 1769 suffered a similar fate.[1]

The utter failure of Ch'ien Lung's Burma campaigns cost him
a great deal of treasure and the flower of his generals. We find the
Emperor, too, bewailing the cowardice of his Chinese troops.[2]

The history of the intercourse between Burma and China after
175 1770 is one of peace, in spite of minor incidents and friction such
648 as when, soon after this date, a party of Shan Sawbwas, sent to
Peking in an embassy, were seized and detained until 1778. Another
embassy was, however, sent in 1787. In 1790 a Chinese embassy
[643] arrived in Burma by the Bhamo and Muangswa (Muse?) route,
bringing three Chinese so-called princesses as concubines for the
King of Ava. The 'princesses', it turned out, were natives of the
town of Malong in Yunnan, and from the circumstance that their
feet were not bound after the custom in vogue among Chinese
ladies, it was evident that they were ladies of low rank and that the
Chinese had 'imposed on the amorous propensities' of the sundescended
king of Ava.[3]

175 Father Sangermano, who lived in Ava from 1783 to 1806, speaks
439 of the trade conducted between China and Burma in these terms:

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[1] Incidents of the war were the arrogant order of the Emperor Ch'ien Lung for disposing of the Burmese and the taking of Bhamo by Colonel Hung Pang in a surprise attack. See *Ch'ien Lung Cheng Mien Tien Chi*, translated as 'Histoire de la Conquête de la Birmanie par les Chinois', by M. Camille Imbault-Huart, *Journal Asiatique*, sér. vi, xi (February, March 1878). See also G. E. Harvey, *History of Burma*, p. 253. Harvey says that such instances were trivial and could have been adjusted had the two Governments been in communication with each other; but they had no embassy system.

[2] Parker, op. cit. p. 31.

[3] Anderson, op. cit. p. 32.

The Chinese Junan [Yunnan] coming down by Kuangtaung and 175 along the great river Ava, bring to the Burmese capital in great boats, 439 several of the commodities of their country, as wrought silks, paper, tea, various kinds of fruit, and other trifles, and they return laden with cotton, raw silk, salt, birds' feathers, and that black varnish which, as we have said, is distilled from a tree: this prepared and perfumed, is the celebrated commodity known as Chinese varnish.[1]

The Chinese (said Captain Cox) thought kindly of the Burma [248] brand of cotton from which they made nankeens. The city of Sagaing was the staple from which the boats carrying cotton started from China. Each boat carried a hundred baskets of a hundred *viss*[2] weight a piece, and late in the eighteenth century the journey took from thirty to forty days.[3]

We are now approaching the period of awakened British interest 175 in China when Burma seemed to offer a short cut to that remote country. Burma at this time was glorying in her defeat of the 648 Chinese in 1765–9, and in her later conquest of Siam, for her era of expansion coincided with the growth of British power in India. Consequently, the stage was set for a clash which came over the ill-defined frontier between Arakan and Bengal and Burmese aggression in Assam.[4] Burma was a medieval State brought up against the modern world; 'failing reformation from within (says Furnivall), foreign intervention was inevitable'.[5] Continual friction led to a series of wars. The first ended in 1826 with the cession of two maritime provinces—Arakan, bordering on Bengal, and Tenasserim reaching down to the Malay Peninsula. The second war in 1852 linked up the earlier possessions through the occupation of Pegu and brought the whole of Lower Burma under British rule. In 1886, after a third war, the absorption of the country within the Indian Empire was completed by the annexation of Upper Burma. Until 1937 Burma remained a province of the Indian Empire. On 4 January 1948 she became completely independent.

Before these wars of annexation Britain's prestige in Burma was

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[1] *The Burmese Empire a Hundred Years Ago as Described by Father* (*Vincentius*) *Sangermano, With Notes and Introduction by John Jardine* (Westminster, Archibald Constable, 1893) p. 217.

[2] A *viss* was a hundred ticals in weight, or 3·65 lb. avoirdupois.

[3] D. G. E. Hall, op. cit. p. 82, citing Captain Hiram Cox, *Journal of a Residence in the Burmhan Empire* (London, Warren, 1821) (relates to the year 1797).

[4] Christian, op. cit. p. 26.

[5] J. S. Furnivall, *Educational Progress in Southeast Asia* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943).

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175 648 not remarkably high. Colonel Michael Symes, who was sent as an envoy to Burma in 1795 and again in 1802, was accompanied on his missions by a splendid suite, but at a function at a Burmese court a Chinese mission which happened to be in Burma at the time were given the front seats while the English were relegated to the back.[1] (One of the objects of Symes's missions was to look into the possibilities of the overland trade.)

The celebrated John Crawfurd, who was sent on a mission to the Court of Ava in 1826, provides us with a wealth of information regarding the Chinese in Burma at this period, but when he deals with the region of the Burma–Chinese frontier he is relying on hearsay evidence and his remarks must be examined with caution. 114 502 Dr Anderson, for example, refers to Crawfurd's statement that 'the Irrawaddy, the largest river in Ava, is navigable only for canoes at the town of Bhamo', and points out that, on the contrary, the largest river steamers could in the seventies reach that place with ease, and it was probable that the channel of that magnificent river would be found deep enough for them for 150 miles farther. Anderson remarks that Crawfurd unfortunately fell into another error in stating that the goods from Bhamo to the capital were carried overland, and (says Anderson) it is difficult to say whether this mistake which he unwittingly fell into, or the explanation of it, is more opposed to the fact. All the trade from Bhamo to the capital appears to have been conducted by boats from time immemorial.

A present-day authority on Burma comments on this passage:

> *Irrawaddy at Bhamo.* The course of the river changes a good deal, and there have been periods when the steamers have had to moor by the bank some distance away. Also, quite close above Bhamo you enter the Defile, which is navigable only by launches (there are one or two wrecks on the bank at that) during the dry weather, and not at all in the rains except by the occasional reckless youth in a dug-out. Crawfurd may not, after all, have been so wrong as Anderson suggests.

175 439 Anderson admits, however, that Crawfurd gives a very accurate description of the characteristics of the trade between the capital and China, though he erred in applying it to Bhamo.[2]

Let us see what Crawfurd actually has to say in this regard:[3]

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[1] D. G. E. Hall, op. cit. p. 82.

[2] op. cit. p. 50.

[3] John Crawfurd, F.R.S., *Journal of an Embassy to the Court of Ava* (London, Colburn, 1834) ii. 187 ff.

> The Chinese in Yunnan conduct a considerable traffic with the Burman empire, the principal marts of it being the capital, or rather a place six miles to the northeast of it, called Mide, and B'hamo, the chief place of a province of the same name bordering on China. This branch of trade is chiefly in the hands of Chinese, being divided between those residing in the Burman dominions and their correspondents in China. . . . The caravan from China, composed entirely of Chinese, arrives at Ava in the beginning of December, and it is said to take six weeks in travelling from Yunnan. It is possible, indeed, that it cannot quit China until the cessation of the periodical rains in the middle of October, which would limit the journey to the period mentioned. No part of the journey is by water, nor are the goods conveyed by wheel carriage, but by small horses, mules, and asses.

Commenting on this, Anderson (who, after all, knew the situation intimately from personal experience) says:

> All the facts in the foregoing are accurate, but I do not think he has rightly interpreted them. The mere circumstance that the caravans arrive at the capital only once a year, seems to me to admit of an altogether different explanation from that given by Crawfurd. It appears that the great distance and the difficult character of the journey travelled, the preparations for the journey there and back, such as collecting the merchandise for the Burmese market, and the disposal of it, and the purchase of goods for the return journey occupy so much time that only one journey can be undertaken, and that the dry months are selected because they are the most convenient. The danger to life, and almost certain loss of property from flood and fell [*sic*] during the rains, would far outweigh all other considerations.

Anderson goes on to say that his remarks apply only to the trade with the capital by the long and difficult route via Theinee (Hsenwi), for small trading caravans which arrived during the dry weather. Bhamo was commercially linked to Yunnan by a chain of Chinese merchants who had settled in this province and in the Shan towns of Manwyne, Sanoa, and Muangla. They maintained a constant but petty trade with the more extensive Momien merchants, who, in their turn, were linked with the growing (*c.* 1870) trading town of Yung-chan, the mart to which the products of western Yunnan found their way. The result was that there was a constant and steady flow to Bhamo of the produce of a part of western Yunnan, largely in excess of the requirements of the inhabitants of that town and district. All the surplus trade therefore found its way down the Irrawaddy to the capital, and the large trading towns along the

175 river. The China traffic was entirely in the hands of the Chinese at Bhamo and Mandalay, and from its thriving and contained 439 character and great age, and from the facilities for transport which it could command at all seasons of the year, it was greatly more important in every respect than that which found its way once a year by Theinee to the capital.

All this is by way of comment *circa* 1870 on information culled by the pioneer, Crawfurd, in 1826, but the essential conditions of the trade had not altered in the interval, though there had been a great change in the nature of some of the goods carried and their place of manufacture—as we shall later see. But let us first return to Crawfurd who still has much to tell us.

Crawfurd says that the articles imported from China in his time were copper, orpiment (yellow arsenic), quicksilver, vermilion, iron pans, brassware, tin, lead, alum, silver, gold, silk, velvets and other wrought silks, spirits, verdigris, dried fruits, paper, fans, umbrellas, shoes, wearing apparel, and a few wrought metals—which last, according to the Chinese laws, were contraband. The orpiment from the Yunnan mines was of a very fine quality. A portion of the merchandise exported from Rangoon went to western Asia and Europe via Calcutta. The largest import to Ava, however, was raw silk. From this primarily was manufactured the cloth which was in general use among all classes of the Burmese. Its quality was coarse and it suffered damage due to its long carriage overland.

Articles imported into China via the Burma trade route included cotton, ornamental fabrics, esculent swallows' nests, deers' horns, sapphires and noble serpentine, *with a small quantity of British woollens.*[1] Raw cotton, however, was by far the most considerable article of import. The feathers, chiefly of the blue jay, were intended to ornament the ceremonial dresses of the Chinese mandarins:[2] Burmese hunters went all the way to India in search of them. The sapphires were intended for mandarins' buttons of rank.

[436] No coin was in use in the Burma trade; gold and silver were the medium of intercourse and had to be weighed, which was a great hindrance to the negotiations.[3]

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[1] Commodities whose quantity or nature changed in the period under review are italicized for easy back-reference.

[2] The demand for blue feathers in China was age-old. The principal export from the vanished kingdom of Angkor to China was kingfishers' feathers for bridal coronals (and no doubt for mandarins' coats too).

[3] Crawfurd, op. cit. ii. 187.

So far our interest has been exclusively directed towards the 175
Mountain Chinese of Burma, largely because for many centuries 167
they were practically the only Chinese to enter the country, but as information becomes available regarding Maritime Chinese we shall more and more be able to bring them into the picture.

At the end of the eighteenth century, 'the Parsees, the Armenians 175
and a small proportion of Musselmen, engrossed the largest share of the trade of Rangoon'.[1] 'Malabars, Moguls, Persians, Parsees, 167
Armenians, Portuguese, French, English all mingle there,' says the same informant. Most of them were merchants. There is, we note, 439
no mention of Chinese among them, which surely would have been the case had they been at all important. But later on he mentions a deputation of Chinese and the fact that that race was addicted to swine's flesh.

On Crawfurd's arrival at Ava in 1826, two Chinese, natives of 175
Canton, came on board the ship, offering their services as provisioners and brokers. They spoke English and had made several 439
voyages to England, to the principal British settlements in India, and to the European ports in Malaya. 'These industrious people (says Crawfurd) are to be found in every port of the East, where there is room for the exercise of their useful industry, and wherever they are found, are always superior to the inhabitants of the countries in which they sojourn.'[2]

There were a great many residing in the Burmese capital, and some were natives of parts of China never seen in the European settlements of India. Crawfurd and his companions accepted the [656]
service of their visitors but were soon told by the Burmese that they were infringing the laws of the country and the two Chinese were ordered, at their peril, to discontinue their visits until after the English envoys had been presented at court. This was in October 1826.[3]

Howard Malcom, an American missionary (whose book of travels [797]
was published in 1839), mentions that in 1823 there had been a dreadful fire at Umerapura (Amarapura), seven miles above Ava, and the town, in which lived many Chinese who carried on trade with their own country by the annual caravans, was almost de-

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[1] *Embassy to Ava in 1795*, by Michael Symes, in John Pinkerton (ed.), *A General Collection of the Best and Most Interesting Voyages* (London, 1811), ix. 426–572.

[2] Crawfurd, op. cit. i. 160.

[3] Ibid.

175 439 [249] stroyed. Malcom thought that American missionaries should study Chinese and be prepared at a future date to accompany these caravans to Yunnan. He also mentions that at a few miles from Ava the Chinese had some plantations of sugar-cane and manufactured a large quantity of excellent brown and yellow sugar, 'as good as our best Havanna', at about 4 cents a pound. At Sagaing lived some Chinese who could read tracts and the Bible in their own language.[1]

175 A peep at the Maritime Chinese in Moulmein is given in March 1836 (as ever, the European reaction to Chinese music is hostile):

> [796] The Chinese have just had their annual ceremonies in memory of deceased ancestors. Hearing, a few mornings since, an uncommon din of gongs and their discordant musical instruments, I went to the veranda, and saw the procession pass to the ceremony. It was a meagre affair as to pomp, but quite as absurd as if it had been in their own country. A succession of tables borne like biers on men's shoulders, were spread with hogs, goats, and poultry, roasted whole, and various other eatables; the horrid music followed; and the procession with streamers, terminated by a man or two with muskets, firing at intervals. A priest, in proper costume, walked on each side of the tables.[2]

The Mountain and the Maritime Chinese were, of course, mixed up together in parts of the country, and not all Chinese who lived [167] in southern Burma necessarily arrived by sea. Christian says that there is no record of Chinese coming in large numbers to Burma by sea before 1800, except occasionally in coasting vessels along the Tenasserim peninsula. The first Cantonese merchant in Mandalay did not arrive until 1861.[3]

With these fragmentary observations on the Maritime Chinese we will leave them again for a while and return to their relatives on the northern confines of Burma.

175 636 439 The Burmese Government exercised very little authority over the Singhpos (Jingpaws or Kachins), Theinbuns, and other wild tribes who occupied the country between Assam, Yunnan, and Ava. Even the numerous Chinese caravans were sometimes attacked by the mountaineers, and the Burmese said that the Theinbun always preferred killing a man to cutting down a tree since the possession of a mere common waist-cloth or tinder-box from the man he might kill was wealth to a Theinbun.[4]

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[1] Howard Malcom, *Travels in South-East Asia* (London, Tilt, 1839) i, 125.

[2] ibid. i. 58.

[3] Christian, op. cit. p. 269.

[4] Captain Burney, *India Political Consultations*, vol. lxix (unpublished India Office records), letter from Calcutta of 14 February 1835, cited by Walter

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In May 1836 Burney heard that the Emperor of China had written 175
to the King of Burma 'remonstrating with the Court of Ava for
having allowed an English officer to proceed northward to ascertain 648
the route to China'. Burney questioned the Burmese ministers, 439
who, while admitting that a letter had been received from China, denied that its contents were more than a complimentary communication relative to a new title conferred by the Emperor on his mother. None the less, Burney was inclined to believe the report he had heard earlier, because he was aware that shortly after Captain Hannay had left Ava the previous December, a deputation of Chinese merchants from Ava had waited on Prince Minthagyi to remonstrate against Hannay's mission. They were fearful lest they might lose the monopoly they had so long held in the trade to the north of Ava and that of the produce of the amber and serpentine mines.[1]

The economist will note with interest the varieties of merchandise 175
carried over the trade routes at different periods. In 1839 the imports
from China were copper, iron vessels, silk (raw and manufactured), 439
precious and semi-precious stones, gold and silver thread and lace, musk, walnuts, carpets, and vermilion. The exports to China from the Shan country were cotton, ivory, skins, and horns.[2]

At this period the caravans assembled at Moung-koo. In 1839 Dr Richardson saw at Zimmay (i.e. Chiengmai in Siam) a caravan of Chinese traders consisting of 200 mules and horses, and 300 more were said to be at Moung-nan where cotton abounded. The two heads of the expedition seemed to be intelligent, enterprising characters. They said they had long entertained the idea of visiting Moulmein, and, now that they were invited and were assured of protection, they would undoubtedly do so the following season, the

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Sadgun Desai, *History of the British Residency in Burma* (University of Rangoon, 1939) p. 240.

[1] Walter Sadgun Desai, op. cit., citing a letter of Burney of 9 May 1836, *India Political Consultations*, India Office Range 194, vol. xv. Burney later secured through a secret agent a Burmese version of the Chinese letter in which it said that the British were accustomed to behave like the Pepal (peepul- or Bo-tree) tree (wherever this plant takes root, and particularly in old temples and buildings, it spreads and takes such a firm hold that it is scarcely possible for it to be removed or eradicated). (Burney's own explanation.)

[2] G. B., House of Commons, *Papers Relating to the Route of Captain W. C. M'Leod from Moulmein to the Frontiers of China, and the Route of Dr Richardson on his Fourth Mission to the Shan Province of Burma* (1869), cited by J. Coryton, in 'Trade Routes between British Burma and Western China', *JRGS* (1875). Deer's horn was used medicinally by Chinese, often as an aphrodisiac.

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175 present one being too far advanced to allow of their increasing
439 their distance from home. They requested that an interpreter
should then meet them at Zimmay.

[484] The chiefs of the native tribes (says Richardson) were favourable
to the passage of caravans through the territory, but even allowing
that the members of the trading expeditions ran no danger of attacks from the people of the country, they still had to face the perils
of the climate and of accident. If a man fell sick, or was disabled,
he was simply left behind. The laws of the trail were ruthless.
[501 Boats used by the Chinese traders on the Irrawaddy below Bhamo
were of the Burmese flat-bottomed kind and were of tolerable size,
502] each accommodating twenty persons. They were particularly well
adapted to the navigation of the river, since they did not draw more
than eighteen inches.[1]

438 The bazaar at Katha in 1835 was well supplied with good native
vegetables of various sorts, and fresh and salt fish was sold by a
435 Chinese. Dried coconuts, sugar, and rice ranging from the coarsest
quality to the finest, were also procurable.

439 The best quality rice was sold at 15 ticals a hundred baskets. Stic-lac, however, was very dear. *Even at this remote spot there was a tolerable display of British piece-goods, but not nearly to the extent noticed at Kyundoung.*

Bhamo at this period had (says Hannay) about 1,500 houses; but
including the several villages that were joined on to it, it contained
altogether 2,000 houses of which at least 200 were inhabited by
[162] Chinese. Besides the permanent population of Burmese, there was
always a number of strangers there—Chinese, Shans, and Kachins,
who either came to make purchases or to be hired as workmen.[2]

175 The route taken by the Chinese caravans started from modern
Bhamo whence the merchandise was taken to old Bhamo, or
439 Manmo, by water, and it then proceeded overland to the *choki* or
ken of Loahlong near Mowan, which was reached in three days;
487 thence it went to Moung-yen or Tenggyechew in the province of
Yunnan, which place was reached in eight to nine days. The principle article of trade, namely cotton, was entirely in the hands of
the Chinese, who arrived in Bhamo in the months of December and

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[1] Captain R. B. Pemberton, 'Abstract of a Journal of a Route travelled by Captain S. F. Hannay from the Capital of Ava to the Amber Mines of the Hukong Valley in the South-east Frontier of Assam', *JRAS*, no. 64 (April 1835).

[2] ibid.

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January. The greater part of the imports was taken to Ava, since 175
the natives of neither Mogaung nor of Bhamo could afford to purchase 439
them. What were disposed of in these places were copper
pots, carpets, and warm jackets which were also in demand all over 487
Burma. Several cotton godowns in Bhamo belonged to the Chinese, [441]
500 of whom were in constant residence in the town, which fact,
added to the numerous arrivals from other parts of the country,
gave the place a very businesslike air. There was a neat Chinese [778
temple with carvings and where tea was served to visitors. The
Chinese of Burma (says Hannay), although differing from the 346]
Maritime Chinese in language and features, had the same idea of
neatness and comfort, and their manners and their mode of living
appeared to be much the same. The temple and the houses were
not of a temporary nature but were of brick stained blue.[1]

In the 1830s the only traffic of any consequence in the Hukawng 439
valley was in amber which was sold to a few Chinese, Chinese 175
Shans, and Chinese Singphos (Simphos) who found their way 316
there annually.[2]

Although it is stated above that the tribes of this area were generally well disposed towards the caravans, there was talk in previous periods of the waylaying of the traders, and in 1836 another British traveller mentions the obstructions due to the jungle and to
hostile tribes. This same authority says that many of the Chinese [317]
made two trips a year—on the second occasion they brought down
rock salt from the neighbourhood of Esnuk (the Muangla of the Shans). There was a great demand for English goods.[3]

From the serpentine mines of Mogaung came boats laden with masses of stone so large that it required three men to lift them.

Hannay learnt that although the greater number of Chinese came 439
to the mines via Santa and Tali, they were only the poorer classes
that did so; the wealthier came by way of Bhamo, which was the 651
safest and best route. The total number of Chinese who visited the 316
mines in 1836 was 480. The Chinese paid 1½–2½ ticals for permis-

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[1] ibid. p. 258.

[2] The price of amber was 2½ ticals a *viss*, or 4½ rupees for 1½ *seer*, but the best [435]
kind, for ornaments, was more expensive. The Chinese sometimes paid in silver
for amber, but also in warm jackets, carpets, straw hats, copper pots, and opium. They also bartered their merchandise for ivory and gold dust, but only in small quantities.

[3] Lieut. T. E. MacLeod, Assistant Commissioner of Tenasserim province, 'Abstract Journal of an Expedition to Kiang Hung on the Chinese Frontier Starting from Moulmein on 13 December 1836', *JRAS* (1837).

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439 651 316 sion to proceed to the mines, in addition to a boat tax of 10 per cent. and 10 per cent. of the appraised value of the minerals they took away.

175 167 439 The principal features of the history of the Chinese in Burma in the first half of the nineteenth century are the flourishing caravan routes between Burma and Yunnan, and the beginnings of large-scale immigration by sea which accompanied the establishment of British power. In the year 1826, 14 million lb. of cotton, worth £228,000,[1] was transported to China via Burmese land routes. But by mid-century great changes were impending. [656 286] One of these was the decline of the overland trade, due in part to the fact that cotton was to be declared a royal monopoly in 1854; another was the Panthay rebellion, which, combined with the vagaries of Burmese policy, brought the trade to almost a complete standstill until the rebellion was suppressed in 1873. A third feature of the period was the substitution of many British-made articles for those traditionally manufactured in China, since Britain, having completed her industrial revolution, was expanding her markets throughout the world.[2]

Yule estimated the value of the trade in 1854 at: exports, £235,000, and imports, £187,000, which was somewhat less than the figures given by Anderson for the same year.

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[1] Christian, op. cit. p. 213, citing Crawfurd, *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Court of Ava* (1829) pp. 436–8.

[2] The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 greatly stimulated this process.

CHAPTER VII

CIRCA 1850–1900

IN the nineteenth century, when China as a Power was in decline, 175
and Burma was being annexed in stages by the British, the 648
history of diplomacy in these regions is mainly one of Anglo-
Chinese or Anglo-French relations. But the change in the super- 439
structure made very little difference to the Chinese traders, miners,
and labourers in Burma who persevered, as circumstances allowed, 654
in their time-honoured routine and tactics. The British, however, dazzled by the legend of the untapped riches of Cathay, conceived an exaggerated idea of the value of the Burma–Yunnan route as a short cut to China. This route, it was argued, would by-pass the Straits of Malacca and shorten the journey by many hundreds of miles. Experience was to prove to them that the central mass of southern China was barring the way and that the Irrawaddy did not rise, as had been thought, in Tibet. But whilst the illusion was maintained it had almost the hypnotic attraction of the Northwest Passage, and a wealth of enterprise and talent was lavished on finding and unlocking the magic door. The story of the quest of a route to China by the Shan States, by the Salween, by the way of Indochina, and of the rivalry of the British and French to be the first to pave the way by road and railway, is told in the voluminous literature of the times: our business here is to repeat so much of it as will reveal and explain the vicissitudes of the Chinese in Burma.

After the Anglo-Burmese war of 1824 numerous surveys were made from India and Moulmein towards the Chinese frontier. During the interval between the first and second Anglo-Burmese wars comparatively little, however, was done towards promoting the trade by the Bhamo route; the British concentrated their endeavours on reaching China overland from Moulmein. Burma, having lost its sole remaining maritime province to the British in 1852, became an inland State and was opposed to all British efforts to cross its territory to Yunnan.[1] The mission of Sir Arthur Phayre to Ava in 1855 to persuade the King to change his mind and to permit trans-Burma trade with China, was, in this one respect, unsuccessful, though it was brilliantly successful in others.

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[1] Christian, op. cit. p. 214.

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In 1854 the cotton trade of Burma became a royal monopoly. Previously to this the Chinese merchants used often to make advances to the native cultivators, taking the produce of the cotton harvest in return. After 1854 advances were made exclusively by the King. The rate at which he paid the cultivators was 20 ticals a 100 *viss*, and the rate at which he disposed of the cotton in the capital was from 40 to 50 ticals for the same quantity. (What terms the Chinese merchants had given are not on record, but they are not likely to have been more profiteering than those of the Burma sovereign.) The cotton, cleaned from seed, was transported by boat up the Irrawaddy to Bhamo. This royal monopoly naturally restricted the share of the Chinese in the cotton trade, though they picked up about 150,000 *viss* of this product in the Shan States to which the monopoly did not extend.[1]

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The Chinese who suffered most from this royal nationalization of the cotton industry lived mostly in the suburbs of Amarapura. They were, in spite of their character of middlemen, instinctively recognized by the Burmese as of close kindred in blood, and were not classified by them with the *Kalas* or other foreigners, though that term included every race of India proper, of western Asia, and of Europe. The Chinese ward (says Yule) occupied a large portion of the main street of the suburb where 'every shop and house exhibited the unmistakable countenance and [pig] tail'. 'Thinking of the Eastern people in the mass (continues the distinguished rediscoverer of Marco Polo) one was apt to class the Burmese and other kindred races with the Chinese, but when one saw the latter in the streets of Amarapura his individuality was just as recognizable as it would have been in Hyde Park.'

563 361 341

A large proportion of the dwellings in the quarter inhabited by the Chinese was built of brick.[2] The colony probably amounted to nearly 2,000 families in the capital and neighbouring villages. They had a temple of their own, 'the nationality of which in its bizarre character would be recognized by an English child'.[3]

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[1] Captain Henry Yule, *A Narrative of the Mission Sent by the Governor-General of India to the Court of Ava in 1855* (London, Smith Elder, 1858) p. 144.

[2] Raffles (*History of Java*, i. 81) noticed that the Chinese invariably constructed a house of brick and mortar when they possessed the means, and that the Chinese kampongs and wards in the Javanese cities might always be distinguished thus from those of the natives. (Cited by Yule, op. cit. p. 142.)

[778 361]

[3] Yule, op. cit. p. 143. In paying a visit to the temple with some other officers of the mission, Yule was very courteously received by some of the Chinese merchants who were passing their evening leisure there. For the temple served

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While Phayre and Yule were still at Ava, there occurred a hap- 175
pening of even greater gravity for the overland trade than the
King's declaration of a cotton monopoly. This was the outbreak 721
of the Panthay (Mohammedan Chinese) rebellion in Yunnan. 648
Yunnan remained under Mohammedan government until 1873.
During this rule bands of marauders under petty chiefs desolated 439
the country on the frontier and harried the few unfortunate traders to such an extent that they threatened to annihilate all trade.[1] So the success of Sir Arthur Phayre in 1862 in negotiating a treaty with the King of Ava, restricting the duty on imports from China to 1 per cent. and prohibiting the levy of any tax or transit dues on goods destined for the China overland, was not as effective as it might otherwise have been.

The struggle that now ensued was between the orthodox Chinese on one side and the Mohammedans on the other. It had the most
devastating effect on trade. Large tracts of cotton-growing land to [433
the south of the capital of Burma, and to a still greater extent to the
north, were now left uncultivated. Previous to these troubles the 248]
Chinese of Bhamo had had large godowns and had dealt in nothing but Chinese goods and those for export to China, but when the route had been for long closed they were forced to become general storekeepers. Whereas in the old days the shopkeepers used to wear cloth jackets which came from Canton overland, now all came by river from Lower Burma. Even the 'lasting' of their jackets (*which were of Leeds manufacture*) now came by ship from Canton. They told Clement Williams that, were the road open, they could sell in Yunnan, in preference to Chinese goods, everything that Birmingham, Leeds, Sheffield, Lancashire, and Yorkshire could produce.
Mines in the Burmese Shan territory, formerly worked by Chinese [316
who paid royalties to the Burmese, were for some time left unworked—in consequence, however, of the oppression of the Bur- 656]
mese superintendents rather than of the closing of the trade route.[2]

But, in spite of the closing of the trade routes, there was a considerable local trade in 1863. ***The bulk of the stores consisted of British piece-goods***, cloth, coarse blanketing, long-cloth, muslins,

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not merely as a place of worship but also as a house of resort or club for its [778
frequenters. The temple was paid for by a voluntary tax on imports.

[1] J. Coryton, 'Trade Routes between British Burma and Western China', 361]
JRGS (1875) p. 231.

[2] Clement Williams, *Through Burma to Western China, Being Notes of a Journey in 1863* (Edinburgh, Blackwood, 1868) p. 82 ff.

175 and cotton clothes, cotton velvets, silk and cotton handkerchiefs,
721 figured and coloured muslins, the lastings of bombazines of which
Chinese jackets were made, twists, sewing goods, needles, buttons,
648 &c. *No Chinese goods were seen except for a few medicines.* Some of
439 the Chinese were well dressed; others seemed very poor.

No Chinese goods were to be seen! What a revolution had taken place since 1793 when the Emperor Ch'ien Lung told Lord Macartney that China lacked no product within her borders and had no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians.[1]

A Sino-Burmese was appointed by the Burmese Government as a kind of mayor.[2]

Failing to crush the Mohammedan movement, the Chinese encouraged freebooters to prey on the Panthay kingdom. These freebooters allowed trade to pass only on the payment of heavy blackmail. The intermediate region between Burma and China consisted of hills and valleys occupied by the semi-civilized Kachins and by the Shans. They were 'as credulous as children, but were fully alive to the profits of the carrying trade which had now been brought to an end'.[3]

175 After the suppression of the long-drawn-out rebellion and the
pacification of the province, one of the first acts of the Viceroy of
648 Yunnan was to send a letter to the King of Burma announcing the
fact and requesting him to assist in re-establishing the trade be-
439 tween the two countries. In response to this letter the King dispatched an embassy to Peking carrying tribute; but so disturbed was the borderland that the ambassador was detained in the hills for a month by the hillmen, who had barricaded the road for the purpose of exacting blackmail. However, he eventually arrived in China and was able to lay before the Emperor a letter which has the merit of affording this study an extra touch of light relief:

> Your vassal would, with all humility, set forth that under the universal sway of His Holiness the streams and hills are all objects of his loving

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[1] Sir John Pratt, *The Expansion of Europe into the Far East* (London, Sylvan Press, 1947) p. 34.

[441] [2] Williams, loc. cit., remarks: 'the likeness of one Burmese to another is striking, but the absolute sameness of one Chinese shop to another is truly wonderful. Not only are they all of one shape and size, but the various goods seem to be arranged after one set pattern—the money-box, the tobacco-bottle, and all the different articles for sale, occupying the same relative position in every narrow warehouse'.

[3] Lieut.-General Albert Fytche, *Burma Past and Present. With Personal Reminiscences of the Country* (London, Kegan Paul, 1878) ii. 97.

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care, the kingdoms of the distant ocean become converted to his civilizing rule and as the sunflower bows before the sun, so does all mankind turn with adoration towards the Imperial person. . . . 175 648 439

The King goes on to state that since he has succeeded to the Emperor's 'barren and far-off dependency of Burma', he offers tribute, and remarks that recently, owing to war and rapine on the borders, communication has been interrupted, the horrors of strife are now over, and the universe has returned to tranquillity.[1] The tribute included five tame elephants.

So say the Chinese accounts of the affair. But listen now to what an authority on Burma's history, Mr B. R. Pearn, has to say:

> There is a complete clash of evidence between Chinese and Burmese accounts. The Burmese deny that in modern times they have ever been tributary to China; they sent friendly gifts at intervals to Peking, but only in response to the prior receipts of gifts from China. Also, their version of the letter which is here quoted is altogether different from the Chinese version: far from being the letter of a vassal to his lord, it uses the language of one independent sovereign to another. . . .

Certainly, in view of the Chinese practice of numbering all foreign countries among tribute-paying countries (e.g. Great Britain), the Chinese account cannot lightly be accepted. Indeed, taking everything into consideration, especially China's weak state as a Power at this time, the Burmese version is much the more plausible.

There is evidence that missions were sent to China in 1787, 1795, 1811, 1820, 1830, 1833, and 1843, and whereas the Chinese claim that these missions were tributary, the Burmese assert that on the contrary they were merely expressive of friendship between independent States and were normally sent only in response to prior missions bearing presents from China to Burma. The truth probably is that 'in nearly every instance the Burmese embassies were preceded by bogus embassies purporting to be from the Emperor of China to the King of Burma but in reality got up to deceive both the Emperor and the King by the Yunnan officials'.[2]

Writing in the period immediately following the suppression of 000

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[1] Robert K. Douglas, 'China and Burma', *Asiatic Quarterly Review*, vol. i (January–April 1886), citing translation into Chinese of the King of Burma's letter in the *Peking Gazette* for 1875.

[2] E. H. Parker, *Burma, with Special Reference to her Relations with China* (Rangoon, 1893) p. 94.

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175 Writing in the period immediately following the suppression of the Panthay rebellion, a close observer and authority on the border
167 region speaks of the Chinese in these terms:[1]

> Mingled with the motley population of Shans, in the belt of the country south-west of Yunnan, is one element of which we may regard the increase in the neighbourhood of Bhamo and Mandalay with great satisfaction. I refer to the Chinese who, having left their country as immigrants from the Eastern ports, have gradually established themselves as coolies, cultivators, and traders all along the coast of the Malay Peninsula from Singapore to Rangoon, and so up the Irrawaddy to the very spot to which we are hoping their brethren will come overland to meet and trade with them.

It will be noted that Coryton regards the Chinese in Bhamo as an extension of the Maritime Chinese rather than as Mountain Chinese who had arrived overland. To what extent this was true we have no means of checking, but it seems probable that nearly all Cantonese and Hokkiens came by sea, whilst nearly all Yunnanese came by the land route.

175 The trade was restarted, and during the year ending October 1874 British steamers carried cargo valued at £200,000 to and from
439 Bhamo. But the following year there was a disappointing lull. As late as 1882 the provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi were still in a state of turmoil from the recent insurrections; brigandage was rampant, transport was bad, and there were epidemics of plague, malaria, and dysentry.[2]

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[1] J. Coryton, 'Trade Routes between British Burma and Western China', *JRGS* (1875) p. 230.

[2] Archibald Ross Colquhoun, 'Exploration in South-Western China', *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society* (1885). Colquhoun took with him a Mr Hong Beng-kaw, a Chinese gentleman educated in Scotland, and a Cantonese interpreter. Malaria has been suggested as the main reason for the eventual defeat of Kublai Khan's troops in the thirteenth century.

The British surveys and expeditions of the Burma–Chinese routes are noticed by Christian (op. cit. p. 212 ff.), and in the article in the *New Times of Burma* of 30 November by Khin Maung Gale, before cited. Notable among the expeditions of the British was that of Margary who reached Bhamo from Shanghai on 17 January 1875—the first white man to make the trip. Margary, however, was murdered at Manwyne, approximately midway between Bhamo and Tengyueh. (For the repercussions of the murder, see S. T. Wang, *The Margary Affair and the Chefoo Convention* (New York, 1939)). In contrast with this tragedy is the experience of J. McArthy, who travelled on foot from Hankow to Bhamo, arriving there on 26 August 1877. Throughout his journey, extending over eight months, he did not meet with a single act of incivility, was never asked for his passport, and was never refused any assistance or courtesy he desired. McArthy's success was due in great measure to his having travelled in native costume, and

1[China--Analyst]

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With the accession of King Thibaw in 1878, conditions in what 175 remained of independent Burma became more and more chaotic. Trade declined and in 1879 the British Resident was withdrawn 439 from Mandalay and the British Agent from Bhamo. In 1885 the 648 ultimatum from Britain ending Burmese independence demanded, among other things, the provision of facilities for opening up British trade with China through Burma. Bhamo was occupied in December 1885. For several years after the annexation of 1886 [579] trade decreased owing to the raids of dacoits on both sides of the frontier. Raw cotton was the only considerable export to China but the cost of transport limited its destination to points not more than 250 miles beyond the Chinese frontier. From 1890 there was a British consul stationed at Tengyueh and, for a time, at Szumao, at which places there were also offices of the Chinese Maritime Customs. The Sino-Japanese war of 1894–5 gave the overland trade a temporary impetus, the total for that year reaching Rs. 32 lakhs as compared with 22 lakhs the following year.[1]

During the negotiations which preceded the Convention of 24 July 1886 between Great Britain and China, the former seems to have been labouring under an exaggerated impression of the power of China. The result was that the two following Articles were included in the Convention:

> I. Insomuch as it has been the practice of Burmah to send decennial missions to present articles of local produce, England agrees that the highest authority in Burmah shall send the customary decennial missions, the members of the missions to be of the Burmese race.
>
> II. China agrees that, in all matters whatsoever appertaining to the authority and rule which England is now exercising in Burmah, England shall be free to do whatever she deems fit and proper.

The decennial mission, however, was never sent. It was pointed out that the dispatch of such a mission would be construed in China, and perhaps in Burma, as placing the British Government in a position of inferiority. The Chinese pressed on several occasions for the sending of the mission, but finally in 1896 the obligation to send it was repudiated on the ground of 'altered circumstances'.

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to his ability to converse with the people in their own language. See J. McArthy, 'Across China from Chin-Kiang to Bhamo', *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society* (1879).

[1] Christian, op. cit. p. 221, citing *Upper Burma Gazetteer*, pt. 1, p. 108.

175 On 1 March 1894 a treaty was signed between Britain and China
439 regulating the Sino-Burmese trade. Free overland trade was
granted for a term of six years, after which the general tariff of the
648 Chinese Maritime Customs would apply. Chinese vessels were permitted to ply the Irrawaddy on the same terms as British vessels. By the same treaty it was agreed that China might appoint a consul to reside at Rangoon, that Chinese subjects wishing to enter Burma might receive passports from a British consular officer, and that the subjects of the two Powers should each within the territory of the other enjoy all the privileges, immunities, and advantages that may have been, or might thereafter be, accorded to the subjects of any other nation.[1] But the trade was a disappointment to the British and Chinese alike. From 1900 until the opening of the Sino-Japanese hostilities of 1937 onwards, the trade with China was of
[496] minor importance. The railway stopped at Lashio and was not
extended to the Chinese frontier.

Sir Charles Crosthwaite, who visited Bhamo in 1887, found it
361 a disappointing place. It was nothing but a very dirty, miserable
364 kind of village, arranged in two streets parallel to the river. Conservancy there was none, and the stench from the streets, the
439 lagoon, and even the bank of the river was sickening. The Chinese
175 were the most prominent of the population. They were, it was said, opium smokers almost to a man and seldom moved until midday. They managed, notwithstanding, to make money and retired to China after a few years with fortunes. Crosthwaite anticipated a large increase in the trade with China but doubted whether the town of Bhamo could grow much on its existing site.[2]

175 The trade, however, could not make much progress on account of the cost of transport between Bhamo and Tengyueh, the risk
439 of attack by Kachins, and the exactions and oppressions by the
Chinese officials who at one time had maintained a *likin* (octroi)
648 station within the British boundary, not far from Bhamo. There was, however, another route used by traders which went by way

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[1] Sir E. Herslet and Ed. Parkes, *China Treaties* (London, 1908) p. 99ff.

[2] Sir Charles Crosthwaite, *The Pacification of Burma* (London, Edwin Arnold, 1912) p. 74.

The population of Bhamo in 1891 was 8,048, in 1901, 10,734, and in 1911, 9,762, of whom 3,000 was natives of India. These figures include the garrison. The figures for 1921 and 1931 were, respectively, 7,741 and 7,827 (in 1921 and 1931 the garrison was not included). These totals are sufficiently indicative of the static nature of the trade.

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of Mansi and Namkhan (Namhkam), a Shan town on the Shweli. 175
After the Kachins in the country south of Bhamo had been subjugated,
the Chinese preferred the Namkhan route, and though the 439
Kachins had ceased to raid, and much had been done to improve
the route to Tengyueh, the trade had not returned to that channel. 648

The depressing picture given of Bhamo by Crosthwaite refers obviously to the 'off-season', and it is counterbalanced by another belonging to a few years later (*c.* 1895), this time written by an observer with perhaps a more buoyant temperament. It gives a very striking impression of the Chinese caravans and of the races of that border town at the period when the trade was in full swing:

> During the rains Bhamo relapses into a small and unimportant town. 175
> . . . But the approach of winter heralds a great change. Over the wild
> borderland through which winds the Ambassador's Road, roughest of 439
> international highways, come the big caravans from China—thousands
> of hardy mules, hundreds of blue-clad labourers and portly merchants, 361
> filled out to abnormal size by dint of satin coats and furs, upon small ponies which amble sturdily along. . . . From the Shan States, north and east, come picturesque crowds of varied nationality, a permutation of Chinese, Burmese and many-tribed Shan, and from the border highways descend the cateran Kachin, to whom the Government now pays a fixed toll in lieu of the income they formerly derived, by robbery and blackmail, from the traders who made their way along this dubious highway. Bhamo now breaks into new life and colour, exchanging its moribund isolation for the concourse of many visitors, like any tourist resort in the season. . . .[1]

Our authority then describes with Celtic enthusiasm the polychromatic visitors—Burmans in silken kilts and flaming headgear, Shans in loose trousers and big straw hats, Kachins with naked swords, real Chinamen in felt boots and black satin caps, hybrid Chinamen in English hats, came and went in an incessant leisurely stream. And out on the white highroad a British soldier swung by, his shoulders square, his boots creaking, the silver head of his regimental cane gleaming in the light. Along the same highway the trader from Yunnan rode by at a fast amble on his shaggy steed. An almond-eyed porter, a man of thews and sinews, struggled slowly behind with a heavy load on his back.

Outside the market-place the view was across the white and grey walls and distinctive roofs of the Chinese houses. In the space be-

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[1] V. C. Scott O'Connor, *The Silken East* (London, Hutchinson, 1904) i. 183 ff.

[241] tween, in hollows where the river, at its rising, rushed in, Chinese
market gardeners were toiling over rows of cabbages and beans.
175 They wore blue clothes and large sun-hats, and carried, slung
439 from poles over their shoulders, cans of water from which the ingenious
bamboo spout made the water splash in large silvery jets.
361 'In all that the Chinese does (says O'Connor) there is something
distinctive, from the decoration of his house, to the pattern of his
pipe and the spray of his water-can.'

439 As for the traders themselves, their dress and trappings had
altered scarce a tittle through the centuries—loose coat, trousers
653 bound tightly round the ankles, black silk cap, and white felt shoes.
291 As ever the Chinese trader was 'portly, affable and clean'. His means
of transport, like a Canterbury pilgrim, was a stout nag with tasselled
492 trappings and short high stirrups, but now here in Bhamo
[177 495] in the first decade of the century our informant observes a revolution—*the
bicycle had come in!*

If we pay yet another visit to Bhamo thirty years or so later through the intermediary of a woman traveller, we shall find ourselves bewailing with nostalgia the passing of the picturesque in the present humdrum age. She is speaking of the yearly frontier meeting between British and Chinese officials:

> [177] How drab, how un-Oriental, the Chinese officials look, dressed as they are in ordinary Chinese robes of black or dark blue silk topped with a bowler or soft felt hat! How different it must have been twenty years ago when China was still an empire and her officials came to call dressed in gorgeous dragon robes with plumes of peacock's feathers nodding in their 'button' hats.[1]

167 The wealth of literature at our disposal regarding the Burma-Yunnan trade routes and the characteristics of the Mountain Chinese must not distract our attention altogether from their brothers who came into Burma by more peaceful and less romantic routes by way of Canton, Amoy, Swatow, Singapore, and the Burma ports. In 1891 a total of 37,000 Chinese were counted in Burma, more than half of whom had come in by sea routes. These Maritime Chinese did not attract the attention of foreigners to anything like the same extent as did their co-nationals from over the mountain frontier,[2] but there were nevertheless some notes made

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[1] Beatrix Metford, *Where China Meets Burma* (London, Blackie, 1935) p. 60.

[2] But it should be mentioned that before the great influx of Indians began, there were fears expressed in some quarters that Burma would eventually be

by foreign observers. To one such account we are indebted for /167
information regarding the Chinese community as a whole and its
influence on the social and economic life of the Burmese which goes
much deeper than the impressions of the ordinary traveller,
however vivid they may be.[1]

The offspring of unions between Chinese men and Burmese 302
women were thought (say our authors) to have a great future. The
sons were brought up as Chinese; the daughters as Burmese. But 276
the men were not suffered to wear the plaited queue of the Chinese;
they merely coiled their hair round the unshaven part. These half-breeds were not addicted to smoking opium.

It is interesting to observe the influence of China and Europe on /177
Burmese trades and handicrafts, and vice versa.

The Burmese umbrella (*hti*) was on the Chinese model—a bam- [293]
boo frame with a paper cover. The Chinese umbrella, however, had
a thin paper cover, whereas the Burmese had a cover of *bast*-paper
which outlasted several of the others. But the Chinese umbrellas
were cheaper and better waterproofed. The Chinese blacksmith [326
had already adopted the European anvil and heavy sledge-hammer
for forging axles and tires, anchors and grapnels. The bench-vice 372]
was also universal. At the same time, the Chinese adhered to his
horizontal wooden box-blast fitted with valves like a double-acting
pump, whereas the Burmese copied the leather double-bellows
from the steam-mill workshops. Needles used to be brought to [412
Burma from China, as well as scissors, though the latter were also
fashioned in Burma. *In the 1890s both were imported from Europe.*[2] 439]
The bulk of the tailoring was in the hands of immigrants from [294
China,[3] but their prejudice against the sewing-machine was helping
to transfer the business to Burmese women. Nearly every well-to- 462]
do family in the towns, however, had its sewing-machine.

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overrun by the Chinese. See, for example, Sir J. G. (George) Scott, *Burma as it was, as it is, and as it will be* (London, Redway, 1886) pp. 142–3.

[1] Max and Bertha Ferrers, *Burma* (London, Sampson Low, 1900) p. 61 and passim.

[2] ibid. p. 61.

[3] A Burma official of many years' experience comments: 'I doubt if the Ferrers are right in saying that the bulk of the tailoring was in the hands of Chinese immigrants. Chinese tailors were rare, very rare, when I crossed from India in the spring of 1915, and I never heard that they had been numerous in the recent past. The Indian *Durzi* was ubiquitous. But the advent of the sewing-machine certainly encouraged Burmese women dressmakers, and every bazaar had its quota of sewing girls with machines.'

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Burma AP1
Chinese

177 335 413 For teak-cutting, the indigenous carpenter's tools were the small adze (*pegot*), chisels and gouges (*sauk*), awls (*lun*), and a rough saw (*hlwa*), besides an axe (*pauksein*). The Burmese adopted the Chinese plane with the Chinese straddle bench. When the impulse to cheap house building was given by the presence of cheap planks, the immigrants from China got the whole work.[1] But by the end of the century the Burmese had begun to oust them from the heavy carpentering and from joinery as well.[2] Ordinary Burmese carpenters earned three-quarters of a rupee a day, the better workmen earned from one to one and a quarter rupees, compared with the one and a half rupees earned by the Chinese carpenter.

[493] European vehicles built by Chinese were used by the better-off Burmese in the towns.

167 579 Such was the state of the Chinese in Burma and their influence on the indigenous people at the end of the nineteenth century. Some observers saw in the Chinese 'a welcome assistant to the British administrator', though they were, unhappily, those who flocked across the frontier and went marauding through the loosely-settled districts. But even these disturbers of the peace eventually married native girls, treating them much better than did either Shan or Burmese husbands, and they remained to multiply and to implant the characteristically Chinese institutions. As a result of Thibaw's misrule the region of the frontier had long been harried by roving dacoits and this afforded to Chinese filibusters a tempting opportunity that they were not slow to exploit.[3]

167 511 These were days long before the rise of Chinese nationalism and the Chinese was still largely judged on his merits or demerits

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[1] The same official also thinks that this must be an exaggeration. It was doubtless true of European-type building in the large towns, but Burmese carpenters and joiners must have done most of the work in the jungle. 'It is fair to say, however,' he adds, 'that where a Chinese carpenter or cabinet-maker did set up in business, he was always heavily patronized.'

[2] A controversy between two of my expert advisers arose over this passage. All I can do is to quote what they say. The first expert remarks, 'Even if (though I doubt it) at the end of the nineteenth century the Burmese had begun to oust the Chinese from the heavy carpentry and joinery industry, this was only a passing phase. By the early 1920s the Chinese had something approaching a monopoly of all forms of such work and their competition had almost destroyed the indigenous craft.' When the second expert replies in the terms of fn. 1 above, the first expert retorts by quoting Christian, op. cit. p. 170, that Chinese and Indian immigrants 'do most of the carpenter work and furniture making'.

[3] F. Wells Williams, 'The Chinese Immigration in Further Asia', *American Historical Review* (April 1900).

as a colonist. But already there was (at least in the minds of some 167
Europeans) a feeling of apprehension as to the eventual meaning of the intensified immigration of Chinese. The authors whose work 511
has been quoted above inserted a warning regarding the future:

> The influx of races whose religion it is to multiply, without regard to the prospect of subsistence, must speedily result in lowering the scale of life for everyone in Burma, a country of which now it may be said that 'a large share of the happiness of each individual is derived from the consciousness of the well-being of other individuals'.[1]

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[1] Max and Bertha Ferrers, op. cit., quoting Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Ethics*, i. 297.

CHAPTER VIII

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

162 198 To a greater extent than in Siam, Malaya, or Indochina, the Chinese in Burma came to regard the country as their home. They learnt Burmese more readily than the Indians,[1] and all Chinese in the country, except in large towns like Rangoon, and the very recent arrivals and the Yunnanese who lived on the land in the Shan States, spoke Burmese fairly fluently. At the same time they used their native Chinese for communication among themselves, even when they belonged to families who had been in Burma for more than a century.[2]

162 609 665 [622] 722 167 609 Despite the anti-Chinese riots of 1931 (in which the Chinese signally defeated their assailants) and the 'middleman' nature of many of their occupations, the Burmese generally had a friendly feeling for the Chinese living amongst them, whom they called *pauk paw* or 'next of kin'.[3] Some villages in Lower Burma had Chinese headmen. In the towns they had a large hold on the catering trade. The opening of the Burma Road in 1939 did something to impair the good feeling towards the race, for it entailed the infiltration into Burma of Chinese contractors and hangers-on of indifferent character, and the behaviour of some of the Chinese soldiers in Burma during the war with Japan and afterwards did not improve relations between the two peoples. (The conduct of

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[1] Christian, op. cit. p. 270. Burmese was the lingua franca of the country, spoken even by Chinese ignorant of one another's dialects.

[2] G. E. Harvey in *British Rule in Burma 1824–1942*, p. 69 fn., says that the Chinese 'got on well with the people and intermarriages were frequent, yet they too were sometimes killed in anti-foreign outbreaks'.

[3] John F. Cady, *The Development of Self-Rule and Independence in Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948) (in mimeograph), pt. 1, Burma, p. 11, says that the Chinese in Burma generally kept clear of local politics, though they were disposed to carry on intrigues with rival Burmese parties; but this perhaps understates the case. Two Rangoon Chinese, Aw Yu-wa and Hoke Sein—the latter known as 'king of Chinatown' in Rangoon—were popularly credited with having caused the disintegration of the United Party, once the most powerful Burmese political group. Christian, op. cit. p. 271. It is pointed out, however, by an authority on Burma, that Aw Yu-wa was not interested in politics, but in more dubious matters, that he was due for deportation after conviction, and interested one set of ministers in his fate. The Cabinet split on the question of his deportation, but in any case was already widely split on other issues.

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Burma AP1
Chinese

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the Chinese troops in Burma in 1942 was good and discipline, in regard to relations with civilians, was really severe—until defeat came and demoralization set in.) 167 609

Some sections of the Chinese in Burma interested themselves in local politics. For instance, for many years Sir Lee Ah Yain and numerous well-to-do Chinese supported the 'Golden Valley' Party sponsored by Sir J. A. Maung Gyi and Oscar de Glanville. Chinese Nationalist politics, which so interested them in other Southeast Asian countries, seemed to the Chinese in Burma to make comparatively little appeal. 665

As has already been stated (see pp. 59–60), the centre of Chinese business relations was the chamber of commerce, which performed similar functions to those described in the case of the equivalent body in the Philippines.[1] 441 666

All members of the chamber, including those who were not British subjects, could, under the British regime, vote for the chamber's representative in the Burma legislature. The candidate, however, had to be a British subject.

A number of Chinese attained positions of prominence under British rule in Burma.[2]

Since the Chinese in Burma are an unobtrusive community taking definitely a second place to the Indians, they have not invited to themselves the same criticism that they have in Siam, Malaya, Indonesia, Indochina, or in the Philippines. There is, indeed, remarkably little attention paid to them in the standard works on Burma (some contriving to omit reference to them at all), but one leading authority on the country refers incidentally to their record of development in a review of Burmese economics. The Indian and Chinese money-lenders and traders (says Dr Furnivall) were not only middlemen; they were potential rivals of the rice-millers since they bought rice for India and the Straits Settlements. Sometimes, through sympathy for the cultivators, the Chinese were pictured as villains. In 1886 some wealthy Chinese combined to purchase all 609 426 [114] 241

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[1] See p. 632.

[2] Sir Lee Ah Yain, for instance, the first Chinese to hold high office in the country, served the Government of Burma for several years as Minister of Forests during the governorships of Sir Harcourt Butler and Sir Charles Innes. See Christian, op. cit. p. 273. Another Burma Chinese who deserves mention is Taw Sein-Ko (b. 1864), son of a Chinese merchant, educated at Cambridge, who was Government archaeologist and adviser on Chinese affairs in 1899–1900. In 1899 he was instrumental in keeping the Burma-Chinese frontier quiet during the Boxer rebellion. [647 648 175]

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Burma AP1
Chinese

656 the paddy coming in and to hold it up against the millers. Again
276 (as an example of Chinese obstruction of reform), when the British
annexed Upper Burma, the Government contemplated retaining
609 the Burmese prohibitions of trade in opium and alcohol, but this
was impossible because the demands by Chinese and Indians had
241 to be met. The wiles of Indian and Chinese money-lenders were
426 denounced in Burma as far back as the eighties.[1]

It was estimated from one source that before the war with Japan
433 the Chinese in Burma controlled one-fifth of the country's economy,[2] but this is an exaggeration. Out of the 12 million acres
471 cultivated, 5 million acres were in Indian hands. Over 70 per cent.
504 of the foreign trade was with India, and conducted mainly by
Indians. The railways were State-owned. Shipping was mainly British or Indian. The Rangoon Electric Tramway and Supply Company, and the Upper Burma Electric Company were British-owned. Banking was mainly British, with Indian, American, Dutch,
453 and Japanese participating. The Chinese came into the banking
business late. The rice crop was financed by Indian chettiars mainly on money borrowed from the banks. Plantations and mines were British-owned, but were inconsiderable. The oil business was British except for one small Indian company. The timber business was mainly British and the chief rice-mills, saw-mills, cotton-mills, and oil-mills were British, though a few were owned by Indians and Chinese. Retail trade in Rangoon and other *large* towns was
144 mainly Indian, with some Chinese participation. Nevertheless, the
Chinese had a considerable holding in rice, timber, salt manufacture, and the retail trade.

648 It was not to be supposed that the Chinese in Burma would have
been overlooked in the Chinese Nationalist movement which was
641 fostered by the Chinese Revolution of 1911, and intensified into a
campaign after the Kuomintang successes of 1927. For years before the war with Japan the Kuomintang had its branches in Burma, and the Chinese consul in Rangoon (promoted to be consul-general in 1940) held elections among overseas Chinese of Burma to select two representatives in the National Assembly of China. Voting was restricted to Chinese nationals registered at the consulate.

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[1] J. S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice in the Far East* (London, Cambridge University Press, 1948) p. 96.

[2] *Christian Science Monitor* (18 December 1947). The estimate of the Chinese one-fifth share in Burma's economy (given by the writer in this newspaper) is considered much exaggerated by at least one Burmese economist.

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Burma AP1
Chinese

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Education, as elsewhere, was regarded by Chinese Nationalists 871 as an important instrument of policy. In 1935 there were 12,707 Chinese children of ages between five and ten years. Of these, 837 162 were in the four Chinese Anglo-vernacular schools and 2,965 were in sixty-five unrecognized Chinese schools. In 1937 the number of pupils in the latter type of school had risen slightly to 3,308. 'The Chinese do not desire government recognition of the private schools (ran the official Government Report); they prefer to run them on independent national lines.' The Report continues:

> Some of the schools receive financial aid from the Educational Association in China, and all are supported by Chinese clubs and associations. . . . *The bulk of the Chinese schools constitute an independent school system in Burma—a system controlled, inspected, staffed, and financed by a Chinese educational body with a curriculum unrelated to the public service of education.* Approaches have been made to one Local Education Authority for the inclusion of a number of Chinese vernacular schools in the public system.[1]

(The result of the approach to the Local Education Authority does not appear to have been recorded, but we can be sure that nothing came of it. The Chinese vernacular school system was *sui generis* and based on the Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen; it would not lend itself to inclusion in any foreign system of public instruction.)

The Sino-Japanese War. Not until the Japanese had attacked 722 Shanghai and then extended their blockade to the southern ports of China did the Chinese Central Government turn its attention 648 to the possibility of an alternative gateway through Yunnan. The 491 Burma Road was begun late in 1937. It followed the line Lashio–Kyukok–Kunming. A later diversion swung it north from the Chinese frontier through Bhamo to Myitkyina, and thence to join the road from Assam through the Hukawng.[2]

In spite of natural obstacles and the alternation of the wet and [132] dry seasons (part of the road received as much as 200 inches of rain annually), by the use of the *corvée* the Chinese completed the work of opening up nearly 750 miles from Kunming to Lashio. The Chinese people of Yunnan province, with their will, their

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[1] *Annual Report on Public Instruction in Burma* (Rangoon, Superintendent of Government Printing and Stationery, 1935–6). The italics are mine. V.P.

[2] See Tan Pei-ying, *The Building of the Burma Road* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1945).

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722 hands, the *tzow tau* (mattock-like shovel), and the bamboo basket,
literally scratched out and filled in the Burma Road, crossing the
648 Kaoli mountains, a 12,000-foot-high span of the Himalayas.[1] The
491 highway was officially opened on 10 January 1939.

Side by side with the Burma Road, the Chinese began the construction of a railway from Kunming to Talifu. The British authorities also began building a railway from the Lashio end.

In 1940, after the fall of France had transformed the political situation in the East, the British Government, temporarily to placate Japan, closed the Burma Road to the transit of war materials for three months from 18 July. The Japanese occupation of Burma closed the road in 1942, but in 1943, when the military situation permitted, reconstruction of the road was begun by the Chinese Government with the advice and instruction of United States engineers.

Only a small proportion of the Chinese population of Burma was able to get out of the country in time when the Japanese invaded it. In April 1947 the new Chinese consul-general to Burma, Mr Shau Chang-hau, said that 14,000 Chinese who had left Burma when the Japanese entered it in 1942 were awaiting repatriation. In 1946, he said, 2,000 had been repatriated.[2]

722 After the Japanese occupation of Burma in May 1942, the Chinese residents seem to have kept their political opinions to themselves and to have stayed out of harm's way as much as possible. Their relations with the Burmese continued to be fairly satisfactory, and they gave no positive support to the Japanese war effort. The Japanese-sponsored Overseas Chinese Association aroused little response from local Chinese. A Military Publicity Corps, recruited by the Nanking 'puppet Government' in China, came to Burma in February 1944 for the avowed purpose of promoting more genuine support for Japan's ends on the part of the local Chinese. As the result of the increased pressure, the Chinese business men of Burma contributed 200,000 rupees for the purchase of Japanese planes, and the Chinese farmers subscribed half that sum a few weeks later. The President of the United Chinese Associations explained that it was only right for the Chinese to help at a time when they were 'enjoying normal business while thou-

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[1] Public Relations Officer, Y-Force Operations Staff, *Reconstruction of the Burma Road: Operational, Logistical, and Historical Data* (New York, 1944).

[2] *New Times of Burma* (6 April 1947).

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Burma AP1
Chinese

sands of Japanese, Indian, and Burmese soldiers are shedding their 722 blood not far away'.

The conclusion of the war with Japan brought to the fore again 722 the question of Chinese immigration. In 1939 the opening of the 648 Burma Road had been viewed with some apprehension by a number of Burmese politicians. The fear was that by opening the road through Rangoon the British exposed the city sooner or later to bombing attack by the Japanese. It was realized that although Japan was not then at war with Britain she was quite capable of bombing Rangoon to bits, and apologizing with compensation afterwards. Fears of an influx of Chinese by this route were not great until a later stage, though they were, of course, present in the minds of some. The political mind was not at that time anti-Chinese so much as apprehensive lest Burma should get mixed up in a Sino-Japanese quarrel. Everybody knew that, owing to their other commitments, the British would reinforce Burma only in the last resort.

A customs wrangle also developed. Goods bought by the Chinese 648 with American credits passing through Burma were charged customs duty, but were given a drawback of seven-eighths when 439 re-exported. The general view in Burma was that the Kuomintang officials objected to the double scrutiny of the consignments that 651 this entailed: 'they had too much to hide'. The Burmese view also was that Burma was being driven into heavy defence expenditure by the opening of the road—expenditure which might otherwise be avoided—and was in any case entitled to some payment under international law for the permanent services used by the goods in transit and the personnel engaged. (China had not then signed the international agreement on these matters.) A vitriolic press campaign against the duties was started in the United States, and the British Government, for diplomatic reasons, then agreed to pay to the Burma revenues the amount of these dues.[1]

In November 1947, on the eve of Burma's independence, the 167 Burma *Daily Herald* gave editorial prominence to repeated reports that, because of illegal infiltration through Lashio, Bhamo, and 204 other routes, the Chinese population of Upper Burma was increasing at an alarming rate. It must be admitted (the paper pointed out) that such a situation had arisen partly because of the inefficiency or shortsightedness of the immigration officers, and that there were

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[1] See *Burma Handbook* (Delhi, 1943) p. 112.

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Burma AP1
Chinese

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204 [674 648] rumours that admission permits were being issued at 10 rupees a permit. There was also disconcerting news that Shan merchants were being kidnapped by Chinese bandits on the frontiers. The paper urged the authorities to take action.[1]

648 101 This immigration question now became involved with a fifty-four-year-old Chinese-Burma border issue pivoting on the triangular northern tip of Burma which at this juncture was reopened by the Chinese Government. The Chinese claim covered roughly 75,000 square miles of territory bordering on Yunnan out of Burma's total area of 262,000 square miles. The disputed area (according to a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Office) had belonged to China as part of a tributary State during the T'ang dynasty in the seventh century. (The spokesman mentioned, in passing, that both Indochina and Siam had once been among China's tributaries.)

The frontier had never been marked on the ground north of 23° 35′. The Wa States, never fully explored, have an area of about 2,000 square miles, and it is along their northern border that Burma's boundary with China was surveyed by the Iselin Commission.

It may be mentioned that American-trained Chinese forces operated in 1944–5 in just the areas to which the Chinese asserted a claim and that they departed thence late in 1945 with evident reluctance; also that in 1946 a Chinese force invaded Burma and camped for over a month on the Irrawaddy below Myitkyina, claiming to be looking for deserters, and left only when threatened with air action.

This claim was answered immediately by an announcement from Rangoon stating emphatically that Burma did not intend to surrender any portion of its territory and would 'defend its integrity without any hesitation'. A suggestion of possible action by the United Nations was declared by the Burmese to be out of the question since Burma's frontiers had been clearly marked on the official maps, and these could not become a subject for dispute.[2]

Though, on the face of it, it was somewhat surprising that the Chinese Government should revive this claim when it was meeting an increasingly grave internal crisis, the political reasons for such

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[1] Cited in *The Burman* (12 November 1947).

[2] *Christian Science Monitor* (18 December 1947).

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Chinese

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action are clear enough. The Nanking Government wished to distract attention from its own internal weakness, and at the same time to give moral support to the Chinese scattered throughout Southeast Asia, and even a remote frontier dispute was grist to their mill. At the same time it was not likely that China would push these claims too far, for by so doing it would lend support to the fear (repeated in soft tones from British, French, and Dutch sources) that China might tend to supplant the white Powers in Southeast Asia. The fear, in view of China's then situation, might seem a little unrealistic, but it might have very real cause if a strong united China were to arise in the future.

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Burma became independent on 4 January 1948, and Dr George Yeh, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Nanking Government, who attended the independence celebrations in Rangoon, endeavoured to soothe Burmese fears. He declared with emphasis that there was no likelihood of Chinese aggression against Burma. The Burmese, he said, would be inflicting an unnecessary mental strain on themselves if they harboured any such fears. The alleged danger confronting Burma because it was sandwiched between two powerful nations, China and India, was an absurd exaggeration.[1]

When pressed by the newspapermen on the subject of the 77,000 square miles of territory claimed by China, Dr Yeh was more cautious. The claim, he replied, had not been intended as an official statement. There were, however, some portions of the China-Burma frontier which remained undemarcated, but this matter would have to be settled in the traditional way by a joint commission. 'We value friendship more than anything else,' said Dr Yeh, 'and one lesson we have learned as the result of being subject to eight years' aggression is not to be aggressive.'

A further statement made by China's Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs on the same occasion reflects the policy of the Chinese National Government of this period to co-operate with the Govern-

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[1] The 'sandwich' idea had been voiced in *Freedom* (Rangoon) as early as 6 May 1946. 'What with their teeming millions and their potential industrial power (the paper said) China and India will sandwich Burma in between them. It is to be feared that circumstances beyond human control will compel the two countries to reach out hands of exploitation to Burma.' A leading authority on Burma comments: 'I cannot but agree with the "sandwich" idea. Even if it takes a long time, the vacant spaces of Burma are likely to attract pressure from both sides. But the fear of this is not common in Burma, though it is one of the factors a statesman would have to take into account.'

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Burma AP1
Chinese

648 ments of Southeast Asia in suppressing Communism. Regarding the Chinese in this region he said:

> They never came out with a mandate for their Government to take part in the politics of these countries. If any country feels that Chinese immigrants impede their political growth and economic development, the Chinese Government is ready to use all its resources to return these nationals to their homeland.[1]

In March 1948 Burma received an ambassador from China. He was Dr Tu Yuen-tan, and, on presenting his credentials to the President of Burma on 3 March, he gave an address in which he recalled that the Chinese were known in Burma by the affectionate name of *pauk paw*, and he referred to the close economic, cultural, and religious ties of the Burmese and Chinese throughout the centuries.[2]

As in the other Southeast Asian countries, both the Kuomintang and the Communists strove to establish a hold on the Chinese community in Burma when the Japanese had surrendered. [609 727] In some essential ways the Communists had the advantage, since the Kuomintang leaders, being mostly business men, had by the mere fact of continuing to carry on their businesses, and remaining in the towns during the occupation, become tainted with the suspicion of being 'collaborators'. (That most of the Burmese Nationalist leaders had also collaborated with enthusiasm, changing their sides at the appropriate moment, was beside the point.)[3]

669 Later in the year a rebellion occurred in Burma which threatened to disintegrate the new State. The issue was still not decided in December 1948. Thakin Nu's Government was holding its own militarily, though the administration, economy, and finances of the

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[1] *Hindustan Times* (9 January 1948). A historical survey of the China–Burma border question from a Burmese point of view is given by Khin Maung Gale in the *New Times of Burma* for 30 November 1947. Christian, op. cit. p. 262, discusses the question at length.

[2] *Burma Tribune* (4 March 1948).

[3] [198 204] In September 1946 Mr Lee Sze-yuan, Director-General of Overseas Affairs in the Kuomintang and Chief of the Burma Branch of the Kuomintang, had made a ten days' tour of the Irrawaddy delta to revive the morale of the Party's supporters (*Morning Star*, 25 September 1946). The Kuomintang published a newspaper in Rangoon, the *Kuo Min Yit Pao*, and the Chinese Democratic League (banned by the Chinese Government because of its alleged liaison with the Communists) also published a small newspaper, the *Zin Min Pao*. Although the circulation was probably not more than 500, it called attention to itself by its virulent attacks on the Chinese Government.

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Chinese

country were increasingly breaking down under the strain. The 669
armed forces of the Government, commanded by a Karen, remained loyal against the 'White Band' Communists and rebellious members of the People's Volunteer Army. The 'Red Flag' Communists remained aloof, while the Karen Movement was generally anti-Communist in nature.

This was the situation when the successes of the Communists 648
in China were threatening to alter the entire political balance in the
Far East. The Communists in Southeast Asia thereby received en- 439
couragement to intensify their efforts. In the comparatively small
Chinese community in Burma the number of Communists was not 243
known, but there can be no doubt that they were giving their active support to the Communist rebellion. More important than any other factor in the Burma situation to the other countries of Southeast Asia, especially to Malaya which produced only a third of its rice requirements, was the reduction of rice exports, for Burma was the greatest rice-exporting country in the world.

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Thailand A01
Chinese

PART III

THE CHINESE IN SIAM

CHAPTER IX

DEMOGRAPHY

[121] 128 IN this study we are interested primarily in *ethnic* Chinese, and only secondarily in Chinese described according to their national status as interpreted by the various Governments. In Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, British Borneo, and the Philippines our task of investigating the numbers, distribution, civil condition, &c., of ethnic Chinese is simplified by the fact that the census authorities define Chinese by race. In Siam and Indochina, on the other hand, 'Chinese' in official returns means members of the race who are not claimed as citizens of Siam or Indochina. Where these two countries are concerned we are therefore thrown back on estimates to establish our facts, and these estimates are often of the most conflicting nature.

162 128 The conflict of definition may, in the case of Siam, be gathered from the following sets of figures, Siamese and Chinese:

Siam: Population[1]

	B.E. 2462 (1919)	*B.E. 2472 (1929)*	*B.E. 2480 (1937)*
Total population	9,207,364	11,506,207	14,464,105
*Siamese	8,260,217	10,493,304	13,841,304
Chinese	260,194	445,274	524,062
Males	205,470	313,764	335,524
Females	54,724	131,510	188,538

* Inclusive of Chinese born in Siam, whose number in 1919 was 113,050.

As against this, the official *China Handbook* for 1937–43[2] gives the number of Chinese in Siam as 2·5 million, and the almost equally official *Chinese Year Book* for 1943[3] puts the figure at 3 million.

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[1] Siam, Central Service of Statistics, *Statistical Year Book of the Kingdom of Siam, B.E. 2476–2477 (1933–5)* English-Siamese ed. (Bangkok, Department of Secretary-General of Council), and the same publication for *B.E. 2480 (1937–8)*.

[2] Compiled by the Chinese Ministry of Information.

[3] Compiled by the Council of International Affairs, Chungking.

[p. 103]

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Thailand AO1
Chinese

162 Although it cannot be doubted that the number of Chinese in
Siam who may be regarded as such by reason of their appearance,
dress, language, customs, education, and loyalty is far greater than
the number allowed by the official Siamese figures, the exact
figure cannot be arrived at. Of this fact the variation of 500,000
in the official Chinese Government figures for roughly the same
period is sufficient indication. In the Siamese census of 1937 the
number of *legal* Chinese is given as 524,062.[1] A competent observer
put the number of *ethnic* Chinese in 1930 at 'at least a million':[2]
[242] the Premier, Luang Pibul, in January 1940 said 'of the more than
two million Chinese in this country over a million read the Thai
language'.[3]

641 According to the Siamese law of citizenship, all children born
in Siam were Siamese unless registered by their parents with the
162 legations and embassies of the Powers with which Siam had treaty
relations as being nationals of those Powers. China and Siam, however,
had no treaty relations until 1946, so that there were no
embassies, legations, or consulates where the children could be
registered. We find, therefore, that the children of Chinese born
in Siam were included among the Siamese population. In B.E. 2472
(1929) the number of these was estimated to be 113,050.[4]

Taking the figure of the Chinese in Siam at about 2·5 million
162 (which was probably not so far wrong for 1948), about half a million
361 of these live in Bangkok and its vicinity,[5] and the remainder are
463 scattered through the country, living in the towns rather than in
rural communities and tending to concentrate in the more commercialized
districts. In more recent times they have penetrated
to the north. Some are to be found in the fishing villages along the

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[1] The Siamese census of 1947 gave Chinese in Bangkok 284,519, Chinese in the provinces 508,172; total 792,691. These were Chinese holding aliens' registration certificates.

[2] Kenneth Perry Landon, *The Chinese in Thailand* (London and New York, Oxford University Press for the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941) p. 22, citing Reginald le May, *Siamese Tales Old and New* (London, Noel Douglas, 1930) p. 165.

[3] ibid. p. 23.

[4] See *Statistical Yearbook*, Thailand, no. 20. B.E. 2480 (1937–8) and B.E. 2481 (1938–9), p. 47, sect. III A. Population census, table 2, and Landon, op. cit. p. 21 ff.

[5] The 1929 census puts more than half the *legal* Chinese of Siam in this area, so that they made up about 40 per cent. of that city's total population and were said to constitute 76 per cent. of its working class. (See Leonard Unger, 'The Chinese in Southeast Asia', *Geographical Review* (April 1944), p. 205.) For 1947 figures see p. 3 fn. 2.

coast. Their agricultural activities are largely confined to fruit and 162
vegetable gardening near Bangkok and the cultivation of pepper
and sugar in certain localities. In the Malay Peninsula of Siam they 361
own some of the rubber and tapioca plantations. 463

A notable concentration of Chinese in southern Siam is made up principally of more recent immigrants. Here the Chinese work in the tin and tungsten mines, in the rubber plantations, and as shopkeepers and merchants in the towns and villages.[1] Disregarding distribution by political boundaries, the Chinese miners of southern Siam and of Tavoy constitute an extension of the group in the Malay States and in Bangka and Billiton.

The distribution of Chinese was by no means equal over the 162
country. Already by the 1880s they formed half the population of the delta of the Menam,[2] with a heavy concentration round Bangkok; they were settled along the coasts in southern Siam, as abovementioned, but in most other parts they were extremely sparse. In 1932 there were only 14,933 Chinese (11,340 males and 3,593 females) in the two circles of Nakon Rajasima and Udon (composing northeast Siam), amounting to an insignificant proportion of little more than one-third of 1 per cent. of the total population (total population 3,887,000 for northeast Siam).[3] (Reginald le May in his authoritative book on northern Siam, *An Asian Arcady*,[4] does not mention the Chinese at all.)

The Chinese in Siam are closely associated with the rice industry. 463
Before the war of 1942–5 they were reputed to own 80–90 per cent. 464
of the country's rice-mills:[5] they had brokers and buyers all over 441

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[1] 'This group, like its Chinese neighbours to the south, has been little assimilated by the indigenous peoples, perhaps as much because of the relatively primitive state of these people as of the recentness of the arrival of the Chinese.' Unger, op. cit. p. 205. The improvement of communications, the frequent passing to and from China, the lack of intermarriage, and the growth of nationalism are, perhaps, the more important causes. [177]

[2] Holt S. Hallett, *A Thousand Miles on an Elephant in the Shan States* (London, William Blackwood, 1890) p. 460 (refers to 1884).

[3] *The Economic Conditions of North-Eastern Siam* (Bangkok, Ministry of Commerce and Communications, June 1932) p. 3. (Northeastern Siam covered nearly one-third of the country.)

[4] (Cambridge, Heffer, 1928.)

[5] Unger, op. cit. p. 204.

A list of the principal rice-mills in Bangkok and their owners on p. 90 of the *Commercial Directory for Siam*, 3rd ed. (Bangkok, Ministry of Commerce and Communications, 1929), shows that the 71 mills all have Chinese names, but 14 appear to have been owned by non-Chinese, including 6 owned by the Privy Purse Department. Those having a large capacity were practically all Chinese-owned.

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[167]
the rice-growing areas, and their larger buying centres were at the focus of water transport in the Menam delta. Almost without exception, the labour in the mills was also Chinese. There was a regular traffic in coolies between Bangkok and the Chinese port of Swatow, thousands coming and going in a single voyage.[1]

167 The Chinese had been visiting and dwelling in Siam for centuries, but their immigration in large numbers is a matter of only the last century. In the time of King Phra Narai (1656–88) there were only about 3,000 Chinese permanently settled in the country. They had been coming mostly overland from southern China, but in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries they arrived more and more by sea from Hainan and other adjacent mainland ports. From 1840 to 1850 Chinese immigration averaged 15,000 annually.[2] The increased flow in more recent years may be attributed to the expansion of Siam's export trade, to the Revolution of 1911 and the disordered state of China that ensued from it, and also to the barriers raised against the Chinese in French Indochina. The surplus of Chinese immigrants over emigrants in Siam from 1918 to 1929 was 400,000 and it is believed to have been even larger before the First World War.[3]

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162 Let us now go back again for a century or so and note the estimates (necessarily guesses for the most part) made by foreign observers at various times. Crawfurd in 1821[4] estimated that of a total popula[illegible]n of 2·79 million for Siam, 1·26 million were Siamese, 840,000 Laos, 195,000 Malays, 440,000 Chinese, and the remainder Cambodians, Peguans, Indians, and Portuguese. In 1828 Tomlin[5] puts the total population of Bangkok alone at 401,300, made up of 310,000 Chinese (paying tax),[6] 50,000 descendants of Chinese,

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[1] *Commercial Directory* (above) p. 38.

[2] Virginia Thompson, Ph.D., *Thailand: the New Siam* (New York, Macmillan, 1941) p. 103.

Crawfurd says that the French writers of the period nowhere estimate the numbers at more than four or five thousand.

[3] ibid. p. 103–4.

[4] John Crawfurd, F.R.S., *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochinchina*, 2nd ed. (London, 1830) i. 224.

[5] Cited in *Journal of Three Voyages along the Coast of China in 1831, 1832, and 1833, with notices of Siam etc.*, by Charles (Karl) Gützlaff, 3rd ed. (London, 1840) p. 23, from p. 21 of Tomlin's *Journal of a Visit to Siam* (1828).

[651]
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[6] The tax of about $3 'levied on every Chinaman on first entering the country and re-collected triennially exempts them from the half-yearly servitude required by the King from every other oriental stranger resident in Siam'. Gützlaff, p. 23.

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0,000 Burmans, 8,000 Siamese, 7,000 Laos, and various other races 162 in smaller numbers.

Gützlaff says that the natives of China in his time came in great 167 numbers from Chaou-chow-foo, the most eastern part of the Canton province (i.e. Teochius). These were mostly agriculturists; 463 members of another tribe, the Kih or Ka (i.e. Khehs or Hakkas) consisted chiefly of artisans. Emigrants from the Tungan district of Fukien province were few and were mostly sailors or merchants. The Hainanese (Hailams) were chiefly pedlars or fishermen and formed 'perhaps the poorest, yet the most cheerful class'.[1]

According to Landon,[2] in 1890 it was roughly estimated that the 162 total population of Siam was about 10 million, composed of over 3 million Siamese, 3 million Chinese, 1 million Malays, 1 million 167 Cambodians, 1·3 million Laos, and about 400,000 Peguans, Karens, and other tribes. However, these estimates are undoubtedly much exaggerated. The total population of the country is given at a million more than it was by the census twenty years afterwards, and the number of Chinese, given at 3 million, even including every person who had the smallest drop of Chinese blood, must be much in excess of what it was in reality. But the estimate is worth including as a warning of the conjectural nature of most statistics regarding Siam, even in recent times.

Much more reasonable is Léon de Rosny's estimate for about 1884. He puts the total population of Siam at 5·9 million, including 1·6 million Siamese, 1·5 million Chinese, 1 million Malays, and 1 million Laos.[3] To Bangkok he gives a total of 404,000, with 200,000 Chinese and 120,000 Siamese.

MacNair quotes the estimate of more than 7 million total for Siam for 1909, of which 10 per cent. were Chinese. Of these,

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[1] ibid. p. 71. Speaking of more recent times, Mr Lin Yu, in 'Twin Loyalties in Siam', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. ix, no. 2 (June 1936), says: 'While an accurate estimate is not possible, it is commonly accepted in Bangkok that 60 per cent. of these families are partly of Fukien stock which provided the earliest Chinese settlers in Siam, while another 10 per cent. trace back in part to the second group of Chinese settlers, the Cantonese. These groups are to be distinguished from the Swatow Chinese who now form the bulk of the Chinese community in Siam.'

See also Crawfurd, op. cit. pp. 221, 222.

[2] p. 21. Dr Landon derives this from M. Gaston Rautier in an article in the *Revue Française*, quoted by Holt S. Hallett, op. cit. p. 461.

[3] Léon de Rosny, *Le Peuple Siamois ou Thai* (Paris, Maisonneuve Frères, 1885) p. 116.

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162 200,000 Chinese were believed to have been resident in Bangkok.[1] The same author also gives some immigration figures which are
167 less conjectural: From 1912 to 1914 the inflow from Swatow to Bangkok was 143,957 and the outflow from Bangkok was 110,525; from Kiungchow (Hainan) the inflow was 27,809 and the figure for the reverse direction was 21,970. From Swatow the great majority of immigrants were almost certainly Teochius, and from Kiungchow it is probable that they were mostly Hailams, though there may have been some transhipment from mainland ports.

The whole nature of the Chinese element in Siam was changed by the immigration of Chinese women in large numbers. Up to about 1914 the Chinese male immigrants could not afford to bring their wives and they intermarried largely with the people of the country. In 1910 a Chinese woman was a rare sight in the streets of Bangkok; twenty years later there were hundreds of them to be
162 seen.[2] By 1937 the number of (China-born) Chinese females was, according to the census, 189,000 as compared with 336,000 (China-born) males. Thus in about seventeen years the females of pure Chinese race had risen in number from being an insignificant proportion of the community to more than half that of the males of the same category.

163 It is interesting to compare the census figure of China-born females in 1937 with the number of Chinese born in Siam in 1929, namely 113,000.

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[1] Harley Farnsworth MacNair, Ph.D., *The Chinese Abroad* (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1924) p. 47.

[2] Landon, op. cit. p. 20, citing Reginald le May, *Siamese Tales Old and New*, p. 165.

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CHAPTER X

HISTORY PRIOR TO 1800

The early history of the Burmese, the Siamese, and the Anna- 174
mites is, briefly, that under the pressure of the Chinese they forsook the territory of west and south China and made their way southwards. Eventually the Burmese came to rest (perhaps because they could get no farther) in the valley of the Irrawaddy, the Siamese in the valley of the Chao Phya River, and the Annamites moved along the coast of the China Sea, some settling in present-day Tongking and Annam and others moving on to Cochin-china. By the twelfth and thirteenth centuries of the Christian era the founders of the Thai or Siamese nation had settled in the northern areas of what is now Siam. They found their new home inhabited by the negritos, whom they displaced. Other races they ejected or subjugated were the Khmer, Yuan, Lawa, and the Mon. By the time the Portuguese arrived Siamese influence extended to Singapore. Whether or not the Siamese and Chinese had a common origin is a speculation that does not belong to these pages; but their brothers, or cousins (if such they were), the Chinese, followed in the footsteps of the Siamese 'like their own shadows'[1]. For the 700 years of Siam's history the Chinese have been bound up with the life and trade of the country.

When Europeans penetrated the hinterland of Siam north of 175
Ayuthia in the 1830s they found the Chinese overland trade well
established there. This was in spite of the formidable natural ob- 439
stacles—the mountains and the gorges of the Lantsan, the Lu 487
Kiang, and the Lung Kong, which as we approach Shan territory assume the better-known names of the Mekong, Salween, and Shweli. 'With their characteristic churlishness', says Warington Smyth,[2] 'and with that deliberate attempt to hamper trade which these unmannerly rivers betray in all their movements, they stretch their deep valleys athwart the lines of communication. . . . It is curious what an effectual barrier this great river region has proved to communication between the Chinese and the Indian Empires.'[3]

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[1] Landon, op. cit. p. 1.

[2] H. Warington Smyth, Director of the Department of Mines, Siam, *Five Years in Siam* (London, John Murray, 1898) ii. 139.

[3] See p. 135 regarding the failure of de Lagrée's mission of exploration of the upper Mekong in 1866.

175 Yet there were Chinese caravan routes of ancient origin over which
487 the caravans came yearly into what we now know as the Shan
439 States and into Siam. Other routes led to Nan and Lampang in
Siam and to Luang Prabang in what was to become French Indochina. The Chinese brought copper pots, silks, rock salt, tinsel, and lace, and took back to China copper, ivory, horns, and tea.

439 Of much less antiquity than the overland route, but dating back,
175 nevertheless, for some centuries, was the seaborne trade. King
Phra Narai (1656–88) in his day established a fleet to carry on commerce with China. His junks at one time numbered more than 400, but when treaties began to be made with the European Powers in the nineteenth century, the number was reduced to less than 100 by the competition of European-owned steamers.[1]

175 Except for retrospective flashes in the Chinese dynastic histories, the history of the Chinese in Southeast Asia is, generally speaking, unrecorded until the arrival of the Europeans, and it seems to have lacked incident and even energy until the greedy and rowdy traders and adventurers of the West had arrived to cause a commotion in the languid pool of native life. The Portuguese, as usual in the East, were the first, arriving in 1518; the Dutch followed at a respectful interval in 1598, and the English came a few years after them, in 1612. As Portuguese enterprise and power dwindled, that of Holland waxed great. The Dutch blockaded the mouth of the Menam River to force a favourable treaty from the reluctant Siam. In 1664 the treaty was signed with the Dutch East India Company, but as the century went on the Siamese were alienated by the truculence of the Dutch merchants and after 1706 the Dutch-Siamese trade lapsed.

In the second half of the seventeenth century the Siamese capital, Ayuthia, was regarded as one of the most important trading centres in the Far East. King Phra Narai was himself the principal merchant in the kingdom. The French arrived in 1662, in the shape of a Roman Catholic mission sent with the support of Louis XIV to convert the whole of eastern Asia. Later there was an exchange of embassies between France and Siam. Meanwhile the French cause was aided by the active support of the Minister of Finance and agent in all foreign relations, Constantine Phaulcon, a Greek by birth, who belonged to that order of adventurer-statesmen of alien race of which Marco Polo, John Law, and Disraeli were 175 fellow members. Phaulcon was pro-French and discouraged the Dutch and English trade. This led to trouble and war seemed imminent. To protect Siam from the Dutch and English, the French in 1687 sent six warships and 1,400 soldiers to act as mercenaries in the service of Siam. At the crucial moment, in 1688, the Roman Catholic priests chose to seek the King's conversion by intensive tactics, but Phra Narai had no urge to save his soul. Fearing that the foreigners meant to subjugate their country, some Siamese nobles formed a plot against both the French and their own King. They killed Phaulcon and three possible successors to the throne, but Phra Narai, being on his death-bed, was allowed to die naturally. The *coup* ended in the departure of the French and the closing of the doors to foreign trade. Although individual Europeans continued to reside in Siam, diplomatic relations were not reopened with the European nations until the nineteenth century.[1]

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[1] Cited by Landon, op. cit. at p. 9 from *Siam*, by W. A. Graham (London, Alexander Moring, 1924) ii. 98–9.

Our knowledge of Siam from the seventeenth century onwards is derived from the accounts of seamen, merchants, diplomats, and missionaries. The first to give any consecutive account of the country is Joost (or Jobst) Schouten, Director of the Dutch East India [114] Company from its establishment at Ayuthia in 1633.[2] On the way thither he passed the site of the future capital city of Bangkok which was to be founded in 1782. Schouten does not specifically mention the Chinese, but their existence in Ayuthia is to be inferred from the context and his description is a useful background to our extracts from other visitors later in the century. He says:

> The city of Indica (Ayuthia); the Metropolis of the Kingdom, and seat of the King and the chief nobles, is situate upon the River Menam, in a little round island, encompassed with a thick stone wall, about six English miles round; the Suburbs are on the other side of the river,

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[1] Luang Chun Kasikan and others, *Prawat Sat Syam*, 3rd ed. (Bangkok, Sri Heng Press, 1935) pp. 172–4, cited by Landon, *Siam in Transition* (London, Oxford University Press, 1939) p. 5.

[2] *A true description of the Mighty Kingdoms of Japan and Siam, written originally in Dutch by Francis Caron and Joost Schouten; and now rendered into English by Roger Manley* (London, Robert Boulter, 1671). (The account of Japan is by Caron and that of Siam (p. 121) is by Schouten.)

This same Joost Schouten was also at Malacca after its capture from the Portuguese in 1641 and has left an account. See Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 30.

Schouten's account of Ayuthia is at p. 124 of his work above.

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175 closely builded, and full of Temples and Cloysters, lying in a flat and fruitful country . . . there are all manner of China wares, Jewels, Gold, Benjamin, Wax, Sappang, Agerwood, Tin, and Lead, etc., and also a vast number of Hart-skins, one hundred and fifty thousand of these being caught yearly in this countrey, and sold with much profit to the Jappaners. They drive a great trade with all eating provisions, especially Rice, many thousand Tuns being transported yearly by Forrainers. The city by reason of its great traffick, is frequented by several Nations, as the Indians, the more Western Asiaticks, European Moors, and Christian Merchants. The King himself is also a merchant, and hath his own Ships and Factories trading to Choromandel and China, being for that cause more favoured and priviledged than any other Prince; he likewise trafficks to Pegue, Ava, Jogoma, Lans-Jang, and other places, besides his negotiations at home, all of which brings him in incredible profit, and no small disturbance to private Merchants, all of which do manifest the great trade that is carried on in this Countrey.[1]

'We may assume', says Credner, 'that the Bangkok mentioned by Schouten already had Chinese residents.'[2] In support of this he mentions that Engelbert Kaempfer in his map of the Menam of 1690 showed a special settlement of Chinese.[3] Certainly they must have been resident at Ayuthia, for not only does Kaempfer show their settlement in his plan but he also says specifically: 'It must be observed here that the several spots of ground, on which the Malayans, Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese, Dutch and other nations live in Siam, and which are more particularly expressed in the annexed Plan of the King's Residence, are called Camps.' The Chinese Camp is in the plan located outside the city to the north-east.

[162] In the last decade but one of the seventeenth century there were probably not more than 3,000 Chinese permanently settled in Siam.[4] (The French observers never put them above 4,000–5,000.)

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[1] cf. Sir Maurice Powicke, *Medieval England* (London, Oxford University Press, 1948) p. 120. '. . . the King [of England] tried to raise money by creating a monopoly for himself in the sale of English wool abroad, and from 1337 onwards he summoned assemblies of merchants to arrange in co-operation with them the methods by which the difficult operation could be carried out.'

[2] Wilhelm Credner, *Siam, Das Land der Thai* (Stuttgart, J. Engelhorns, 1935) p. 193.

[3] Engelbert Kaempfer, *The History of Japan. Together with a Description of the Kingdom of Siam, 1690–92* (Glasgow, James Maclehose, 1906).

[4] Cited by Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 104, from O. Frankfurter, *Siam Society Journal* (1904).

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In 1685 and 1686 an embassy from Louis XIV of France came 175
to Siam. The ambassador, the Chevalier de Chaumont, and two
others accompanying him, the Abbé de Choisy and the Comte de 162
Forbin, have left accounts of their visit. De Chaumont[1] enumerates the races inhabiting the country—the Laos, eight or nine true Portuguese families but more than 100 *mesties* (Portuguese-Siamese Eurasians); the Dutch had one factory, the English the same, the Cochinchinese had about 100 families for the most part Christian, the Tongkingese seven or eight Christian families; the Malays were there in great numbers but were mostly slaves; there were Macassars, Javanese, Moors, Turks, Mogols, Golcondas, Bengalis, and Armenians. But, in this list, no Chinese! However, in another place the Chevalier says: 'It is only some Moors, Chinese, French, and English who live in the city; all the other nations are lodged in the
suburbs by "Camps", that is to say all of one nation together.' The 175
Abbé has nothing to say regarding the Chinese community as such, nor has the Comte de Forbin, the most lively and impressionable
of the party, who, however, records a matter of great interest. On [797]
his return to France he had an audience of Louis XIV who asked him whether the French missionaries had converted many Siamese, and he had replied, 'Not a soul, sir'. Louis remarked that this did not agree with what Père Tachard had told Père Lachaise. Forbin, having narrated this, continues:

> While I stayed in Siam several Chinese of great wit and learning confessed to me that they could not comprehend how people of one and the same faith, who had left their native country and made long sea voyages through such vast seas, could propose to convert pagans, while they themselves were not agreed in their conduct, some living with great modesty and charity, and others abandoning themselves to malice and strife, to call it by no worse name. This was the language of all Chinese with whom I talked.[2]

The embassy was received with elaborate entertainment concluding with a Chinese play. (Chaumont says it was a comedy; Choisy says it was a tragedy!) There were actors from Canton and others from Fukien: the Fukienese were the most magnificent and the most ceremonious. The Chinese started their posturing; there

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[1] *Relation de l'ambassade de Monsieur le Chevalier de Chaumont à la Cour du Roy de Siam*, Archives curieuses de l'histoire de France, ser. 2.

[2] *Memoirs of the Count de Forbin, Commodore of the Navy of France* (translated from the French) (London, J. Pemberton, 1731) pp. 215, 227, 229, 231.

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were some Siamese also, but the Frenchmen [illegible]ld not understand a word they or the Chinese said. After the comedy there was a play by Chinese marionettes, but they 'did not approach those of Europe'. Regarding the music the Abbé was affected by it very much as Europeans visiting the East have been before and since—'La symphonie détestable, ce sont des chaudrons qu'on bat en cadence'.[1]

De la Loubère who was in Ayuthia about three years afterwards, in 1687 and 1688, during the troubles, also speaks in amusing terms of a theatrical performance:

> The one was a Chinese comedy, which I would willingly have seen to the end, but it was adjourned after some scenes to go to dinner. The Chinese comedians, whom the Siamese do love without understanding them, do speak in the throat. All their words are monosyllables, and I heard them not pronounce one single one, but with a new breath: some would say that it throttles them. One of the actors who represented a Magistrate walked so gravely that he trod first upon his heel, and then successively and slowly upon his heels and toes. . . .[2]

Father Tachard, mentioned above, whose impressions of the Chinese at Batavia are quoted in Part VII of this work, was in Siam with the embassy and has recorded his experiences. In his *Journal* he says:

> Since all the Nations are well received in Siam, and each is allowed to live in the free exercise of their religion, there is scarcely a single Nation that is not found there. The Chinese are the ones who do the most trade; besides that of China they also engage in that of Japan. . . . He [the Siamese King] hath also several Jonkos which are Chinese vessels, and are manned by Chinese. But though that nation brag that they have had the use of the compass for above two thousand years; yet they come very far short of the European in the art of navigation. They have no other instruments for sailing than the Lead or Sound. They keep reckoning as we do, and run some time upon such a point of wind, the currents, mountains, which they discover on Land, the colour, fineness, and mixture of the sand, with other experiences are the rules they go by.[3]

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[1] *Journal du Voyage de Siam fait par M. l'abbé de Choisy, en 1685 et 1686* (Trévoux, 1741) p. 286.

[2] *A New Historical Relation of the Kingdom of Siam*, translated from the French of de la Loubère, by A. Gen (London, Thomas Horne, &c., 1693) p. 11.

[3] *Voyages de Siam des Pères Jésuites, envoyés par le Roy, aux Indes et à la Chine* (Amsterdam, Pierre Mortier, 1687) p. 177. Above translation from an English edition (London, 1688).

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According to de la Loubère, the population at this epoch was counted every year, and an exact account was kept of men, women, and children. The population of 1687 is given at 900,000 for all races. 'From which I question not', says de la Loubère, 'that some retrenchment is to be made for Vanity and Lyes; characters essential to the Eastern people; but on the other hand, thereunto must be added the Fugitives, which do seek a sanctuary in the woods against the Government.'[1] 175 [61]

Engelbert Kaempfer's description of Siam refers to the years 1690–2. Between the embassy of the Chevalier de Chaumont and this period there had been, in 1688, a court revolution in Siam with a change of dynasty. Faulcon or Phaulcon (or as he signed himself, Phaulkon), the Greek who had controlled the finances of the kingdom, fell from power and was imprisoned. Having been tortured and starved for fourteen days until he was reduced to a skeleton, he was beheaded. The French, who had under General des Fargues been placed in command of the fortress of Bangkok, were ejected from Siam. King Petracha who succeeded Phra Narai was strongly anti-foreign. About the same time Japan closed her doors to foreign trade, and the Japanese settlement at Ayuthia declined. But these happenings had little influence upon the fortunes of the Chinese resident in Siam.

The prestige of the Chinese civilization had for long been high in Siam, and a number of natives of China had reached important positions. Kaempfer in a list of the 'chief mandarins' mentions Peja Jummeraad, 'a learned Chinese', who was Chief Justice of Siam.[2] (Incidentally, two diverse institutions the Siamese had already adopted from the Chinese were the cangue (a movable pillory) and the cycle of sixty years.)[3] [77]

Siam's history in the first half of the eighteenth century included a succession of plots and counter-plots in the court entourage, the mass elimination of pretenders to the throne and all their relatives, and revolts in the provinces, but at the same time the period was free from serious wars with the country's neighbours. The reign of King Boromakot (1730–58) was called the golden age of Siam. Then war with Burma broke out in 1759 and continued, between monsoon seasons, until 1767 when Ayuthia fell to the Burmese. The city was burned and the written records of Siamese history

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[1] op. cit. p. 47.

[2] Kaempfer, op. cit. p. 38.

[3] ibid. p. 70.

175 were lost. Whilst various aspirants for power struggled for ascendancy Siam remained in a state of disorder. Five years after the sack of Ayuthia, Phya Tak[1] shook off the Burmese yoke and set up his capital at Dhonburi, now a part of Bangkok.

[643] Tak Sin, the first King (1767–82) to unite the Siamese kingdom under his rule after the Burmese had destroyed the ancient capital, was of mixed Chinese-Siamese ancestry, his father having been a Chinese tax-farmer named Hai Hong. Indeed his Chinese blood was one of the factors (said his enemies) that made him unsuitable as a sovereign. A conspiracy was formed against him, he was dethroned, and afterwards put to death. The new King, Chao Phya Chakri (1782–1809), founded the Chakri dynasty, which was still reigning in 1950, and established the city of Bangkok on the site of a Chinese settlement which was removed to Sampeng. He was a son-in-law of Phya Tak and had been given a Chinese name in addition to his Siamese name. It is said that the Chakri family has itself an admixture of Chinese blood, and certainly there were Chinese women in the harems of the later Kings.[2]

In 1733 a Chinese rising had taken place and 300 Chinese had attacked the palace. They were, however, dispersed and forty of their ringleaders were captured and executed.[3] But in spite of this departure from the good manners expected of guests, the Chinese retained their position in Siamese society, so that the French historian Turpin could refer to them in the third quarter of the century in these words: 'The Chinese colony is the most numerous and flourishing by the extent of its commerce, and by the privileges which it enjoys. Its compliance with received customs, a certain conformity of character and manners, seem to ensure it a continuance of its privileges and prosperity.'[4]

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[1] He is variously called Pin Tat, Tia Sin Tat, Tay Cheow, or Tak Cheo. His personal name was Sin. He was later called Lord of Tak (a town). (Landon, op. cit. p. 7.)

[2] Landon, *The Chinese in Thailand*, p. 8.

[3] W. A. R. Wood, *A History of Siam* (London, Fisher Unwin, 1926) p. 232.

[4] M. Turpin, *Histoire civile et naturelle du Royaume de Siam* (Paris, Costard, 1771) p. 9.

A translation of the above is in Pinkerton's *General Collection of the best and most interesting voyages and travels* (London, 1808–14) xi. 426–572.

[439] Rice was for very long a staple article of commerce between China and Siam. In 1722 the Emperor ordered 300,000 piculs (18,000 tons) of rice to be imported from Siam. Although the relaxations of the restrictions on the export of copper from China to Siam could not be obtained, the rice trade continued. In 1751 any Chinese bringing 2,000 piculs of rice to China from Siam was rewarded with a

Turpin's anticipation was justified for at least another century and a half, after which the irony of circumstances arising from the birth of nationalism caused the Chinese to be regarded as a foreign and schismatic element in the Siamese nation. 175

mandarin's button. William Nunn, 'Some Notes upon the Development of the Commerce of Siam', *Journal of the Siam Society*, vol. xv, pt. 2, p. 82.

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CHAPTER XI

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: FIRST HALF

167 As in the other countries of Southeast Asia, the Chinese immigrants into Siam until the beginning of the twentieth century, and even during its first two decades, were mostly males. The majority of them were small traders, and of these a number had been sailors, fishermen, and peasants before their coming to Siam. They owned no land on their arrival—but land or no land they would have found trade more profitable. They were readily assimilated for they married Siamese women and their children were brought up as Siamese. The children of these marriages were called *Lukchin*, and were proud of their Chinese blood. Supplying the energy and the initiative that the Siamese lacked, they were welcomed and received favoured treatment from the Government, especially in the days of intense anti-European feeling among the Siamese.[1] Assimilation, too, was made easier by the racial similarity of the Chinese and Siamese which was greater than that of the Chinese and any other race in Southeast Asia. In the second or third generation the immigrants were completely absorbed and considered themselves as Siamese. Indeed they would have been insulted to have been called Chinese, since the Siamese were the ruling race and the Chinese were their social inferiors. 'The typical merchant of Siam', says Kumut Chandruang, 'usually had Chinese blood, and his grandfather was very likely a pure Chinese. He may still worship his ancestors by burning gold paper, but his sons have gone to Siamese schools and learned to write on their slates in both languages. The third generation do not remember Chinese; many of them have changed their family names and forgotten their family origin.'[2]

In the nineteenth century Siam, 'under a debasing tyranny, destitute of arts and commerce, alike, offered a fair field for the development of their superiority', says Finlayson[3] writing in the 1820s.

000 From the early 1820s onwards a number of alert European

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[1] Landon, op. cit. p. 11; Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 104.

[2] Quoted by Landon at p. 11 from 'Young Siam in the New World', by Kumut Chandruang, *Asia* (May 1939).

[3] G. Finlayson, *The Mission to Siam and Hué* (London, Murray, 1826) p. 167.

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From the early 1820s onwards a number of alert European 175 observers began to penetrate the seclusion of remote Siam and 567 several have bequeathed us their impressions. One of these is Captain Burney who carried out a series of missions to Siam mostly in connexion with the problems of relationship between that country and Britain, arising from the latter's occupation of the island of Penang in 1786 and Singapore in 1819. He was naturally more concerned with southern Siam with its predominantly Malay population than with the north. He found that the Chinese in this region were engaging in the same sort of nefarious traffic that they were carrying on at the same time, or a little later, in the islands and the coastal region of western Sumatra.[1] There were in 1826 in [167] almost every part of the Siamese dominions hundreds of Malays and natives of India who were most anxious, but unable, to return to their countries. Burney found that it was a common practice for the Chinese to seize Malays who happened to be on board their junks at Penang or Malacca, Java, and other places and to bring them to Siam as slaves.[2] He was also concerned with the apprehension [687] of criminals who had fled from Penang to Kedah. One of them, Tucang Chu-koor, the Chinese monopoly farmer at Kuala Muda, against whom the Governor of Penang had preferred a charge, was arrested by the Siamese and confined in a cangue for several months.[3]

There is also included among the Burney papers an appreciation 18 of the Chinese character written by Major James Low. Major Low was closely associated with Malaya and his writings are more than once referred to in Part V of this study, but it will be convenient to insert the character sketch here since it applies as much to the Chinese he met in the Siamese territory of Kedah, &c., as it does to the Chinese in the Straits Settlements.

Low's considered opinion of the Chinese is this:

> They are a time-serving people, and unlike the Indo-Chinese tribes around them, they seem to be very deficient in imagination, and therefore less disposed than these to give way to theoretical impulses. Their understandings are pretty sure guides to their interests, and they perceive at a glance that the latter and any assumption of political power in the countries they have settled in are things at complete variance with each other. But unwilling as they may be to turn Rulers, where nothing

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[1] See p. 496.

[2] *The Burney Papers* (Bangkok, Vajiranana National Library, 1910) i. 95. (Originals in the India Office, London.)

[3] ibid. ii. 7.

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> 18 could be obtained or be put in competition with their mercantile gains, they do not seem to be at all averse to intrigue with one or even with both, so that whatever be the result their interests may continue unaffected. It need not be added that the real leaning in such a case will be to the stronger party, although the weaker will be cajoled by promises and aided by supplies and arms, the sale of which at high profits they can easily effect. I have had personal opportunities of knowing this to be true. Keeping these traits in view as checks to an over confidence in Chinese political fidelity, it may safely be pronounced that as settlers they are eminently valuable in new countries on account of their unceasing and well directed industry, their enterprise as traders, their luxurious habits which swell the revenue by the consumption of taxable commodities, and lastly perhaps because their physical powers of endurance exceed those possessed by the Malays and the other Indo-Chinese people.[1]

A shrewd appraisal if ever there was one, and deficient only in the respect that it is purely an objective one from the point of view of the usefulness or otherwise of the Chinese to the ruling Power, in this case Britain, and takes no account of what the Chinese felt about it all or why they felt it. This limitation we shall find everywhere in perusal of European opinion of the Chinese in Southeast Asia through the course of three and a half centuries.

John Crawfurd, the associate of Raffles, appears a number of times in these pages and whatever his merits as an administrator or diplomat, he was certainly a keen and, usually, accurate observer. The following is his impression of the Chinese in Siam in the early 1820s:

> The Chinese settlers in the Siamese territory are chiefly immigrants from the provinces of Canton and Fukien; but there is also a considerable number from the island of Hainan and some from Chekiang and Kiangnan. The few immigrants from Yunnan are confined to the northern parts of Laos. . . . The Chinese resort to Siam and other foreign countries, unaccompanied by their families. They soon intermarry with the Siamese, there being no scruple on either side. They even adopt, whatever may have been their religion before, or whether they had any or not, the Buddhist form of worship, visiting the Siamese temples, and giving the usual alms to the priests. A few even enter the priesthood, although the mode of life is by no means congenial to their industrious

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[1] *A Retrospect of British Policy in the Straits of Malacca from the period of the First Establishment of Penang on 17 July 1786 up to April 1842*, by Major James Low, 46th Regt. Madras Native Infantry, printed in the *Burney Papers* (1914) i. 1. 105.

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> and active character. What is probably more remarkable, they forego their partiality for costly sepulchral monuments, burying their dead like the Siamese. . . . They invariably dress, however, in the costume of their own country. Every male amongst them above the age of twenty, pays a capitation tax. The number assessed to this tax at Bangkok and its vicinity, was stated to me at 21,000. Indeed it is commonly computed that half the population of the capital is composed of Chinese. . . .[1] 18

As is usual with foreign observers, Crawfurd is keenly interested in the statistics of the matter. He was informed that the total number of Chinese in Siamese territory, Malay States excluded, was 100,000. The Chinese settlers within the territory of the Malay States, 'engaged in traffic or in working in gold or tin' were estimated at 20,000. 'An intelligent Chinese' told him that 'pestilence was necessary for keeping down population now that wars had ceased'. 'No other Asiatic but a Chinese', remarks Crawfurd, 'would have thought of expressing himself in such language.' (This early Chinese Malthusian was a trifle optimistic regarding the cessation of wars!) Pestilence certainly was very active in Siam, and in 1849, for example, 1,500 deaths a day occurred at Bangkok during the cholera epidemic, the river being thick with floating bodies. Siam was in any case a sparsely populated country and what with the ravages of ill-nourishment and disease it would have been more sparsely populated still had it not been for the Chinese. Referring to the number of Chinese, Crawfurd says: 'This shows an extraordinary increase since the close of the seventeenth century, for I find that the French writers nowhere estimate the numbers at more than four or five thousand.' [162] [165]

Crawfurd also affords us a minute on the subject of Siamese-Chinese relationships in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries which throws considerable light on the questions (disputed as late as 1917) of imperial suzerainty and a vassal's tribute. The matter was so arranged then that the vanity of the Chinese Emperors gave them the nominal overlordship over the kingdom of the Southern Ocean, whilst the cupidity of the Siamese sovereign was simultaneously assuaged: 175 648 439

> The connection of the Siamese with the Chinese nation, although ostensibly political, is in fact purely of a commercial nature. The terri-

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[1] *Journal of an Embassy to the Courts of Siam and Cochin-China* (London, 1828), p. 450. [I have modernized Crawfurd's spelling of place-names to avoid confusion. V. P.]

175 tories, indeed, border upon each other, but in remote and thinly populated
parts of both. These are the Kingdom of Lao on the one side, and the
648 Chinese province of Yunnan on the other. Here some traffic is carried
439 on between them, and a considerable number of Chinese of Yunnan have settled at Lanchang, the capital of Lao, and the other towns in the country. But the great intercourse is generally maritime and such as I have already described. The King of Siam, although the circumstances be not generally known, acknowledged himself a tributary of the Emperor of China. His doing so does not arise from any particular necessity or consideration, or out of any actual dependence of Siam upon China, but altogether from this mercenary motive, that the vessels which carry the ambassadors may, under pretext of doing so, be exempted from the payment of all imposts. With this view two of the largest descriptions of junks, amounting to nearly one thousand tons each, sail annually from Bangkok to Canton loaded with merchandize. They carry ambassadors annually to the Vice Roy of Canton and, once in three years, these ambassadors go to Pekin, an honour, however, of which they are not considered worthy until they receive a title of Chinese nobility from the Vice Roy and assume the costume of the Chinese. They carry the Chinese Emperor a golden flower in token of tribute, but receive in return gifts to a far greater value. The vanity of the one court and the rapacity of the other have long rendered this course a permanent one.[1]

18 Our next report on the Chinese is from Karl Friedrich August
177 Gützlaff, the first Protestant missionary in Siam, of whose observations we have already had occasion to make use. Mr Gützlaff, we feel, is not of a particularly tolerant disposition and regards the Oriental races generally with the same distaste as did his notable contemporary, Dr Morrison, in China and Malaya.

The Chinese, Mr Gützlaff informs us,

> delight to live in wretchedness and filth, and are very anxious to conform to the servile habits of the Siamese. In some cases when they enter into matrimonial alliance with the latter, they even throw away their jackets and trousers, and become Siamese in every respect. As the lax, indifferent religious principles of the Chinese do not differ from those of the Siamese, the former are very prone to conform to the religious rites of the latter. And if they have children, they frequently cut off their queues and become for a certain time priests. Within two or three generations, all the distinguishing marks of the Chinese dwindle entirely

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[1] *The Crawfurd Papers: a Collection of Official Records relating to the Mission of Dr John Crawfurd sent to Siam by the Government of India in the year 1821* (Bangkok, Vajiranana National Library, 1915) p. 147.

away; and a nation which adheres to its national customs so obstinately becomes wholly changed to Siamese. 18

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These descendants of Chinese, Gützlaff tells us, usually neglect the literature of their paternal country and apply themselves to that of Siam. To them nothing is so welcome as being presented by the King with an honorary title, 'and this generally takes place when they have acquired great riches or betrayed some of their own countrymen'. From this moment they become slaves of the King, the more so if they are made his officers. No service to them is so menial, so expensive, so difficult but that they are forced to perform it. And in the case of disobedience they are severely punished and perhaps put in chains for the rest of their lives. 'With the exception of the *Hwuy Hwuy*, or Triad Society, implicit obedience is paid to their most exorbitant demands [those of the Siamese] by every Chinese settler.'

669 In spite of the deliberate refusal of the Chinese to involve themselves in any political responsibility, as Low has described, their policy of subservience and obsequiousness to the ruling race or party, and their passivity under ill usage, there was occasionally a time when they were driven to revolt. There had been one rising, as we have seen, in 1733; in 1824 the Chinese at Chantaburi rebelled, and this was followed by other risings of their countrymen at Nakon Chaisri in 1842 and 1847, at Langsuen, and at Chengsao in 1848;[1] we shall read of another rebellion in 1847 later on. In the 1820s or early 1830s (the date is uncertain) a conspiracy was formed by the Triad Society. Some Chinese of this society seized some native craft at Blampasoi near the mouth of the Menam and 'began to avenge themselves upon their tyrants', but, falling short of provisions, they were chased by a small Siamese squadron, and beset by contrary winds and lacking the necessities of life, they had to surrender. The ringleader escaped to Cochinchina, but his followers were either massacred or sent to prison for life. A great many individuals (says Gützlaff) 'hope that the English (according to their own expression) will extend their benevolent government as far as Siam. Every arrival of a ship enlivens their expectations: every departure damps their joy'.[2]

396 Our next notable informant is George Windsor Earl who sailed the seas as a merchant from 1832 to 1834. His impressions of the

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[1] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 32.

[2] Gützlaff, op. cit. p. 73.

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396 Chinese in Borneo and Malaya are mentioned in the appropriate place in this survey.[1] When Earl arrived at Bangkok about an hour before daybreak on 10 March 1833, he found in the lower part of the port that, notwithstanding the earliness of the hour, vast numbers of Chinese blacksmiths were busily employed forging ironwork, probably for the junks that were being built on the banks of the river. He tells us that there were then about half a million Chinese in Siam, and that they 'possess all the mechanical employments' (a locution, by the way, which is often found in books of the period
439 and is enough to date them). They were engaged in junk-building, making *quallies*, or iron pans, which latter were exported in large
396 quantities all over Asia. Chinese junks used in foreign trade were usually built in countries where wood was plentiful. Earl supposed that a junk could be built more cheaply at Bangkok than at any other place in 'India' (in which term he undoubtedly included the whole of Southeast Asia).

000 He remarks, however, that the Siamese empire was 'apparently in a decline', an observation which agrees with that of other visitors to the country.[2]

18 In any anthology of character sketches of the Chinese the vignette of Captain Sherard Osborn would deserve a place. It refers to a visit to Kangar, Perlis, in the late 1830s:[3]

> A few Chinese, the Jews of the Eastern Archipelago, were there also. They were so obsequious, so anxious to attract the attention of a British midshipman, that he, with all the dignity of that proud caste, allowed them to change a dollar for him. The Chinese were mostly money-changers. The insolent contumely they endured at the hands of the Malays struck me very much. The natives when ill-treated, chattered like a nest of rooks. Not so the Chinese: they bore it with cringing and shrinking; one could see, by the twinkle of their little glittering eyes that they only abided their time to bite the heel that bruised them.

But he gives the other side of the medal in a footnote in the shape of the time-honoured tribute to the industry of the Chinese race: 'It is but justice to these industrious emigrants to say that they are invaluable as labourers, agriculturists, artisans, and merchants

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[1] See pp. 492, 493.

[2] George Windsor Earl, *The Eastern Seas, or Voyages and Discoveries in the Indian Archipelago in 1832–33–34* (London, W. H. Allen, 1837) p. 159.

[3] Captain Sherard Osborn, *Quedah, or Stray Leaves from a Journal in Malayan Waters* (London, 1855, new ed. 1865) p. 216 ff.

throughout our colonies; and better conducted subjects Her 18
Majesty Queen Victoria nowhere possesses.'

Most of the Chinese who rendered exceptional service to Siam 175
before the middle of the nineteenth century are anonymous, but
one exception is Lim Hoi, a Cantonese merchant resident at
Thalang in Junk Ceylon. He was returning from Penang where he
had been on business when he caught sight of a Burmese sailing
vessel. Something about it aroused his suspicion and he attacked
and captured it. Whilst examining its contents he came across a
Burmese official letter addressed to the Raja of Kedah. He there-
upon brought the boat and the crew to Thalang and made them
over to the Governor. The official forwarded the letter and
prisoners, together with Lim Hoi, to Bangkok. Here the letter was
translated and proved to be an instigation by the Burmese of the
Raja of Kedah to rebel against the King of Siam. The King suit- [651]
ably rewarded Lim Hoi and appointed him Luang Raja, 'Capitan'
of the Chinese, and chief collector of the royalty on tin mines
on Junk Ceylon Island. This appointment evidently included not
only the tin-smelting monopoly already in existence from the last
quarter of the eighteenth century, but also the collection of crown
dues on the net produce.[1]

Diplomatic missions to Siam and Burma were fairly frequent during the century, and Crawfurd, Finlayson, Bowring, and Roberts have left their impressions in their reports or memoirs. Mr Edmund Roberts was the American envoy who visited a number of countries on behalf of his Government in 1835, 1836, and 1837. Dr Ruschenberger, his medical officer and historian, gives us a number of interesting facts about the Siam of the period. He notes, as Earl had done, the Chinese junks in the river at Bangkok; a row of these vessels of from 200 to 600 tons burden each were at anchor in the middle of the stream, and the line extended for more than two miles. Here they often remained for months, retailing their
cargoes. They were kept, he says, 'in a most filthy condition'. In [62]
1836, Ruschenberger estimates, there were over 400,000 Chinese
in Bangkok out of a total population of 500,000. They were chiefly
Teochius, but there were also Cantonese and Hailams (Hainanese)
and some from Shanghai. About 30 to 80 junks annually visited the
port.

Ruschenberger, too, gives us our first glimpse of the education 000

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[1] *Journal of the Siam Society*, vol. i, pt. 2 (1904) pp. 202–3.

871/ Ruschenberger, too, gives us our first glimpse of the education of Chinese children in Siam, though we can safely assume that the better-off families, at least, gave their boys a grounding in the Four Books, the Trimetrical Classic, &c., just as we know they did in Batavia in the sixteenth century. The schools referred to were almost certainly missionary schools, and Mr Gützlaff no doubt took a leading share in their establishment:

> Two or three schools have been begun here for Chinese children, and are now in operation, but there is much difficulty in organizing and sustaining them, for the reason that Chinamen here have Siamese, Burman, Laos, and even other country women for mothers, whose prejudices are even stronger than that [*sic*] of the Chinese themselves.[1]

391/ 302 The same authority describes the Chinese in Siam as easily distinguishable by their complexion, being more yellow than the Siamese, 'but they have generally *docked* the *entail* to their heads, and dress à la Siamese, with a circle of hair on the *roof*. But few of the "long Tails", the distinguishing appanage to a Chinaman's head, are to be seen.' Sandals were worn by the Chinese only.

439 302 792 The Bangkok Chinese imported brassware and silk stuffs from China and Surat, and their cotton and woollen goods were principally from Singapore. Even the Talapoys'[2] (Buddhist priests') razors for shaving their heads were imported from Canton. They were made of thin brass of curved shape, two inches wide throughout, and six inches long, fitted with a coarse wooden handle.

651/ Except in the case of debt, the Chinese were exempted from labour on the public works by paying the triennial tax of 4½ ticals. Some say (Ruschenberger records) that this tax was collected annually.

525 As at all times in their history, the Blackhaired Race were observed in Siam in the 1830s to gamble to excess.

439 Dr Ruschenberger adds his contribution to the long arraignment of the Chinese abroad for their lack of honesty. The Chinese, says he, 'who are noted everywhere for their villanous tricks', import large quantities of ordinary goods here, as well as good quality goods, including tea. The tea was bought up again after use and 'fired anew'. It was coloured green by the use of smalts and exported.[3]

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[1] W. S. W. Ruschenberger, M.D., *Narrative of a Voyage Round the World, during the years 1835, 36, and 37, including a narrative of an Embassy to the Sultan of Muscat and the King of Siam* (London, Bentley, 1838) p. 280 ff.

[2] Sometimes spelt Talapoin.

[3] op. cit. p. 287.

About 1840 we have another set of statistics of the population of Bangkok offered us, and it seems to have little relation to those of Crawfurd, Gützlaff, &c. The total is put at 350,000 by Mr Neale, with 240,000 Siamese, 70,000 Chinese, 20,000 Burmans, and 20,000 Arabs and Indians. Ruschenberger and Neale must have had a very different eye for counting heads, and a very different notion of what a Chinese was since their estimates of 400,000 and 70,000 refer to periods little removed one from the other.[1] 162

According to Neale, many Chinese who had settled and married in Siam had reaped immense wealth from sugar plantations they possessed in the interior; others were occupied in the cultivation of tobacco and several kinds of cotton, and a few made a living by collecting a gum used as incense. Gamboge, sapan wood, and other valuable products were all brought from the interior to Bangkok where, being weighed and taxed, they were retailed to the more opulent merchants established in the city, and by the latter shipped to Singapore, Bombay, and England.[2] 442 439 463

These impressions of the Chinese in the several countries have a great sameness, but a trend of development is observable through them as the years go on. The diversions and ritual of the Chinese, too, have a strangely static quality; the gambling, the burning of gold paper, the weddings, the funerals, vary scarcely a tittle from country to country and from century to century. Chinese theatricals and music are, of course, uniformly unpleasing to the European ear. As the Abbé de Choisy was affected by these in 1685, and the German, A. Bastian, in 1863,[3] so was Frederick Arthur Neale affected in about 1840. 'The first Chinese play I ever witnessed', he records, 'and certainly the last I should ever wish to see, for methinks a continuation of such noises for a succession of nights would render me unfit for anything but Hanwell, Bedlam always excepted.'[4] 178

Siam, although on the eve of the penetration by the West, was still an isolated State ruled by an absolute monarchy. The Chinese had already got their hands on to a great deal of economic power, but in an absolute State political power prevails over economic in a way that it cannot do in a democratic society. In the latter case, 642

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[1] Frederick Arthur Neale, *Narrative of a Residence in Siam* (London, National Illustrated Library, 1852) p. 30 (refers to period *c.* 1840).

[2] Neale, op. cit. p. 69.

[3] Dr Adolf Bastian, *Der Völker der Östlichen Asien: Reisen im Siam im Jahre 1863* (Jena, 1867) iv. 354.

[4] op. cit. p. 95.

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642 however harshly the Government bears on private enterprise and however great the taxation, the capitalist can nearly always recoup himself, at least in part, for his losses: in an absolute State like Siam, with the monarch not only a ruler but also a monopolist and competitor, the Chinese merchant and middleman was very much at the mercy of the despot's greed or caprice. Thus 'The Chinese cringed before their oppressors, paid a heavy tax for being exempted from military and *corvée* services, and laboured from morning to night to feed their insolent and haughty tyrants, who thought it beneath their dignity to earn their bread by their own efforts'.[1]

669 The Chinese, as we have so frequently seen, are a long-suffering race but are liable when driven to extremity by an affront to their pride, or (more easily) by an injury to their interests, to riot or even to rebel. We have heard of the insurrection of 1733 and of several other smaller risings, and the Triad disturbances of the early 1830s, and now in 1847 they rose once again against their Siamese oppressors.

[651 257] The occasion for the rising was the levying of a new tax on sugar refineries (or 'boilers'). The Chinese had created and had come to control a now-flourishing sugar industry. The insurgents seized the Governor of Petriu and decapitated him. Siamese troops sent to subjugate them exhibited great poltroonery against the enemy who were now besieged in a fort at Leukonchesi. The besieged garrisons were wholly ignorant of the art of war and the only ammunition they had to fire at the Siamese troops was *beans*! But notwithstanding the fact that the hardy regulars were for a while demoralized by the shower of vegetables, the gates of the city were finally destroyed. Elephants were sent out, and a general massacre of unresisting men, women, and children took place. 'It is supposed that a general rising was intended; and it is very doubtful whether the Siamese Government could have maintained itself against any very extensive combination.'[2]

The insurrection had failed and soon all was quiet again. The Chinese resumed their wonted air of submission—or at least of bland acquiescence or noncommittal blankness. There were still many compensations left to them for their lack of political power or ability to redress the grievances inflicted by an arbitrary authority.

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[1] Gützlaff, op. cit. pp. 29, 30.

[2] Sir John Bowring, *The Kingdom and People of Siam* (London, J. W. Parkes, 1857) i. 86.

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ity. A minority identified themselves[1] so successfully with their 000
masters that they achieved noble rank and positions of profit, and 557
a majority were so well off that it could be said of them a few years 565
later that 'they were still the most privileged class in the country,
*as was shown by the number of Siamese who had cultivated a queue in
order to pass for Chinese*'![1]

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[1] M. L. Cort, *Siam, or The Heart of Further India* (New York, Randolph, 1866) p. 33, quoted by Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 106.

1[i.e., the Chinese -- Analyst]

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CHAPTER XII

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: SECOND HALF

175 Owing to the weakness of China as a Power, her self-centredness and ignorance of the world beyond her frontiers, and her indifference to the fate of her traders and vagrant children beyond the mountains or the seas, the diplomatic history of Burma, Siam, Indochina, and the other countries of Southeast Asia belongs in the nineteenth century to the European nations. All the while that great events were happening, and revolutions taking place in trade and politics, the Chinese in these countries were never making innovations but were ever adapting their behaviour to the changing circumstances of living and trade. So whilst the course of international relations contains scarcely a mention of them, it is necessary to consult the record of the diplomatic weather to understand why and how the Chinese spread or trimmed their sails, dropped anchor, or ran for shelter in the alternations of fair wind, calm, or storm.

648 The history of modern Siam may be said to begin with the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce concluded with Great Britain in 1855. There had been previous treaties, but this one, negotiated by Sir John Bowring, was of key importance and was followed by similar treaties with other Powers. The treaty provided for extraterritorial consular jurisdiction for British subjects and it included commercial regulations that were to transform Siamese [651] trade. Some of these were to affect the Chinese merchants and revenue farmers directly. Previous to the treaty, duties were paid on all imports with the exception of opium, the import of which was forbidden. Opium was now put on the free list, with bullion and personal effects, and a limit of dues of 3 per cent. *ad valorem* was [477] placed on all imports. Monopolies were abolished by the treaty, but that of opium for some reason still remained, as Bowring himself tells us, and this to the great profit of the Chinese who possessed it. Presumably foreign merchants, including British, imported opium and sold it to the monopolist. The effect of the abolition of the other monopolies upon the Chinese is not clear, but they, including the holder of the ninety-odd monopolies mentioned by Bowring, had to find new channels for their energies.

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Whether these new channels were advantageous or otherwise for 648
the people of Siam would depend on the enlightenment of Govern- 439
ment policy rather than upon the Chinese, who, having no executive power, felt no political responsibilities and were opportunists. In 1900 the abolition of the revenue farms in the Netherlands [655]
Indies led to Chinese capital being employed in constructive rather than parasitic undertakings, but in Siam in 1855 the net result would appear to have been that the import business, previously the monopoly of the King or his farmers, became shared and eventually controlled by British and other European merchants. The [477]
Chinese would thus to a further extent be thrown back on their role of middlemen, but they retained the monopoly of rice and, later on, had large holdings in tin and rubber. After the making of the treaties with the European Powers, the China trade did not thrive and, as has been remarked, the competition of European-owned steamers reduced the fleet of over 400 junks to fewer than 100.[1]

In 1828 Robert Hunter, the first British merchant in Siam—the 175
first, at least, for a century or so—arrived in Bangkok. A timely 441
gift to the King of 1,000 muskets earned him the right to remain 439
and trade. For long he was the only European merchant. The native commerce was at that time so completely in the hands of the Chinese that the only profitable business to be done, Hunter found, was with the court. He had sidelines, however, one of which was importing opium for sale to the Chinese.

The historian of the Chinese in Southeast Asia has constantly 114
to be on the look out for contradictions and inconsistencies, apparent or real, in the accounts of contemporary European observers. In describing the character, the virtues, and vices of this race it has been justly remarked that no two writers agree. We can detect discrepancies of a less emphatic sort in the accounts given of the degree and speed of assimilation of the Chinese in Siam to the natives of the country. Sir John Bowring, for instance, remarks that the children of Chinese men and Siamese women are 'invariably educated to the Chinese type', and again 'the father alone seems to model the child's nature and education'.[2] How are we to reconcile this with Gützlaff's assertion (see pp. 122–3 *ante*) that

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[1] W. A. Graham, *Siam* (London, Alexander Moring, 1924) i. 209. Graham says that before 1890 the junks had entirely disappeared, but this is an exaggeration. They survive in small numbers to this day.

[2] op. cit. p. 85.

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114 'within two or three generations, all the distinguishing marks of the Chinese dwindle entirely away; and a nation which adheres to its national customs so obstinately becomes wholly changed to Siamese'?

In attaching a value to the two pieces of evidence, we must remember in the first place that Sir John Bowring (1792–1859), although a polyglot, was fifty-seven before he went to the East and sixty-three when he first visited Siam, whereas Gützlaff (1803–51) went to Siam when he was twenty-five,[1] so his observations were over a longer space of time. Both Bowring and Gützlaff possessed, it appears, a knowledge of the Chinese and Siamese languages. Allowing for this, it would seem that both observers are, according to their perspectives, right. Bowring is quite correct when he notes the dominance of the father's culture over that of the mother, and Gützlaff himself (p. 126 of this survey) admits the difficulty of establishing schools for the Chinese because of the Siamese, Burmese, or Laos wives of Chinese whose prejudices (presumably in favour of their husband's civilization) are 'stronger than that of the Chinese
186 themselves'. It would seem, then, that what we are witnessing is *in the first generation* the obstinate refusal of the Chinese system to
177 yield to the native one, but fighting nevertheless a losing battle: the struggle continues in the second generation, though with diminishing intensity, and finally in the third generation the battle is lost and the native culture prevails.[2]

171 In Malaya and Indonesia we do not witness a similar process. The Babas of Malacca, descendants of Chinese who intermarried
177 with Malays and other Malaysians, retained their Chinese customs and religion whilst losing their language.[3] In Indonesia the Dutch
186 policy of segregation of the races helped the Indonesian-born Chinese to retain their own culture in spite of intermarriage. In Annam the culture was already essentially Chinese in nature so

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[1] *Dictionary of National Biography* (London, Oxford University Press, 1891).

[2] A woman of character would be able to influence her husband in either direction. Dr Landon cites *An English Governess at the Siamese Court*, by Anna H. Leonowens (Boston, Fields, Osgood & Co., 1870) p. 247, regarding a Chinese girl of the harem of the fourth king of the Chakri dynasty who was the only woman who ever managed him, 'She was hardly pretty, but well-formed, and of versatile tact, totally uneducated, of barely respectable birth,—being Chinese on her father's side,—yet withal endowed with a naïve intuitive appreciation of character.'

[3] But see Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, pp. 37, 61, &c., and Appendix, 'The Baba Language', pp. 293–5.

that miscegenation had little effect on the customs and religion of 171 the offspring. 177

The whole question is of paramount importance to our study and discussion of it will be resumed at a later stage, but as we fol- 186 low the career of the colonial Chinese in Siam in something approaching chronological sequence it is necessary to be aware of the processes that are in train.

The changes in store for Siam as a country as the result of Euro- 477 pean encroachment were to affect the Chinese as greatly as, and in some respects more immediately than, the Siamese. A treaty with 648 Britain abolished the whole system of monopolies and established free trade from the month of April 1856. Bowring witnessed the demeanour of a Chinese of enormous wealth among prostrate Siamese nobles when the article in question was read out to the court. He owned the opium and ninety other monopolies. 'He bowed his head in silence, but looked as if a hundred thunderstorms were concentrated in that proud, scornful, yet resigned expression. But as the opium monopoly, the most precious and profitable of them all, was preserved to him, he had the sagacity to feign a willing resignation.'[1]

A foremost quality of the Chinese overseas is adaptability— 182 when their swings are taken away, they are quick to discover some roundabouts.

In the year 1857 it was estimated that the kingdom of Siam had 441 1·5 million Chinese settlers, 200,000 of whom were in Bangkok and environs. This estimate is Bowring's and is probably much nearer 162 the truth that Ruschenberger's of a generation earlier or Gaston Rautier's of a generation later.[2] Nine out of ten of the floating bazaars which lined for miles the banks of the Menam were owned by the Chinese.[3]

'The Siamese keep the Chinese in absolute subjection; and while I was in Bangkok,' says Bowring, 'I saw no instance of resistance to the native authority.'[4]

Most of the European visitors to Siam from the sixteenth to the 162

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[1] op. cit. i. 86 ff.

[2] For examples of estimates of population inspired by hope and faith rather than informed by cold scrutiny see Francis Light's estimate of the Penang population (Purcell, op. cit. p. 40) and Stamford Raffles's regarding Singapore (ibid. p. 71).

[3] Bowring, op. cit. p. 85. The estimate given above is on the same page.

[4] ibid. p. 86. He knew of the rebellion of 1847, but maybe not of the others.

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162 twentieth century confined their observations to Bangkok and neighbourhood and few went any farther afield. Now, however, comes the famous French naturalist and traveller, Henri Mouhot, the discoverer of the ruins of Angkor, who explored both the upper waters of the Mekong, the gem districts of Chantabun (or Chantaburi), and the wilds of Cambodia, some provinces of the last-named being then in Siamese territory. He gives the population of Siam at 2 million Siamese, 1 million Laos, 1 million Malays, 1·5 million Chinese, 350,000 Cambodians, and 50,000 Peguans.[1]

175 Mouhot remarks that Siamese annals relate that in the seventh century Chinese junks used to ascend the Menam as far as Sang
133 Khalak, a distance of 120 leagues from the sea, whereas they now navigate it for 30 leagues at most. He says that Saraburi was a place of some extent, the population consisting of Siamese, Chinese, and Laos agriculturists.

Having decided to visit Cambodia, and finding his little river-boat of no use, Mouhot discovered that the only way of going to Chantabun was by Chinese junk or fishing vessel. On 4 January 1859 he arrived at Chantabun. Christian Annamites formed nearly a third of the population, the remainder being Chinese merchants
138 and some heathen Annamites and Siamese. In spite of its scanty population the province managed to export to Bangkok a great quantity of pepper cultivated by the Chinese chiefly at the foot of the mountains.

000 Every Siamese subject in Battambang on attaining a certain height had to pay the Government an impost or annual tribute equal to 6 ticals (18 francs). The Annamites paid this in eagle-wood, the Siamese in gamboge, and the Chinese paid in gum lac every four years, their tribute amounting annually to 4 ticals.

Most of the Chinese were addicted to gambling and opium-smoking. To record this is to be guilty of monotonous repetition, but it is well to note that however far from their fellows the Chinese remained true to type.

Henri Mouhot found himself installed in the house of a good Chinese, a pepper planter in the hill country of Chantabun, whose name was Taié-ou or, in Siamese, Apait. His son proved a real treasure to Mouhot. The two brothers of Apait were Catholics. Near the mountains 'were scattered the modest dwellings of the

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[1] Henri Mouhot, *Travels in the Central Parts of Indo-China (Siam), Cambodia, and Laos* (London, Murray, 1864) i. 61.

laborious Chinese'.[1] At the Chinese New Year Mouhot sat with 000
Apait while his son played some airs on the bamboo flute.[2]

Miscellaneous information recorded by Mouhot includes the fact that the gall of apes was sold to Chinese doctors in Chantabun; that Siamese and Chinese performed together in theatricals at a funeral; that a magnificent tree called by the Siamese *Mai Jakienne* was much prized by the Chinese for junk masts; and that Chinese and European junks were constantly going up and down the Komput River. At Komput the Chinese shopkeepers sold glass, china, hatchets, knives, and Chinese parasols. The beautiful cardamon of Poursat (an aromatic, pungent spice) was much sought after by the Chinese who paid the best prices for it. Its sale was entirely monopolized by the King and his ministers.

Mouhot did not think that the country (presumably Cambodia) contained above a million inhabitants, and, according to the most recent census, the number of free men fit to carry arms was returned at 30,000, besides a number of Chinese 'relatively great'.[3]

The greater part of the trade of Upper Siam was with Burma 439
and China, the transport to Bangkok being too costly. It was carried in caravans composed of mules, pack-bullocks, and carrying-coolies. The trade with China and Burma in the 1890s was much of the same nature as it had been for many decades or even centuries; the imports from China were brassware, ponies, and silk; walnuts were also largely imported, but rather as ballast than as paying freight as the caravans were usually thirty days *en route*. The imports from Burma were chiefly piece-goods, opium, and ponies. Exports were Chinese sticklac, horns, hides, beeswax, and imported goods.[4]

The French undoubtedly had Chinese trade as their objective when they sent their expedition of exploration, under de Lagrée, up the Mekong in 1866. This expedition proved a failure, the Mekong being found to be of little use for navigation north of the 14th, or at most the 18th, parallel, owing to the presence of rapids.
The Menam, however, was vastly superior to the Mekong in this 496
respect, and, with the completion of the railway which already in
the 1890s the Siamese were building to the north through central 439

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[1] op. cit. i. 142.

[2] ibid. p. 155. The Chinese flute is in a class by itself and, unlike the other instruments of the Chinese orchestra, is acceptable to the European ear.

[3] ibid. i. 275.

[4] A. Cecil Carter, *The Kingdom of Siam* (New York, Putnam, 1904) p. 33.

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Siam, important commercial developments were expected to follow.[1]

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The literature of foreign observers of Siam in the nineteenth century is considerable, and in sifting it in search of significant information we light on two books which have the merit of making actual the life of the people they describe. Both of these relate to experiences in the 1890s: one is by a transient;[2] the other by a travelling official.[3]

> There are [says Ernest Young] nearly as many Chinese in the country as there are Siamese. They marry Siamese women and their children make excellent subjects, as they possess both the natural brightness of the mother and the industry of the father. Unless they renounce their nationality they are subject to a poll-tax of about 5 or 6 shillings, payable every four years. At a date made known by proclamation each Chinaman must present himself at the police station and pay the tax. The receipt given is a small piece of beeswax about the size of a threepenny piece. This bears a seal, and is worn on the wrist for a certain time, fastened by a piece of string. The police are very busy at this time, and there is nothing that a Siamese policeman so much enjoys as leading some unfortunate Chinaman to pay the tax. Should the seal be lost, the alien is bound to buy another as soon as he is requested by some officer of the law.[4]

463 First to rise in the morning in Bangkok were the Chinese inhabitants, and on rising they exploded crackers. They were carpenters, blacksmiths, butchers, bakers; they watered, swept, mended, and scavenged the roads; they were wharf coolies, servants, and rickshaw-pullers. No Siamese were to be found among these last. The rickshaws were mostly discarded ones from Singapore and were in a very dilapidated condition. The Chinese rickshaw-men never resented being cut by a driver's whip if caught on the wrong side of the road.

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Blue, as ever, was the colour of the Chinese workaday clothes. Other colours were worn only at the New Year when gorgeous heliotropes, lavenders, pale blues, green, and yellow silks made their appearance, having been deposited in the interim in the pawnshops.

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[1] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 10th ed. (1902) xxxii. 612.

[2] Ernest Young, *The Kingdom of the Yellow Robe* (London, Constable, 1898).

[3] H. Warington Smyth, Director of Mines, Siam, *Five Years in Siam* (London, Murray, 1898) (refers to 1891–6).

[4] op. cit. p. 9: cf. p. 484 of this survey regarding a similar proceeding in Java in about 1798.

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The only truly native quarter was a long bazaar known as Sampeng. 361 It was about a quarter of a mile in length and contained a 443 mixed population of Indians, Siamese, and Chinese. It somewhat resembled a street in Canton but lacked the wealth of elaborately carved and gilded signboards which give such a distinctive and local atmosphere to a purely Chinese street. Stretched overhead from side to side were pieces of torn cloth and sacking which acted quite as effectively in keeping out the sun as imprisoning the awful combination of foul odours that seems to be the possession of all Oriental thoroughfares. Everywhere were stagnant water and domestic rubbish. The gambling houses, opium dens, and brothels in this quarter were thronged by the lowest of the low. Electric light had already arrived in the city, but in the outskirts the lamplighter was still to be seen wending his way on his evening round, carrying the small ladder, boxes of matches, and bottles of oil that marked the nature of the operation. In some places in the city and in Sampeng little cholera lamps swung aloft at the end of slender poles, swaying backwards and forwards and telling where death had entered on his work of destruction.

At the end of the bazaar was the chief idol manufactory in the country, supplying all the temples of Siam.[1]

The Chinese are seen through the eyes of another contemporary 505 observer of Bangkok thus:

> Bangkok port has no rules but one:—Thou shalt not rebuke or in anyway inconvenience a Chinese coolie whatever he may do! He is the master of the port. He may grapple on to a steamer with his cargo boat when she comes up the river to seek her moorings. He may refuse to cast off when the captain has to change his berth; he may, and probably will, refuse to load the ship in any way but his own, even to the peril of ship and cargo; he may spit and smoke in the poop, and may generally lord it. But he must be allowed his sweet will; and if any officer cuts his rope away, or a quartermaster kicks him over the side, there is a general strike, and the captain is dropped by the agents. For the Chinaman is a privileged person, and the port is run for his private edification and enjoyment.[2]

Warington Smyth is not highly appreciative of the Chinese of 000 Bangkok, but he has humour and buoyancy which atone in some measure for the malice of his abuse, as when he says, comparing

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[1] Ernest Young, op. cit. pp. 19, 22.

[2] H. Warington Smyth, *Five Years in Siam*, p. 10.

000 the luck of other races who chance to fall or be pushed into the
Menam: 'Chinese are different; a tiger will take a Chinaman without
provocation, as will a shark; for he is fat and porky, and as unpopular
with animals as with men.' Summing up he says: 'This is
Chinese Bangkok, malodorous and ill-mannered.'

575 The widely operating secret societies of the Heaven and Earth
or Triad we have encountered before in this part of our survey: we
668 shall read of them again more than once in Malaya, Sarawak, and
the other countries of Southeast Asia. They were responsible for
[669] riots in 1889 and six years later for fighting with fire-arms from
behind street barricades. In the latter year rival factions of the Yee
797 Heng and the Su Lee societies held one Bangkok district in a state
of siege for a few days and the battle was stopped only through the
intervention of Danish officers. Yet the Siamese Government went
so far as to cultivate these secret societies as they were thought to
offset the association of native Christians fostered by the French
missionaries. The movement was regarded as particularly alarming
after a Buddhist priest, who had been chaplain to the late Regent,
turned Christian.[1]

With Mouhot we escaped from Bangkok for a spell and visited the confines of the northwest; with Warington Smyth we are able to take another excursion, this time to peninsular Siam of the south and at a period about forty years after the French naturalist.

648 There was long-standing controversy among British officials of
Penang as to whether or not Kedah was subject to Siam at the time
636 of the cession by the Sultan of Kedah of the island of Penang to the
316 British in 1786. On this turned the question whether the British
had undertaken to defend Kedah against the Siamese. In any case
they did nothing to defend it when it was overrun by the Siamese
in 1818. At the time when it was ceded to the British by the Treaty
of Bangkok in 1909 Kedah was a border province of Siam. In the
1830s the Chinese were mining tin in Negri Sembilan and Selangor;
in the 1850s they were active in the tin-fields of Perak; they
had already, it seems, penetrated to the rich mining lands of
southern Siam. The Chinese tin-mining community of Siam was in
effect an extension of that of Bangka and Billiton. Racially and
economically the settlements were connected, though the political
000 jurisdiction over them was divided. As has been said, in Siam the

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[1] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 107. Dr Thompson cites the *Bangkok Times* of 8 October 1901 regarding the riots.

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As has been said, in Siam the
Chinese, usually of mixed blood, sometimes attained to high office 557
under the Siamese with titles of honour attached. More than one of these families retired to Penang and, keeping connexions with the source of their wealth, formed part of the bridge linking the two Chinese communities.

In the 1890s, at the time of Warington Smyth's visit, the Raja 635
of the west coast of the peninsula was a Chinese named Praya
Rasada (Phya Ratsdain in Dr Landon's spelling), known familiarly 674
as Simbi (Sim Bee). His two brothers were Rajas of Renawng 361
(Renong) and Langsuan (Lang Suan), 'but neither can equal him in energy, popularity, or good nature'. Of his own initiative he introduced the Burmese village system into his province. In 1892 he moved his capital bodily down the river to be nearer the sea. The old capital, the Khoantani of Major Low, was now being connected with the new one, Kantun, and also with the pepper-planting district of Taptieng, by new roads. Other improvements and reforms were in progress. Dacoity had practically disappeared; even the secret societies, who generally were unmolested in Siam, had received a warning in the form of the suppression of one of their number to whom a murder had been traced. There was a [625]
police force of Sikhs and Siamese. Cleanliness was one of the Raja's hobbies.

This Chinese, Phya Ratsdain, or Kaw Sim Bee, was a member 556
of a family which achieved outstanding success in Siam. Dr Landon gives an extended account of its history and the present writer was for years personally acquainted with some of its members and can confirm that its standing was high both in Siam and in Penang.[1] The founder of the family was a coolie, named Kaw Su Chiang, a native of Ch'angchow-fu in Fukien province, about thirty-five miles from Amoy. He arrived in Penang about 1810 when he was about twenty-five years of age with nothing but his clothes and a carrying-pole. He soon entered the coastal trade in which—subject to the avoidance of pirates—cloth, muskets, &c., were bartered for tin, areca nut, birds' nests, copra, and pepper. Kaw Su Chiang prospered as a trader and extended his interests to tin. This he found in great quantity in the Renong district and he imported Chinese coolies to mine it. He ruled with a patriarchal hand the community

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[1] The surname is usually spelt Khaw in Penang. Khaw Su Chiang's name occurs among the subscribers to the reconstruction of the temple of the goddess of mercy in the 1860s (originally built in 1800).

556 he had created. Later he was given the title of Phra (the third highest of the titles awarded to commoners) and made the Raja of Renong. The carrying-pole he had brought to the country he now had gilded and he showed it to visitors with pride. He had both a Chinese and a Thai wife and of his sons one, Kaw Sim Kong, succeeded his ageing father as Raja of Renong, another became Raja of Lang Suan, a third, Raja of Kra, and 'the youngest and greatest',
[635] Kaw Sim Bee, Raja of Trang. In 1892 Sim Bee was appointed High Commissioner of the Western Provinces on the Indian Ocean with a capital at Phuket.

635 In the 1890s the policy of the Siamese Government was to dis-
651 place the Rajas by Governors and to curtail the powers of the
554 Rajas who remained, to rule directly, and to collect the taxes
through their own officers instead of farming them. In spite of the administrative reorganization, Sim Bee retained the substance of his power to the end of his days. He was completely loyal to Bangkok. Although he spoke Thai and Chinese fluently he never learned to read Thai. 'Arrogant, choleric, and ambitious, he was so feared by the people that they prostrated themselves when he passed.'[1]

162 Speaking of Taptieng, the centre of the pepper-planting district
in the midst of lateritic soil approved by the Chinese planter,
575 Warington Smyth says that it was a filthy place 'as all Chinese
245 towns are'. There were 10,000 Chinese in the district. The Raja took the Director of the Department of Mines to one of the principal secret societies in the town where he was on good terms with the Chinese officers. The Director was elaborately introduced to the latter, and he confessed that he was favourably impressed by the style and appearance of their hosts as well as by the cleanliness of the place. Referring to the building occupied by the society, Warington Smyth remarks that there is 'something strong and imposing in Chinese architecture and ornament which is certainly attractive'.

162 Topographical information such as this, imparted by a lively writer and a keen observer, amounts to more than a catalogue of

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[1] Landon, op. cit. pp. 13–15.

Abjectness was encouraged by the absolute despotism of Siam. Two ambassadors arrived in England from Siam in October 1857 and had an audience with Queen Victoria; 'they brought with them magnificent presents, which they *delivered crawling*, on 16 November.' *Haydn's Dictionary of Dates* (London, Ward, Lock, 1906) p. 1208. (My italics. V.P.)

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impressions, for from it can be gleaned facts that connect up the economic and social history of the Chinese of these parts. For instance, the fall in the price of pepper had halved the population of Taptieng.[1] The roads hitherto maintained by the Chinese had now become obliterated or impassable. At Palean, which was also under the Raja of Trang, there were a few Chinese and a little pepper. Tin mines were scattered through the southern part of the province from the sea to the boundaries of Lakawn. In Takuapa, where the Government was bad, the mines were set deep in the jungle, reached by rough-and-tumble forest paths. The royalties exacted by the Government were high: the communications were poor. Nevertheless, Takuapa exported 600–700 tons of tin yearly. Here the arrival of the party was inopportune. Rice and opium were the chief articles of import, but the stock of these two commodities was now very low, the failure of the former being due to the loss of a rice-laden junk. The coolies were clamorous: the *Towkays*[2] were anxious.[3] 162 316 439

Their itinerary punctuated by the gongs and crackers of Chinese funerals and weddings, the party passed to the east coast. Here there was no place of equal importance to those of the west coast for a long way south. Pran, Kuwi, Bangtaphan, and Patiyu were insignificant villages at the mouths of their streams with a population of fishermen, chiefly Chinese. The population of Champawn was said to have been 30,000 all told, but only the fishing villages on the coast had any large population of Chinese. Paknam, a fishing village, had lately been visited by cholera. 'Its male inhabitants were chiefly Chinamen: everything was consequently filthy.' 162

Langsuan had a population of 11,000 including 2,000 Chinese. The Raja was a Chinese who was by no means sensible of his responsibilities and exercised practically no control over the Chinese who carried on the government under him. His son was a Penang Chinese 'who needed a good licking'. The mines lay principally in the valleys along the granite outcrops of the main [635] 316 162

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[1] In Penang, when in 1810 the bottom fell out of the pepper market, there had also been a great misfortune; but here cloves were a second crop which was a mainstay till the blight fell on them in the 1860s. See Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 44.

[2] *Towkay*, meaning head of a business, is a common term among the Chinese of Southeast Asia. Though a Hokkien expression, it is used by all tribes, though the Cantonese also use *Szt'au*, which has the same meaning.

[3] Warington Smyth, op. cit. ii. 20.

162 range dividing the Raja of Langsuan's territory from that of his
brother of Renong. Some 200 Chinese coolies were employed in
316 the mines at wages ranging from \$4½ to \$8 a month. The methods
of mining were primitive.

439 In Bandon (or Kanchanadit in Siamese) the population was
442 about 22,000, of which a large part was Chinese. These were
Hainanese, Hokkiens, and Cantonese engaged in the export of
162 timber, rattans, skins, and other jungle produce. Quite a large fleet
of Chinese junks was engaged in the trade. The steamers from
Bangkok on the whole were successfully boycotted by the Chinese
who kept the trade as much as possible in their own hands.[1]

439 Singora (Songkla in Siamese), on the east coast, south of the
Isthmus of Kra, was inhabited by a large number of Chinese
662 traders who had a practical monopoly of the local trade and owned
636 many junks. It was seized at the beginning of the nineteenth century by Chinese from Amoy led by the great-grandfather of the
present Governor (*c.* 1890), and for a long time they were little
meddled with by Bangkok, under which they had placed themselves. There was now a Siamese commissary from the capital in
several of the provinces. Bribery played a large part in the Chinese
methods of keeping influence.[2]

167 Labour was needed for Singora, for example for the coffee
plantations, but the lack of coolie regulations made it impossible
464 to import either Tamil or Chinese labour. The Siamese officials
considered that the existing arrangements were good enough and
they did not want any more foreign labour in the country.

316 The Lakawn mines were worked by the Siamese before the
Chinese arrived some time around 1840, and now in the 1890s
there were 350 Chinese men working them, divided into five
kongsis, or associations. The blast furnaces were of the Chinese
pattern. The output was 800 cwt. per annum with a value of
\$24,000.[3] The tin was bought by a Government buyer at \$30 a
167 picul. The Chinese miners 'were the wildest Chinamen we had
ever met, and had mostly been imported direct by junks from
674 the interior of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Hainan'. They were in
the habit of holding folks up to ransom. As a contrast to these
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[1] ibid. ii. 84. Warington Smyth mentions that in the 1870s piratical Chinese junks were still not uncommon along this coast.

[2] Warington Smyth, ibid. ii. 106.

[3] The Mexican silver dollar is probably intended in these values. Warington Smyth speaks of the 'currency nightmare'.

ruffians Warington Smyth met a 'charming old Chinaman', a boat- 000
builder.

It would seem from what has been recorded above that the 635
Chinese in southern Siam fifty years ago were living in a state of
semi-independence. Not only were some of the Governors Chinese, 636
but also the secret societies and the kongsis (which probably were 575
to a large extent identical) were allowed fairly complete charge of
their own affairs. The Siamese officials were interested principally 651
in tribute and taxation. They were quite content for the hard-working Chinese to produce for them the profit that would not have been forthcoming from their less energetic countrymen.

CHAPTER XIII

LUKCHIN AND NEW-COMER[1]

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IN 1900 the civilization of China was in decay. How long it had been so is hard to decide; but if the arts and crafts are any indication of a healthy society, then the reign of Chia Ch'ing which began in 1796 is as definite a mark as any between a condition of static comeliness at the least and one in which inventiveness and skill were noticeably in decline. The decline of art may well have been an early symptom of political and social senility, of the former more certainly, for within a generation or so China was offering but the feeblest opposition to the onslaught of the West. Yet, convinced of her self-sufficiency and the adequacy of her institutions, she refused for many decades to consider political or educational reform. Arsenals, indeed, were set up in China under foreign engineers and mechanics between the First and Second China Wars, but it was not until after a new defeat by France in 1885 that for the first time history, mathematics, and science were introduced into the public examinations. Up to 1860 China had no Foreign Office, and one was created only at the behest of foreigners by a clause in the Tientsin Treaty. Japan's story was a very different one. Adapting her institutions to receive the sources of Western strength, she administered a crushing defeat to her former teacher, China, who had taught her nearly all she knew. Finally, in 1898, the mandarin Chang Chih-tung, in his *Exhortation to Learning*, issued a warning that China must adopt Western learning at once or be destroyed.[2]

The ferment belatedly generated, as by a kind of yeast which would magically rejuvenate very old and insipid wine, resulted in the rise of nationalism and the Revolution of 1911 and its chequered aftermath.

In 1900 all of this was only dimly foreseen even by the most divining Chinese: to the *Lukchin*, or 'child of a Chinese' in Siam, and to the immigrant coolie on the deck of a ship *en route* from Swatow or Hong Kong to Bangkok it had no meaning at all. They may have heard of the Boxer risings and of the anti-foreign decrees

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[1] *Lukchin* = child of a Chinese, and means the Sino-Thais.

[2] Victor Purcell, *Problems of Chinese Education* (London, Kegan Paul, 1936) p. 1 and passim.

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of the Empress-dowager and Prince Tuan, but almost certainly not of K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-chao, the prophets of educational reform, or, possibly, not even of the exiled Sun Yat-sen. 000

China's claim to suzerainty over Siam was very shadowy (as indeed was the case with her other claims of this sort, Britain was included as a vassal in Chinese records) and had not been asserted for a long time. Tribute, or merchandise masquerading as tribute, had indeed been extremely intermittent for the last century or so, and latterly had ceased altogether, but this was a thing China was used to from her many supposed 'vassals'. After an interval of eighteen years the tribute had been renewed in 1869, but its bearers had been compelled by 'the Chinese to use the route via Canton and were not allowed to come by the Tientsin route which the foreigners used'.[1] China refused to make a treaty with Siam, although at this time her influence in that country was at its height, for the simple reason that she did not want diplomatic relations with anyone. Later on, when China herself desired such a treaty, the Siamese were reluctant to conclude one, and it was not until 1946 that one was signed.[2] 648

The absence of ambassadors and consuls to whom the Chinese could appeal for protection when their rights or privileges were assailed was now regarded by the Siamese with favour. Immigration from China had greatly increased after the First China War which was concluded in 1842. In the 1840s it was estimated to be at the rate of about 15,000 a year; by the turn of the century about 1,200 a month were arriving at the port of Bangkok in addition to an even larger number in the peninsular States. The great flood of immigrants had not yet begun, but already in the 1880s there was talk in Siam of restriction of Chinese immigration, and in 1888 the establishment of a Chinese Protectorate on the Straits Settlements model was mooted, and abandoned only on the ground of expense.[3] But so long as China had no diplomatic or consular officers in Siam there was no danger of the aliens rallying round them and forming a dangerous opposition to the authority of the Siamese Government. 648 167

It was estimated that about 40 per cent. of the new-comers remained in the country, and that of these about half married Siamese women. With improved communications between Siam and China, the proportion of transients was increasing and these were disposed 167

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[1] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 103.

[2] See p. 192.

[3] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 107.

167 to look upon Siam as a place in which to make money and from
which to depart as early as possible. This fact did not escape the
notice of the Siamese and they remarked openly upon it. At the
same time the peculiarities of Chinese social organization overseas
were impressing themselves more and more on the Siamese authorities.
575 The secret societies had long before this brought themselves
669 to the very unfavourable notice of the Government of the Straits
Settlements and there had been serious battles between rival factions
579 in Singapore in 1854 and in Penang in 1867; but in Siam in
the 1880s the Government, as we have seen,[1] encouraged their
activities as an offset to the influence of the native Christians. The
riots of 1889 and the conflict between the Yee Heng and the Su-lee
Ku societies in the streets of Bangkok in 1895 must have convinced
the Siamese that these associations were a pest and far more to be
feared than were a few docile Christians. In more modern terms,
the official cultivation of the Thian Ti Hui had upset the entomological
674 balance and this must now be redressed. Of illicit organizations
the Ang Yee secret societies were the most important. About
1905 Siam was seriously troubled by Ang Yee wars. Legal cases
were not taken to the courts but were tried before Ang Yee
578 tribunals. 'Competition and jealousy set group against group, and
the Chinese killed one another without regard to the laws of the
land.'[2]

575 A law was passed in 1897 requiring the registration of every
society. After two years only two had registered and the Siamese
656 authorities, owing to the lack of the machinery of investigation, were
unable to prosecute those societies which had neglected to do so.
Without a Chinese Protectorate like the one in Malaya, the police
were completely unable to lift the cloak of mystery in which the
operations of these societies were wrapped. The Chinese, for their
part, were most suspicious of the designs of the Government,
imagining the law to be a preliminary to requiring them to do military
service, and even the truly philanthropic societies, which had
nothing to fear from revealing their existence, neglected to register.[3]

167 We must not, however, exaggerate the causes of friction between
the Siamese and the Chinese at this period, for, compared with the
177 situation which developed in the 1930s, complete harmony between
the peoples now prevailed. Sir Josiah Crosby, who spent
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[1] See p. 138 and Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, chap. viii.

[2] Landon, op. cit. p. 149.

[3] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 108.

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most of his long official career in contact with the Siamese, says of 167
the period:

> In 1904, the Chinese question, although it was already attracting 177
> notice, was not a very urgent one, chiefly because in those days a Chinese 178
> immigrant usually took to himself a wife from among the women of the country. Children of mixed races born of such unions were brought up as Siamese, regarding Siam as their home and merging themselves readily with the population around them.[1]

Before the rise of nationalism in China and Siam there seems to have been no problem of assimilation. In three generations, as we have seen, the new-comers were completely absorbed into the Siamese people. During the process of assimilation these people performed a necessary function in Siamese society. They were a source of new energy to a people who suffered from the usual tropical lethargy, and as Siam had been under-populated throughout her history, there was no threat that the natives would be swamped in the flood of immigration.

A combination of factors was to change the situation completely within the next decade or so. The first was the growth of a feeling on the part of the two peoples that they had separate entities, that these entities were threatened by foreign encroachment, and that they must be defended by the encouragement of a sense of apartness, by aggressive activity on the political and diplomatic planes, and by protective legal measures. China was large, unwieldy, and split by tribal and clan divisions: Siam was smaller and compact, and though she had her racial minorities she was able more easily to consolidate herself into a conscious nation. The other important factor was that with an increasing immigration Chinese women were, after 1910, accompanying their men in large numbers and thus creating a wall against assimilation. The feeling of separation on the part of the Chinese was more and more fostered by the policy of the Chinese Government.

The new-found concern of the moribund Manchu Government 648
for the wandering sons of Han—or rather of T'ang[2]—was mani-

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[1] Sir Josiah Crosby, *Siam: the Crossroads* (London, Hollis & Carter, 1945) p. 71.

[2] The people of north China called themselves the 'Sons of Han' (i.e. of the dynasty which ruled from 200 B.C. to A.D. 220) while the people of the south called themselves the 'Sons of T'ang' (i.e. of the dynasty which ruled from A.D. 618 to 907). The Manchus were far more identified with the north than with

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648 fested in Siam about the same time that it was in the Netherlands Indies. Apart from their increased international awareness encouraged by a succession of defeats, the Government felt, no doubt, that they should show the flag abroad and thus counteract the influence of the revolutionaries who were now plotting against the Ch'ing dynasty with the financial help of overseas Chinese. In 1907 a Chinese commercial commissioner paid a visit to Bangkok accompanied by an imposing suite and escorted by two cruisers.[1] He did not discuss political questions, and acted solely as the head of what came to be called a goodwill mission. There were, indeed, no grievances to redress or protests to be made. At that time the 609 Chinese were enjoying something like an equality of treatment together with privileged facilities for making a good living. That same year King Chulalongkorn made a public pronouncement in which he stated his attitude towards his Chinese subjects:

> It has always been my policy that the Chinese in Siam should have the same opportunities for labour and profit as are possessed by my own countrymen. I regard them not as foreigners but as one of the component parts of the kingdom and sharing its prosperity and advancement.[2]

The sentiment here expressed was reciprocated in the attitude of the Chinese, especially of the second and third generations, until complete merging took place. Dr Landon gives an example of a prominent Chinese merchant whose face was unmistakably Chinese and whose father was a Chinese although his mother was Thai, who took immediate offence when he was playfully charged with being Chinese—'in spite of the fact that his shop signs were in Chinese, that he spoke two Chinese dialects, that he kept his accounts in Chinese, and sent his children to a Chinese school'. He also spoke Thai perfectly in two dialects, regarded himself as a Thai, and patriotically supported the modern Siamese nationalistic movement with large contributions to the defence forces. 'He was typical of an unnumbered host who are,' as Kumut Chandruang says, 'our flesh and blood, because they keep alive our

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the south so that their concern for the immigrants from Fukien and Kwangtung had a less genuine and disinterested ring than that of the followers of the Cantonese Sun Yat-sen.

[1] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 108.

[2] Cited by Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 108 from the *Bangkok Times* of 21 February 1935.

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national economy.'[1] This is recounted of a generation later when all sorts of incidents had happened to disturb the harmonious relationships between the races: it must have been doubly true of the earlier period. 609

Mr Lin Yu stresses the great proportion of Chinese blood that must flow in the veins of the more influential classes of Siamese. 144 He tells us that on one occasion when King Vajiravudh (1910–25) 565 commanded those of his courtiers who had Chinese blood in their veins to stand to the right of the room, 90 per cent. of them did so.[2] It was, therefore, one of the ironies of history that the officials who were to pass the immigration, educational, and labour laws which were to operate so to the disadvantage of the overseas Chinese should be Siamese with a large admixture of Chinese.

Legal Status of the Chinese in Siam. Until 1946 there were no 648 treaty relations between Siam and China. We have seen something of the reason for this. In the first years of the century the Chinese several times approached Siam through Tokyo with a view to establishing diplomatic relations. At one moment a treaty was actually drafted but owing to an anachronistic pride or a clumsy gaffe on the part of the Chinese draftsmen, by which Siam was referred to as China's vassal, the Siamese were enabled to withdraw from the negotiations with an injured look. Similarly at Versailles, overtures on the part of China came to nothing. Later on it will be recorded how the treaty was eventually signed and ratified, but a throng of events demand attention before such a record is timely.

Immigrants from China who were not the subjects of a European 651 Power were regarded by the Siamese as being under their jurisdiction and were subject to the laws of the realm. After three years' 641 residence, and at the close of every three years from that date, they had to pay a tax of 4½ ticals, equivalent to 8*s*. 6*d*. in the 1880s and 1890s and to somewhat less in the first decade of the twentieth century. They were exempted from *corvée* labour, and all other Government requisitions, except ordinary taxes. Their children, who as there were no Chinese consuls could not be registered as Chinese, had the option of submitting to the triennial tax or of selecting a Government master and becoming Siamese. The grandchildren of Chinese immigrants were classed and registered as Siamese, and were liable to *corvée* labour as soon as they measured

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[1] Landon, op. cit. pp. 18, 19.

[2] Lin Yu, 'Twin Loyalties in Siam', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. ix, no. 2 (June 1936).

651 641 2½ sok, or 50 inches, to the shoulder, and were marked to one or other Government master. The mark was tattooed on the back of the right or left wrist, and all persons thus marked were liable to be called out in their master's department.[1]

648 641 Then, in the spring of 1909, the Chinese promulgated a nationality law whereby the *jus sanguinis* was adopted and all persons with Chinese fathers were regarded as Chinese, irrespective of where they were born. Thus there arose from this moment a problem of dual nationality. The new Chinese law, moreover, foreshadowed interference in the affairs of persons of Chinese race born abroad whom China now regarded as her nationals. The actual interference was signalized by the laws and regulations governing the composition and election of the National Assembly on 10 August 1912, by which 6 out of 274 senators were to be elected by 'the electoral college of Chinese abroad'.[2]

Not having any consuls of their own to whom they could appeal, those Chinese who could claim the nationality of countries more favourably placed did so in large numbers. In 1936 there were 55,000 Asiatic subjects of Great Britain residing in Siam, most of whom were Chinese.[3] The status of Chinese born in the Netherlands was uncertain owing to the state of the Dutch law.[4]

648 These problems, however, belong to a later period and the purpose of this section is to make clear the situation existing on the eve of the Siamese-Chinese friction of 1910. In this year, in spite of the civil disabilities due to the lack of a treaty between the two countries, the Chinese enjoyed a favoured position. The China-born could not, indeed, vote or hold any civil office other than that of clerk or interpreter, but that was a small matter compared with the freedom to monopolize the retail and the rice trades and to levy toll through their influence on nearly every business transaction. They were permitted to travel and to live wherever they wished; they had access to the courts and police protection. They might own and lease property and settle in undeveloped areas. On the whole the

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[1] Holt S. Hallett, *A Thousand Miles on an Elephant in the Shan States* (London, Blackwood, 1890) p. 460, cited by Landon, op. cit. p. 10.

[2] MacNair, op. cit. p. 25.

The principle here introduced of holding elections for membership of bodies in China among overseas Chinese was to give trouble in the future, particularly in Indonesia, Malaya, and Siam.

[3] Landon, op. cit. p. 27.

[4] Amry Vandenbosch, *The Dutch East Indies* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1942) p. 193.

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Chinese would have agreed with King Chulalongkorn's statement 648
that they had the same opportunities for labour and profit as were possessed by his own countrymen.[1]

[1] Dr Virginia Thompson at p. 114 of her work, *Thailand: the New Siam*,
states that 'When a Chinese married a Siamese woman, the wife—not the husband— 641
became head of the family and controlled its property and cash.'

This gives, I feel, a misleading idea of the situation. The fact is that a Siamese 421
woman married to a Chinese did not take his nationality but remained Siamese.
The children, too, were Siamese in the eyes of Siamese law. Since under the new
laws of *c.* 1939–40 an alien was restricted in his right to hold land or to acquire 592
it, a Chinese husband would often hold land in his wife's name. This both
secured him in his property and protected his wife and children. A Siamese wife 595
practically never accompanied her husband to China where, incidentally, he
probably had a wife already. But there was no matriarchal system as suggested
by the above statement, and the transfer of any property was entirely at the
husband's discretion.

[p. 152]

CHAPTER XIV

THE GENESIS OF DISCORD

000 There is a process known to geographers as 'river capture'. The beds of rivers are continually extending backwards towards the hills or mountains; this is due to soil and rock from the higher slopes at the head of the valley being washed into the river and carried away. In this manner the watershed may be lowered until streams from the other side may find an easier route down the channel of the river which has cut back. Without stretching the metaphor too far, we can say that something like this happened forty years ago to the stream of Chinese immigrants into Siam. Hitherto the stream had flowed into the main river of the Siamese nation, but at this epoch the river of Chinese nationalism cut back and captured the stream. Although this comparison is over-dramatic and incomplete, it should serve to suggest the striking change which took place about this time.

178 Whereas in 1900 the alien Chinese were living side by side with their Siamese hosts without great consciousness of difference on either side, and were being absorbed into the body of the nation by a leisurely and seemly process, in 1920 the two communities were deeply conscious of their apartness, and assimilation had to a great extent been arrested. This we know was due partly to the growth of nationalism in the two countries, especially in China, to greatly increased immigration, and the improvement in transport which facilitated frequent passing to and fro, and if we wish to fix a date, or rather an epoch for this cleavage, we may choose either the Chinese nationality law of 1909 adopting the *jus sanguinis*, or the Chinese Revolution of 1911. In point of fact, however, there is an intermediate date which it would be more fitting to select since it marked a moment when it was brought home to the Siamese that the Chinese among them formed an unassimilated element—or, to resume the metaphor, a stream which had forsaken its bed in their midst to join an alien waterway. Our reference is to the Chinese strike and riots in Bangkok in 1910.

651 We have seen in the preceding chapter that the Chinese in Siam had been paying a poll-tax at the rate of about 1½ baht a year for

many years.[1] The Siamese, on the other hand, had for the past 651
twenty years been paying about 50 baht a year. A new law now called for the collection of a capitation tax on all persons resident in
Siam irrespective of race. The tax applied to Europeans as well as 792
Asiatics, and the only exceptions were priests and ordained ministers.
Immediately, serious riots broke out among the Chinese as a 669
protest against the application of the tax to them, and all Chinese
shops were closed in sympathy, causing a complete stoppage of 468
trade. The riots were soon suppressed and the shops reopened, but the damage was done. The Chinese stood convicted by the Siamese as devoid of a sense of fair-play since the new law was merely intended to place all persons living in Siam on an equality as regards taxation, and the people realized for the first time the extent of the Chinese economic grip on the country, and the ability of the settlers to paralyse at will the life of the nation. From this time forward the dislike and fear of the Chinese long felt by many Siamese of influence were reinforced by popular sentiment.

A prejudice, however, cannot derive permanent sustenance from 609
a single incident and, to survive, it must be fed with further
grievances. Also it must be demonstrated to the people that such 643
incidents form part of a policy. It happened, then, that a long and
circumstantial indictment of the Chinese was forthcoming from 539
the hand of no less a person than the reigning monarch. There 578
seems to be no doubt that the series of articles which appeared in the vernacular newspapers in Siam under the pen-name of 'Asavabahu' (Pegasus), and which were reprinted in the form of a pamphlet entitled *The Jews of the East* were written by His Majesty King Vajiravudh, otherwise Rama VI.

'Asavabahu's' thesis, in condensed form, was this[2]: In Siam and in Eastern territories under British and American jurisdiction there exists a situation analogous to the Jewish question in countries of the West. This is 'The Yellow Peril'. The danger arises solely from the Chinese from whom the Siamese are even more different than

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[1] A baht was worth about one-eleventh of an English pound. Its value dropped after 1939, and after the Second World War the Siamese currency, in common with other Far Eastern currencies, suffered great inflation. 435

Dr Landon's account in chapter ii of his work, *The Chinese in Thailand*, has been closely followed in the present chapter.

[2] The complete translation of the two chapters in the pamphlet dealing with the Chinese, by Margaret D. M. Landon, is given in Dr Landon's *The Chinese in Thailand*, pp. 34–43.

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539 Europeans are from the Jews. The first similarity between the
Chinese and the Jews is in the matter of 'racial loyalty'. No matter
609 where they live, what nationality they assume, Chinese remain
643 essentially Chinese. But theirs is race loyalty, not love of country,
and, for the sake of convenience, they will register themselves as
578 nationals of foreign countries, even when they are living in China
itself. But such registration does not mean that they cease to act like
Chinese. They will be loyal to their adopted country only so long
as it suits their interests. What makes them undesirable is their
racial consciousness; they regard their residence ~~in the~~ country as
temporary and are unwilling to become its citizens. The purpose of
every Chinese immigrant is to amass as much money as possible
and then to depart—the fact that not all of them manage to do this
does not alter their common motive.

593 It is argued that Chinese intermarry with the people of the country: so do the Jews. But when a Chinese man marries a Thai woman, the woman becomes a Chinese and adopts Chinese customs in every detail. Their children become Chinese also. But if a Thai man marries a Chinese woman she continues to be Chinese. The man finds himself adopting Chinese ways and conforming to the Chinese pattern of life. As for the children, even though they are Thai in name they are psychologically Chinese. There are exceptions, of course, but they are few. Our hope was that the Chinese would put down roots in this country: the opposite has occurred.

The Chinese are unwilling to recognize any obligation to the country in which they reside. If there are privileges to which the native inhabitants are entitled, they demand them: if an occasion arises in which they are required to undertake the duties of citizens they evade these duties if possible. No doubt you will all remember the time four or five years ago when the Chinese suspended work. Their object was to protest against paying *the same poll-tax that all pay!*

The second characteristic of the Jews is found developed in the Chinese also. That is, the Chinese, like the Jews, are an ancient race, whose high civilization was developed at a time when our ancestors had not emerged from savagery. They divide the world into two classes—the Chinese and the barbarians (*Huan* [i.e. *Fan*]). Europeans are as much barbarians to them as are other Asiatics or blacks. They are likely to think that we exist only to be robbed

or cheated. In their contact with the barbarians the Chinese re- 539
cognize no right or wrong; nor do the Jews in dealing with the
Gentiles. 609

Chinese are willing to undergo any sort of privation for the sake
of money. Anyone who has watched Chinese coolies eat cannot help 643
but feel a sense of revulsion, since it seems that the food they eat 578
would hardly attract the curs which roam the streets. And if one speaks of places where they live, it is amazing that so many persons can squeeze themselves into a space so small that no other race on earth could manage to breathe in it. This being the case, it is not surprising that the Chinese can manage to corner all the available work for themselves.

The above are the main arguments of the pamphlet but they are greatly elaborated and illustrated by incidents. Mention is made of bogus insurance companies run by Chinese and of bankruptcy which is no shame to a Chinese. It is a smart practice to be used by the clever and knowing. They drain off the money of the Siamese and remit it to China. Friction in the future will almost certainly develop between the Chinese and the natives of Eastern countries. Even though the Jews prosper enormously in the countries in which they reside, they must use their wealth in those countries because they have no homeland to which they can remit it. But the absence of a Jewish national home is something of a liability as well. This arises from the fact that the Jews try to acquire political power as well as wealth in the countries in which they live. The Chinese, having a national home, are not unduly interested in the politics of other countries. Should they lose their national home through some calamity they will become the occasion of serious disorders. 'Therefore it is my profound and earnest desire that China shall continue to exist as a free nation in the midst of the nations forever.'

This pamphlet, *The Jews of the East*[1] and the articles in the 208
Siamese language from which it is a reprint have an interest quite
apart from their royal authorship. They set forth in very cogent 609
form the Siamese case against the Chinese, and they belong to an 578
early period in the history of the Siamese-Chinese friction. It is probable that they had an important, if imponderable, part in shaping public opinion if only for an interval. The question for us is whether they state the facts correctly or not.

We can leave aside for the moment the question, so often 000

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[1] [see pp. 153ff, cat. 116 --Analyst]

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184 We can leave aside for the moment the question, so often repeated in Siam and other countries of Southeast Asia, whether the
177 Chinese disposition was an anti-social element in the community or not. The important question here is whether it is true to say that the Chinese are unassimilable. This takes us back to the discussion in Chapter XII as to the comparative merits of Bowring's and Gützlaff's observations on the point in the preceding century. Bowring, we may remember, asserted that the children of Chinese men and Siamese women were 'invariably educated to the Chinese type', and Gützlaff asserted that 'within two or three generations all the distinguishing marks dwindle entirely away'.[1] We decided that Gützlaff's contention represented the true situation after two or three generations, but that Bowring had accurately described the situation as it appeared to be in the first generation, and that the process of assimilation proceeded in a subtle, unseen way.
[162] When 'Asavabahu' wrote,[1] the composition of the Chinese in Siam was beginning to change owing to the arrival of large numbers of Chinese women, though the sex ratio was still less than one woman to four men,[2] and immigration of Chinese was on the increase. But he was not referring to the barriers raised against assimilation by the existence of purely Chinese families within the country but to the resistance to assimilation of the Chinese who married Siamese women. The arrival of these Chinese women was a fact of which he does not seem to have been aware, for otherwise he certainly would have included it as an even more powerful argument against the Chinese race. But taking his case on this one point as it stands, the weight of opinion is against him.

[162] Prince Damrong had stated in conversation with an Italian newspaper correspondent in 1911 that one-quarter of the population of Bangkok was composed of Chinese and, unlike those of British Malaya or Java, they conceived an affection for the country in which they lived.[3] Marrying Siamese women, they became subjects after the third generation and served in the Siamese Army.[3] Later, in 1927, a European authority, F. H. Giles, speaking when the situation had greatly changed, said:

> The number of Chinese in this country is considerable, and it might

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[1] See p. 122.

[2] See p. 104, table showing *legal* Chinese males and females for 1919, 1929, and 1937.

[3] Salvatore Besso, *Siam and China* (London, Simpkin Marshall, 1913) p. 45. Landon, op. cit. p. 43.

1 [See pp. 153ff, Cat. 116 -- Analyst]

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have been expected that they would have exerted a strong influence on the manners, customs, and culture of the Siamese, but in the main 184
essentials of life, the Siamese have not been affected, they still retain in 177
a marked degree their own customs as well as their own culture which is of Indian origin. In fact, the Siamese have absorbed the Chinese, but there are signs that Chinese in the future will remain a distinct entity within the body politic of this country.[1]

The conclusion to be drawn, then, seems to be this: The Chinese immigrants into Siam were being readily assimilated until greatly increased immigration and the introduction of Chinese women created an enclave the existence of which was fostered by the Chinese Government partly for political reasons and partly for the sake of the remittances from overseas which were to be an important part of its financial strength. This enclave extended its membership from among the *Lukchin*, because many of them sent their children to schools where Chinese was the medium of instruction and they thus absorbed the nationalism taught therein, and because the increasing anti-Chinese feeling among the Siamese forced them more and more into the alien camp.

We now come back to the knotty question of whether the presence or otherwise of Chinese in the community was advantageous 441
or detrimental to it. Those who argue that the Chinese 'drew off 434
wealth' ignore the fact that without the Chinese there would have been no wealth to draw off. They seem to regard the country as a kind of bag containing a fixed number of coins which were never counted but always existed, and once having been removed could never be replaced, like Ricardo's Wages Fund. This notion may be true of mineral industries, such as tin-mining, but it is certainly not true of other forms of wealth. To be wealth at all, Siamese products had to be given a shape, to be gathered, and distributed and sold, and in doing all this the Chinese had the principal role. Sir Frank Swettenham, writing of the Chinese in Malaya, says: 'The reader should understand at once what is due to Chinese labour and enterprise is the evolution of the Federated Malay States.'[2] In endorsing this and other statements of the kind from the same source, Dr Landon remarks: 'What Sir Frank wrote of the contribution of the Chinese to the evolution of Malaya could

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[1] *Journal of the Siam Society*, vol. xx, pt. 3 (1927) p. 239. Landon, op. cit. p. 43.
[2] *British Malaya* (London, 1907) pp. 231–3.

441 be written, almost line for line, of Thailand's economic progress. There would have been no progress without the Chinese."[1]

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434 [1] op. cit. p. 44.

One of the experts to whom this Part was submitted before publication comments: 'This seems to me grossly exaggerated: has there been no progress in Ceylon, Burma, Sumatra, the Philippines? Kelantan has roads, bridges, buildings, etc., all made with local labour; the rubber plantations were largely opened with Indian labour, and in Malaya the public works are maintained by them.'

This comment refers to the Chinese solely as labour; it is the combination of *enterprise* and labour that Sir Frank Swettenham and Dr Landon have in mind.

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CHAPTER XV

CHINESE SOCIAL AND BUSINESS LIFE IN SIAM [p. 159]

THIS chapter is in the nature of an interlude. While the forces 121 described in the preceding pages are working subtly and inevitably to bring the Chinese question to a head in Siam in the 1930s, we will attempt to take a closer view of the life of this alien community, bearing in mind what we know of the life of the Chinese in adjacent countries so that when the time comes we may compare the similarities or contrast the differences between the two.[1]

The factor dominating the nature of the Chinese organism overseas is the sex ratio. 162 The proportion of women to men had been rising steadily in the 1920s, and in the 1930s this process was 167 accelerated. In 1921–2 females formed 15 per cent. of total arrivals and in 1925–6 21 per cent. In 1936–7 the figure would rise to 27 per cent.[2] But, even in the late 1930s, there was a considerable excess of men over women among the China-born Chinese in Siam. Taking into consideration not only the number of available Chinese women but also other factors such as expense, only about one ethnic Chinese in five could establish a purely Chinese home. Chinese of [582] all descriptions preferred, if possible, to marry pure Chinese females and those of their own tribe—Cantonese, Hokkien, Hailam, &c.—when it could be done, but the cost of these was much greater than of other women, and consequently this was out of the question for the greater number of Siam-born Chinese, or 'Sino-Thai'. The [583] price of the bride, or 'milk-money' as it was called, was from 50 to 200 baht for a Thai peasant girl, from 100 to 300 for a Sino-Thai girl, and from 300 to 500 for a Chinese girl.[3] The effect of all this 177 was that whatever the force of Chinese nationalism in separating

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[1] Chapters iii, iv, v, and vi of Dr Landon's work have provided the substance of this chapter, but the selection and compression for the purposes here stated are from the angle of one who has had many years' experience of the kindred Chinese community on the Malayan side of the border.

[2] See p. 103. The official migration statistics did not distinguish between the races of the migrants, but Chinese formed about 95 per cent. of all arrivals and departures, so that the overall percentages may be reasonably taken to apply to the Chinese alone. cf. Landon, op. cit. p. 53 ff.

[3] Landon, op. cit. p. 55.

177 the two races within Siam, most of the homes were open to native influences. At the same time immigrant Chinese adopted insensibly many Thai attitudes and a selection of Siamese words crept into their vocabulary. Such words were *knanom*, meaning cake, as used by the Thai to refer to the little snacks they bought during the day from hawkers, *snuk*, meaning fun or pleasure, 'which is descriptive of every situation pleasing to a Thai, whether it be related to football or a religious ceremony',[1] or *thiau*, meaning to take a trip, but as used by the Thai meaning everything from a stroll down the street in the cool of the day to a trip to Bangkok or England, and *mai pen arai*—it is of no importance, it does not matter. The last expression is obviously the counterpart of the Malay *tid'apa*, and the two convey that feeling of tropical nonchalance, or languid indifference, which must eventually capture Chinese, Siamese, and Malay alike as they succumb to the influence of the heat. The women, too, were invariably affected by local ideas of cooking, health, education, religion, and so on.

What we observe here among the Sino-Thai is a process analogous to that which created the *Baba* Chinese of Malacca and Penang. This community was the product of the intermarriage of Chinese men with Malay and other Indonesian females, and in Penang there was also an Indian element, and of the intermarriage of the offspring of the mixed blood. The Chinese culture being the dominant, it prevailed in essence, in spite of the fact that the Chinese language itself was lost and a kind of Malay containing Chinese words and locutions was substituted for it.[2] But in the case of the *Babas* the process of racial admixture was complete, while with the Sino-Thai it was only partial. The twentieth-century forces would in all probability prevent the repetition of the *Baba* history from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, and these forces were also battling with the process of complete assimilation which had gone on in Siam for so long.

582
672
[586]
From 1 October 1935 all marriages contracted in Siam had to be registered to be legal. People were very indifferent to this marriage law and preferred to do as they had always done. The Chinese were even more apathetic than the Siamese towards registration, although it gave the wife and her offspring a legal claim on a deceased husband's estate.

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[1] Landon, op. cit. p. 54.

[2] See Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 293, appendix 1, 'The Baba Language'.

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Customs among the Chinese in Siam have been modified partly 177
by native influence and partly by the changes which are going on in
China itself. There is also the effect of intercourse with Europeans,
which is probably much stronger in the neighbouring British colony
and protectorate of Malaya than in Siam, and the Chinese of Siam
would copy their brethren over the border with whom they have
frequent contact, especially in the south, and some of their children
attend schools in Penang and Singapore. This process of adaptation [585]
is most noticeable in the change in the nature of wedding
ceremonies. Old-Style marriages with the wedding chair, the bride
dressed in the traditional red with a veil of beads obscuring her
face, and the day after day of ritual, have for many years been giving
way to the New Style which ranges from a modification of the
old ceremony to an out-and-out occidental wedding. In the case of
families long resident in Siam, Thai usage is sometimes followed
to some extent. In such a case a chapter of Buddhist monks might
be invited to the home, and a ceremony would take place in which
the bride and bridegroom prostrated themselves while the guests
poured ceremonial water over their hands.

A Chinese teacher who had lived for years in many provincial 602
towns as well as in Bangkok answered a questionnaire put to him
by Dr Landon and from his answers a fair summary of the changes 61
going on in Siam in the 1930s and still continuing can be obtained.
He said that the greatest numbers of Chinese women arrived in [167]
Thailand between 1924 and 1926. About 70 per cent. of the two
million-odd Chinese in Siam still adhered to Chinese custom; the
unit of kinship was still definitely the clan.[1] Asked whether the
clan existed as a 'dynamic social unit', the respondent answered
'Absolutely!' A man was the head of the clan, but should he die

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[1] By 'clan', *hsing* is presumably intended, that is to say, persons of the same surname, Tan, Ch'an, Wong, Ong, &c. In English the divisions into Cantonese, Teochius, Hailams, Hakkas, &c., are usually called 'tribes'. Families were subdivisions of the clan. But I am not quite sure how Dr Landon defines 'clan'. He speaks (p. 63) in his questionnaire of the clan, and the 'large family' and the 'small family'. I take it that this is from Dr Ta Chen's use of the terms, but Dr Ta Chen does not himself define their meanings (op. cit. p. 127 ff.). On p. 65 Dr Landon speaks of 'clan halls'. In Malaya the centres of community life are the *wui kwuns* (*hui kwans*) which are named after the districts, &c., in China from which the given group of Chinese originates, e.g. the *Hokkien Hui Kwan* (provincial) or the *Teochiu Hui Kwan* (prefectural), or the *Mui Yüen Hui Kwan* (district). In Penang there are halls or *kongsis* based on the clan surnames of five principal families, Lim's, Chias, Tans, &c., and there is at least one hall, the Chia Hall, in Singapore.

602 a woman might sometimes become the head. Questions relating to marriage, occupation, business transactions, education, &c., were 61 decided by the head of the clan in consultation with the heads of the large or small families involved. [593] Young men and women now exercised a great deal of freedom in their choice of a partner, but 584, their profession was usually chosen for them by their fathers. [198] Siamese was spoken only in a few Chinese homes in Siam; in homes where both parents are Chinese they prefer Chinese even though the Education Act was compelling them to use Siamese. The Chinese family, the respondent thought, would, in spite of everything, tend to maintain itself as a Chinese cultural unit for ever.

602 The person here interrogated, we must bear in mind, was a member of a profession pledged to hand on the torch of Chinese nationalism as well as of Chinese learning, and the chances are that he was himself born in China. His replies would represent his own sentiment rather than the precise facts, for, if he is to be believed in every particular, assimilation of the Chinese into the Siamese community must have entirely stopped. Moreover, the clan which he regards as likely to maintain itself eternally is undergoing disintegration. In China the clan, or the family, is rooted in the soil. Even there its hold is weakened when many of its members take to living in villages and towns. In Siam, as in Malaya, Indonesia, and the other countries of Southeast Asia, this association with the soil is broken; the only link between membe[illegible]f the same clan is common sentiment. As an organization the clan can only maintain itself when there are a sufficient number of its members living in close proximity. At the same time, the pressure from the outside in the form of a campaign by the Siamese authorities to speed up assimilation had the effect of tightening up the Chinese family structure as a measure of resistance.

However, compared with education, all the factors referred to above are of minor effect in shaping the Chinese social organism, and of education we shall speak fully when we come to recite the sequence of events after the *coup d'état* of 1932.

The Chinese in Business

442 454 The Chinese are the middlemen, the exporters, and the financiers of Siam, but no one knows the exact extent or the value in money of their holdings. Even in countries like the Netherlands

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Indies and Malaya, where statistics of various kinds have been [454]
kept for many years, only a rough estimate of Chinese wealth is
possible. Mr Callis estimates that in 1938 Chinese investment in 442
Siam amounted to U.S. $100 million as compared with other
foreign investment of U.S. $124 million.[1] In Siam not only do the [161]
authorities refuse to distinguish between Chinese born in the country
and others they regard as Siamese, but statistics in the modern
sense of the term have been a matter of only the last few decades,
and there was not even an attempt at a complete census of the
country until 1909–10. However, there is detailed information on
rice, the principal product and the chief export of the country, on
teak and forestry products, on maize, tobacco, cotton, peas, sesame,
pepper, and coco-nuts, but nothing, for instance, on rubber, certainly
one of the chief crops of the country and the third in export
value.[2] These details give some assistance in deciding the nature,
if not the extent, of Chinese participation in the economic life of
the country.

To begin with agriculture, the occupation of 80 per cent. of the [241]
people. The rice grower has always remained Siamese, and the
Chinese had not by 1930 made any attempt to usurp that position.[3] [463]
But as stated in Chapter IX, the Chinese own and operate 80–90 442
per cent. of the rice-mills, the biggest undertaking in Siam, and 256
their industry is not confined to the milling of rice. More often [426]
than not the Siamese farmer has to borrow from a Chinese in order
to live between sowing time and the harvest, and after the harvest
it is the Chinese dealer who buys the paddy and transports it to the
mills in Bangkok. After milling again it is the Chinese import and

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[1] Helmut G. Callis, *Foreign Capital in Southeast Asia* (New York, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942) (in mimeograph) p. 69. Mr Callis regarded this as a conservative estimate.

[2] Landon, op. cit. p. 119.

[3] Reginald le May, *Siamese Tales Old and New* (London, Noel Douglas, 1930) p. 165.

Soon after this was written, however, a firm of Chinese merchants from Malaya started the cultivation of rice on a large scale by mechanical means in south Siam. The experiment was successful. Thirty men were able to till an area of 600 acres of paddy whereas by ordinary methods about 300 men would be required. Instead of dividing the land into small plots, as was the Siamese method, they worked several hundred thousand acres as a unit. By the end of 1937 two large Chinese rice-owning companies had demonstrated what scientific farming and co-operative effort could accomplish. See *Report of the Rice Cultivation Committee* (Government Printing Office, Kuala Lumpur, 1931). cf. Landon, op. cit. p. 124.

442 export trader in Singapore, Penang, or Hong Kong who handles
256 three-quarters of the rice exported from Siam.[1]

Fishing is the second item contributing to the Siamese income,
226 most of it being done in inland waters, and the fish are consumed
442 locally. The Siamese are independent of the Chinese in such cases,
but where there is coastal fishing carried on by the Siamese the
Chinese are the buyers and exporters, and handle the local sales.
231 Most of the pig breeding is done by Chinese. They sell young pigs
443 to Siamese farmers who feed them for a year or two and then sell
[779] them back to the Chinese. Being a Buddhist, the average Siamese
does not want to do the slaughtering, and so has to buy his pork
from the Chinese butcher.

427 Chinese also figure among the landowners of central Siam. They
are usually merchants, and do not farm themselves. As is the case
454 elsewhere when there are absentee landlords, the system has given
rise to a great deal of discontent and abuse, but here the Siamese
landlords are more heavily interested than the Chinese. The lack
[331] of building materials in central Siam also increased the dependence
of the Siamese on the Chinese for such materials and for assisting
in the construction of houses.

426 At this point it may be timely to consider the Chinese in Siam as money-lenders and middlemen. An impartial survey by Mr James M. Andrews does not bear out the widespread belief that they are unconscionable usurers.[2] The Thai farmer, and especially his wife, says Mr Andrews, is much more given to money-lending with the hope of high profits than the Chinese. Chinese lent money seldom, but they did advance commodities on credit. When he did lend money, the Chinese insisted on a written contract, security, and interest, but he did not ask for illegal rates of interest as did the Thai. Both Chinese and Siamese often lent money to friends and relatives without asking interest.

It is interesting in this connexion to remark that, whereas in Siam and Indochina the Chinese were prominent as money-lenders (subject to the above considerations), they were not so in Malaya. In Malaya it was the Tamil chetty (chettiar) who did most of the

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[1] Lin Yu, op. cit.

[2] James M. Andrews, *Siam, Second Economic Survey* (Bangkok Times Press, 1935) p. 314. This survey was of 41 'sample' villages—10 in northeast Siam, 7 in south Siam, 11 in north Siam, 11 in central Siam, and 2 in southeast Siam. Mr Andrews considered the 'sampling' satisfactory. The printed report covers 396 pages.

money-lending and second came the Sikh, whose reputation for 426
being a harsh and unfeeling creditor was universal in these parts.
The chetty was considered an honest man in comparison with
him. The Chinese part in local finance was more in the nature of
banking or the advance of goods on credit, as apparently it was in
Siam.

Handicrafts were cultivated by Siamese women, but neglected 286
by Siamese men. Siamese weaving could not, however, compete
with Chinese-made textiles. Poor-quality *phanungs* (native costumes) 439
were made in Bangkok by Chinese weavers, while good silk
phanungs were imported from China.[1] Pottery manufacture was [323]
largely in the hands of the Mon people who lived not far from
Bangkok, and who sold their product to Chinese traders. Most of
the tiles used in the larger towns were made by the Chinese. When [335]
construction on a large scale was undertaken, Chinese carpenters
were called in, and the largest part of the wooden building and
fitting in the cities and towns was done by them. Iron-working, too, [326]
was done by Chinese in the market centres. The same race had a
practical monopoly of the preparation and sale of rice, vegetable, 443
and meat dishes, but the cooking and the sale of fruits, cakes, and 462
various sweet dishes was, on the other hand, almost entirely undertaken
by Thai women. In rail and road transport the Siamese held 489
their own, but heavy transport of rice on the rivers (entailing very
hard labour) had been taken over by the Chinese.

As has been remarked above, the Chinese did not, except for the [242]
recent experiment in scientific farming in south Siam, plant rice,
but they went in largely for the growing and marketing of vegetables 244
which was more profitable. But labour other than agricultural 461
was performed by Chinese since they had no objection to long hours 464
and hard work, and it is estimated that they made up roughly 70
per cent. of the non-agricultural labouring population.

Much of the small trade in Siam was carried on by Siamese [443
women who took to the markets fish, fruit, vegetables, spices, and
cooked food for sale or barter. But trade on a larger scale developed 462]
in the rice-collecting centres, and since the Chinese were the boatmen 442
this trade was in their hands. Having no effective competition, 477

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[1] This statement is questioned by an expert on Siam who read the passage in manuscript. He says, 'The Siamese make beautiful *phanungs* with gold and silver thread or silk in Korat and Chiengmai. Their finest *phanungs* are almost always made in Siam.'

442 they were able to charge as much as they could persuade the
477 Siamese to pay.

The extent of the Chinese participation in wholesale business is,
442 as has been remarked before, impossible to assess with any accuracy. In the *Directory for Bangkok and Siam* for 1933 in which the larger firms are listed, 112 are shown as European, 61 as Chinese, 38 as Siamese, 16 as Indian, and 8 as Japanese. Many of the businesses with Thai names, however, were owned by Chinese. For 1940 the same authority gave the comparative figures as 103, 98, 56, 35, and 7 respectively. This, of course, does not give any idea of the amount of the capital investment in the firms or of the value of their turnover or profits, but the European Financial Adviser to the Siamese Government, Mr W. A. M. Doll, in 1937–8 remarked that 90 per cent. of all commerce and trade was in Chinese hands alone.[1]

453 The Chinese banks who before the war with Japan were prepared to grant credit for private enterprise were the Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation (capital SS $10 million), the Sze Hai Tong Banking and Insurance Company Ltd., and the Wang Lee Chan Bank Ltd.

465 But information as to the aggregate of Chinese wealth would not
conveу much of value to the sociologist unless it were accompanied
434 by figures of distribution. The Chinese formed the middle class

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[1] W. A. M. Doll, *Report of the Financial Adviser in Connection with the Budget of the Kingdom of Siam, 1938–9* (Bangkok Times Press, 1939) pp. 9, 10. Landon, op. cit. p. 144.

The following figures for Sino-Siamese trade may contribute some light on the subject to those who are in a position to allow for all factors:

[439]

Sino-Siamese Trade

	Imports from Siam		*Exports to Siam*		*Total trade*	
	Haikwan taels	*Index no.*	*Haikwan taels*	*Index no.*	*Haikwan taels*	*Index no.*
1868	615,089	100·0	69,115	100·0	684,204	100·0
1878	314,347	51·1	193,880	280·6	508,227	74·3
1888	54,003	8·8	357,654	517·5	411,657	60·2
1898	206,394	33·6	698,866	1,011·2	905,260	132·3
1908	46,802	7·6	1,938,489	2,804·7	1,985,291	290·2
1918	395,360	64·3	1,972,030	2,853·3	2,367,390	346·0
1928	6,127,987	996·3	6,622,530	9,581·9	12,750,511	1,863·6
1933	39,836,970	6,476·2	3,739,409	5,410·4	43,576,379	6,368·9

From Ho Ping-yin, *The Foreign Trade of China* (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1935) p. 490.

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of the nation, but there were also Chinese workmen who received 465 in real wages only slightly more than did the Siamese peasant. The peasant did not handle as much money (a good part of his income 434 being in the shape of crops), but the 20–30 baht a month received by the Chinese coolie who had to purchase his food and pay for shelter did not make him substantially better off. The Chinese petty tradesmen, rubber-cutters, and skilled workers, and most pedlars and street hawkers got about 50–100 baht a month. These rates compare with the 100 baht received by the majority of Siamese officials. Better-off Chinese, not very numerous, would receive 750 baht a month and upwards, and the income of a tiny minority might reach 3,000 or more baht a month.

Whether or not the Chinese enjoyed more than their fair share of the national income, or whether or not they created more wealth than they consumed, the fact is that their position in the community lent itself to the manufacture of political capital. The Siamese [426] generally felt that the poverty of the peasants was to be blamed in large part on the Chinese money-lender.[1] A Siamese remarked with feeling in a Bangkok newspaper, commenting on some new Government regulations: '. . . the poor peasants are liberated from the bonds of the blood-sucking "shylocks" who used to lend money on exorbitant interests and sell-your-rice-at-our-offer contracts'.[2]

If this chapter has successfully compressed the facts it should 342 help to make actual the position of the Chinese in Siam on the eve of the events of 1932 and onwards. There was nothing particularly 514 glamorous about the lives of the majority of the sons of T'ang. In the country they lived in an *attap* (palm leaf) hut with an earth floor, lit at night by a kerosene or coco-nut-oil lamp, with the animals in an adjoining room; in the mining villages their home would be the cheerless coolie lines; in a town their residence would be over, or part of, the place of business. The urban 'toilet' would be a bucket which was emptied in the canal twice a day. The mansions of the rich Chinese merchant were more obvious and elegant, but less typical. However this might be, even the most humble and 'under-privileged' Chinese was classed by the strong current of Siamese opinion as one of the Jews of Asia!

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[1] Landon, op. cit. p. 130.

[2] ibid. quoted from *Siam Chronicle* of 8 April 1939.

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[p.168]

CHAPTER XVI

THE REVOLUTION OF 1932

669 At five o'clock on the morning of 24 June 1932 tanks, machine-guns, and troops were on the move in Bangkok. Prince Nagor Svarga, half-brother to the King and Minister of the Interior, was the first to be visited. By one o'clock in the afternoon forty important persons were held prisoners in the Throne Hall. An ultimatum had been dispatched to the King at his summer palace at Hua Hin. The revolution had begun.

The leaders of the revolution wished, if possible, to retain the reigning King as a constitutional monarch. If he were not amenable, then they would proceed towards their objectives without him. The ultimatum called upon King Prajadhipok to return to the capital again as king under the constitutional monarchy as established by the People's Party. The King accordingly returned to Bangkok on 26 June, and by 1 July the Party was able to announce that his Majesty had consented to their terms. No blood had been shed.[1]

The new dispensation which had thus been ushered in was not the product of a mass movement among the people; it arose in the first place from discontent among that class of commoner which in the previous reign had held most of the important offices of the Government, but which under King Prajadhipok administered only eight of the twelve ministries. A commoner, no matter how high his rank, might be tried by the law courts: royalty, the only other class, were a set apart, and could not be brought to trial without the consent of the King. The shift in the balance of power made commoners feel that they were being ruled without adequate representation. A second reason for the discontent was the secrecy with which the government of the country was conducted, and the lavish, and apparently useless, expenditure of public funds. A third cause, probably as important in its influence, was the dismissal of many officials of the lower rank and the levying of a new salary tax while the royalty remained exempt. A fourth reason was discontent among officers of the Army.

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[1] The principal authority followed in this chapter is *Siam in Transition*, by K. P. Landon, chap. i.

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Compared with the violent political upheavals of French and 669
Russian history, the course and the occasion of this transition may seem undramatically mild. But Siam gained much more by its painlessness than she suffered through its lack of drama. The leading figure in the movement was Luang Pradist Manudharm,[1] a young lawyer who had studied in France. His were the brains and the ideas that gave it meaning and direction.[2]

Since our concern is to follow the fortunes of the Chinese in Siam, and since they were not involved in any way in the *coup* (save that the blood of their race flowed in the veins of most of its leaders), we need not describe in detail the phases of the situation as it developed. We must watch closely, however, for any of the consequences of the revolution which bear on the interests of our subject.

The new constitutional monarchy experienced no great difficulty 669
until March 1933, when Luang Pradist Manudharm introduced
his economic plan. It was discussed in both the People's Assembly | 85
and the State Council. Of the changes that it proposed, one of the most important was the purchase of farming land for the nation. The farmers would then become Government employees and would receive salary and pension. The growing and selling of rice, the principal industry of the nation, would thus be nationalized. This would automatically eliminate the middleman, both as buyer and wholesaler, and this middleman was usually a Chinese.

When the plan was referred to a special Committee of Fourteen the burden of opinion was in favour of giving it a trial. But opposition developed under the leadership of the Premier, Phya Mano, who suggested that the Government should attempt to better the economic situation in a more conservative way. Luang Pradist's

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[1] His name is also given in English as Nai Pridi Panomyong. There are two ways of expressing the Siamese name and title in English: both forms have always been used.

[2] Dr Landon's interpretation of the course of events in Siam is here followed, but one person who has read the text is a little dubious about the statement of the causes of the 1932 revolution and the implied denunciation of the old regime. The reduction in official establishments (he points out) and the imposition of the salary-tax were necessitated by the economic depression (cf. the cut in the pay of public servants in Great Britain in the same period). The old regime had its defects but it also had its merits: there has been far more corruption in high circles in Siam since the exercise of power passed from members of the Royal House to the middle class—if only because the members of the former were so wealthy that there was no inducement to indulge in corruption, 'Even the devil should have his due', remarks the critic.

669 proposal was to encourage the co-operative society idea, thus mak-
ing more capital available to the peasants, to enlarge the credit
185 stores where the peasants could buy their supplies at cost price, to
establish granaries at local points and to buy up rice for shipment
to Bangkok in order to eliminate the middleman, to establish co-
operative rice-mills for the sale of rice direct to foreign countries,
and finally to establish a settlement scheme for people who had no
668 land. In the People's Assembly, however, many members agreed
with Phya Mano in thinking that the plan was communistic.
475 Difference of opinion became bitter, without hope of reconcilia-
tion. Finally, when it was certain that his plan would not be ac-
cepted, Luang Pradist left for Europe. After his departure an Act
was passed against Communism and was also aimed against the
nationalization of land, industry, capital, and labour.

669 A second *coup* of 20 June 1933, when tanks again rolled through the streets of Bangkok, resulted in the arrest of Phya Mano and the resignation of his Government. The charge against the régime was that it had nullified the gains of the revolution, for when Phya Mano had prorogued the People's Assembly, as a result of the differences of opinion over Luang Pradist's plan, it meant that all the powers of the Assembly had been entrusted to the King until such time as the Assembly should be reconvened—which was thought on all sides would be never! But with a few important exceptions the new *coup* put the same elements in power again. The new Premier, Phya Bahol, the friend of Luang Pradist, made it clear that whilst he was in power the Government would never follow Communist ideas. Says Dr Landon:

> 423 Phya Mano, shrewd and experienced politician that he was, knew that a peasant's dearest possession is his land. In many districts it is considered shameful to sell a section of rice land; since that land, in peasant thought, is the rightful inheritance of the children, whose very bread and butter it is. Government ownership of rice lands cut across the very fibre of the people's thinking. It could hardly have done anything else than pauperize the country.[1]

The way was now clear for Luang Pradist's recall. He arrived quietly in Bangkok on 29 September 1933, and a commission appointed to investigate his standing with regard to Communism reported early the following year that he, personally, was cleared of suspicion on this count. Luang Pradist had previously persuaded

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[1] Landon, *Siam in Transition*, p. 34.

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the commission that the consideration of his plan was irrelevant to 669
any discussion of his personal position. The plan, however, was
shelved indefinitely.

A royalist rebellion of 12 October 1933 led by Prince Bavoradey was a failure: in March 1935 King Prajadhipok abdicated. These events, however, belong to the political history of Siam, and they had no direct bearing on economic policy or on the fate of the Chinese.

The People's Party, while it was still a secret society, had drawn up a policy of Six Principles which were promulgated by radio, newspaper, and handbill on the day of the revolution in June 1932. These principles were those of equality, liberty, education, maintenance of internal order, independence, and economics. Most of these were implemented one by one, but that of economics was never promulgated though parts of it were gradually adopted.

The principle of independence involved the denunciation of the 648
old treaties with foreign Powers, and paved the way for the negotia-
tion of new ones on a basis of perfect equality of the signatories. 186
When eventually a treaty with China was completed in 1946, it was
naturally of this same order. In the field of economics the Chinese
were to feel the force of modern nationalism, even though Luang
Pradist's National Economic Policy was, in the main, shelved; in
the field of education the measures of the Government were to bear
fruit sooner. Let us consider economics first.

Post-revolutionary Economic Measures and the Chinese

Luang Pradist's plan, though it was not published and the two 185
Bills based on it were dropped, nevertheless embodied the ideas
behind the measures which were actually to be brought into effect. 444
In essence it aimed to raise the economic status of the Thai as dis-
tinguished from the other peoples in Siam, to complete their
adaptation to the modern technological world, to provide them
with a higher degree of education, and to put them in control of
industry, commerce, and agriculture. Commerce, hitherto left to
the immigrants from China, was now to be opened up to the
Siamese themselves. This meant that the non-citizens controlling
so much of the commercial life of the nation would have to be
ousted, and since 95 per cent. of these aliens were Chinese it was
obvious that they were going to feel the operation.

The question of remittances to their home country called addi- 000

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457 The question of remittances to their home country called addi-
tional attention to the Chinese. The European Financial Adviser,
471 Mr W. A. M. Doll, in 1937 quoted a Chinese banker as congratulating his countrymen in 1932 on the fact that all through the depression Chinese immigrants in Siam had not diminished the scale of their remittances home, which he placed at an aggregate of $50 million (Chinese) per annum, a sum equal at the then exchange to 37 million baht. Although this sum, said Mr Doll, might be an overestimation, careful attention should be devoted to any measure or series of measures aiming at the retention of a larger share of the country's earnings, for attainment of this object would result in building up resources of national wealth available for capital development, which in 1937 were strikingly non-existent.[1] Mr Doll, however, surprised perhaps by the ardent and radical reaction to his remarks, soon reconsidered his figures and decided that the calculation of the Chinese banker was an over-estimate and that the figure of Chinese remittances was really less than 20 million baht.[2] At the same time he issued a warning to the Siamese nation against attempting too fast to gain its economic objectives.

441 One way of altering the existing state of affairs was to encourage the Siamese to engage in trade and commerce; the other was to exercise discrimination against the Chinese. Both methods were tried in turn, or simultaneously. By the beginning of 1939 the trend of events had made the moment propitious for a series of definitive measures and these were guided into law by the versatile and thorough-going Minister of Finance, the brains of the revolution, Luang Pradist Manudharm.

444 First of the series of Government Acts concerned a matter which
on the face of it was comparatively trivial, namely the forbidding
656 of Chinese food hawkers to sell their wares in the vicinity of the
Ministry of Education. Hawking, as we have seen, was largely in
655 the hands of the smaller Chinese tradesmen. This was followed by
measures which probed deeper into the economic system of Siam. From 1936 onwards the Government had entered increasingly into business on its own account—it had established paper-mills, a sugar factory at Lampang, a silk factory at Nagara Rajasima, a tobacco factory at Bangkok, an oil refinery at Klong Toi, a cannery at Pak Chang, a textile-mill, and a soya-bean-oil distillery, and it

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[1] Cited in 'The Chinese in Thailand', *The Record*, vol. xvii. no. 1 (July 1937) p. 165. (Bangkok, Department of Commerce.)

[2] op. cit. pp. 39–40; Landon, *The Chinese in Thailand*, pp. 166, 167.

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was planning to engage in the manufacture of cigarettes, leather, 655 and cement, to build rice-mills and a tin-smelter, and to operate tin-mines and co-operative stores. To feed these undertakings with [874] staff it had set up vocational schools and had re-shaped the education system generally to encourage industry as an outlet for Thai energy. Further to guarantee the success of these ventures, the 186 Government in 1939 announced that patriotic Siamese should observe five points—namely, eat food derived only from Siamese 441 produce or Siamese manufacture, wear clothing manufactured by the Siamese, assist one another to enter into commerce, trade, and industry, help all public works and other ventures devised by the Government for the good of the nation, and finally, the supporters of the Government should show themselves worthy of public trust by conducting their businesses in an honest and honourable way. The proclamation was known as *Ratha Niyom.*[1]

Response to this exhortation by the easy-going Siamese not being what had been hoped, a campaign was started in 1940 for the encouragement of Thai merchants and Thai industry.

All this activity was obviously directed towards competing with 651 the Chinese: now in 1940 the Government sought to reinforce its campaign by regulating them more severely. On 21 February the Minister of Finance introduced a new system of taxation. On imports of food, alcohol, and cloth the tariff was to be increased: on farm implements, draft animals, and farm machinery it was to be reduced. The total taxes remitted amounted to over 12½ million baht, but it was intended notwithstanding to raise the Government revenue from 109 to 155 million baht to pay for new social services, including 30 million baht for local improvement and primary schools. This would be done by an income tax, a shop tax, a bank tax, a stamp tax, and an amusement tax. There would also be an increase in the amounts charged for various permits such as for gamblers, prostitutes, opium smokers, &c. By the new code of taxation passed by the National Assembly on 29 March the burden was to be borne by the merchant class, which was, of course, largely Chinese.

In addition to these measures, a new amendment to the Aliens' Registration Act was passed, whereby all aliens were required to pay a yearly registration fee not exceeding 10 baht in addition to the original immigration and certificate of residence fees. For the

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[1] *The Chinese in Thailand*, p. 181.

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651 first year the fee was set at 4 baht and dependants of aliens were not required to pay it. The Chinese being the principal alien immigrants, the fee would amount to a further tax on them.

641 'As law followed law, dislodging foreign business men from fields of commercial enterprise which they had held, in some cases for centuries,' says Dr Landon, 'the natural tendency among the Chinese was to seek Thai citizenship in larger numbers than previously.' This was a development not entirely welcome to the Siamese, and they met it by raising bars to such naturalization. Amendments to the law now required applicants for naturalization to possess one or other of a number of qualifications—service in the Army or Navy, or in other Government service, an age exceeding fifty years, employment in agriculture, ownership of immovable property for a period exceeding two years at the time when the application for naturalization is made. (In the case of landed property it must be over two rais[1] in cities, or twenty rais up-country.) In all cases where the applicant had to be over thirty years of age, he had to possess a good knowledge of colloquial Siamese; in cases where the applicant was under thirty he must also know how to read and write Siamese. Even then a majority of the applications for naturalization were rejected for various reasons.

656 The Chinese complaint was that not only were they, a helpless minority, discriminated against in a breath-taking series of regulations and decrees, but also that they were allowed no decent interval to adapt themselves to the new situation. Other aliens, too, were being squeezed out of their occupations, but whereas the Shipping Act directed against Europeans gave a respite of 180 days before it came into effect, the Salt Act affecting the Chinese came into operation immediately, and no time was given to the Chinese in the industry to wind up their businesses, and the regulations against food vendors were also of immediate application.

186 As the fervour for nationalism grew and highly placed Siamese vied with one another in showing their enthusiasm for the newly proclaimed *Ratha Niyom*,[2] agitation against the Chinese, reinforced by active governmental measures, rapidly approached hysteria:

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[1] A *rai* = 1,600 square metres.

[2] The principles of *Ratha Niyom* were announced by the Premier, Luang Pibul Songkram, on 24 June 1939. It was rather like the mixture of the First Principle, nationality, of Sun Yat-sen, with the New Life Movement in China. A first measure was the changing of the name of Siam to Thailand (it was changed back to Siam in September 1945 and back again to Thailand in May

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By the middle of August more than thirty Chinese schools and ten of 186
the eleven Chinese newspapers had been closed, numbers of Chinese had been deported, hundreds were being called in the tong probes, raids on Chinese schools, newspaper plants, and homes were becoming a daily occurrence; several prominent Chinese were in jail for remitting money to China, and the entire Chinese community was in an uproar.[1]

Meanwhile the Siamese and their Government, though they must have expected strong reaction to their policy, were satisfied that they were acting within their rights. Indeed it was the Chinese community that seemed to be provocative, and its secret organizations were responsible for a series of murders and other crimes. A newspaper correspondent urged the Chinese to welcome the police drive then in progress against secret societies as a measure towards cleansing the Chinese community of disruptive elements.[2] He argued that the Chinese had been given the same freedom and right to live as the Thais and they even had the right to send good Thai gold out of the country. Let them in return keep the peace and co-operate in making the land a safe and prosperous one. The [648]
Government itself felt the situation had become so tense that an official communiqué was issued denying rumours current abroad that Thailand (the new official name of the country) had changed her policy of equal friendship for all foreign nations, and that the recent police campaign against secret-society activities constituted an anti-Chinese move. Thailand's foreign policy (it stated) remained the same as before—offering equal friendship to all—and the recent action against certain Chinese residents had been necessitated by the Government's task of maintaining public safety, peace, and order. Simultaneously the Government broadcast in the Chinese language to the Chinese in Siam, Malaya, and Hong Kong justifying its actions.

On 29 November Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, thinking the 648
time opportune for him to take a hand in the affair, sent a telegram to Luang Pibul Songkram, President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs. He had watched with admiration (he said) the recent accomplishments in Siam which had filled the hearts of

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1949). The word Thai was extended to all sections of the people. There were regulations, too, for dress and deportment, and insistence on a national moral code which forbade Thais to act in the interests of foreigners as, for instance, by being their agents in the sale or purchase of land, or disclosing any information to them detrimental to the interests of the country.

[1] Landon, *The Chinese in Thailand*, p. 189.

[2] *Thai Chronicle* (16 August 1939) cited by Landon, op. cit. p. 192.

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648 all Asiatic peoples with pride, and, having stressed that the Chinese people were by nature peace-loving and law-abiding and the Chinese residents of Thailand hard-working and conscientious, and had long lived on the best of terms with the Siamese, he requested the Government of Thailand to give full protection to the lives and property of Chinese citizens residing in Thailand and permit them to engage in their lawful pursuits without molestation as heretofore.

722 What was happening within the Chinese community in Siam at this period can be divined by analogy from the simultaneous developments in Malaya. The war with Japan was now in full swing and the Chinese generally regarded themselves as being participants. But the Government of Siam, in the same way as the Government of Malaya, was at peace with Japan and desired nothing to happen within its territory which would prejudice its status. Within the community there was a difference of opinion amounting to a split between the Chinese Nationalists, organized by the Kuomintang, who wished to bring about a complete boycott of Japanese goods, and the non-politically-minded merchants who wished to conduct business as usual, even, in the ordinary way, dealing in Japanese goods. Many of these merchants were otherwise supporters of the Kuomintang and were generous contributors to the funds for relief (*anglice*, the maintenance of the war) in China, but some of them drew the line at sacrificing their businesses in competition with traders of other nationalities who had no scruples regarding trading with the Japanese. Organizations of youths and girls who wished to make the boycott a total one resorted to direct action to enforce it and this, in Malaya, brought them into collision with the police. Pressure amounting to blackmail was at the same time applied in some cases to secure contributions to China relief and for the private needs of these organizations. In Malaya the organizations were known as the Anti-Enemy-Backing-Up Societies and they had close associations with the Communist Party. 575 668 All this activity, whether of the Kuomintang or of other political societies, was to be distinguished from that of the 'secret societies' who were acting purely for their own profit. In both Siam and Malaya all these organizations were in one sense 'secret societies', since legally they were not permitted to exist, but by long usage the term has become associated with the Heaven and Earth or Triad societies.[1]

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[1] Dr Landon refers to the 'tong probes'. *Tong* (properly 'T'ong') is a Can-

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Discrimination against the Chinese has been analysed by Dr 656 Landon under 'minor industries' and 'major industries'. The former included, for instance, birds'-nests concessions (in which the Chinese were to be completely squeezed out of a business which was one of their traditional occupations), food vending, salt and tobacco, the Signboard Act (taxing signboards in Chinese), the butchering and retailing of meat (also to be taken from the Chinese), domestic shipping, and the Liquid Fuel Act, which threatened the existence of the foreign oil companies and, indirectly, that of their Chinese agents and sub-agents. Under 'major industries' Dr Landon lists rice, tin, rubber, and teak forests. In each case the object was to eliminate the Chinese from the industry.

There remains to be summarized action against the Chinese 167 through the Government control of immigration. This dates from 1927. Mr Lin Yu says: 651

> At that time anyone free from trachoma might land on the payment of a landing fee of 5 ticals and a process fee of ticals 6.50. In 1931 the law was revised. The landing fee was raised to 10 bahts (the new name for tical); a new tax of 30 bahts for the right of domicile was imposed, and a Chinese resident, on leaving Siam, was required to obtain a return passport (valid for two years) at a fee of 5 bahts. In 1933, the domicile tax was increased to 100 bahts and the fee for a return passport to 20 bahts, and the holder of the passport was required to return within one year. A literacy clause was also added, to bar Chinese labourers and women from entering the country. The result was that the first two steamers entering Bangkok from Swatow after the enforcement of the new law carried a total of only 41 passengers, while formerly they had carried hundreds on every trip; and of these 41, over 20 were prevented from landing, under the new act.[1]

Backdoor immigration became a serious problem almost as soon 167 as the law went into effect. One way was to be landed from a junk 687

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tonese word meaning 'hall', 'court', and in mandarin 'Tang'—not to be confused (as it often is) with 'Tang', a society, as in Kuomin*tang*. It is not used in this sense in Malaya and apparently describes what is known there as a *hui*. Its association, it seems, is with the ancestral hall of a clan. This is its meaning in the United States. [575 668]

The whole question of the connexion between huis, tongs, and political organizations needs much more clarifying and I personally feel that there is a closer connexion between the Heaven and Earth Society and modern political societies than is usually thought. Certainly the type of 'hoodlum' who naturally turned to secret societies and extortion finds a modern outlet for his talents in the Communist Party in Malaya and elsewhere. V. P.

[1] Lin Yu, 'Twin Loyalties in Siam', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. ix, no. 2 (June 1936) p. 193.

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167 in some quiet spot; another was to land in Malaya, paying the
landing fee which was only SS $5 (11*s.* 8*d.*), and then to enter Siam
687 secretly by one of the numerous jungle paths over the frontier. The
Siamese Government's answer to this was the Registration of
Aliens Act of B.E. 2479 (1936–7).[1] No charge was made for the
certificates, but each applicant had to supply photographs of himself
which were good likenesses and which had to be changed every
five years. A widespread check-up was begun with the object of
discouraging illicit immigration. A fine of 200 bahts was imposed
for failure to produce a certificate on demand.[1]

Even this was not enough to stem the tide of immigration, and the Immigration Act of 1937–8 empowered the authorities to charge the immigrant a fee of 200 bahts. The new law also placed on the carrier a responsibility for the alien, and heavy penalties were provided for a shipping firm or other carrier who, knowingly or unknowingly, brought an illicit immigrant into the country. This last measure had effect, and after the introduction of the 200 baht fee in October 1938 the number of Chinese entering Siam was usually less than the number leaving it. Had it not been for the war in China, which was reducing the power of the country to support its still-increasing population, it seems almost certain that Chinese immigration would have come to a standstill.

121 We have left to the next chapter an account of the efforts of the
Siamese Government to counteract the propaganda of the Chinese
208 Revolution and to force assimilation at an increased rate. As always
in Southeast Asia, the field of education is where the most decisive
battles are fought. But the evidence above collected and summarized
would amount to a complete dossier by itself. Can it be said
on the facts set out that the Siamese were justified? One witness,
at least, thinks they were, and this is Sir Josiah Crosby, who was
609 British Minister in Bangkok from 1934 to 1941. In a book published
in 1945 he says: 'It has been alleged against the Siamese that
656 what they were doing at this time amounted to a persecution of the
Chinese community. To this view I am unable to subscribe and I
consider such an accusation to be altogether too sweeping.'[2]

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[1] For further details regarding the discrimination against Chinese in immigration and labour see Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 115. A law of 1935–6 forcing rice-mills to employ a 50 per cent. minimum of Siamese workers failed, since it was found impossible to carry on owing to the shortage of labour.

[2] Sir Josiah Crosby, K.C.M.G., *Siam: the Crossroads* (London, Hollis & Carter, 1945) p. 75.

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Later he states thus his opinion regarding the future relation of the two countries: 'I see no reason why Siam and China should not get on quite well in future, provided that the Chinese will extend to Siamese national rights and susceptibilities the same recognition which they are so insistently and so understandably demanding for their own.'[1]

A contrary opinion is that of Dr Landon who, writing of the same period but at an earlier date, says:

> Thailand has a right to autonomy. The fact that she is using this right to discriminate against a helpless minority is, however, a sad commentary on the Government. The Government has an honourable record of solid achievement in many fields of endeavour, but a record that is stained now by its treatment of the Chinese.

However, Dr Landon's criticism of the Siamese Government is not so much of what they were doing but of how they were doing it: 'If the Chinese in the salt industry had been given a year in which to wind up their businesses, if the food vendors as well as the Chinese in other industries affected by the new laws had been given the same period, there would have been little if any room for criticism.' The last two passages must be read in juxtaposition. The fault, it seems, lay in *suddenly* depriving thousands of unfortunate human beings of their means of livelihood; not in reserving an industry to the native people.

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[1] ibid. p. 76.

CHAPTER XVII

EDUCATION AND THE CHINESE IN SIAM

869 THE paucity, or absence, of information regarding the instruction
of youth within the Chinese community of Siam up to
the twentieth century need not deter us from asserting that
such instruction existed in every family where there was at least
one literate member, and that it bore almost exactly the same form
and character as in China itself or in countries of the Nanyang.
872 This assurance derives from the knowledge that there had been no
radical change in Chinese elementary education for centuries. If a
779 school existed, it was almost certainly in a temple or matting shed,
often ill ventilated and ill lighted. In one corner would be the tablets to Confucius, the 'Teacher and Pattern for all Ages', and to the god of letters. Incense sticks would be burning in front of both. On entering the room the boy would bow to the tablet of Confucius, salute his teacher, and take his seat. The school course would consist in the first stage of committing to memory the canonical books and of writing an infinity of diversely formed characters as a mental exercise. In the second stage, the pupil would translate books into the colloquial language (i.e. 'reading') and he would have lessons in composition. In the third stage, there would be belles-lettres and the composition of essays. Pupils learnt their lessons aloud (a feat of concentration when all the other pupils were doing the same thing with another book or a different part of the same book), and recited them when learnt with their backs to the teacher. There were no graduated classes; in fact, there were as many classes as there were pupils. The books would be the *San Tzŭ Ching*, or Trimetrical Classic (a work of A.D. 1050), then the *Ch'ien Tzŭ Wen*, or Millenary Classic, the Odes for Children, the Canons of Filial Piety (*Hsiao Ching*), &c., and in due course the pupil would pass on to the Four Books, which, from the Sung dynasty, comprised the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, the Analects, and Mencius.

872 There would, of course, be a good deal of variety even within these circumscribed limits, and in a mercantile community such

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as that of the Chinese in Siam the use of the abacus would certainly be added to the curriculum.[1] 872

That, generally speaking, the existence of instruction among the Chinese in the Nanyang attracted such little notice from the authorities of the country in which they dwelt was due to the fact that the instruction was by no means universal, that it was largely domestic, and that when Chinese schools did exist (and the uproar created by pupils 'backing' their lessons or yelling out their tasks would certainly not conduce to secrecy) they were always few and small.[2] Chinese who could afford it (and there were not many) sent their children back to China for instruction.[3] What effect this kind of education had in sharpening or dulling the pupil's intellect is a question with which we are not immediately concerned, but it is certain that it left an indelible mark or *cachet* on its recipient which was as unmistakable as that of Eton or Harrow. In the old days the instruction was not politically suspect for it enjoined obedience to authority and was otherwise ultra-conservative in tone. 871

However this might be, the education of the Chinese by themselves had indubitably the effect of confirming the Chinese in his sense of being one of the Black-haired Race, in his apartness from the native peoples and belief that they were all 'outside Barbarians', and when the spirit of nationalism began to arise in Siam and China it was soon regarded as the essence and the symbol of segregation. But as the age-old Chinese system began at last to meet the modern demands upon it, and to transform itself and cease to be conservative, the suspicion and hostility of the authorities were increasingly directed towards it.

As for Siamese boys, there had also been education of a sort for them, but in the modern sense it came in with the American missionaries in about the 1830s.[4] Progress was extremely slow in the face of the *vis inertiae* of native apathy, so much so that when Prince Damrong was appointed Minister of Public Instruction in 1908, it was still necessary to pay families to send their children to school. The priests, too, resisted the modern ideas of education [797]

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[1] For an account of the Old-Style Chinese schools see Purcell, *Problems of Chinese Education* (London, Kegan Paul, 1936) p. 18 ff.

[2] In Batavia the Chinese school in the eighteenth century had only about 400 pupils.

[3] Virginia Thompson, *Thailand: the New Siam*, p. 109.

[4] Landon, *The Chinese in Thailand*, p. 261.

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871 with great determination. Little by little, with much effort, they were converted, and they now conformed to the desire of the sovereign, so that in many *wats* (temples) the teaching was equal to that in the best schools.[1] In 1914–15 there were only 119,000 pupils, with 4,500 teachers: by 1936–7 there were 1,227,000 pupils, with 27,000 teachers.[2]

872 Since 1898 there had been in existence a scheme for national education. In 1919 a law was promulgated making primary education compulsory for all boys and girls between the ages of seven and fourteen. By this private schools and law schools were formally brought under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Instruction, and their heads had to be registered with the Government. The first Primary Education Act was passed in 1921. With the passage of these laws the Government began to undertake the regulation of all schools. All children of compulsory school age had to attend schools run by the Government or private schools which had permits from the Government.[3]

871 So far what has been recounted is the creation of the *machinery* for the control of these private schools: the application of this control had, however, begun to be applied before the Acts of 1919 and 1921, albeit with a gentle hand. In 1918 the law had required that in every Chinese school the principal must have completed at least two years of Siamese schooling, that the teachers must have passed two Government examinations within one year, and that three hours a week should be devoted to the study of the Siamese language. This ruling, which was a shock to Chinese conservatism, provoked protests in Chinese newspapers, and the opposition of the Chinese together with the impracticability of the laws resulted in lax enforcement for a number of years.[4]

Meanwhile a great increase in the number of Chinese schools in Siam had resulted from the zeal for education, which had received a new impulse from the Chinese revolution of 1911, and which was given further momentum by the success of the Kuomintang drive in 1926–7 and the adoption of the Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen as the foundation of Chinese education the following year.[5]

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[1] *Statistical Year Book—Siam*, chap. viii, quoted by Landon, op. cit. p. 263.
[2] ibid.
[3] Landon, op. cit. p. 265.
[4] Lin Yu, 'Twin Loyalties in Siam', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. ix, no. 2 (June 1936). cf. Virginia Thompson, *Thailand: the New Siam*, p. 109.
[5] Purcell, op. cit. p. 161.

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Of 1,581 private schools listed for 1935–6, 206 were Chinese, and of the 1,541 listed in 1936–7, 259 were Chinese.[1]

Before 1928 the rise of these schools had excited a very general attention to them on the part of the Siamese, and obviously the administration were expecting in due course to find them a cause of embroilment. Writing in 1924 Graham says:

> . . . These schools, which date from shortly after the Chinese revolution, were at first looked upon by the Siamese with suspicion, as it was thought that they inculcated revolutionary principles, and checked the free mixing of Chinese with Siamese blood which had been so much to the advantage of Siam. The suspicion which seemed at one time likely to lead to interference and suppression, though not unreasonable, had apparently faded away, a measure of purely nominal control had been accepted, and the schools in question flourish and increase. They are certainly creating a class with aspirations and ideals largely foreign to, and seemingly incompatible with, those of Siam.[2]

The change of attitude can be traced to the visit of King Prajadhipok to the southern provinces in 1928. His Majesty learned then that many schools were flagrantly ignoring the orders of the inspectors, and his visit was quickly followed by that of the Minister of Public Instruction with the aim of devising a more adequate control of these schools.

This was the beginning of a campaign which was to last for many years.

The promotion of education was an essential plank in the platform of the party which accomplished the revolution of 1932. The aim was to create a population that was 50 per cent. literate within the ten years it had fixed as the limit of its own party control of the country's affairs. The existence of a system of Chinese schools side by side with the native Siamese schools was a grave impediment to this programme. In the words of Dr Landon:[3]

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> . . . the schools were alien in character and purpose. From the beginning they were founded to preserve the foreign culture of a minority population, to perpetuate the Chinese language and Chinese nationalism. Whenever the law conflicted with their purpose, they got round it if they could—and disobeyed it if they could not.

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[1] Landon, op. cit. p. 267. Schools with secondary classes as well as primary were counted as two schools.

[2] W. A. Graham, *Siam* (London [illegible] ander Moring, 1924) i. 256–7, cited by Landon, op. cit. p. 265.

[3] Landon, op. cit. p. 269.

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871 To check this process, and at the same time as a measure towards eradication of Communist propaganda in the schools, the law of 1919 was for the first time applied seriously in Bangkok, and affected Chinese schools in particular because of their heavy concentration in the capital.[1] In the past it had been the practice for Chinese to be taught in the Chinese schools in the morning and Siamese in the afternoon. In many cases children did not bother to attend the afternoon session. Government inspectors found that children who had been attending school for three years could not read Siamese. The conclusion to be drawn was that the Siamese language was not being taught.

The response of the Government to this defiance of its decrees took the form of a requirement that in a 28-hour school week, 21 hours were to be devoted to studies in the Siamese language, and one hour was to be given to physical education. Mathematics, science, geography, history, &c., were to be taught in the Siamese language. Foreign languages might be taught in the afternoon only and Chinese might be taught only as a foreign language. If these regulations had been strictly obeyed it would have meant the practical elimination of the teaching of Chinese since this language was much more difficult than Siamese to learn and the time left for its study was quite inadequate.[2]

875 Added to this was the insistence that stiff examinations in Siamese must be passed by teachers in Chinese schools. This measure dated from four years before the Siamese revolution of 1932. Before that it had been possible for teachers from abroad to start teaching in schools in Siam immediately after arrival by obtaining permission from the inspectors to defer their examination in Siamese for six months, which period might in some cases be extended up to four years. The order following on the royal tour in 1928 had made it impossible for anyone to teach who had not passed the fourth primary examination in the Thai language.

871 The new regulations and the strictness with which they were enforced roused the Chinese community of Bangkok to present a petition to the Government asking for more time to be allowed for

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[1] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 110.

[2] The writer when Assistant Director of Education in charge of Chinese schools in the Straits Settlements, 1930–2, found that the 5–7 hours a week devoted in most Chinese schools to the learning of English was quite inadequate and the results were, in effect, nil; and Chinese is more difficult to learn than En[illegible].

teaching the Chinese language, and that teachers from China be 871 absolved from passing the stiff examination prescribed. But the Government refused to make any concessions on this score. They insisted, however, that other foreign schools should comply with the regulations in exactly the same way as the Chinese were required to do.

If there is one technique in which the Chinese surpass all other races it is that of obstruction, and they now called out their shock troops of passive resistance (if one may so put it) to render the regulations inoperative. Local Chinese qualified to do so passed the examination in Siamese and a stock of certificates to teach was created for the use of newly arrived teachers from China; another plan was to clip ten minutes or so off each hour allotted to the Siamese language, using the gain for teaching Chinese.[1] The Siamese inspectors, though exasperated, maintained their courtesy and calm, and the result was that seventy-nine Chinese schools out of a total of over a hundred were closed.

One more shot, at least, the Chinese had in their locker in this [167] new cultural battle, and that was to pack off their children to school in China or Malaya; this they did with thousands above the age of five.[2]

In view of the indignation aroused and the commotion caused in the Chinese community (and for all their reputation for resigned endurance they are an extremely excitable race), it is a little surprising that the crisis passed off without a boycott, strike, or some incidents of violence. It happened, however, that at this juncture a party led by the Minister of Commerce of the Chinese Govern-

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[1] Landon, *The Chinese in Thailand*, pp. 272–3. 'One school in Bangkok used a burglar alarm when inspectors were sighted and teachers without permits would then hide in cupboards while qualified teachers took over their classes.'

[2] Dr Landon says (op. cit. p. 273): 'One of the wildest rumours was that the Government was planning to pass a law prohibiting the return of Chinese children to China for study. Another version of this rumour claimed that the Government was going to collect a tax of two to five hundred baht on every child sent out of the country to study.'

Mr Lin Yu states this rumour as a *fact*—and says that when the Chinese [651] talked of establishing Chinese schools in Malaya, the Siamese Government immediately decreed that any child of school age leaving Siam would be liable to a tax of 500 bahts! 'Twin Loyalties in Siam', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. ix, no. 2 (June 1936) p. 196.

Dr Landon's account is undoubtedly the correct one and Mr Lin Yu's acceptance of the rumour lends support to Luang Pradist's complaints against Chinese newspapers and other manufacturers of rumour.

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871 ment made a tour of Siam and on their return to China they reported that the Chinese enjoyed more freedom under the Siamese Government than under any other foreign Government in the world—in fact that they were in a most favoured position in the country. This, no doubt, had a sobering influence on the Chinese community, though there was nothing in the attitude of the Siamese educational authorities to suggest that they were to be treated more leniently or that they had nothing to fear in the future from even more stringent regulations.

204 The following year, 1934, the conflict was reopened by the publication of a list of fifty banned books. This list was merely a recapitulation at the end of the year of books of a strongly anti-foreign or nationalist nature which had been banned one or two at a time over the years (some of them dated from 1925 onwards when anti-foreignism was deliberately introduced into text-books);[1] but the effect on the Chinese was as if the fifty had been suddenly banned all at once. In 1938 a further forty-three books were banned as containing Communist or other objectionable doctrine (an act, incidentally, that was likely to secure the support of at least the anti-communistic Chinese).

Meanwhile spokesmen for the Chinese stated the Chinese case in foreign periodicals, and the Bangkok newspapers were by no means silent on the subject. One of the latter, the *Bangkok Daily Mail*, owned by Prince Svasti, the father-in-law of King Prajadhipok, and with (usually) an American editor, commented in an editorial,[2] 'it is indeed strange that some kind of compromise measure could not have been arrived at (regarding the time allotted for teaching Chinese) after the Chinese residents here presented their petition'. Nothing happened and shortly afterwards the newspaper ceased publication for good.

648 609 871 In July 1936 Luang Pradist himself, now State Councillor for Foreign Affairs, felt impelled to make a public statement on Siamese-foreign relationships in general with a special reference to relationships with the Chinese. This is what he said:

> A word about the relations between China and Siam would not be out of place in the course of this article. Connexions between the Chinese and Siamese peoples date as far back as the beginning of the history of the Thai. China and Chinese have played important roles in all aspects

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[1] See Purcell, *Problems of Chinese Education*, p. 165 ff.

[2] 1 July 1933, Landon, op. cit. p. 272.

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of Siamese life and the Chinese immigrants in addition to being afforded 648
the cleanest, widest, and most independent home they have ever ac- 609
quired abroad, have been amply rewarded for their contribution to-
wards the progress of Siam. It is therefore most regrettable that, of 871
recent date, some subversive elements have been devoting themselves to jeopardizing the friendly relations between the two countries by spreading absurd tales regarding the treatment of Chinese in Siam.

Any misunderstandings between Chinese and Siamese are built up mainly on ignorance of the facts and on prejudice. For instance, Chinese newspapers have reported that 'The Siamese Ministry of Public Instruction forbids the teaching of the Chinese language to Chinese children in Siam.' The Primary Education Law in Siam was enacted years ago, but efficiency in its enforcement is more recent. What the Ministry of Education insists on enforcing, is that a certain number of hours per week be devoted to the teaching of the Siamese language in Chinese and in other foreign-owned and foreign-managed schools. When Chinese immigrants choose to settle down in Siam, it is but natural that their children should be afforded the educational background which will qualify them for their social and political status and responsibilities as sons of the soil. As a nation engaged in developing a democratic form of government in which the people will have a predominant voice in the administration, it is but just and right that every future citizen of the land should be acquainted with the national language, at least up to a certain minimum standard.[1]

Luang Pradist's article announced the firm intention of the new 609
regime to persist in the course it had undertaken, and there was
increasing evidence that it was having a great measure of success 871
in securing its aims. More and more Siamese teachers were employed in place of Chinese in Chinese private schools. There was little point in having Chinese teachers now that the time for teaching the Chinese language was so restricted, and, incidentally, the Siamese cost less, a matter of importance now that the Chinese merchants were less disposed than before to contribute to the funds of the schools. In April 1939 there was a new tightening-up of the regulations. Children between seven and fourteen, who hitherto had been allowed to study Chinese five hours a week, were in future to be allowed to study it for only two hours a week, with concessions in favour of the Chinese language for those above that age. At the same time the regulation that in all subjects other

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[1] Luang Pradist Manudharm, 'Unimpaired Balance in World Friendships is Watchword of Siamese Foreign Policy', *Siam Today* (Bangkok, Government Publicity Department, July 1936).

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than language study Siamese must be used as the medium of instruction was insisted upon anew. In the meantime the amount of Chinese taught in the Government schools had decreased during the years of the constitutional regime until it was on the point of disappearing altogether.

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Under the ultra-nationalistic regime of Luang Pibul, action to enforce Siamese education at the expense of Chinese was intensified. From April to August 1939 twenty-five private Chinese schools were closed; in August seven more were closed. The reason given in the latter instances was that the action was in the course of a campaign against Chinese 'secret societies', including the Kuomintang, and in order to forestall plans for organizing sedition and unrest. During the rest of 1939, and throughout 1940 and 1941, the offensive went on and was being vigorously maintained, along with other measures to control the Chinese, at the moment when the Japanese troops landed at Singora.

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[p. 189]

CHAPTER XVIII

BEFORE AND AFTER THE SIAMESE-CHINESE TREATY OF AMITY OF 1946

CONSIDERATION for the feelings of a friendly nation had, even 648 before 1942, been of secondary importance to the requirements 722 of Siamese domestic policy; but when, on 25 January of that year, Siam threw in her lot with the Japanese and declared war on Britain and the United States, this factor was altogether removed. China, although not technically at war with Siam, was an ally of the two Western Powers and her nationals were now to all intents and purposes enemy nationals. It cannot be said, however, that the new discriminatory measures introduced were anything more than a continuation of a course already embarked upon.

By a decree of 10 June 1942, twenty-seven trades and professions 463 were reserved exclusively for Siamese. Aliens were to be allowed a period varying between ninety days and one year to leave the 722 reserved occupations, which were as diverse as hairdressing and 656 brick manufacture. The impediment to making the decree effective proved to be the lack of Siamese competent or willing to fill the 609 vacancies left by the Chinese, and as was the case with earlier similar measures it brought no revolutionary change.[1] Concurrently, however, the pro-Japanese dictator, Luang Pibul Songkram, took other strong measures to keep the Chinese in their 'place', and Chinese of non-Siamese citizenship were excluded from residence in certain Siamese cities.[2]

As in other countries of Southeast Asia, the 'iron curtain' descended with the Japanese occupation and cut off Siam from outside view. What came through was mainly sparse intelligence, and since the liberation there has become available very little supplementary evidence. It seems, however, that the main action against the Chinese was as described above. The more dramatic developments were to come only after the Japanese surrender.[3]

[1] P. P. Pillai, ed., *Labour in South-East Asia, a Symposium* (New Delhi, Indian Council of World Affairs, 1947) p. 209. The *New York Herald Tribune* of 14 November 1945 says twenty-one occupations, but the principle is not affected.

[2] *New York Herald Tribune* (14 November 1945).

[3] There is evidence that the Allied cause had support among the Siamese [668]

609 463 722 656 During the period following Phibun's overthrow in 1944 the Siamese Government which came into power withdrew a number of anti-Chinese regulations, including the one prohibiting the Chinese from following any of twenty-seven stated professions.

727 579 In September 1945, when after the Japanese surrender Allied troops had entered Siam, the Chinese in Bangkok assembled to celebrate the Allied victory. This led to a clash and Bangkok officials had to intervene to end sharp fighting between Chinese civilians and Siamese troops and police.[1] A number of Chinese were reported killed.[2]

According to *The Times* report, one Australian was killed in the disturbance and three others were wounded, among thousands of prisoners of war awaiting repatriation. The Siamese were said to be fighting among themselves and against Chinese in pitched battles. Many of the Siamese engaged were of the bandit type, armed with rifles and grenades obtained from the Japanese. The police attempted to break up a Chinese procession with a bayonet charge which was followed by machine-gunning and bayonet tossing. A curfew was thereupon ordered by the British military and Siamese civil authorities. The immediate cause of the outbreak was said to be the Siamese refusal to allow the Chinese to hoist Chungking flags in celebration of the Allied victory. Intermittent clashes lasted until 28 September.[3]

648 727 609 There was an immediate outburst in the Chungking press. *Ta Kung Pao* demanded that the Siamese Government be forced to go through a surrender ceremony, and that all former collaborationists, including Luang Pibul Songkram, should be punished as war criminals.[4] The incident was cited also in connexion with the

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[668] population. For instance, the *Straits Times* of 9 April 1948 reported that Wong Seng Wan (apparently a Cantonese), the leader of the White Star guerrillas, an outlaw band along the Siam-Malaya border, had offered to suppress any agitation which might be 'provoked from outside' in the four Malay-speaking provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, and Setun as a mark of gratitude to the Siamese Government for supplying rice to the guerrillas when they were in the field against the Japanese. This at the same time was a gesture of anti-Malay feeling, for there was at this time agitation among the Malays against Siamese rule. It seems, too, that the White Star guerrillas were Communists who were pro-Ally only during the war with Japan.

[1] *New York Times* (25 September 1945).

[2] ibid. (29 September 1945).

[3] *The Times* (25 September), *Manchester Guardian* (26 September), *New York Times* (28 September 1945).

[4] 29 September 1945.

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anti-Chinese policy generally by the Kuomintang organ the *Central* 648
Daily News,[1] which urged that the Bangkok regime should be compelled to suspend its measures against the 2·5 million Chinese of 727
Thailand, while the *National Herald*[1] demanded action against the 609
'unmistakable manifestation of a hostile attitude on the part of Siam'. The Chungking newspapers, at the same time, coupled the conduct of the Siamese Government with that of the Government of the Philippines which was then adopting an intransigent attitude to the return of Chinese ex-residents to the country. Simultaneously the Chinese Foreign Office announced that it had instructed the Chinese embassy in the United States to ask the Siamese Minister in Washington for an explanation of the clashes, and to demand that steps should be taken against a recurrence of the incident and also payment of compensation for the victims.[2]

The disturbance in the Siamese capital had been quietened by the Monday (25 September), although a shutdown of Chinese shopkeepers had paralysed much of the city's trade. Police were reopening the closed streets and the curfews imposed by the Allied occupying forces were lifted.

An official explanation of the cause of the incident was soon forthcoming. A Siamese Government spokesman stated that his Government, insisting on complete sovereignty, could not allow the Chinese in Siam to fly the Chinese flag by itself and that the Siamese colours must be flown beside it. The spokesman pointed out that the law regarding flag-flying was not peculiar to Siam, for the Chinese had one of a similar kind.[3]

The reason for the riots which appears to be accepted in official [668]
circles in the United States is that the Siamese were critical of the Chinese community in Siam because it had not participated in the underground Free Thai movement to assist the Allies. The Chinese, on the other hand, were critical of the Siamese because the Siamese Government had declared war on the Allies. Since China was one of the major Allied Powers they identified themselves with China. Each group resented the other's celebrating an Allied victory.

This view is very plausible, and demonstrates once more the irony of international politics.

However, no settlement satisfactory to both Governments was

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[1] 29 September 1945.

[2] *New York Times* (A) (29 September 1945).

[3] *New York Times* (29 September 1945).

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648 727 609 reached, and we shall observe that at a later date the Chinese protests were renewed. It was against this unsatisfactory background that the Siamese-Chinese Treaty of Amity, so long delayed, was to be negotiated. It was finally signed at Bangkok on 23 January 1946, and since it forms the diplomatic basis of all subsequent relations between the two countries it is desirable that it should here be reproduced in full instead of being relegated to an appendix.

Siamese-Chinese Treaty of Amity[1]

648 *Article I.* There shall be perpetual peace and everlasting amity between the Kingdom of Siam and the Republic of China as well as between their peoples.

Article II. The High Contracting Parties shall have the right reciprocally to send duly accredited diplomatic representatives, who shall enjoy, in the country to the Government of which they are accredited, all the rights, privileges, immunities and exemptions generally recognized by public international law.

Article III. Each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to send Consul-Generals, Consuls, Vice-Consuls, and Consular Agents to the localities within the territories of the other which shall be determined by common accord. Such consular officers shall exercise functions and enjoy the treatment generally recognized by international practice. Prior to their assumption of office, they shall obtain from the Government of the country to which they are sent, exequaturs which are subject to withdrawal by the said Government.

The High Contracting Parties shall not employ persons engaged in industry or commerce in these consular offices.

609 648 *Article IV.* The nationals of each of the High Contracting Parties shall be at liberty to enter or leave the territories of the other under the same conditions as the nationals of any third country, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the country applied to all aliens.

Article V. The nationals of each High Contracting Party shall receive in the territory of the other the most constant protection and security for their persons and property, and shall enjoy in this respect the same rights and privileges as the nationals of the other High Contracting Party, subject to their compliance with the same laws and regulations.

The nationals of the High Contracting Parties shall receive in the territory of the other in regard to all legal proceedings and in matters relating to the administration of justice and the levying of taxes and requirements in connection therewith treatment not less favourable than that accorded to nationals of the other High Contracting Party. 648

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[1] *The Siam Directory, 1947 (B.E. 2490)* (Bangkok, the Thai Company) p. B-33 (checked from official version supplied by the Siamese embassy, London). Preamble omitted above.

Article VI. The nationals of each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to travel, reside, to carry on all kinds of professions and occupations, to engage in industries and trade and, subject to reciprocity, to acquire, inherit, possess, lease, occupy, and dispose of any kind of movable property, throughout the whole extent of the territories of the other, under the same conditions as the nationals of any third country, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the country. 609

They shall also have the liberty to establish schools for the education of their children and shall enjoy the freedom of assembly and association, of publication, of worship, and religion, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the country. 871

Article VII. Other relations between the two High Contracting Parties shall be based on the principles of international law. 648

Article VIII. The High Contracting Parties agree to conclude as soon as possible a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.

Article IX. The present Treaty is drawn up in duplicate in the Siamese, Chinese and English languages. In any divergence of interpretation the English text shall be authoritative.

Article X. The present Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible by the High Contracting Parties in accordance with the respective constitutional requirements, and shall enter into force on the day on which the exchange of ratifications takes place. It shall remain in force continuously thereafter. Twelve months notice of termination may however be given by either High Contracting Party after a lapse of ten years.

The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Chungking or Nanking.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Dated at Bangkok, etc.
(L.S.) M. R. Seni Pramoj
(L.S.) Li Tieh-tseng.

By a letter dated the same day (23 January 1946) Mr Li Tieh-tseng, the Chief of the Chinese Mission to Siam, confirmed on behalf of his Government, that

> The stipulations contained in the said Treaty do not in any way affect, supersede or modify any of the laws and regulations with regard to naturalization, immigration and public order which are in force or which may be enacted in territories of either High Contracting Party, provided they do not constitute measures of discrimination particularly directed against the nationals of the other Party.

609 648 In regard to land ownership, the rights already acquired by nationals of either High Contracting Party in the territory of the other, in accordance with the laws and regulations of such territory, at the coming into force of this Treaty shall be respected. In the event of expropriation, an indemnity will be paid, not less favourable than that paid to the nationals of the other Party or the nationals of any other country.

On the same day the President of the Council of Ministers, Mr M. R. Seni Pramoj, addressed a letter to Mr Li Tieh-tseng in exactly the same terms *mutatis mutandis.*

This treaty, which was ratified by both countries at Nanking on 28 March 1946, marked an epoch. Thereafter China would have diplomatic and consular representatives in Siam to safeguard the interests of her nationals, though the practised eye might see in this the possibility also of exacerbating the old conflicts. But although the 'perpetual peace and everlasting amity' in Article I contrasted with the 'twelve months notice' in Article X may cause the moralist to raise a sorrowful eyebrow or the cynic to shrug his shoulders, the treaty as a whole seems at first glance not to impose any conditions incapable of fulfilment. The loophole as before is the conceding to the Chinese in Siam the same rights as any *third* nation, for whatever could be safely imposed on any third nation could safely be imposed on the Chinese. Yet it must seem to the observer that the treaty of itself could not, even if fulfilled to the letter, dispose of the deep differences of attitude of the two Governments. This, however, must appear from the narrative.

Whilst Siam is awaiting the arrival of the first Chinese ambassador and the first Chinese consuls, it will be convenient to discuss two questions involving the Chinese which were agitating the Siamese authorities. One was rice, and the other was immigration.

477 439 442 In spite of all the measures devised to prise the rice monopoly out of the grip of the Chinese merchants, the latter in 1946 still managed to retain control of the marketing of that essential commodity. In the post-war Far-Eastern world the food position was critical, verging on the disastrous. The eyes of the deficiency countries were directed towards the only two with any considerable export surplus, namely Burma and Siam. The exporting ability of both these countries had been greatly reduced by the war. The Siamese Government was under an obligation imposed by the peace treaty with Britain to export to Malaya and other countries a given quantity of rice free and a further quantity at a given price,

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but it found all attempts to meet its obligations frustrated by the enormous scale of the smuggling then in progress. It was said that for every two tons produced by the middlemen for Government export at least one ton was smuggled over the frontier or by ship, at a price many times the official one. Moreover, the Siamese Government was unable to obtain revenue on a reasonable scale through the tax on the country's main export, rice, at a time when the trade was the most profitable. In these circumstances resentment of the Chinese stranglehold on rice was naturally provoked anew. 477 439 442

On 22 July 1946 Mr M. L. Kri Dechatiwong, Minister of Commerce, called for the co-operation of every Siamese in preventing rice-smuggling, and threatened to impose the most stringent measures to the same end. The same day the Ministry of Commerce issued the following communiqué: 439 442 656

> Whereas the Government is under the obligation to supply rice to alleviate the starvation of the peoples of the world within twelve months from last May, it appears that in spite of the price offered by the Government for the purchase of paddy, a large number of merchants do not give due co-operation to the Government at all, hoping that the Government may increase the monthly offered price. The result has been that for the period May–June this year the Government has been able to ship only 10,000 tons. If this situation is allowed to continue, it will mean a total shipment for the twelve months of only about 500,000 tons which will be some 700,000 tons short of the target tonnage. In terms of money the country will lose 300 million baht. . . . With a view to remedying the situation, the Minister of Commerce finds it imperative to take steps to ensure the smooth supply of rice. This may take the form of compelling the hoarding merchants to sell their stocks at the fixed price within the month.

In commenting on this communiqué, the same Siamese-language paper, *Prachakorn*, said that in other words if Siam could not carry out the terms recently agreed to, the Government would have to supply the rice free of cost to the United Nations according to the financial agreement with them.[1] This would mean that the Siamese nation as a whole would be the injured party because the Government would have to levy additional taxation to pay for the rice supplied free.

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[1] *Prachakorn* (24 July 1946). This was included in the Anglo-Siamese Rice Agreement.

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The Minister of Commerce, in pursuance of his determination to end the stoppage in the flow of rice to the Government market, made plans for the entire reorganization of the rice industry. A committee was appointed to consider the appointment of wholesale and retail agents of the Ministry of Commerce under the rice-rationing system planned for the following year. The committee decided that the number of wholesale agents for Bangkok and Dhonburi should be thirty, each catering for the needs of about 4,000 families. Many dealers had also applied for appointment as retail agents, and it was reported that all the retail agents would be appointed from Siamese applicants. The Prime Minister, however, turned down a suggestion that only Siamese dealers should be appointed both as wholesale and retail agents under a rationing system, while Chinese merchants should be allowed to carry on with their existing rice business so long as they did not sell above the controlled prices. This, said the Prime Minister, would be contrary to a promise given to the Chinese ambassador (who had now arrived) that Chinese merchants would be welcomed to help in the rationing plan.[1]

Strong protests from the Chinese merchants were received by the chairman of the committee on the appointment of rice-selling agents, and on one occasion he received a fuseless bomb accompanied by a letter threatening that if he did nothing to assist the Chinese rice merchants he would receive another bomb, this time 'complete with fuse'![1]

The progress in the rice war is described in the vernacular press of January 1948. First of all we learn that of the eighty or so mills in Bangkok, most had had to stop as a result of the new system of rice trading introduced by the Ministry of Commerce. By this system only the Thai Rice Company and affiliated mills were entrusted with the milling and grading of rice. About 10,000 labourers were unemployed as a result of the new measures. But the affected rice-mills had already appointed representatives to negotiate with the Minister of Commerce. Khaung Aphaiwong explained that the new system was introduced to ensure sufficient rice for internal consumption, and to improve the quality through carefully supervised grading.[2]

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[1] *Siam Nikorn* (16 December 1946).
[2] ibid. (5 January 1948).
These developments all belong to the period subsequent to Marshal Pibul

On 18 January, however, a communiqué of the Rice Office of the 442
Ministry of Commerce stated that the Ministry had now accumulated appreciable reserves and that paddy was coming to Bangkok 656
in an even flow. Rice godown and rice-mill owners had promised 434
to improve the quality of the rice, and the Minister had therefore lifted the order to intercept rice and paddy boats along the waterways, in order that rice-mills and merchants might be able to make their usual purchases.

It does not seem that the war against the Chinese rice merchant and mill-owner had been won by the nationalization of the industry, but temporarily, at least, a working compromise had been reached.

Immigration

In the second half of August 1946 some concern over the influx 167
of Chinese immigrants into Siam had been revealed in the Bangkok press as a result of the entry of an additional shipload of over 2,000 Chinese. In a press interview the Minister of the Interior stated that he was informed that there were from 40,000 to 50,000 Chinese in Swatow awaiting transportation to Siam. In June a report had mentioned that there was a rush of bookings in Swatow because of the rumour that the Government would shortly raise the immigration tax. Both the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior assured the public that there was no cause for alarm, that the Chinese were a law-abiding people, that the Government would maintain a policy of magnanimity, and that sympathy was due from the Siamese to the Chinese since the latter were suffering from famine conditions in their own country. At the same time the Ministers assured the public that the Government would repatriate Chinese who were without employment or the means of support. Mention was made of the fact, however, that the Siamese were entitled under a clause of the Sino-Siamese Treaty of Amity to enforce an immigration quota and it was stated that the subject was now under consideration and would be placed before Parliament in due course.

Statistics published by the Minister of the Interior showed that

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Songkram's new *coup d'état*, but are included here to take the rice story as far forward as possible.

That the quality of rice exported had greatly deteriorated since before the war was the subject of constant complaint in Malaya during 1946–7.

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167 70 per cent. of recent immigrants were women and children, that 10 per cent. had been in Siam before, and that immigration exceeded emigration by only 10 per cent. About 3,000 arrived in June 1946, 4,000 in July, and August expectations were even greater. The pre-war average had been about 30,000 a year, so that, if the Swatow figures were accurate, twice as many Chinese desired to enter Siam as in 1939.[1]

Early in 1947 the immigration question became involved with that of the outbursts of violence laid at the door of the San Min Chu I Youth and other secret societies, amounting to some hundreds, and arrests accounted for the 400 Chinese awaiting deportation in February of that year. It was at this time officially announced that the details of the proposed new immigration regulations had been completed, and that shortly a communiqué could be expected fixing an immigration quota of 10,000 a year for Chinese and 200 for other nationals.[2] The introduction of the new measure coincided with a fresh crop of rumours, including one that Chinese officers as well as Chinese civilians were infiltrating from the famine areas of China.[2]

Finally, in 1948, the immigration quota for Chinese, as well as for other nationals, was fixed at 200. This, of course, was a much more drastic measure of immigration control of the Chinese than any that had been enforced hitherto.

871 *Education*

The eternal dispute as to whether the children of Chinese immigrants should be educated in Chinese or Siamese continued as before, but between the liberation and the *coup d'état* of November 1947 there was no very important development. In November 1946 it was learned that the Ministry of Education would in future in-

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[1] About this time a group of Chinese leaders approached the Government with a proposal to establish a Chinese immigrant city along the banks of the Chao Phya River, but Government support for such a scheme was not likely to be forthcoming.

Because there had been several cases of cholera on a ship that had recently arrived, the entire shipload was quarantined in a rice-mill and the Government announced that the necessary inoculation must be secured by the Chinese at the port of embarkation twelve days before sailing. To the group under quarantine the Minister of the Interior made a speech on 27 August advising them as to the friendly relations existing between Siamese and Chinese nationals, and of the laws they were expected to abide by, and concluding with a presentation of powdered milk to the children and expectant mothers.

[2] The *Satcha* (14 January 1947).

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clude the Chinese language in the curricula of the (Government) 871 schools, but at the existing stage it would be taught only in the commercial schools and language courses. Later, however, the teaching of this language might be extended to other faculties.[1] The following week it was reported that some Chinese schools had been opened in Bangkok without proper permission from the Ministry of Education and this breach of the law had been brought to the attention of the Chinese ambassador.[2] The new Chinese [648] ambassador, for his part, as might have been expected, had already been agitating for concessions to Chinese schools, but it appears that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had replied that none of his requests could be complied with, as the regulations applied to American, British, and French schools equally.[3]

If, however, the Chinese daily, *Hua Ch'iao Pao*, is to be trusted, the ambassador's persistency was not altogether without result. The newspaper said that some of the six demands had been agreed [875] to, including the one that Chinese teachers should be exempted from Siamese examinations. Following up this reported success, the paper in an editorial referred to the Compulsory Education Act of 1935 and the People's Schools Act of 1946, insisting that Chinese schools in Siam were greatly affected by these Acts. Freedom of education had been taken away from the Chinese. Chinese children under fifteen years of age were forced to receive Siamese education. Only a few hours were left for Chinese study. In the past Chinese teachers who did not pass the examination in Siamese were not allowed to teach.[4]

Diplomatic and Other Relations. Mr Li Tieh-tseng, the first 648 Chinese ambassador to Siam, arrived in Bangkok on 6 September 1946, and was most enthusiastically received by the Chinese com- 664 munity. But his position was by no means an enviable one. Unlike most ambassadors to a foreign country, he could not in the first 609 place rely on the undivided support of his nationals within the country. The Chinese community was sharply divided into factions, and the ambassador, as representative of the Kuomintang Government of China, would be the natural object of hostility from the Chinese Communists within Siam. Two attempts on his life were reported soon after his arrival. Furthermore, he was beleaguered by hundreds of Chinese pressure groups. In consequence he was harassed and uncomfortable. Several incidents between Siamese and Chinese a few days before his arrival, possibly due to the heightened sense of national importance felt by the Chinese, caused him to emphasize in a speech during the flag-raising ceremony that he would be of aid and protection only to the law-abiding.

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[1] *Prachakorn* (19 November 1946).

[2] *Suparb Burus* (23 November 1946).

[3] *Siam Radsra* (4 December 1946).

[4] *Hua Ch'iao Pao* (30 January 1947).

The new claims on the ambassador's attention were myriad. He had to preside over the inauguration of a number of new Chinese consulates in Siam; he had apparently received instructions to press for a settlement in regard to the death and injury of Chinese in the victory celebrations of September 1945; he was soon to submit memoranda to the Foreign Ministry demanding action regarding the teak commandeered from Chinese nationals; he had to request a softening of the conditions of the control of Chinese schools and teachers; he would before long be confronted by a Bill which, if passed, would affect the right of residence and vocation of the Chinese in Siam.[1] These and a hundred other things he had to attend to, and in his spare time he would be expected to travel the length and breadth of the country to the numerous centres to which his countrymen had penetrated. Apart also from his duty to pursue the interests of his country with the Siamese Government, he would have to be ready with replies to the complaints which the Siamese themselves would certainly prefer in return against his Government and the Chinese community within Siam.

One such complaint concerned the taking of votes among Chinese nationals in Siam for the elections which were to be held in China the coming October. This procedure, which had been the cause of friction in other countries in Southeast Asia in the past, was said to be regarded by the Siamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a 'direct violation of Siamese sovereignty'. It was recalled by the Siamese press that when the German residents had voted for the elections in Germany they had gone over three miles from the Siamese coast to do it.[2] The reply by the secretary of the embassy to a press inquiry was that by the rules of the election the embassy had no right to concern itself with the matter.[3]

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[1] A Bill for reservation of certain areas for economic and agricultural purposes sponsored by Luang Arthaphorn Phisan, M.P. for Trat, was introduced in the National Assembly in July 1947. The ambassador's contention was that the Bill, if passed, would violate Article VI of the Treaty of Amity. The *Kiatisak* (13 July 1947).

[2] *Nakorn Sarn* (22 August 1947).

[3] *Heung Yian Pao* (16 September 1947).

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On 15 October the Chinese ambassador officially informed the 648
Foreign Ministry that his Government had dropped the plan to
authorize the consuls to supervise the voting of Chinese nationals 609
in Siam in the forthcoming general election. In announcing this, the Siamese Premier, Mr. Dhamrong Nawasawat, said that this officially closed the issue. At the same time it was officially stated by a spokesman of the Chinese consulate-general that plans were under way for the registration of all Chinese citizens in Siam.[1]

It must have been a matter of the greatest difficulty for the Chinese ambassador to decide the order of priority for addressing himself to the manifold problems. The Chinese press and the 'pressure-groups' were agitating for action in a hundred different directions at once. At the same time the new diplomatic and consular representatives did not wish to appear to lack initiative on their own account. For example, it was stated on 19 August 1947 that, following the inauguration of the Chinese consulate at Singora, all Chinese consulates would hold a meeting to discuss the conditions of livelihood in Siam and promote a policy for action.[2] Negotiations for the trade agreement foreshadowed in the Treaty of Amity would also come within the sphere of the ambassador.[3]
Other questions competing for attention were the border troubles,
in which Chinese outlaw bands claiming Kuomintang affiliations 668
were reported to be fleeing into south Siam from Malaya, and the increasing Chinese secret society and mob disturbance in Bangkok and towns in the vicinity.[4]

In reviewing the first year of diplomatic relationship between Siam and China it could not be fairly said that the innovation had eased the tension between the peoples within Siam. It had indeed intensified the existing feeling. Soon after the arrival of the Chinese ambassador one Siamese newspaper had commented:

> Although there is some degree of truth in the old saying about Sino-Siamese relationships, it is not the less a fact that, due to some reason or

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[1] *Straits Times* (17 October 1947).

[2] *Hua Ch'iao Pao* (19 August 1947).

[3] It had already been announced that the Chinese Government had successfully negotiated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for permission for Chinese cargo boats to anchor in Siamese waters and trade with Siam, in the absence of mutual agreements to this effect. The *Satcha* (23 August 1946).

[4] When Mr Li Tieh-tseng returned to Bangkok on 26 September from a visit to the south, he stated that during his trips from Singora (Songkla) to Penang he had found peace and quietness. There had been no murder of five Siamese police by Chinese bandits as had been reported.

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648 other, natural or even blood relationships seemingly have failed to become a guarantee for the good conduct of either party. . . . The establish- 609 ment of diplomatic relations between Siam and China has become all the more necessary now in order to ensure this natural relationship against unfair play on the part of either the Chinese or the Siamese. . . .[1]

[304] Nor did some sections of the press, especially the Chinese press, tend to unruffle feelings or to allay suspicions. The *Suparb Burus*, for example, on 1 December 1946 complained of an article in the *Hua Ch'iao Pao* calling upon the Chinese community to unite against the Siamese so that 'the influence of China may dominate the whole of the Chao Phya River'. 'No Chinese will believe', comments the Siamese editor, 'that any Chinese newspaper would be permitted to behave in this way in any country other than Siam.'

The happenings above described, though not by any means constituting a detailed history, are enough to indicate the trend between the Japanese surrender and the *coup d'état* of November 1947. The deterioration of the military situation in China to the disadvantage of the National Government, and the increase of Communist activity in Malaya and other adjacent countries, together with the return to power of Marshal Pibul Songkram who had been identified with the anti-Chinese policy of before and during the war, were factors that were bound to influence the fortunes of the Chinese in Siam.

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[1] *Naeo Na* (11 September 1946).

[p. 203]

CHAPTER XIX

THE COUP OF 1947 AND ITS SEQUEL

EARLY on the morning of 9 November 1947 Siamese Army units under the leadership of Field-Marshal Pibul Songkram[1] seized control of the Government by a *coup d'état* in Bangkok. The Premier Luang Dhamrong Nawasawat was reported missing and Nai Pridi Panomyong (i.e. Luang Pradist Manudharm) was said to be sheltering in Singapore. 669

Faithful to the historic policy of the Chinese in positions of dependence, important members of the Kuomintang in Bangkok lost no time in calling on the Marshal. They brought with them baskets of flowers. Pibul asked the overseas Chinese to be calm and to adhere firmly to peace, not giving way to fearful expectations. Both sides, it was reported, had a 'sincere talk'. The Marshal assured the deputation that there would not be any anti-Chinese action. In return the Chinese spokesman, Mr Lee Li-yow, promised the Marshal that China and the Kuomintang would support his work until its successful fruition. In conclusion he expressed a hope that "the sentiments of the Chinese and Siamese would remain for ever as fresh and as beautiful as the garlands of flowers in this basket', and he hoped that the mutual friendship would be eternal.[2] 669 648

Marshal Songkram followed up his assurance to the Kuomintang deputation by a declaration on 12 December in which he said, 'it should be clearly understood that I am in no way involved in politics since I have handed the powers of administration over to the Government, retaining only my military post'. He insisted that the restriction to the areas in which aliens could reside, the reservations of certain trades for Siamese nationals, and other measures he had introduced were *merely a part of his war-time policy to prevent the Japanese from getting full control of the country.* He solemnly asserted that the acts of the past would not be repeated. It was his firm belief, he said, that the Khuang Aphaiwong Government, now in power, composed of discreet and far-sighted gentlemen, would

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[1] Luang Pibul Songkram was placed under house arrest in September 1945, but released the following March, the Bangkok High Court having decreed that the War Crimes Act could not operate retrospectively.

[2] *Chong Yuan Pao* (12 November 1947).

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669 be instrumental in safeguarding and in enhancing Sino-Siamese relations. 'I will give them all the support in my power.'[1]

669 645 The Chinese, both diplomats and ordinary civilians, watched the fortunes of the new regime with a strong personal interest. After the bloodless November coup, the monarchists gained the upper hand and in the January elections Aphaiwong's Democratic Party won a majority in Parliament over Pibul Songkram's own Tharmatipat Party. In February Aphaiwong (Khuang Abhaiwongse) accepted the post of Prime Minister, but, like his predecessors, he found the influence of the fighting forces too strong for him, and early in April, when Marshal Pibul again headed a combination against the Cabinet, Aphaiwong was forced to resign in spite of his parliamentary majority. The Regency Council then asked the Marshal to form his new Government, which was thereupon made up of nine soldiers and seventeen civilians of his own choosing.[2]

648 666 The United States, Britain, China, and India recognized the Government of Khuang Aphaiwong in March 1948 following popular elections which had returned the Democratic Party to power with a large majority. Pibul (Phibun) came to power in April by theoretically constitutional means. There was, therefore, no question of recognizing him, since theoretically there had been no *coup d'état* but continuity in the Siamese Government. (The United States and the other Powers had for a short time considered a policy of non-recognition (i.e. withdrawing recognition) but did not pursue the idea.)

648 578 Before China had recognized the Marshal's regime the flag question had once more come to the fore. Following protests from the Chinese in Siam against the law prohibiting the flying of the Chinese flag over Chinese private schools except on 'special occasions', the Chinese ambassador had referred the matter to Nanking. The Chinese consul at Paknampok about this time ordered all Chinese schools within the consulate area to hoist the Chinese flag alongside the Siamese flag. This led to an incident which a Siamese education officer reported to his superiors. Chinese schools were then instructed that they could fly only the Siamese flag daily, and the Chinese flag in addition to that of Siam only on special occasions under the Flag Act of 1936. When some Chinese schools stopped putting up the Siamese flag they were informed that they were

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[1] *Straits Times* (12 December 1947).

[2] *The Times* (1 May 1948); *New York Times* (7 April 1948).

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committing an offence. If they persisted in their action they were warned that strong measures would be taken against them.[1]

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Although the press in China and the Chinese press in Siam made a great deal of incidents such as these, it seemed that Marshal Pibul intended to adhere closely to his promise that the old days of repression would not be repeated. 'They were very angry with me once', he repeated in April: 'I shall take careful steps', he added.[2] It was therefore with some dismay that the Chinese residents of Siam heard on 13 May that the Siamese Government had forbidden new Chinese schools to open, ordering that the number must now be reduced from 490 to 148. This was hailed as the first anti-Chinese action since the Marshal had returned to power.[3]

When the Chinese in Siam realized the full import of this new decree they were filled with consternation. It was much more thorough-going than anything that had been decreed before. For weeks the papers were flooded with arguments pro and con. Meanwhile there was a rumour that the schools had refused to comply with the regulations and were closed, and that all teaching in the Chinese schools had come to a standstill. Actually, as it turned out, only a few schools had closed and these shortly were reopened. Then the Ministry of Education intervened with counsels of moderation. Let the schools reopen, it said, and comply with the Government regulations. Chinese educationists could then seek for changes in the regulations. Only Parliament could alter the regulations, insisted a spokesman of the Ministry. Subsequently more liberal teaching hours were granted to the Chinese schools.

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By the beginning of 1949 agreement between the Siamese and the Chinese Governments had been reached on the daily ceremony of hoisting the Siamese flag and the use of Siamese as the chief

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[1] Bangkok United Press message to *North China Daily News* (4 February 1948).

On 14 February 1948 Mr Sahas Mahakhun, President of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and representative of other Chinese associations, called at the Ministry of the Interior and the Foreign Office to present a petition that Chinese schools in Siam be permitted to fly the Chinese flag. *The Standard*, Bangkok (14 February 1948).

[2] *North China Daily News* (12 April 1948).

[3] *New York Times* (15 May 1948).

General Mankorn Promyodhi, Minister of Education, at a press conference the same day said that the number of Chinese schools in Bangkok would be reduced gradually from 100 to 8 and in the rest of Siam from 390 to 140. Any school which was closed for an infringement of Siamese rules would not be allowed to reopen. ibid.

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648 medium of instruction: on the other points at issue negotiations were proceeding.

All this on the face of it looks like a renewal of the old campaign to insist on the assimilation into the Siamese people of all who made Siam their home. In one sense it was, but a new factor had come to the surface in Chinese affairs in Southeast Asia generally which was to mean a re-ranging of forces, and this we must investigate if we are to make a fair appraisal of the Siamese Government's policy.

186 668 When the rise of nationalism effected a dichotomy in the Siamese organism, the pull was either towards Siam and her traditions or towards Chinese racialism in its new bourgeois-socialist guise. After the purging of the Kuomintang of its leftist elements in 1927 the Communists had split off and gone underground. Both in Siam, where no political parties were allowed, and in Malaya, where neither the Kuomintang nor the Communist Party were registered societies permitted to operate, the activities of both the parties were illegal. But they were nevertheless in operation and in clandestine conflict with one another. The Chinese Communists, however, in spite of their universal doctrines, were Chinese first and Communist afterwards when it came to an issue where a third party was involved. Moreover, a large proportion of the poorly-paid Chinese teachers who came to the Nanyang were sympathetic to Communism and disseminated its doctrines clandestinely to their charges. When it came to a contest with the Siamese authorities they were naturally wholeheartedly on the side of the Kuomintang even though the Communist Party denounced its members as bourgeois traitors and betrayers of the revolution.

One does not need to have crossed the border into Siam to understand the dilemma in which the Chinese *towkays*, the merchant leaders and members of the committees controlling Chinese schools, found themselves in this long-developing situation. Many of the older ones had had little education themselves, and though they wished their children and grandchildren to share in its blessings they had no desire to have them brought up as Communists. The Kuomintang with many younger and active leaders did its best to ensure that the teachers engaged were orthodox in the faith of Sun Yat-sen, but it was beyond their powers to ensure that even a majority of the 3,000 teachers, paid so little and subjected to all the vexations imposed by Siamese educational policy, were incul-

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cating the doctrines approved by Nanking and nothing else. So it 186
was that many Chinese, though ardent Nationalists, had mixed up 668
with their feelings a secret sympathy for the Siamese Government in its campaign against subversive action.[1]

Since all political organizations were illegal, the Government was 668
correct in refusing in its campaign to distinguish between Chinese Communists and Nationalists. At the same time it was somewhat 575
ironic that a popular underground movement among the Siamese in furtherance of the Government's aims should also have taken the form of secret societies. Early in May the existence on a large scale of these societies, variously describing themselves as 'Black Siamese', 'Black Elephants', 'Black Tusks', and 'Buddha's Disciples', was disclosed when they splashed the city of Bangkok with posters and leaflets demanding an immediate cessation of Chinese immigration into Siam, and calling on the Government to set up 'Chinatowns' in Bangkok and other major cities in the kingdom. The police were said to be trying to track down these secret societies.[1]

Early in June the Chinese Communist terror began in Malaya. 668
Overt war to the death was declared against the Government and capitalists and Kuomintang members alike, without distinction of race. Since the Communist guerrillas in Malaya were Chinese almost to a man, the tendency among Europeans in Malaya was to identify with them the Chinese race as a whole, even though Chinese merchants, shopkeepers, and employees on mines and estates as well as Europeans were being struck down with strict impartiality. In the Siamese Parliament an allegation was made that the Chinese were trying to 'colonize' Siam, and had offered huge bribes to the police authorities in pursuance of this aim. The Deputy Minister of the Interior, replying to a question on the subject, stated that an investigation had been ordered by the Government. At the same time the Siamese authorities ordered a vigorous campaign against all secret societies, and the illegal carrying of arms. They meant to 'crush the Chinese menace', but simultaneously they meant to eradicate all secret societies of whatever colour. 'Black Elephants' or 'Buddha's Disciples' might propagate correct sentiments: in the long run they might prove a double-edged weapon.[2]

At the beginning of 1949 informed opinion inclined to place the number of Chinese Communists in Bangkok at 30,000, this being

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[1] *Straits Times* (7 May 1948).

[2] ibid. (7, 10 May 1948).

668 the estimated number of adult male demonstrators in the May Day procession of 1948. There was a strong branch of the Communist Party with close affiliations with the movement in China, but it was doubtful whether the active members numbered more than a few hundred. Communist influence had been apparent in three spheres —labour, education, and commerce. Shortly after the war the Com-
[467] munists took the lead in forming a Central Labour Union, really a federation of trade unions, but it attained nothing like the same scale as the Malayan General Labour Union, and there was little industrial unrest in Bangkok. There were, however, it was reported, some powerful business interests in Siam which, if not wholly Communist in sympathy, were so hostile to the Kuomintang that they were proving useful allies of the Communists.

204 By February 1949 the Communist victories in China were al-
208 ready having a noticeable effect. The circulation of the Chinese Communist daily, *Chuan Min Pao*, then estimated at 10,000, was reported to be rising rapidly. In the words of the special correspondent of *The Times* in Bangkok: '*There is no doubt that Chinese opinion here, as in Malaya, will fall into line with whichever political group emerges victorious in China.*'[1]

000 We will now take leave of the Chinese in Siam for the time being in order to visit their brethren in the eastern half of the great Indochinese peninsula. In the play we shall witness the leading part will again be taken by the overseas Chinese, but the Thais will be replaced by the French, the Annamese, and the Cambodians, and the interaction of a different set of racial characteristics will impart a distinctive quality to the performance.

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[1] Against Chinese Communism the Pibul Government up to this time had taken only limited action. Fifty-one Chinese had been deported in 1948.

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PART IV

THE CHINESE IN INDOCHINA

CHAPTER XX

DEMOGRAPHY

659 669 POPULATION statistics for Indochina were becoming very much out of date by 1949 as, however, was to be expected in a country so rent by civil strife. The same was true for Indonesia 162 and for Burma; Malaya, Siam, and Sarawak alone had had recent censuses. The last census of Indochina had been in 1937, and from this an abstract is given below. But in considering the figures we must bear in mind that they represent *legal* and not *ethnic* Chinese, 162 as indeed is the case in Siam. According to the *China Handbook* of 1937–43 the number of (ethnic) Chinese was 427,000 in 1940,[1] whereas the 1937 census gives a total of 326,000 legal Chinese. Chinese half-breeds, with a Chinese father and an Indochinese mother, were counted fairly completely in 1921, and a less complete estimate was made in 1931. Putting these two together and making allowances for the time interval, we arrive at a figure of about 141,000, which, added to the 326,000, gives 467,000 for 1940, about 40,000 in excess of the estimate from Chinese official sources. The Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer estimated the number of Chinese (ethnic) in Indochina in 1947 at 850,000.[2]

727 178 In the abnormal conditions ensuing after the Japanese surrender in 1945 and the reoccupation first by British and Chinese troops

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[1] *China Handbook, 1937–43*, compiled by the Chinese Ministry of Informa- 162 tion, Chungking (New York, Macmillan, 1943) p. 36. *The Chinese Year Book, 1943* (Chungking, Council of International Affairs) p. 123, gives 400,000 as the number of Chinese in Indochina on the eve of the war with Japan.

The French laws permitted naturalization only to those natives who by their 'education, habits, and general manner of life have assimilated themselves to the French'. The Chinese were legally assimilated to the Annamites, but from 1935 were regarded as 'foreigners with a privileged status'. See J. Frankel, *The Governments of South East Asia and the Chinese*, Ph.D. Thesis, London University, 1950.

[2] The most recent and apparently the most authoritative figures for 'legal' Chinese are given in the *Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochina*, 1948, which gives the total as 633,354. To this we may add an estimate[illegible],000 for Nord-Vietnam (Tongking) as this area is not included in the 1948 figures. This gives a final total of roughly 698,000 'legal' Chinese for the whole of Indochina.

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727 and then by French, with the complicating factor of the emergence of Vietnam, the Chinese population was, at least temporarily, re- 178 distributed. For example, in April 1948 Hanoi was reported to be 'half dead' and its business almost at a standstill, with a population 162 (said to have approached 200,000 before the war) reduced to 110,000, with 5,000 Europeans and Eurasians, 90,000 Vietnamese, and 15,000 Chinese. Saigon-Cholon, on the contrary, had an enormously swollen population. There were said to be 12,000 French, 225 'foreign Europeans', 845,000 Vietnamese, and 310,000 Chinese, where in 1931 there had been a total population for the two cities of 256,000 including 100,000 Chinese.[1] These figures, however, must be accepted with great reserve.

TABLE III

Number of Chinese in each of the Countries of French Indochina and their percentages to the Total Population in 1937.[2]

Country	*Total population*	*Density of total population per square km.*	*Number of Chinese*	*Percentage of Chinese to total*
Cochinchina . .	4,616,000	71	171,000	3·7
Cambodia . .	3,046,000	17	106,000	3·48
Tongking . .	8,700,000	75	35,000	0·4
Annam. . .	5,656,000	38	11,000	0·19
Laos . . .	1,012,000	4	3,000	0·3
Total . . .	23,030,000	31	326,000	1·42

162 Population pressure developed in the northern plains at an early date. Not only has the entire area there been under cultivation for 434 a long time, but also the people, especially the Tongkingese, have had a gradual admixture of Chinese blood 'and have acquired con- 471 siderable skill, if not real mastery, of trade and industry'.[3] This fact 439 has limited the opportunities for new immigrants such as the Chinese. The Chinese are also restricted in scope by the fact that 316 the over-population of the Tongking and Annam deltas has meant that there has been only a small agricultural surplus for export, and consequent limitation of the natives' buying power has restricted foreign trade, one of the greatest interests of the Chinese. More-

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[1] *France Viet-nam* (15 April 1948).

[2] Charles Robequain, *The Economic Development of French Indo-China* (Oxford University Press, for the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944) p. 34. *Statesman's Year Book* (1948) p. 948.

[3] Robequain, op. cit. p. 35.

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over, Europeans have appropriated most of the control of modern 162
industry, especially mining. In southern Indochina, however, 434
colonization is quite recent and was still going on in the middle of
the twentieth century. Here the Chinese managed to establish 471
themselves in Cochinchina by exploiting the Annamite-Cambodian
conflict, and they had not to meet the same competition as they had 439
in Annam and Tongking from the less numerous and less in- 316
dustrious native peoples. The coming of the French with their 243
improved techniques, such as dredging, added to the opportunities 654
of the Chinese by extending the cultivation of rice in central and
western Cochinchina, in the sale of which the Chinese obtained the
leading position.[1]

Let us now look rather more closely into the distribution of 162
Chinese in 1936, province by province.[2]

Cochinchina (171,000). Among the five provinces of the Union of 167
Indochina, Cochinchina, with the smallest area, received more 438
Chinese immigrants proportionately than the others, and accounted
for more than half the Chinese total for the whole of Indochina. Between the Gulf of Siam and the China Sea, Cochinchina occupied the best situation in the line of international maritime communications and this favoured the reception of the Chinese who came almost entirely from the southern provinces of China, namely Kwangtung and Fukien. The economic conditions here—with rich alluvial rice cultivation, convenient river communications, and a much more developed domestic and foreign commerce—were also more favourable for the Chinese, who were mostly merchants.

Cochinchina was colonized from the seventeenth century onwards by the Annamites, who form the mass of the population today; but at almost the same time the Chinese flowed in, and to them the Annamites were prepared to relinquish trade since they were so much more experienced in it than they.

Cambodia (106,000). Fourth in population among the provinces of the Union, Cambodia had about one-third of the total number of Chinese. The situation of Cambodia on the Gulf of Siam, near to Cochinchina, explained the important size of the Chinese community, and here again the easy communications and the small aptitude of the natives for commerce have favoured the immigrants,

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[1] ibid.

[2] Wang Wen-yuan, *Les Relations entre l'Indochine française et la Chine* (Paris, Éditions Pierre Bossuet, 1937) p. 25 ff. is here followed.

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438 [241] opening to them an opportunity in the highly developed trade in rice and pepper. A number of Chinese in Cambodia also lived by the actual cultivation of pepper.

162 *Tongking* (35,000). Even though Tongking borders on south China and the climate consequently resembles that of China and the other provinces of the Union, and although communication between the two countries by the sea routes is easy, the Chinese in this area are weak in numbers as compared with Cochinchina and Cambodia. Only one-eleventh of the total is to be found here. To the reasons for the sparseness of the Chinese population indicated above must be added a number of others—(*a*) the countries bordering on Tongking are inhabited by little-evolved tribes (Meo, Yao, Lolo) and they supply therefore few Chinese immigrants to Tongking; moreover these half-civilized peoples have been pushed back towards Upper Tongking by Chinese who occupied the conquered territory and had no reason to emigrate; (*b*) the foreign commerce of Tongking is less important than that of other provinces of Indo-[438] china; (*c*) in Tongking the retail trade is more in native hands than it is in Cochinchina; (*d*) owing to the frequency of typhoons off the coast it is less accessible than Cochinchina; and finally, (*e*) the over-[161] population of the delta of the Song-Ko (namely, 430 inhabitants to the square kilometre, excluding the big towns) deprives the Chinese of room for settlement.

Annam (11,000). From the situation of Annam on the borders of the China Sea, its history, its civilization, and its social customs for a long time derived from China, with which it has lived in close association. one would imagine that the number of Chinese immigrants in the country would be considerable, whereas it is relatively small. Indeed, it is less important than in Tongking, [438] Cambodia, or Cochinchina. The Annamite chain of mountains stretches from north to south; interior communications are difficult and commerce in consequence is much restricted. Besides, the rice which is cultivated for the most part in the coastal plains, far from producing an important export trade for a middleman, is not enough to support the population, maize being grown to help make up the deficiency. To these considerations Annam owes its small population of Chinese.

162 438 133 *Laos* (3,000). Laos has the greatest area of the provinces of the Union, but the smallest population of Chinese. The reasons for this are a very broken surface, lack of seaboard, the inconvenience

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of internal communications, and lastly, only small commerce is practicable. Laos is a country backward in economic evolution. Hence the Chinese are few. 438 133

The following figures for 1921 and 1931 will be useful for comparison: 162

TABLE IV

Number of Chinese in each of the Countries of Indochina

Country	*1921*	*1931*	*Increase*
Cochinchina	156,000	205,000	49,000
Cambodia	91,000	148,000	57,000
Tongking	32,000	52,000	20,000
Annam	7,000	10,000	3,000
Laos	7,000	3,000	−4,000
	293,000	418,000	125,000

Places of Origin in China of Immigrants into Indochina 162

From 1891 for Cambodia, and from 1906 for Cochinchina, the French Government, in order to facilitate its administration, divided the immigrants from China into five groups according to their place of origin or their dialect.[1] 167 463

1. Canton group. This group comprises the Chinese originating from the northwest of Kwangtung province, and above all from the delta of the West River. It is principally composed of the commercial element; many among them, however, are equally workmen, artisans, or boatmen.
2. Fukien (Hokkien) group. This comprises the natives of the southern districts, and above all those of the Amoy region. Although less numerous than the Canton group, they have also a great commercial influence.
3. Hainan (Hailam) group. The majority of these come from one of the centres of the west district of Wenching in the island of Hainan. They embark from Hoihow to become pepper planters and domestic servants in Indochina.
4. Teochiu group. This district in Kwangtung province (called Trieu-chau in Sino-Annamite) is one of the cradles of Chinese immigrants. These embark at the port of Swatow, and are notably agriculturists, boatmen, and coolies. They are generally called Hoklos (in Chinese this means 'men of Fukien').

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[1] Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 12 ff.

162 167 463 5. Hakka (Kheh) group. The Hakkas, probably in the fourteenth century,[1] emigrated from north China to the northeast of Kwangtung and particularly to the sub-prefecture of Mei-Hsien. They are mostly cultivators and workmen, though some are artisans and even business men (above all tea merchants). They, too, come via Swatow.[2]

162 A large proportion of the Chinese were urban and their numbers in the larger cities in 1931 are given below:[3]

TABLE V

City	Total population	Chinese
Cholon	134,000	66,000
Saigon	122,000	34,000
Pnom-Penh . . .	96,000	29,000
Haiphong . . .	124,000	19,000
Hanoi	128,000	5,000
Namdinh . . .	?	1,500
Tourane . . .	27,000	600

162 167 458 Owing to the world trade depression the number of Chinese in Indochina declined between 1931 and 1936. By 1934 the number of Chinese in Saigon and Cholon had dropped to 28,000 and 49,000 respectively. There was, as we shall see, an excess of departures over arrivals for several years, but by 1936 there was once more a net gain.

162 The Chinese are very unevenly distributed throughout the country and are much more numerous in the two southern provinces of Cochinchina and Cambodia than anywhere else. Eighty-

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[1] Mr Wang Wen-yuan says 'in the fourth century B.C.'

[2] Mr Wang Wen-yuan does not give the numbers for the several groups and they do not appear to be available from other sources.

[3] Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 35.

An expert, commenting on these figures, says: 'It seems to me that Cholon is closer to ninety per cent. Chinese. Even in 1931 this was probably the case.'

Cholon, when I visited it in 1935, certainly appeared to be virtually a Chinese city, but the above figures from Wang Wen-yuan are confirmed by Robequain, op. cit. p. 34–5. V.P.

The following figures of total population were supplied to me by M. Roger Lévy:

	Saigon		Cholon	
	Chinese	Total	Chinese	Total
1932	32,000	104,506	66,000	122,818
1934	28,031	114,945	49,355	106,476

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five per cent. of the total were to be found here. In the six cities, 162
Cholon, Saigon, Pnom-Penh, Hanoi, Haiphong, and Namdinh, there were 126,000 Chinese (38 per cent. of the immigrant Chinese), which figure is about 29,000 less than in 1931 (see Table V above). In 1936, 106,000 were in the three southern settlements, but only 20,000 were in the Tongking delta.

Estimates for 1940 showed a total of 380,000 Chinese in Cochinchina, 127,000 of these being in the Cholon area. In 1939 there were reported to be only 15,000 Chinese in Annam.

Immigration and Sex Ratio

In 1889, 57,000 immigrant Chinese were counted in Cochinchina, of whom nearly 16,000 were in Cholon and district, 7,000 in 162
Saigon, 5,000 in Soctrang, 4,000 in Travinh, and approaching 167
3,000 in Giadinh, Cantho, Baclieu, and Mytho, and in the neighbourhood of 1,500 in both Sadec and Chaudoc.[1] By 1906 the total Chinese population in Indochina had reached 120,000,[2] an increase of 63,000 in the intervening seventeen years. The mean annual immigration was, from the official figures, 3,720. Between 1906 and 1921 there was a further increase of Chinese immigrants in Cochinchina to a total of 156,000.

It will be remarked that the increase of Chinese in Indochina was greater in the first period than in the second. This was due to the fact that the French colonization of the country attracted a large number of Chinese merchants who benefited from their exemption from taxation. But after 1906 a decree severely restricted the immigration of Chinese into the country, and French policy was subsequently opposed to their entry. The First World War, moreover, slowed up the progress of French colonization and threw the whole system of world commerce out of gear. In the period 1906–21, the Chinese entering the country consisted almost entirely of persons who came to join their friends or families, and no large element without connexions was entering in the hope of bettering their lot.

From 1921 to 1931 there was a great increase in the Chinese population of the Union, from 293,000 (156,000 in Cochinchina and 91,000 in Cambodia) to 418,000. The main reasons for this

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[1] *Annuaire de l'Indochine française pour l'année 1889*, p. 530. Cited by Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 16.

[2] Lucien Haudebert, *L'Indochine française* (1909) p. 66. Cited by Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 17.

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162 167 were the expansion of trade, the construction of railways and roads, and the opening up of land hitherto uncultivated, all resulting in much more rapid progress than before. This time it was Cambodia that received the largest contingent of Chinese immigrants, making an increase of 57,000 (from 91,000 to 148,000), though Cochinchina with an increase of 49,000 (from 156,000 to 205,000) was not far behind. Tongking received an accession of 20,000 and Annam of 3,000. In Laos alone was there a decrease in numbers of the immigrant Chinese, for here the numbers fell from 7,000 to 3,000.

The Decrease in Chinese Immigration after 1931. In the peak years of Chinese migration between China and Indochina there was a tremendous passing to and fro. From January 1923 to December 1927, 381,000 Chinese entered and left Indochina (a mean of 76,000 annually); in the four years 1928–31 the total reached almost 495,000 (at an annual mean in precise figures of 123,721). Thereafter there was a decrease in both arrivals and departures. In 1927 there was a net gain of Chinese immigrants of 31,000; in both 1928 and 1929 of 30,000; in 1930 of 18,000: but in 1931, 1932, and 1933 these figures became losses of 8,000, 16,000, and 8,000 respectively. The world economic crisis had set in and trade depression was making itself felt among the Chinese in the Indochinese Union.[1]

Recovery in Chinese Immigration after 1933. After the trade depression the number of Chinese passing to and fro between China and Indochina again increased with once more a net excess of arrivals over departures, as shown by the following figures for 1936:

TABLE VI

Migration of Chinese to and from China in 1936[2]

Country	*Entries*				*Departures*			
	Males	*Females*	*Children*	*Total*	*Males*	*Females*	*Children*	*Total*
Annam	682	176	203	1,061	619	213	228	1,060
Cochinchina	14,237	11,822	9,668	35,727	8,233	7,129	5,206	20,568
Tongking	11,108	2,696	2,833	16,637	11,033	2,610	2,300	15,943
Total Indochina	26,027	14,694	12,704	53,425	19,885	9,952	7,734	37,571

That is to say, there was a net gain of Chinese of 15,854 in the

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[1] Abstracted from Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. table on p. 21. Source, *Annuaire statistique de l'Indo-Chine*, vol. ii, p. 67; vol. iii, p. 57; vol. v, p. 54.

[2] *Annuaire statistique de l'Indo-Chine, 1936–37* (Hanoi, 1938) vol. vii, p. 33.

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year, but even then the gross figures were much less than they had 167 been for the peak years.

Sex Ratio. In 1921, of the 285,710 Chinese in Indochina (excepting 162 Annam), 184,320, or 65 per cent., were males, and 101,390, or 35 per cent., were females. In 1929, the peak year of Chinese immigration into the country, the proportion of women to men was its smallest, namely 33 per cent., whereas, in the years 1923 and 1932, when the immigration was at its lowest, the proportion was up to 63 per cent. All this goes to prove that the object of the great majority of the Chinese was not to establish themselves permanently in Indochina but to return to their own country when they had achieved a competence. The adverse sex ratios, however, meant a considerable amount of intermarriage with the Annamite or Cambodian women, a feature, *mutatis mutandis*, common to all countries in Southeast Asia except Malaya.

Sino-Indochinese or Métis

The offspring of Chinese-Annamite marriages were known as *Minh-huong*, and those of Chinese-Cambodian marriages as Sino- 162 Cambodians. When mixed with Chinese the Muongs and the Thōs 144 of northern Tongking were known as *Hung-dans*, *Māns*, and *Miens.*[1]

Since the Chinese male immigrants arrived in Indochina un- 609 married, they usually took wives among the native population, 584 being influenced, no doubt, not only by the natural desire for a mate but also by the advantage such an alliance would have in trading with the people of the country. Such marriages were very well looked upon by the Annamites and Cambodians, for the Chinese man had the reputation of being sober, industrious, and economical, and he was also esteemed in native circles as being of incontestably superior intelligence.

It was obviously in Cambodia and Cochinchina that the number of *métis* would be greatest, for it was in these countries that the immigration of the Chinese was most intense. The Minh-huong were strongest in Cochinchina. In 1921 about 64,500 were enumerated, and in 1931, 7[illegible]000. (The largest numbers were to be found in six provinces—Soctrang, 13,000, Baclieu, 11,000, Travinh, 8,500, Cantho, 4,000, Rachgia, 4,000, and Hatien, 3,000. In the first three and the fifth of these provinces the number of *métis* was greater than that of the pure Chinese.)

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[1] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed. (Cambridge, 1910) xiv. 491.

144 As for Sino-Cambodians, most of these were to be found (as
609 would be expected) in Cambodia. In 1921, 68,430 were counted.
Half of these were in the two provinces of Kampong-Cham (19,000)
584 and Kamdal (18,000), and two-fifths in the following—Takeo
162 (7,500), Preyveng (7,000), Kampong-Thom (7,000), and Battambang (6,000). Only a tenth were located in the provinces Kampot, Pursat, Soairieng, Stungtreng, and Kratie.

The total of these two kinds of half-castes came to 141,430 (figures for 1921 for Sino-Cambodians and of 1931 for Minh-huong); that is to say, six *métis* as against nineteen pure Chinese per thousand inhabitants.[1]

Occupations

463 Trade and kindred occupations absorb the majority of Chinese
of Indochina. The Chinese is seldom a rice grower here, though a
244 single group, the Hakkas, are an exception to this rule. A tribe apart from the other Chinese, they crossed the land frontier, pushed back the Annamites and Thai, and settled in the alluvial plains and low hills bordering China between Moncay and Tien-
[361 yen. They live in little villages scattered all over the country and
226] subsist on carefully irrigated farms and on fishing.[2] The Chinese
have also specialized in certain highly-skilled cultivation, for example, the market gardens adjoining large cities, especially in the south. They retain, too, the almost complete monopoly of pepper growing, which was already in their hands when the French came, and, with the exception of one French pepper company, all the pepper farms near Tien and Kampot on the Gulf of Siam are owned
[464] by Chinese. Here the Chinese are Hailams (Hainanese). A Chinese
coolie is rarely found on European plantations in Indochina, Annamite labourers from the delta of the north being preferred as being cheaper and more manageable.

463 Chinese labour was used in the construction of the Yunnan railway, but was subsequently found less necessary as native labourers
32 were trained. The Chinese were also to some extent employed as
33 skilled workers in modern industry (e.g. as timbermen, carpenters,
316 blacksmiths, mechanics, &c.). The law does not permit them to
656 participate in mining as it does in Malaya.

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[1] Wang Wen-yuan adds together figures separated by a decade. All I can do is to point out the fact. V.P.

[226] [2] Robequain, op. cit. p. 36. The author warns that these Chinese in Tongking should not be confused with those who sail every year from the ports of south China to fish in the waters of the Gulf as far south as Vinh.

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participate in mining as it does in Malaya. They, however, operate 463
most of the saw-mills in Indochina, and own sugar refineries on 313
the plains of Cochinchina and one at Tayninh. Chinese own most
of the rice-mills in Indochina, as they do in Siam. In urban centres, 249
where it is permitted to be such, they are large landowners.[1]

It is in trade that the Chinese excel. They have developed a
comprehensive system of rice purchasing which covers the whole 243
of Cochinchina and Cambodia. They are also prominent in the 463
export trade, such as in fish and hides. By and large, the Chinese
are confined to the plains, and are *par excellence* the middlemen of 442
the country. They are not to be found, as was once hoped, clearing
the uncultivated lands in the back country.

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[1] It was estimated that in 1936 the Chinese owned 62,000 hectares of land 423
(155,000 acres), 46,000 of which (114,000 acres) were in Cochinchina. Thomas
E. Ennis, *French Policy and Developments in Indochina* (University of Chicago 162
Press, 1936) p. 125. Robequain, op. cit. p. 37, says that one of the richest Chinese
in Indochina is reputed to own half the land in Saigon.

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CHAPTER XXI

THE CHINESE IN INDOCHINA FROM EARLY TIMES

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An outline account of Chinese contacts with Indochina in the earliest times has already been given in Chapter II and the story is here resumed and carried down to the twentieth century.[1]

Several Emperors of the Western Han dynasty deported criminals to the territory of Giaochi, and in the following centuries Indochina became a common place of refuge for the fugitive supporters of fallen dynasties. In A.D. 877 the descent of the pirates under Hoang-chao upon the capital of Kwangtung province forced a large number of Chinese to seek safety in these southern regions, in the train of a hundred thousand Arabs and Persians who were also fleeing from the peril of the invasion.[1]

Indochina forms a geographical barrier between India and China, its lands offering no natural or easy road between the two. Nevertheless, it was to be the meeting-place of the two civilizations. Early in the Christian era priests, merchants, and adventurers came over from India apparently from Bengal and the Coramandel coast, and sowed the seed of the Hindu culture in southeast Indochina. Meanwhile, in the Indochinese peninsula, favoured by the north-south direction of the river valleys, the Chinese pressed down in a spasmodic but unending emigration. With them they brought the essential elements of their own culture, and, although in the tenth century the Annamites threw off the Chinese political dominion, the impress of the Middle Flowery Kingdom on the people of Annam was indelible.

Until about the year 1000 Tongking and the major part of Annam were considered to be part of 'colonial' China.[2] Many centuries later, in 1680, Chinese officers and several thousand men,

[1] [See cat. 116, pp. 11-30 --Analyst]

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[1] Wong Shion-f., *General History of Southeast Asia* (in Chinese) (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1920). Cited by Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 11.

These round numbers must be treated with reserve, being rhetorical rather than statistical.

[2] H. F. MacNair, *The Chinese Abroad* (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1924) p. 49, says that these territories were under the direct rule of China from 36 B.C. to A.D. 968 and that Tongking was regarded by China as a vassal State until 1884.

supporters of the overthrown Ming dynasty, arrived in Indochina 648
and settled in the Mytho area of Cochinchina. Later, in the eight- [167]
eenth century, other important groups arrived and settled in the
Hatien region of that country. Since that time there has been a 175
steady flow of new-comers, mainly men.[1] Chinese infiltration into 177
the sparsely populated lands of Indochina was by sea as well as by
land, but the French occupation of the country promoted the entry
of Chinese merchants and artisans by the sea routes.

A second period of Chinese immigration into Indochina is 175
marked by the arrival of the partisans of the Sung dynasty, when
the latter were overwhelmed by the Mongol invasion of the thir- 167
teenth century. These partisans were composed of soldiers and 648
civilians who spread out into the regions of Giaochi (in Tongking),
Tenchen (in south Annam), and in Tchenla (in Cambodia).[2] A third period of large-scale immigration into Indochina was dictated by a similar set of circumstances when, in 1680, about 3,000 Chinese owing allegiance to the Ming dynasty, which had now been replaced by the Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty, landed at Tourane and proceeded to the Court of Hué to ask for a grant of land which they might cultivate in return for the payment of taxes in force. The Court granted this request and established them in the provinces of Lower Cochinchina on the plain of Donnai, which had recently been acquired, namely, at Bienhoa and Mytho.[3]

Finally it should be recorded that in 1715 a Chinese named Mac Cuu, originating from Lei-Tchou, took possession by surprise of Hatien belonging to Cambodia, and, as was then the custom, paid homage for this province to the Court of Hué, on the express condition of being nominated chief mandarin of this country. In consequence of this, a thousand or so of his partisans established themselves in Cambodia.[4]

At the outset the children of Chinese and Annamite mixed mar- 621
riages were considered as Chinese, but from 1829 onwards they 631
were treated as Annamites and grouped in separate communities
in each province. They were given the same protection rights as the 641

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[1] Olov R. T. Janse, *The Peoples of French Indo-China* (Washington, Smithsonian Institution, 1944) p. 18.

[2] Wong Shion-fi, *General History of Southeast Asia* (in Chinese) (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1920) p. 43. Cited by Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 11.

[3] Charles B. Maybon, *Histoire moderne du pays d'Annam (1592–1820)* (Paris, Librairie Plon, 1920) p. 119.

[4] ibid. p. 122; Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 11.

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631 641 Annamites and were allowed to hold office in the kingdom, a right never conferred on their forebears.[1]

175 439 504 *Commercial Relations*. Commercial relations between China and Indochina go back to remote antiquity. As early as 183 B.C. the Empress of China published an edict forbidding the Chinese people to export iron or metal goods to Nam-Viet and limiting the export of horses, cattle, and sheep to the males of the species. In the T'ang dynasty (618–905) the maritime commerce of southern China became the most important. In the Sung dynasty (960–1226) Chao Ju-kua, the author of *Chou-Fen-Chi* (*History of the Vassals of China*), speaks admiringly of the importance of Chinese trade at Jen-Tchen, Pin-Tung-Lung (in the south of the present Annam), and at Tchen-La in Cambodia.

In the second half of the sixteenth century, at the time when European merchants arrived in Indochina, the King of Cochinchina (the present South Annam) gave permission to the Chinese to choose a convenient site in their territory for building a town where they could hold their fair. This town was called Faifo and was in the centre of present-day Annam. It was divided into two separate quarters—one Chinese and the other Japanese—each ruled by a governor. The opening of the period of trade in this town coincided approximately with the new year. The natives adopted the practice of bringing there the produce of the country—raw and processed silk, ebony wood, eagle wood (much employed as an aromatic in the Far East), sugar, musk, cinnamon, pepper, and rice. The Chinese vessels arrived loaded with porcelain, paper, tea, silver bars, arms, sulphur, saltpetre, lead, and lead oxide. When the trading transactions, which lasted about seven months, were over, the foreign merchants left with their return cargoes.

In the eighteenth century Faifo remained the commercial centre of Indochina. There were in 1768 nearly 6,000 Chinese there who were the most important merchants. The merchandise imported from China consisted of brass, tea, porcelain, raw silk, drugs and medicines of all sorts, paper, paintings, cloth, &c. It came from Amoy and Ningpo and sometimes from Japan.[2]

175 439 For long the Chinese in Indochina were content with the foreign imports which their compatriots brought. They, for their part, purchased for export to China gold, ivory, areca-nuts, woods for

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[1] *Labour Conditions in Indo-China*, p. 244.

[2] Maybon, op. cit. p. 51 ff.; Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 115.

dyeing, gamboge, pepper, salt fish, birds' nests, rhinoceros horns, 175
and all other Indochinese products cited above. The rivalry of 439
Chinese and European merchants then made itself felt in the Indochinese market, but it could not arrest the progress of the Indochinese commerce. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, 175
when France became established in Indochina, the principal Indochinese commercial centre began to grow up in Saigon-Cholon. 439
France from that time strove to develop the production and the 504
commerce of her colonies, and in 1883 demanded that China should
open the towns of Yunnan (Montseu, Tsemao, and Lungchau) to 361
commerce. She undertook the improvement of interior and exterior 609
communications, the exploitation of mines, and the equipment of ports.[1] The city of Cholon, five kilometres from Saigon on the Chinese Arroyo, was founded about 1778 by a group of Chinese immigrants who, having been established at Bienhoa to the north-east of Saigon, by order of the Court of Hué moved to Cholon in order to escape the ravages caused by the revolt of the Tay-Son. Cholon began as a group of villages. To their new residence the Chinese gave the name of Taignon or Tingan. A map of the Saigon citadel of 1795, by M. le Brun, called this agglomeration the Chinese Bazaar. But, in spite of the foresight of the Court of Hué, the Chinese who had fled to Cholon were overtaken by the rebels and massacred. In 1782 the Tay-Son killed 10,000–11,000 Chinese in this town and in Saigon, burning and looting the Chinese shops.[2] Taignon, however, recovered its impulse under the Emperor Gia Long (1775–1820) who, having suppressed the revolt of the Tay-Son in Cochinchina, lived in Saigon from 1789 to 1793.[3]

The Annamite name of Cholon, which signifies 'great market', was given to this town in the time of Le-Van-duyet, the Grand Eunuch of the palace of Gia Long, who was appointed Governor of Giadinh in 1801.

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[1] According to Chinese (foreign-directed) Customs statistics, the Sino-Indochinese commerce reached 1,469,000 taels in 1893, 6,670,000 in 1913. In 1868, before the French occupation, the commerce between Annam and the Chinese empire was valued at only 383,000 taels; in 1913 the exports were valued at 4,780,000 taels (13 times the 1868 figures) and the imports at 1,880,000 taels (45 times the 1868 figures). Wang Wen-yuan citing Chao-Zoo-biang, *Étude sur le commerce extérieur de la Chine*. Thesis for a doctorate of the University of Paris (Lyon, Imprimerie franco-suisse, 1936) p. 143.

[2] J. Bouchot, 'Notes historiques sur Cholon', *Extrême Asie* (May 1948).

[3] C. B. Maybon, op. cit. pp. 99–200; Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 59.

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Chinese Communal Organization in pre-French Indochina

621 656 641 In both Annam and Cambodia the Chinese organized themselves into communities called *bangs*, according to their dialect or province of origin. Officers, called *bang truong*, corresponding to the Chinese captains in other Southeast Asian countries, were selected for them by the native authority, and these were responsible to the Government for the good behaviour of their fellows and for the payment of taxes. They enjoyed the same civil rights as Annamites and were exempted from military service and *corvée*. The laws of Annam, which were applied to them on an equality with the Annamites, being derived from Chinese sources, were congenial to their [438 276] spirit. From time to time the Emperors of Annam, however, entertained doubts as to their bona fides and reminded them of their position as aliens by banishing individuals concerned in commercial fraud or clandestine trade in opium.[1]

A very favourable picture is given of the Chinese in Saigon by a British visitor in about 1822:

> 511 We were absolute strangers who had come to pass a few hours only in the town; yet in almost every street we were invited by the more wealthy Chinese to enter their houses and partake of refreshments. They could not have known beforehand that we were to visit the place, yet some of the entertainments laid out for us were in a style of elegance and abundance that bespoke of affluence, as well as of the hospitality of our hosts. Amongst others, we were invited by three brothers who had been settled in the country for some time. They wore Cochin-Chinese dress, and in [177 261] appearance differed little from the native inhabitants. Their manners were engaging, perfectly easy and polite; their house was both handsome and spacious, nor did anything appear wanting to render it a very superior mansion, even in the opinion of a European. They received us in a large, well-furnished ante-room; a table was soon covered with a profusion of fruit, the most delicate sweet-meats, and a variety of cakes and jellies. They insisted upon attending us at table themselves, nor could they be induced to seat themselves while we were present.[2]

The Chinese under the French Regime

175 648 Christian missionaries were the first Frenchmen to come to Indochina, the most famous of them being Father Alexandre de

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[1] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 165.

797 [2] George Finlayson, *The Mission to Siam and Hué in the Years 1821–2* (London, Murray, 1826) p. 168.

Finlayson mentions that the principal articles sold in the bazaars of Saigon were coarse china, Tongking crapes, silks, and satins, Chinese fans, and porcelain.

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Rhodes, of the Society of Jesus, who arrived in Tongking in 1627. 175
Traders arrived later. In the eighteenth century the French East
India Company, wishing to extend its field of action in the Far 648
East, sent representatives to Indochina to survey the country's 797
resources and to devise plans for their development. But although
these representatives duly submitted their report, no action was
taken. Then, in 1787, Pigneau de Behaine, Apostolic Vicar of Indo-
china, secured the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles between
France and Annam, which provided that, in return for support
given the prince against the rebels, France was to obtain the port
of Tourane and the island of Poulo Condore off the Cochinchina
coast. Owing to the French Revolution this came to nothing, and
it was not until 1840 onwards, when the British were smashing
open the doors of China, already ajar, that the attention of the
French Government was again drawn to Indochina. The persecu-
tion of white missionaries by the Annamite Emperors was the [609]
occasion of intervention by France and Spain.

After a fruitless attack on Hué, the Franco-Spanish expedition
turned south and captured Saigon in February 1859. By the treaty 175
of 5 June 1862, the Emperor Tu Duc ceded the three eastern pro- 648
vinces of Cochinchina, Bienhoa, Giadinh, and Mytho, and the
island of Poulo Condore to France. Vinhlong, Chaudoc, and 721
Hatien, in western Cochinchina, came under French tutelage in
1867. In the meantime, menaced by the competitive expansion of
both Annam and Siam, Cambodia accepted French protection in
1863, but it was not until 1884 that an agreement was reached
which defined the general principles of law and administration for
governing the country.[1] There were said to be 56,000 Chinese in [162]
Cochinchina in 1886 out of a total population of 1,745,000.[2]

Having consolidated their position in Cochinchina, the French 175
turned their eyes towards the northern plain of Tongking. It was
chiefly the desire to open a good road to China that prompted them 648
to extend their power in this direction, but the existence of mines 439
of coal, zinc, tin, lead, &c., was also a strong inducement.[3] Lagrée's

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[1] Robequain, op. cit. p. [illegible] ff.

[2] Paul Bonnetin, *L'Extrême Orient* (Paris, Maison Quantin, 1887) p. 109.

[3] After the capture of Hanoi, the French came across some books in Chinese about these mines. Studies were made of these and other extensive material from which it appeared that the Court of Hué had received revenue from 123 mines, of which all but six were located in Tongking. At the time of the conquest the Chinese were still working the coastal mines. Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 114–15.

175 expedition of 1867–8 had shown that the route to Yunnan through
439 the Mekong valley was not practicable, and the Red River valley
seemed to offer the easiest gateway to the province. The French
648 influence was rapidly expanded by individuals, but French official
[642 opinion lagged behind them. A treaty of 1874 acknowledged
France's right of protectorate over all the Annamite countries, but
721] its terms were ambiguous and in 1882 the Emperor Tu Duc, in
alliance with China, began to make trouble for the French. This time the French responded with action backed by adequate military force and imposed the treaties of 1884 and 1885 which made definite the French control over Annam and Tongking.

175 Laos was added to the French sphere last, and by the gradual
extension of French influence first from Tongking and Annam.
642 Clashes ensued with Siam which claimed suzerainty over all coun-
648 tries where Thai dialects were spoken, and the French protectorate
over Laos was not established until the Franco-Siamese treaty of October 1893, under which Siam renounced all claims to territory to the left of the Mekong. Further treaties and agreements finally established the western frontiers of French Indochina, the most important being the Franco-Siamese treaty of 1904, by which Siam renounced all the sovereignty it still retained over Laos and Bassac, and that part of the kingdom of Luangprabang located on the right bank of the Mekong, and a further treaty between the two countries in 1907, by which Siam ceded to France the Cambodian regions of Battambang, Siemreap, and Sisophon. The last-named regions were to be a source of dispute culminating in Siamese action after the fall of France in 1940, and ending with their return to Indochina in 1945.

175 By 1866 the Chinese centre of Cholon had already 500 tiled
houses, two canals made by excavation, and five bridges under
361 construction, including one of iron. The quay along the Arroyo
366 Chinois was covered with warehouses and shipyards. In the centre
of the town was placed a fountain of Chinese design, and the streets
365 were lit by reflecting lamps fed with coco-nut oil. In 1870 the town
342 was extended in size. By 1879 there were said to be 44,000 Chinese
in all Cochinchina.[1] Cholon in 1889 had a population of nearly
16,000 Chinese and Saigon of over 7,000 in a total of 56,000 Chinese immigrants for the whole of Cochinchina.

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[1] International Labour Office, *Labour Conditions in Indochina*, no. 26 (Geneva, 1938) p. 245 (quoting Dubreuil).

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Fear of Chinese machinations among the more docile Annamites, 651
and of being overwhelmed in this region by their numbers,
prompted the French to impose a heavy poll-tax on the Chinese 656
resident in Indochina. The Chinese Government protested against
an invidious distinction being placed upon its subjects and appealed 167
to the treaty stipulations. The French responded by placing a tax on *all* Asiatics, and inasmuch as the Chinese alone travelled frequently or far, a Service de l'Immigration was established at Saigon to watch them, and, if possible, to control their immigration. The regulations for this were contained in decrees of 1874 and 1876.[1] A Chinese reaching Saigon by sea, unless a contract labourer, had to be registered and receive a card. If he came overland, he had to buy a pass from the administration and exchange this subsequently for a *permis de circulation*, good for one month. For breaking these regulations the penalty was expulsion from Indochina, and if the expelled Chinese was found returning he was sentenced to three years' imprisonment. Exception was made for women and children *who almost never immigrated and whose presence was much desired by the administration.*

Decrees regulating, taxing, and punishing (and, of course, always irritating) the Chinese in the colony followed thick and fast upon one another during a period of twenty years (says F. Wells Williams). The legislation was ever a matter of checks and hindrances, an artificial system which looked splendid in Paris but worked badly in Saigon. An example was the Government order in November 1880 that every Asiatic not a French citizen, unless he be a landowner or an indentured labourer, be required to provide himself with a workman's book containing his name, first names, birthplace, occupation, the names and domicile of his parents if belonging to the colony, his signature, photograph, and number, and the date of issue of the book, with sundry remarks if any room remained for them. For such a book the fee was 2.50 francs and replacement if it were lost cost 2 more francs. The population of this region was roughly estimated at 2 million souls, and if every adult male there got his book it was not strange (says Wells Williams) that the French *fonctionnaires*, though numerous, should complain of being overworked in tropical Asia! Moreover, these attempts at prevention and control were not in the least

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[1] Frederick Wells Williams, 'The Chinese Immigration in Further Asia', *American Historical Review*, vol. v, no. 3 (April 1901).

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effective in hindering the influx of Chinese into the colony. By January 1885 the notion of this little book was allowed to drop so far as immigrant Chinese were concerned, and they were required to buy a personal identity card at the beginning of every year.

For purposes of taxation the Chinese were divided into three groups—first, indentured labour of the first and second class; second, landlords paying between 60 and 20 piastres in taxes; third, all others—women and those under fifteen and over sixty being exempted. To leave the colony every Asiatic was made to pay 2 francs for a permit.

In spite of the completeness of these arrangements the Chinese were not kept well in hand and the expected prosperity was still somewhat painfully awaited (Wells Williams continues). But the French would not give up their centralized system, their cards of identity, and their classification by category. Regulations at the end of the century (dating from a decree of 19 February 1890) were slightly less severe than of old, but they compelled the incoming Asiatic to go to the capital, register at the Bureau of Immigration, accept a place in one or other of the groups recognized by the Government, obtain a travelling certificate, have his *permis de séjour* renewed each year, and when he departed to receive a passport. The three groups covering all Chinese were now paying respectively 80, 60, and 7 piastres annually in taxes. Anyone found to be associated with a secret society not authorized by law was heavily punished by fine and imprisonment and then expelled.[1]

In Tongking the situation was complicated not only by the existence of a long conterminous Chinese frontier but also by a deep disgust of Frenchmen towards a country which had cost so much blood and treasure and yet had apparently proved of so little worth. Legislation applying to this region was of a rather haphazard sort. Immediately after the conquest the poll-tax already referred to was ordered (in 1885) to be levied on all Chinese alike. In December 1886, after a protest from Peking, the distinction was made less invidious by applying the tax to all Asiatics whether resident or immigrant.[2] The *carte de séjour* and regulation into cate-

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[1] The system described by F. Wells Williams certainly does seem exceedingly cumbersome, but a system of landing permits (exchanged afterwards for certificates of admission) worked very well in Malaya where I had experience of it as Immigration Officer for Malaya 1934–6. V.P.

[2] The writer has followed Wells Williams for this period without greatly questioning his conclusions, but it has been pointed out that the registration of

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gories were also adopted as administrative measures, but here four 651 groups were constituted—those paying 300 francs and more in 656 taxes, those paying 60–300, those owning land, licensed labourers, employees, &c., and lastly, the common workman. The yearly cost 167 of the card was fixed at 300, 100, 25, and 10 francs respectively, according to category. But these terms merely had the effect of stopping the Chinese coming at all! In the 1880s so many restric- [439] tions were placed on trade in Haiphong that the Chinese left this prosperous region in order to avoid the excessive taxes.[1]

Here as elsewhere (remarks Wells Williams) the European found [463] himself helpless without the assistance of Chinese in his plantations and mines, his boats and wagons, his ships and houses. The laws were again tinkered with, the categories extended and amended through a long series of changes, the result of which was to let down the barriers almost entirely and to allow the Chinese to enter on his own terms.

By applying for a permit from French consuls in the south China [648] treaty ports, the Chinese could, by a decree of May 1890, travel and trade for two months in Tongking and Annam without any payment at all, while for those who chose to remain the categories were so reduced as to rest very lightly upon the artisan and trading classes.

At the end of the nineteenth century there was still a great wall of prejudice between the French colonials and the Chinese immigrants, but the latter carried on their trade and work, showing little concern: they were able to survive by their supreme adaptability. It is even said that during the first trying years of occupa- [439] tion, when the French had only very uncertain and irregular means of communication between Cochinchina and the world beyond, the Chinese of Saigon maintained and profited by a regular courier service direct to Canton, where they learned the latest market quotations and easily outdistanced all their European commercial rivals.

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all Asiatics does not on the face of it seem necessarily anti-Chinese, that there [651] seems to be confusion between registration of population, revenue measures, and immigration controls, and that the poll-tax may have been solely a revenue device. Without more precise information the writer cannot give an opinion on Wells Williams's case; the important question seems, however, to be whether French policy was hostile to the Chinese or not. The answer undoubtedly is that they were rather grudgingly tolerated, and that their immigration was subject to strict control.

[1] Thomas E. Ennis, *French Policy and Developments in Indochina* (University of Chicago Press, 1936) p. 119.

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167 In Cochinchina the Emperor Minh Mang had introduced strict
622 regulations governing the immigration of Chinese. Before being
659 allowed to land, immigrants had to be accepted by the chief of a
167 village or tribal organization and their names were then entered in
[171] a register. This system the French retained and extended. The *congrégations*, as the French called them (they should be distin-
631 guished from commercial syndicates of the same name), appear to have been the same in origin as the *bangs* mentioned earlier in this chapter and as the *huis* and *kongsis* in other Southeast Asian countries; but here in Cochinchina they had a special position because the French, who found them useful instruments in imposing corporate responsibility, gave their headmen wide police and fiscal powers over their members. The *congrégations*, five in number,[1] assisted the French in the assessment of taxes and their collection from the Chinese, and they also assisted the immigration officials. In addition, they carried out the functions of district or clan associations elsewhere, and they managed Chinese schools, temples, cemeteries, hospitals, &c.

The Chinese themselves in course of time found the powers of the headmen oppressive and protested against the insistence on *congrégations* as being discriminatory against their race. In the
[648] Franco-Chinese negotiations of 1930 and 1935 their protests were unavailing, but by an agreement of 1948 modifications of the system were obtained. The name *congrégations* (to which the Chinese objected because of its associations in the past) was replaced by *Groupements Administratifs Chinois Régionaux*, and the Chinese consuls were given the right of vetoing candidates for the position of headmen of these bodies.

656 The Chinese had the right of free movement, or trading freely, of acquiring property, or submitting tenders for public contracts,
671 of fishing in territorial waters, and of taking part in the coastal
651 trade in the navigable waters. Their personal and family status
438 were maintained according to Chinese custom. They were subject to the jurisdiction of French tribunals and enjoyed the right of possessing property in common. On the other hand, however, they were subject to certain special restrictions in accordance with the regulations for the *congrégations*. *They were further subject to a special personal capital tax in proportion to profits gained.* In Cochinchina this tax consisted of (*a*) a fixed tax of 15 piastres and (*b*) a

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[1] See p. 260, n. 1.

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graduated tax equal to the amount accumulated from the principal 656
of patents, and of credits paid in the different localities where they 671
owned establishments. The effect of this fixed tax was to prevent
all but a certain economic élite of the Chinese from re-entering 651
Indochina.[1] 438

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[1] Étienne Dennery, *Economic Relations of French Indochina* (Institute of Pacific Relations, 1933), Banff Conference Papers, Misc. Papers, vol. xv.

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CHAPTER XXII

THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE CHINESE IN INDOCHINA

167 656 609 439 651 BY neither the French rulers nor the people of Indochina generally can the Chinese immigrants be said to have been made welcome. Phrases such as 'the Chinese stranglehold on Indochina',[1] 'the Chinese cyst', and 'the Chinese excrescence' were heard on every side. Regulations imposed upon the Chinese accounted for the comparatively small numbers of immigrants. At one time the Chinese merchants complained of the Government restrictions prohibiting the export of any commodity other than rice. Later they protested against the harsh treatment to which importers of goods had to submit and, above all, against the heavy taxes. Taxes, they claimed, were actually seven times as heavy for a Chinese coolie as for an Annamite. Thus it was impossible for the poor Chinese to get into the country, and life was difficult even for the well-to-do business man. Most of the Chinese entering Indochina in the 1920s were sent for by their families or by Chinese firms who preferred Chinese employees. The extent of the demand for their services was the main check upon the stream of immigrants. There was little of the impulsive or casual in the motives that brought the new settlers. The immigration was conducted on a prearranged system, filling up vacancies in the groups of Chinese, and adding to the communities only as prudence or resources dictated. In the admission of Chinese to Indochina there was nothing of peaceful penetration, no suggestion of a 'Yellow Peril'. The influx was by no means miscellaneous as it had been, for example, in Malaya, but was an immigration very representative of the differing social classes of China.[2]

The Chinese in Agriculture

241 464 The French Government had constantly endeavoured to employ Chinese coolies in the fields. From the earliest days of conquest, the first Admiral-Governors of Indochina had decided that cultiva-

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[1] Étienne Dennery, *Asia's Teeming Millions* (*Foules d'Asie*) (London, Jonathan Cape, 1931) p. 130.

[2] ibid.

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tion would benefit from the services of Chinese immigrants, but 241 all to no purpose. Subsequent attempts to induce the Chinese to take to agriculture were equally fruitless. One reason was the fact 464 that no concessions of rice-growing land were made to Chinese immigrants. However, one group, the Hakkas, had managed to establish themselves as rice growers. Dwelling in little villages bordering China between Moncay and Tienyen, and living on rice growing and fishing, they appeared to be firmly-rooted peasants.[1] As has already been stated, the Chinese in other places had specialized in highly skilled cultivations such as market gardens adjoining [244] large cities, and before the arrival of the French they had made a monopoly of pepper planting on the Gulf of Siam. They had also planted mulberry trees. Government regulations practically excluded Chinese from 'red land'[2] grants so that they took small part [425] in rubber cultivation. A Chinese coolie was rare too; on European plantations in Indochina Annamite labourers were preferred.

Chinese pepper and mulberry trees were tended with the same 244 exact care as the market gardens. The time-honoured methods of their tillage might be observed on the banks of the Gulf of Siam. 231 Each tendril of the pepper vine was the product of extraordinary patience—burning endlessly repeated, with the ashes regularly sprinkled round each tree, the soil absolutely levelled, the daily spraying against insects, trenches and ridges constructed so that the seed could be planted at mathematically correct intervals, a tiny stone ledge built under each row, yearly cuttings and harrowings, the frequent renewal of props—'a labour that like some religious rite becomes ever more complicated with the passage of time'.[3]

The reasons for Chinese agriculturists not being in demand in 241 Indochina (which, however, had need of them) were said by Mr Dennery to be four in number: (1) planters of Cochinchina found 464

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[1] Robequain, op. cit. p. 36 ff.

[2] In southern Indochina there are extensive basalts which, as they decompose, produce a rich soil called 'red lands'. Rubber is the leading crop on these lands [248] which also produce coffee and tea. There were seventy small holdings of rubber in Chinese hands in the neighbourhood of Saigon which held a place of only [134] small importance in the total output of the country.

[3] Aug. Chevalier, *Le Poivrier et sa culture en Indochine* (Paris, 1925). Cited by Étienne Dennery, op. cit. p. 136.

Indochinese pepper was exported almost exclusively to France. It reached [439] from 1927 to 1934 an average output of 4,000 tons (worth 40 million francs). Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 48.

241 464 that Chinese labour was too expensive compared with native labour; (2) the conditions of life conceded to Chinese in Indochina were hardly favourable (severe immigration restrictions, heavy taxes); (3) in Indochina concessions on the 'red lands' were not made to foreigners; and (4) (finally and above all) Indochina had in recent years been more a country of rice planters than of plantations, and though a Chinese might have been attached to a rice-field in his own country he was rarely so attached when he quitted his native soil.[1]

167 464 241 Early in the century an article comparing Javanese labour favourably with Chinese had awakened the interest of the Cochinchina planters.[2] The Javanese were good and steady workers, although less robust than the Chinese. Though their labour output was smaller, they readily attached themselves to the soil, were more easily disciplined, and were totally without that commercial aptitude which made the Chinese a problem. The Dutch Government naturally opposed their wholesale migration, but in 1906 Indochina was successful in obtaining the right to import Javanese labour under certain conditions. This experiment proved largely successful; 45 per cent. of the first group and 85 per cent. of the second group renewed their contracts. The First World War, however, changed the willingness of the Dutch to permit labourers to leave Java. The conditions became stricter. Moreover, it was observed that the Javanese were more expensive than Annamites and the fact that they were Mohammedans complicated the problem of feeding them. In 1928 a census of foreign labourers in Indochina showed that of the 12,000 total, the vast majority were Chinese.[3]

Fishing

226 464 In fishing the Chinese enjoyed an appreciable role. The inhabitants of the region of Haininh (Moncay) practised not only agriculture but (and as actively) fishing as well. Twenty-one Chinese fishing villages were counted. The produce of their deep-sea fishing was estimated at 5,800 tons of fish in 1929. More productive than this was the fishing carried on in the Gulf of Tongking by the junks coming annually from China to fish from the south China ports. At the customs station at Catba, near Haiphong, figures were

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[1] op. cit. p. 131.

[2] *Quinzaine Coloniale* (July 1903). Cited by Virginia Thompson, *French Indo-China* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1937) p. 151.

[3] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 151.

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kept from 1924 onwards for these junks. In 1924–5 there were 407 junks; in 1925–6, 483; in 1926–7, 442; in 1927–8, 246; in 1928–9, 362; in 1929–30, 300.[1]

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The junks engaged in the fisheries were based on Pakhoi and Hoihow and were constructed with solidity to stand up to the worst weather. They ranged between 30 and 100 tons' burden and had two or three masts, and a crew of about fifteen each. They were for the most part armed against pirates who might attack them. On an average, the Chinese from south China who had the right to come down as far as the latitude of Vinh were able to lift up to 6,000 tons of fish from the Tongkingese and Annamite waters.[2]

These Chinese fishermen from their home ports, be it noted, always ventured into the high seas, and were not in competition with the Annamite fishermen who contented themselves with harvesting the coastal waters, and even then in only a half-hearted fashion.

Another fishing-ground, this time within the territorial confines of Indochina, in which the Chinese enjoyed the lion's share, was the lakes of Cambodia. Before the establishment of the French protectorate the King often granted the fishing rights to Chinese who in their turn sub-let them, and the sub-lessees retained the right of negotiating with the actual fishermen. Thus it happened that between the State as the granter of the concession and the real fishermen the old native regime allowed five, and sometimes six or seven intermediaries to reap, without work and without risks, profits that were quite substantial for each of them.[3]

Under the French regime these fisheries were leased every four years by public auction which was the occasion for keen competition among the Chinese or the Sino-Cambodians who kept in their hands the local and export trade in dried fish. The net catch was on an average about forty tons of fresh fish per square kilometre in the southern, middle, and western parts of the Great Lake. In the northwest the exhaustion of certain sills of the lake rendered the

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[1] Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 50.

[2] Pierre Gourou, *Le Tonkin*, published on the occasion of the French International Colonial Exhibition (Paris, 1931) p. 144; Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 50. This apparently refers to fish caught under licence in Indochinese territorial waters.

[3] Loys Petillot, *Une Richesse de Cambodge: la pêche et les poissons* (Paris, Librairie Maritime et Coloniale, 1911) p. 112. Cited by Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 51.

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226 656 fishing less easy. It was estimated that about 100,000 tons of fresh fish were obtained annually from this one lake.

The Chinese in Trade and Industry

505 The boat traffic on the rivers and streams of Cambodia and Cochinchina (especially the latter) offered the Chinese many opportunities for profit. Their junks and sampans were used in the transport of rice brought by the Chinese rice merchants. These boats, moored along the rivers, served them as dwelling-places. According to the 1921 census, of the 156,300 Chinese in Cochinchina and 91,000 in Cambodia, 5,500 and 2,690 persons respectively were enumerated on board these crafts (that is to say, 35 per thousand in Cochinchina and 28 per thousand in Cambodia). This was itself an indication of the importance of the boat traffic in the economic activity of the country, especially in Cochinchina where the Chinese possessed nearly all the junks, totalling 3,000.[1]

463 471 The agricultural and other pursuits mentioned above are ones in which the Chinese are actively engaged for the most part with their hands, though even here they have tended towards the role of entrepreneur; but they employed their skill also as artisans and in the handicrafts. Many were in business for themselves as artisans, in some cases employing others as workers and apprentices. In the cities they were tailors, shoemakers, and joiners.

> Particularly in Cholon [says Robequain] the variety of Chinese manufactures is extraordinary. There are buildings divided into seemingly identical compartments which shelter the most diverse manufactures—food pastes, basketry, boots, paper boxes, brushes, candles, &c. Here is a duck-raising establishment where the eggs are put into incubators filled with paddy chaff; when ready to hatch they are set out on a piece of screen where hundreds of ducklings emerge cheeping from their broken shells. In an old shed glass makers are blowing paste through a long tube to make bowls, bottles, and lamps. Elsewhere looms placed side by side operate in crowded rooms.[2]

167 323 392 586 The influx of immigrants in the last year or two before the Second World War, especially of women, had greatly helped the development of these workshops. Around Moncay the Chinese had set up shops for ceramic making; at Haiphong they were engaged in machine and ship construction. Chinese also owned most of the

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[1] Étienne Dennery, op. cit. p. 142; Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 51.
[2] op. cit. p. 37.

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Chinese also owned most of the

saw-mills in southern Indochina and they had a practical monopoly 643
of the mills preparing rice for export. They had sugar refineries on 313
the plains of Cochinchina and at Tayninh. In mining, however (as 256
has already been remarked), the law did not permit them to par- 316
ticipate as it did, for example, in Malaya.

As insecurity in China increased, Chinese immigration into Indo- 167
china was intensified. It was of a type not of special interest to
French colonization as regards labour, nor as regards commerce 463
(for which the French looked largely to France), nor as regards agriculture. Because, generally speaking, the Chinese who came to Indochina did so to engage in commerce or to hire their services to their compatriots already established in the country, it was not considered necessary to create in this colony a department on similar lines to the Chinese protectorate in Malaya, where there were numerous Chinese agricultural and mining labourers in need of protection.[1]

But in trade, and in all its forms and ramifications as distin- 438
guished from industry, the Chinese found himself in his element.
To begin with, he had at his disposal the network of guild and 441
co-operative organization which enabled him to work with his eyes
and ears open and with the mutual assistance of his fellows and 511
competitors. Secondly, he had opposed to him the Annamites and 609
Cambodians who almost entirely lacked his qualities of economy and perseverance. At the same time no cultural gulf yawned between him and the Indochinese: they were (barring the qualities just mentioned) very similar to him in temperament and attitude of mind. It was this (says M. Robequain) which gave the Chinese a big advantage over the European merchant. He could live as the native did, or on a slightly higher level; he was entirely acclimatized in the country which adjoined his own, and he did not require the standards of hygiene and comfort indispensable to the European: he learnt languages readily and gained an understanding of local psychology which, although less refined and developed than his own, was nevertheless similar in character; he never experienced the feeling of misunderstanding or basic incompatibility which so often overwhelmed the European in dealing with native behaviour and reactions. Because the Chinese understood the native, he was

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[1] E. Delamarre, Inspector General of Labour in Indochina, *L'Émigration et l'immigration ouvrières en Indochine* (Hanoi, Imprimerie d'Extrême Orient, 1931) p. 45 ff.

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441 better able to gain the latter's confidence and, for the same reason,
511 could deceive him more readily. He also knew how to make himself
609 indispensable between the European and the Indochinese.[1]

Chinese Rice Merchants

256 The Chinese rice merchants had rice-mills or husking-mills
471 where the paddy was processed—husked, blended, packed—on behalf of the exporters. Often they themselves combined both
439 functions, in which case they were called miller-exporters of rice. The greater part of the rice of Indochina was exported from Saigon, and the miller-exporters were concentrated particularly at Cholon, the industrial and commercial centre adjacent to Saigon. With the exception of three French firms, all the rice-millers at Cholon were Chinese: they owned in 1932 nearly all the seventy-five rice-mills in this city. At Haiphong in Tongking there were two Chinese rice-mills, one capable of dealing with twenty tons of paddy a day, and at Haly, near Haiphong, there were three other mills of, however, much less capacity. This group of rice-mills was the principal one in Indochina.[2]

243 Purchase of paddy to feed the rice-mills was not, except to a very
438 limited extent, in the hands of the miller-exporters of rice. The great majority of them bought their paddy from merchants specializing in this trade, of whom in Cholon alone there were about a hundred. In general, these merchants worked with their personal capital and
[505] had considerable funds at their disposal. They created buying pools through the intermediary of agents (*ramasseurs*) and they had large fleets of junks available to them, the number of which in Cochin-china alone, as we have seen, was estimated at 3,000.

[439] Accessory to the rice trade was that in jute rice-sacks brought from British India, from which again the Chinese drew the greatest profits. The Chinese paddy merchants were organized into syndicates, which made it impossible for the rice-miller to obtain his paddy direct; he could obtain it from the producer only through the intermediary of the syndicates. At the same time it was difficult for the native proprietor of a rice-field to attempt to carry his grain to the miller at Cholon or any other big town.[3]

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[1] op. cit. p. 38.

[2] Henri Yves, *Économie agricole de l'Indochine* (Hanoi, 1932) p. 343; Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 38.

[3] Henri Yves, op. cit. pp. 346, 348; Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 39.

The whole of this intricate organization was a matter of agency. 423
The Chinese paddy merchants in the great centres of Cholon,
Haiphong, Pnom-Penh, and Hanoi did not effect their own pur- 438
chases of paddy on the spot; they had, as we have said, agents 442
placed at the points of concentration of paddy growing and in the
river ports whose role was ordinarily to direct the activities of the 452
ramasseurs who were, in turn, under their orders. The functions of the first intermediaries were also nearly always carried out by Chinese. The agents were often simultaneously wholesale or semi-wholesale grocers. The money necessary for the trade was furnished by the employer and distributed to the *ramasseur* by the agent. There were also, however, especially in Tongking, big grocers who bought paddy on their own account, transported it in their junks to the large towns, and there re-sold it to the merchants specializing in paddy buying.

In Cochinchina the agents for paddy buying had warehouses in which they stored the paddy which the *ramasseurs* had bought, or which the great landed proprietors had consigned there on the condition that the paddy should be stored without charge and should be sold at once through the intermediacy of the agent. In Cambodia, where few of these entrepôts existed, the agents took the paddy more often than not by bullock-cart or lorry to a point of embarkation in the river system whence it was transported to Cholon in junks.

The custom was for the agents to trouble themselves only with transactions of 10,000 *gia*[1] and above. Their accountants handled consignments of 5,000 to 10,000 *gia*, their sub-accountants amounts of 500 to 5,000 *gia*; quantities below 500 *gia* were handled by the *ramasseurs*.

We finally come down to those *ramasseurs* of paddy (called *Hang-Sao* in Tongking) whose business it was to buy the paddy in the village markets, either by searching for it among the small farmers (*ta diens*) or the small or medium landowners from whom it had already been bespoken in advance by loans on account of the expected harvest. The *ramasseurs* were usually Chinese who, assisted by their native wives, kept general stores. This was more generally the case in Cambodia than in Cochinchina, there being indeed scarcely a hamlet in the former which had not a trader of this kind. The *ramasseurs* did not work with their own capital but received

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[1] A *gia* is an Annamite measure equal to 40 litres.

423 the requisite money from their superior agents or from the big merchants who carried on the trade in rice in the larger cities as a
438 side-line. These village stores served as banks and their proprietors
440 generally made advances or loans to the peasants.

The credit system (as Mr Wang Wen-yuan puts it) 'descended
452 in a cascade'. The wholesale merchants extended credit to the semi-wholesale merchant of the centre of an area, who in turn delivered merchandise to the retailer, and he in turn gave credit to his customers, the peasants and the small proprietors, all the year round and was repaid only at the harvest, and then usually not in money but in kind.

243 The role assumed by the Chinese in Cochinchina was to bring together the great native landowners, the chetties (Indian money-
442 lenders)[1] and the European undertakings. The same system as in
426 the rice industry was in force in the cotton and sugar-cane industries.[2]

452 M. Robequain says that the Chinese trader speculated on the peasants' improvidence rather than on the crop yield, and the interest rate he charged was so high and the borrower so indolent that the debt was never fully repaid, and every year the larger part of the crop went to the Chinese as interest payment.[3] Nor did his gain end here. Simultaneously the Chinese trader was making big profits on imported goods; he was also the broker or 'news chronicler' who visited the smallest hamlets; he was the collector who peddled or loaded sacks on carts and junks; he was the owner of the bulging junks.

Other Trades

471 Other trades in which the Chinese were engaged in Indochina were those in cotton, sugar, condiments, silk, and tea. The export
288 of the Mekong cotton-mills was small. Three Chinese cotton undertakings (*trusters*) at Krauchmar (Cambodia), Chiné (Tongking), and Kampong-Cham (Cambodia) carried on business in associa-

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[162] [1] In addition to the Chinese there were in 1937 6,000 'Asiatic foreigners' in Indochina. They were mostly Indians who were British subjects, almost all of them residing in Cochinchina and Cambodia where they were brokers or money-lenders. Most came from around Madras, others from the Sind. The chetties specialized in financing the rice harvest, thus competing with the Chinese. See Robequain, op. cit. p. 168. See Appendix V.

[2] Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. pp. 40, 41.

[3] op. cit. pp. 38, 39.

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tion with a Chinese factory in Cambodia which was in direct contact 471
with the Chinese and Japanese markets, but while by 1932 the
Chinese association still existed, two French factories had taken 288
the place of the Chinese one. The sugar trade was very prosperous
in Annam but was also distributed in some small measure throughout 249
Indochina. The Chinese again monopolized this trade. They 471
gave loans which were repayable in molasses processed at their
central refineries. Their principal refineries were at Thuxa (Quangngai)
where about twenty Chinese firms were concentrated and
treated the molasses of the region. Also important were Chinese
refineries in the Saigon area. In the condiment trade, which was
almost entirely in Chinese hands, cinnamon bark and cardamon
held an important place in the exports of the country. At Pnom-Penh, [288]
Saigon, and, above all, at Hanoi there were many Chinese
merchants dealing in silk and silk textiles. It was they who introduced
Chinese silk culture into Indochina and reanimated the
native industry. Finally, a considerable number of Chinese were
engaged in the tea trade in the Union, especially in Annam. In
Laos some Chinese harvested wild tea in the mountain region of
Phousang and prepared it for sale. This was known as Tranninh tea.[1]

Following the example of the Dutch in Indonesia, the French 241
established People's Banks or 'Funds'. Their main purpose was to
supply the funds needed by individuals, small farmers, and craftsmen, 656
who, were it not for the People's Banks, would have to borrow
from money-lenders at very high rates, and further to enable communities 453
or hamlets to obtain quickly and on favourable terms the 426
necessary funds to carry out certain undertakings in the public
interest. In Cochinchina the People's Banks had another purpose,
which was to facilitate redemption or re-purchase of property
mortgaged or sold under pressure of circumstances and thus to
secure a better distribution of land.[2]

Before 1945 there were:

In Tongking . .	16	Provincial	Funds	and	13	branches
,, Annam . .	10	,,	,,	,,	6	,,
,, Cochinchina .	19	,,	,,			
,, Cambodia . .	7	,,	,,			

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[1] Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 42–3.

[2] Office of the Special Commissioner in Southeast Asia Social Welfare Conference, 18–23 August 1947, *People's Banks, Measures affecting the Indigenous Population*. Paper no. 9b.

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426
[474]

These 'Funds' and their branches advanced money on a short, medium, or long-term basis, according to the borrower's needs, the amount of the advance, and the value of the collateral security. They likewise financed the operations of agricultural, craftsmen's, and marine co-operative societies. The numbers of these societies in Indochina before 1945 were respectively thirty-two, seventeen, and nine.

The People's Banks and the co-operative societies were controlled by the Office for People's Banks, an autonomous body under Government supervision. But, at any rate in Annam, Tongking, and Cochinchina, these institutions could not hope to be effective in providing credit to peasants on an adequate scale so long as conditions remained as disturbed as they were. Nor is there any evidence to show the effect of these People's Banks on the Chinese or Indian money-lending business. If experience of similar institutions in Indonesia and of co-operative societies in Malaya is any guide, the banks met only a small proportion of the credit needs of the people and the money-lenders had almost as much business as before. One reason for this is that the money-lender did not demand the same security as did the banks, and another is that the money-lender would advance money for purposes which the banks would refuse to recognize, considering them 'unproductive'.

The Trade Depression of 1929–33

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The above description of the Chinese economic activities in Indochina refers for the most part to the period just previous to the great world trade depression of 1929–33. In 1931, 1932, and 1933, as we have seen, the number of Chinese returning to China always exceeded the number of new arrivals in the colony. One of the closest observers of Indochinese economy (says M. Robequain) writing in 1933, remarks, 'In so far as it was in the hands of the Chinese, the whole commercial structure of Cambodia has crashed. There is practically nothing left of it, and the same thing has happened in Cochinchina, although in a lesser degree. . . . With one or two exceptions, the Chinese, who had a virtual monopoly of rice distilling, have disappeared; only one of every four of those who monopolized the sale and purchase of paddy are still in the colony, and nine out of every ten of those engaged in the sale of hardware and fabrics have gone. The fact must be faced that a

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whole generation of Asiatic merchants is on the way to replacing 438
those who have disappeared.'[1]

When the trade depression had ended and the new order was 471
established, the Chinese did not regain all the influence they had
lost. In the rice-milling trade they now had competition from the 458
French and even from the Annamites who operated a few husking-mills, especially in Cochinchina. Another factor tending to the dislocation and decline of Chinese business was the big increase in trade between Indochina and the metropolitan country, France. Moreover, the training the native was now receiving in public [871]
schools and private institutions was making it possible for him to take the place of the Chinese in occupations for which he had hitherto been considered unsuitable. The Chinese 'comprador' in banks and large business firms had declined from his position as a 'universal informer and touter, responsible for his client's solvency' (Robequain) and had become a mere middleman.

Extent of Chinese Holdings in Indochina and of Remittances to China

As is the case elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the information under 471
this heading is very scanty.[2] Remer, cited by Callis, placed the value of Chinese remittances from Indochina to China in 1930 at H.K. $5 million. An estimate of the total value of Chinese investments in Indochina has never been attempted, but Mr Callis in 1941 considered that it was safe to place it at U.S. $80 million as compared with a foreign investment of U.S. $384 million.[3]

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[1] Étienne Dennery, op. cit. p. 157; Robequain, op. cit. p. 43. See also Virginia Thompson, *French Indo-China*, p. 127.

[2] Research work in this field sponsored by the Royal Institute of International Affairs under the direction of Professor G. C. Allen was still in progress in 1949.

[3] Helmut G. Callis, *Foreign Capital in Southeast Asia* (New York, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942) (in mimeograph) p. 84, [439]
citing C. F. Remer, *Foreign Investments in China* (New York, Macmillan, 1931) p. 185. (Remer gives the following remittances to Hong Kong in millions of Hong Kong dollars for 1930: Straits Settlements 42·0, Dutch East Indies 29·0, Siam 20·0, Philippines 12·5, Indochina 5·0.)

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CHAPTER XXIII [p. 244]

SINO-INDOCHINESE RELATIONS

101 177 181 In view of the contiguity of Annam and China and the intercourse between the two countries extending over more than two millennia, the general reader may be tempted to conclude that Annam was to all intents and purposes an extension of China, sharing its culture in a modified form and with the blood of its peoples inextricably commingled. The truth is, however, that for a number of reasons the two countries have retained individualities which are quite distinct. The temperaments of the Chinese and the Annamites are of a different order in spite of their strong racial affinities. To take one example: 'The Chinese (says Mr Brodrick) have never been able to communicate to the Annamese their cheerful good humour. In his fears, in his hates, in his complicated and baffled spiritual unrest, the Annamese is as unlike the Chinese as it is possible to imagine.'[1] Again, the Annamite culture, though owing so much to the Chinese in every way, had retained its own roots and its own identity.[2]

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[1] A. H. Brodrick, *Little China, the Annamese Lands* (London, Oxford University Press, 1942) p. 45.

[2] The writing of the Annamite language is one indication of this relationship, and a note on this subject (based on a section of Mr Brodrick's work above cited) may be illuminating.

Annamite, now mostly written in Latin letters with diacritical marks, called *quoc-ngũ*, was invented in the seventeenth century by Portuguese missionaries. Traditionally, however, it was written in Chinese characters, and was still so written in all formal documents of the Court of Annam.

The language to-day consists of four layers: (1) of pure Annamite origin, owing nothing to Chinese. This does not account for half the whole. It consists of the terms needed by a primitive people. (2) Words derived long ago from Chinese and considerably deformed as compared with modern Chinese pronunciation. (3) Words of Chinese origin which differ in pronunciation or in sense from their Chinese prototypes. (4) Sino-Annamite proper, i.e. Chinese characters read aloud in Annamite. Very often in the olden days Annamite mandarins from all over the country exchanged letters in pure Chinese, intelligible both to Chinese and Annamites, written in Chinese ideograms intermixed with other ideograms made up of Chinese elements but peculiar to Annam. This is the so-called *chũ-nõm*, or Southern Writing. Annamite literature is scanty and its development has been hampered by the existence of the vast majestic body of Chinese classics.

(Mr Brodrick uses 'Annamese' instead of 'Annamite' throughout. The former is apparently formed on the analogy of 'Chinese' and may eventually replace 'Annamite', but I have used Annamite for the sake of consistency. At the present time 'Vietnamese' is replacing both 'Annamite' and 'Annamese'. V.P.)

Apart from these temperamental, cultural, and linguistic considerations, 177 the nature of modern Chinese immigration into Indochina has decided the quality of the Chinese influence. The vast 167 majority of immigrants (as we have seen in the preceding chapters) came by sea and settled in Cochinchina and Cambodia: they did not filter down over the border into Tongking and Annam. These last two provinces, indeed, have a comparatively small number of Chinese residents. The bulk of the immigrants, too, did not come from the official or scholar classes who had been the main means of cultural transfusion in former periods, but they were, so to speak, an entirely new infusion. Thus it is that although we must look into history for an explanation of the similarities of Annamite and Chinese, we must not attribute more than is justified to their common cultural heritage.

Opinions on the Role of the Chinese

Cultural influence is at the best hard to describe with exactness; 144 blood admixture of the first generation is a much more definite quantity and can be expressed in statistical terms.

In the first chapter of this Part the number of Chinese *métis*, or mixed Chinese and Indochinese, was estimated at about 140,000 compared with 326,000-odd immigrant Chinese (*c.* 1936). The number of Minh-huong and Sino-Cambodians here given does not, of course, account for all the persons in Indochina having some admixture of Chinese blood but only for those with Chinese fathers and Annamite or Cambodian mothers. After two or three generations the half-breeds become amalgamated with the native population, and the process has been going on in varying degrees of intensity for the last 2,000 years. The Chinese heritage is quite obvious in the new provinces of Trans-Bassac and Baclieu in Cochinchina. Many of the half-breeds have taken to agriculture. [241 Such admixture has always been regarded as advantageous to the country, especially where it produces the Sino-Cambodian. 609]

> This new race [says René Morizon], for it is truly a new race, which 144 is being created, is very robust. It has been observed in the course of the last few years that the annual medical statistics published in Cambodia 164 by race, reveal a mortality that is infinitely less with Sino-Cambodian *métis* than it is with the Chinese and pure Cambodians. The mixed blood offers, in fact, a greater resistance to cholera and to smallpox than does that of their parents. Their coefficient of health would be

144 analogous to that of Europeans. It is, indeed, superior, for that of the latter must be attributed less to any particular robustness than to the
164 minute hygienic care which is lacking to the people of the country.[1]

[186] Up to the reign of Minh Mang (1820–41) these half-breeds were regarded as Chinese, but a need to increase the population caused that Emperor to turn them into Annamites.

144 This infusion of their blood into the native population must therefore be counted as a heavy item on the credit side of the
177 Chinese balance-sheet with Indochina, especially as the descendants of the union usually became farmers—an occupation that
186 no one denounced as parasitic or unproductive. Certainly the Sino-Cambodians were regarded as welcome in Cambodia, for as M. Morizon says: 'It is for them (the Chinese) that the Cambodian reserves his sympathy. It is them that they admire and in whom in particular they sense superiority. The Chinese enjoy among the Cambodians the same prestige as the Greeks and Romans did among the barbarians.'[1] Which is prestige indeed!

426 The fact of this prestige is reconcilable with the functions of entrepreneur and usurer which the Chinese simultaneously discharged only because of the very tactful way he went about his business. Says M. Dennery:

> The Chinese (who is known as 'uncle') prefers to remain on good terms with his debtor. After each of his visits he takes something away with him—a measure of paddy, the daughter of the house for concubine, or a new contract. The native is still in his debt, and the Chinese finds the delay convenient. He prefers goods to money down; he is a money-lender because he is a merchant.[2]

426 It is worthy of remark that it is in the part of Indochina where culture has an Indian, not a Chinese, background that the Chinese
442 is more acceptable than he is in Annam which has a Chinese culture. But in spite of the advantage which the admixture of his blood is admitted to be for the native peoples, it cannot be denied that the Chinese in Indochina, as in Siam, Malaya, and the Philippines, constitutes a 'problem'. This has not escaped the notice of the many observant Frenchmen who have been associated with the colony and some of them have expressed their views with great directness. If the Chinese had (let us imagine) been committed for

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[1] R. Morizon, *Monographie du Cambodge* (Hanoi, 1931).

[2] Dennery, op. cit. p. 143.

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trial, for example, the case for the prosecution could not be more 426
vehemently put than it is by M. Gourou:[1] 442

> The Chinese are masters of the Cochinchinese copra market, and fix [249]
> prices practically as they wish. Their harmful influence is not limited to displacing the producers. As the Chinese take no interest in the copra's quality, they exert no influence on the producers with a view to leading them to improve their product's appearance, and to this the Cochinchinese copra owes its poor reputation. . . . The role of the Chinese is no 226
> less harmful in the fisheries, so important to Cambodia. The owner-captains of the fishing boats are in debt for life to the Chinese money- 426
> lenders and, these in fact, extract the largest part of the entire returns 442
> from the fisheries. When the time comes to purchase equipment for the fishing season (bamboo, boats, screens, nets, &c.) the owner-captains ask the moneylenders for advances.[2] And the latter multiply their opportunities for profit by getting themselves reimbursed very abundantly in kind for the advances they have made in money—for the market price for fish for export is fixed by a Chinese syndicate—by obliging the owner to equip himself with rice, lines, and sundry materials from the middleman-moneylender's own stock. The fisherman is helpless against this exploitation, because the Chinese assigns a clerk to go with him, watch that he sells his fish to no other buyer than his creditor, and makes no purchases from the shop of another tradesman, and because the only wholesalers are Chinese, who back one another up. The master fishermen are generally Annamese. They sublet from the Chinese lessees, who have secured their fishing lots from auction. (*vide* Chevey and Le Poulain, *Bulletin économique de l'Indochine*, pp. 278 et seq., 1939.) The Government has regulated the sub-leases in order to prevent the exploitation of the worker by the creditor, but in practice, the Chinese get round the rules. The contracts for the sub-leases are correct but, for example, the sub-lessee will agree that the Chinese lessee will be his partner for half shares, which gives the capitalist half the gross profits. . . . The useless and excessively greedy middleman, whose profits do not remain in the country and constitute heavy invisible exports (we are thinking as much of the chetty as of the Chinese) must be eliminated without violence, without specifically hostile measures, but by the mere progress of rural credit organization and of improvement of the general economy.

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[1] Pierre Gourou, *L'Utilisation du sol en Indochine française* (Paris, English translation by S. Haden Guest and Elizabeth Allerton Clark for the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, unpublished, 1940) p. 561 of manuscript.

[2] The rate of interest paid by the Cambodian peasant to the Chinese trader is usually 100 per cent. for 6 or 8 months, Gourou, op. cit. p. 386.

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455 M. Robequain, for his part, sets out the charge as he sees it—indeed with a heavy entry on the debit side, but nevertheless with some extenuating items for the Chinese immigrant. He says that the Chinese are often criticized, and frequently with good reason, for their unscrupulousness and their harsh treatment of the natives: their practice of taking advantage of the shortcomings and poverty of the peasants is quite rightly termed hateful, as is their shrewdness in evading the laws and regulations imposed on them, in avoiding all official control, and in working under the cover of unstable and irresponsible associations. They are denounced as parasites who do not create wealth but fatten on the riches created by Indochinese labour, benefiting the while from the security established by Europeans, and the roads and railways which European technical skill and capital have built. The Chinese are branded as speculators shrewdly taking advantage of monetary instability. They send large sums of money annually to China and the Chinese returns shamelessly to his native country as soon as he has made a fortune or, in the event of bankruptcy, he suddenly disappears.[1]

But (says M. Robequain) these criticisms, aggravated at times, should be somewhat tempered. While the shrewdness of the Chinese must be admitted, it cannot be justly claimed that his activities are
[177] harmful. In many of their material and spiritual characteristics the native civilizations testify to the age-old influence of the Chinese. Unlike the Westerner, he has not ruthlessly imported the revelations of a new world. His activity, no less influential, has been undertaken gradually. His colonization of Indochina is, therefore, not wholly to be condemned.

168 Although the Government of Indochina took a neutral stand on the Chinese question (the Chinese, after all, paid a considerable
433 portion of the taxes), French unofficial opinion was divided. Some recognized the ability of the Chinese as workers but were alarmed because they discouraged French business and business men. Others considered them a dangerous element because they introduced into Indochina the political controversies of the Kuomintang and other parties. A third group held that they were a counterbalance to the indolence of the Annamites. They would, it was said, cultivate every inch of cultivable land if they were allowed to do so. Those who favoured the Chinese were opposed to their mass immigration but were anxious that the French might benefit from

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[1] Robequain, op. cit. pp. 39, 40.

the steady labours of the Chinese on land unused by the Anna- 168
mites. They wished, however, that only the 'coolie' class should
be admitted. Many colonial experts took this view, recognizing 433
that Indochina was large enough to hold all Chinese moving into it for years to come. Furthermore, it was expected that, once established, they would eventually consume the products of French manufacture.[1]

In the regions opened up by the French Government the Chinese were said to be obtaining a foothold by dint of clever propaganda against all rivals. In the French-leased territory of Kwong-chow-wan, for example, where the harvests were poor owing to the lack of fertilizers, a German firm had, in 1930, established an installation in order to engage in soil chemistry and it offered easy credit to the farmers. The Chinese (it was alleged), in order to undermine the German influence, spread reports that their methods were destroying the plants, ruining the soil, and poisoning all who ate the foodstuffs produced therefrom. Such stories were believed, with the result that the Chinese gained in prestige and the Germans (presumably) lost their trade.[2]

Chinese knowledge of the natives, and their willingness to travel
into parts of the interior where the French had never penetrated, 438
were more than a match for the superior French organization of
trade. High tariffs protected imports from France (58 per cent. of 439
the import trade was reserved for the metropolitan Power in this way), but as against this the Chinese sold articles such as swallows' nests, Chinese medicines, or joss-sticks which only Chinese manufactured. They even encroached on the French clientele, being willing to take less profit than their foreign trading rivals. Before the depression of the 1930s, a fair balance had been struck, and while the Chinese handled native imports and exports the French did the same for the Europeans.[3]

Another great asset of the Chinese trader was his intimate know- 656
ledge of the market and the fact that his accounts were kept in
Chinese, a language which no French official could read. In 1927 451
an edict was published requiring the keeping of commercial books 198
in roman letters and arabic numerals. This edict was criticized by
the French as not being strong enough to be effectual and by the

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[1] The arguments in this paragraph are from Thomas E. Ennis, *French Policy and Developments in Indochina* (Chicago University Press, 1936) p. 119.

[2] Ennis, op. cit. p. 126.

[3] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 174 ff.

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656 Chinese as being highly prejudicial to their business, and in 1930
451 a compromise made the regulation apply only to big businesses
which had to be officially registered. By means of this regulation
198 the Government attempted to ascertain the names of the persons
who were behind the leading Chinese firms.[1]

Commercial Relations between China and Indochina

439 From 1913 to 1935 inclusive the mean annual Sino-Indochinese trade was valued at 99 million piastres (64 million for exports; 35 million for imports) in a total of 285 million, the mean annual value of the total exterior commerce of Indochina. Averages over the years 1919–35 show that 34·6 per cent. of Indochina's special trade was with China:[2] 34·5 per cent. was with France.

Of the merchandise exported to China (1931–5) 68 per cent. was for foodstuffs, 29 per cent. for raw materials, and 3 per cent. for manufactured articles. Of the merchandise imported from China 44 per cent. were raw materials, 4 per cent. manufactured articles, and 16 per cent. foodstuffs. Rice and its derivatives accounted for 62·1 per cent. of the total exports from Indochina to China direct, oil for 22 per cent. (1931–5), and for 1935 alone the rice figure had risen to 86·8 per cent. of the total. Merchandise imported from China into Indochina included tin (24 per cent. for 1931–5) and raw and manufactured silk (20·3 per cent. for 1931–5).[3]

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[1] For an account of a similar controversy in the Philippines see pp. 631–3, regarding the Book-keeping Laws.

[444] Dr Thompson (op. cit. p. 178) says: 'The steps were designed to eliminate the Chinese trick of using names like "Eternal Happiness" and "Springtime of Youth" to prevent the prosecution of the real directors of a bankrupt enterprise who could melt away under suchlike joyous nomenclature. . . . Chinese merchants were henceforth to report their business balance after six months and if they planned to leave the colony, they must announce their departure a month in advance.'

The business signs, or 'chops', under which the Chinese traded undoubtedly facilitated the secrecy they required either for legitimate or other reasons, but they were not invented expressly for the purpose of deceiving foreigners. They were names of firms in the same way as are, say, the Savoy Tailors' Guild or Ardath Cigarettes. In Malaya, opposition to the compulsory registration of the names of Chinese partnerships came not only from the Chinese traders themselves, but also from British import firms who argued that it had taken many years for them to build up their systems of trade information, and they did not see why rivals should profit by the enforced divulgence of trade secrets.

[2] The 'special' import trade comprised merchandise from abroad declared to be for the supply of ships having their base in Indochina, or placed in the category of temporary admission, &c.

[3] Wang Wen-yuan, op. cit. p. 117 ff.

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These figures were taken from Mr Wang Wen-yuan's detailed exposition of the subject, but it has been pointed out that being *average* figures they are quite misleading, especially for 1934 and 1935. For 1934–7 the actual figures were: 439

	1934		*1935*		*1936*		*1937*	
	Export	*Import*	*Export*	*Import*	*Export*	*Import*	*Export*	*Import*
France	49·0	57·0	33·3	55·0	55·0	53·0	56·0	53·0
China	5·4	4·0	15·1	7·8	2·9	9·2	5·4	7·2

France's trade policy for Indochina was frankly protectionist; but even as far back as 1892, when the principle was being applied in all its rigour, it was found expedient to make an exception in the case of much of the merchandise imported from China which was necessary to the Indochinese population.

In 1922 recognition by the Washington Conference of tariff autonomy necessitated a new treaty with Indochina. But there were obstacles. First of all the French demanded a *quid pro quo* for the acceptance of Chinese consuls in Indochina and for a diminishing tax on Chinese goods, in the shape of indemnification for the loss of French lives and damage to property in China and a cessation of political agitation among the Chinese in Indochina itself. The delay in ratifying the treaty that had been arranged allowed China to raise her tariffs and to devalue her currency. Eventually the treaty was agreed in principle in 1930,[1] but this fact did not noticeably ease trade relations. Indochina's trade with China fell off perceptibly after 1930, and trade restrictions between the two countries were later intensified by protective measures. The central or provincial Governments replied to increased Indochinese tariffs by raising their duties on coal and (especially) on rice. The Nanking agreement of 1935, however, lowered the rates which had proved the worst trade barriers.[2] These agreements provided for migration between the two countries on reasonable terms, and for the establishment of Chinese consulates in Hanoi or Haiphong and Saigon. (The French agreed to receive Chinese consuls solely to obtain concessions for coal exported to China from Tongking). Most Chinese goods originating in the provinces bordering on Indochina could be exported through the latter country duty free. Munitions 648 439 000

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[1] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 178 ff.

[2] Robequain, op. cit. p. 327.

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Munitions

722 might be shipped across Tongking at the wish of the Chinese
439 Government free of transit duty. This last provision naturally led to conflict between Japan and Indochina when, in 1937, the blockade
648 of Chinese ports by the Japanese caused the Haiphong–Kunming and Hanoi–Langson railway lines to carry an ever-increasing portion of China's military supplies. As a consequence of Japanese protests, Japan and France agreed in the course of 1938 that the frontier should be open only to goods contracted for before July 1937. The closing of the frontier, subject to this exception, was modified in some cases, but the traffic suffered much interruption and on the whole the railway was grossly inadequate for Chinese requirements. In December 1938, after further Japanese protests, the Indochinese authorities stopped all transit to China over the Yunnan Railway. Following this success, early in February 1938 the Japanese occupied Hainan Island, commanding not only the Shanghai–Hong Kong–Singapore shipping lanes but also large areas of the Gulf of Tongking and the port of Haiphong. In reply the French reopened the Yunnan Railway to Chinese war materials on 20 March.[1] In April 1939 the Japanese occupied the Spratly Islands about half-way between Saigon and North Borneo. In 1940 when the fall of France made it virtually impossible for the colony of Indochina to resist Japan when the latter country renewed its old complaint regarding the shipments of war supplies to Kunming, the French acceded to the Japanese demands.

All these events were bound to affect the fortunes of the bulk of Indochina's Chinese population—the traders. So far as they identified themselves with China they suffered with her in this period of misfortune and their communications with and remittances to their families there were interrupted and diminished, but in a purely material way they had compensations for their hardship. The rice market, in which they were so greatly interested, was saved because conditions in Japan and Japanese-occupied China created a greatly increased demand for the Indochinese product just at the time when the market from Europe and North Africa collapsed. Much of the rice sent to Hong Kong and 'other Chinese ports' was probably shipped to Japan or used to feed Japanese troops in China.[2] In default of restrictions imposed by national authority,

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[1] Supplement to Robequain, op. cit., by John R. Andrus and Katrine R. C. Greene, p. 353.

[2] Saigon's rice export totalled 1,681,000 tons in 1939 of which 162,000 tons

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patriotism has small modifying influence on the simple business 439
law of profit making.

went to Hong Kong, 78,000 to other Chinese ports, 461,000 tons to France, 648
147,000 to other European countries, and only 8,000 tons to Japan; in 1940
Japan took 476,000 tons, Hong Kong 244,000 tons, other Chinese ports 235,000 722
tons, French colonies 104,000 tons, France 91,000 tons, and other European
countries 49,000 tons.

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CHAPTER XXIV

ANNAMITE NATIONALISM AND CHINESE POLITICS

668 175 If we were to display the pieces of political fabric representing each country in Southeast Asia one by one there would be a great deal of warp and woof irrelevant to our survey of the Chinese. At the same time it is not always possible to isolate the Chinese theme when it is a mere thread, even a concealed one, without snapping it. In Indochina the Nationalist movement was largely independent of that in China itself, though having contacts with it and in some respects being inspired by it, and with some of its leaders educated in the school at Whampoa or the Chinese political arena. We must therefore aim at sketching in only so much of the Nationalist pattern in Indochina as will serve as background to the Chinese story.

Although the Annamite people were thoroughly sinicized in their beliefs, their habits, and their general cultural patterns, they did not surrender to the invader their sense of being a people distinct and apart. Annam is full of pagodas and temples erected in honour of national heroes who had resisted the Chinese invaders or the Chinese pirates from the south.[1]

After the French invasion of Annam, intermittent fighting between the conquerors and the Annamites continued while the imperial Court of Hué became the scene of anti-French intrigue and palace revolution. But as the Nationalist forces arose and took shape in the first and second decades of the twentieth century there was little co-operation among them and they were united only by their common dislike of French rule.

665 668 175 The early Nationalist associations in Indochina put forward a moderate programme. It was only when lack of any marked success in promoting their aims had discredited them with the bulk of their followers that the more leftist associations or groups robbed them of popular support. Belonging to the category of moderates was the Tongkingese Party of the Pham Quynh and the Constitutional Party of Bui quang Chieu. Their failure led to the rise of

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[1] Dang-Chân-Liêu, 'Annamite Nationalism', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. xx, no. 1 (March 1947).

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parties which concentrated upon direct action. In 1927 the New 665 Annam Revolutionary Association (*Tan-Viet-Cach-Menh-Dang*) 668 was established, drawing its membership both from the Nationalist-minded *petite bourgeoisie* and the Communists. It organized a 175 series of strikes in consequence of which it was subjected to severe repression by the Government, and in 1929 was dissolved. The Communist elements of the old Cach-Menh-Dang then joined with the New Annam Revolutionary Youth Association (*Viet-Nam-Cach-Menh-Thanh-Nien-Hoi*) to form the Indochinese Communist Party under Nguyen Ai-quoc[1]—a Party whose ancestry derived from the revolutionary Association for the Restoration of Vietnam which had existed earlier in the century. In 1931, two years after its founding, the Communist Party claimed 1,500 members and some 100,000 peasant adherents.[2]

The *Viet-Nam-Quoc-Dan-Dang*, founded about 1927 in Tongking, was modelled on the Chinese Kuomintang founded by Dr Sun Yat-sen. It appealed to youth, and from the outset it was a terrorist association. It issued propaganda addressed to students, employees, and the army, and endeavoured to secure feminist support. The year of its foundation is significant, for it was in the same year that Chiang Kai-shek, now on his victorious march to the north, purged the Kuomintang of its Communist elements which had hitherto formed the left wing of the party but which now split off into their own organizations. The attempts of the Quoc-Dan-Dang to link forces with similar groups in Siam came to nothing, but it had succeeded in establishing relations with the Kuomintang and with the Yunnan branches of the same society. Since it did not change its name and continued to exploit its Kuomintang connexion, it seemed that it ignored the purge of 1927. In January 1929 it attempted unsuccessfully to assassinate Pasquier, the Governor-General of French Indochina, and a month afterwards succeeded in murdering Bazin, head of the Labour Recruiting Bureau.

Finding the police hot on the trail, the Quoc-Dan-Dang 665 decided prematurely to launch the next stage of its revolutionary programme—the phase of overt action—and a series of acts of 669 violence resulted. A mutiny took place at Yenbay, at Hanoi bombs 175

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[1] Who was later to be known as Ho Chi-minh (or Ho Chi Minh).

[2] The exact origins of these parties (says Mr Dang-Chân-Liêu) are as hard to determine as the sources of rivers, but this is not very important since it is the rivers and not the springs with which political history has to deal.

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665 were thrown at the Commissariat, and the sub-prefect of Vinhbao
669 was assassinated. An abortive attempt to set up a revolutionary
regime in the three Annamite provinces and to initiate a drive in
175 concert with the Yunnanese supporters of the association ended
in the execution of thousands in 1930–1. By 1933 the party was
officially reported dead as an organized group.[1]

We have observed so far the alliance of sympathy between the Vietnamese Nationalists, proceeding early from moderate to violent programmes, and the Chinese Nationalists, especially in Canton and Yunnan. But the movements were quite separate from one another and were developing along different lines. The difference is underlined by the contrasting personalities and careers of the two leaders. Those of Chiang Kai-shek are well enough known: those of Nguyen Ai-quoc are less so.

668 Nguyen Ai-quoc (the personal name, Ai-quoc, is apparently a
self-adopted one and means 'lover of his country')[2] was born in
665 1892 in Annam. He went to France and in Paris in 1920 he founded
175 the Intercolonial Union of Coloured Peoples: in 1923 he was study-
ing in Moscow and in due course he passed on to Canton. Borodin was now associated with Dr Sun during one of his periods of control in the southern capital, and Nguyen Ai-quoc and he are said to have arranged to work in co-operation from both sides of the Sino-Indochinese border, distributing anti-colonial tracts in both China and France. Young Annamites then received instruction at the politico-military school at Whampoa, founded to train leaders for the Kuomintang. Nguyen Ai-quoc's interests were more nationalistic than communistic at this stage. When Chiang Kai-shek's purge got under way, both Borodin and Nguyen Ai-quoc sought refuge in Russia. The Annamite students who had received training in Canton and Whampoa returned to their own country to make use of their new-found political knowledge.

With the Communists made temporarily impotent by vigorous French action, the more moderate Annamite Nationalists were hopeful when the Front Populaire came into power in France in 1936 that this would mean a less repressive policy towards them-

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[1] Virginia Thompson, op. cit. p. 489.

[2] Nguyen is apparently the surname. Later on, in 1933, as we shall see, Nguyen Ai-quoc changed his name to Ho Chi-minh (or Ho Chi Minh)—*Ho* characterizes the Annamites just as Han does the Chinese; *Chi* means 'intelligence'; *Minh* means 'bright, brilliant', and in Sino-Annamite is the same as the Chinese *Ming* in Ming dynasty.

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selves, and the replacement of the illiberal Governor-General René 668
Robin and the declaration of an amnesty encouraged this hope. But
when the Nationalists in Indochina staged strikes with the idea of 665
forcing even larger concessions, the new regime stiffened up against 175
them. When the Popular Front fell, the Anti-Imperialist Democratic Front which had formed itself in Annam in the optimism of the hour went underground with the rest of the Nationalist parties.[1]

After the acceptance of the Japanese demands on Indochina in
1941 Vichy officials remained in nominal control of the colony. In 722
concert with the Japanese they put down Nationalist risings and 665
pro-Allied sabotage. The Vichy regime suited Japanese purposes
until March 1945 when the increasing nearness of the Allies 668
decided the Japanese to take a more direct control of Indochina. On 10 March they announced that 'the colonial status of French Indochina' had ended, and the following day the Annamite Emperor was reported to have declared the independence of the kingdom of Annam. In August he made a declaration uniting Annam, Tongking, and Cochinchina (the three *ky*, which were separate provinces under the French). Later he gave the name of Vietnam to the kingdom in an attempt, no doubt, to suggest that the battle for Annamite independence which had so long been fought under the banner of that name had at last been won. On 18 March the protectorate of Cambodia announced its independence, and on 10 April Laos followed suit.

Meanwhile during the years of Japanese dominance the Vietnamese had not been altogether passive. At Dongdang in Tongking, and at Coalankh in Annam in 1941 they had risen against both Vichy and the Japanese. In 1942 members of the Annamite and anti-fascist groups had escaped to China to form the Viet Minh[2] (League for Vietnam Independence) which was pledged to fight both Vichy and Japan for the independence of a democratic Vietnam. After the Japanese collapse, the Japanese radio quoted Premier Tran Trong Kim as declaring the determination of the

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[1] For this period Ellen J. Hammer, 'Blueprinting a New Indochina', *Pacific Affairs* (September 1948), and *The Emergence of Viet Nam* (New York, Institute of Pacific Affairs, 1947, mimeographed) by the same author are mainly followed.

[2] Viet Minh, the abridged title of a group of several Annamite parties, in full the Vietnam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi (League for the Independence of Vietnam), Roger Lévy, *L'Indochine et ses traités* (Paris, Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, 1947) p. 10.

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665 people of Vietnam to 'defend their independence'. But his regime
668 came to an end on 22 August when the Viet Minh established a
provisional Government under Ho Chi Minh (the name assumed
722 in the war years by the veteran Communist leader, Nguyen Ai-quoc) for the Annamite provinces. Bao Dai abdicated, but preferring, as he said, to be a citizen of a free country rather than the king of an enslaved one, he joined the Viet Minh Government as political adviser. On 2 September the new Government issued its declaration of independence based on that of the United States.

The war-time agreements between the British and the Chinese fixed the sixteenth parallel as the line of demarcation between the British and Chinese troops where they were to be allotted the task of disarming the Japanese—the British to the south of the line and the Chinese to the north. The two forces now duly entered Indochina to carry out their tasks. The British had already announced their intention of before long handing over control of Saigon and of southern Indochina to the French. The intentions of the Chinese, however, remained for the time being obscure.

Before the account of events is resumed in the ensuing chapter, it would be well to summarize and explain developments that have been described.

In the tangle of events and policies a distinction must be made between China as a Power and Chinese nationals in Indochina. The first was a political entity playing of necessity the international game of power politics whilst conducting simultaneously a war of resistance against the Japanese and against the Communists in its midst; the second were a community, very largely bourgeois in composition and interest, which was striving to maintain its existence in the tussle between the conflicting elements in Indochina. For reasons of political prestige the Chinese Nationalist Government did its best to protect the interests of its children in Indochina, but at the same time it had to keep its eye on international and internal developments. With the defeat of the Japanese the game became more complex than ever.

668 We have seen, so far, no fewer than four separate forces of
Chinese origin operating simultaneously in Indochina. The first
648 was the ancient conquest and colonization of Annam which had stamped its ineffaceable imprint on the culture of Annam; the second was the influx of immigrants, mostly by sea, which the economic expansion of Indochina under the French regime had made

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possible; the third was the influence of Chinese nationalism on 668
Annamite nationalism bifurcating into left and right; the fourth
was China as a Power fighting the Communists in her midst and 648
at the same time struggling to maintain her international position. In the fourth category of action China had to take into account the two forces striving to fill the vacuum left by the Japanese surrender, namely the new-born France reasserting her old claims in Indochina, and the new republic of Vietnam. At the juncture to which we have so far brought the narrative, the Indochinese territory, north of the sixteenth parallel of latitude, including the whole of Tongking, most of Laos, and part of Annam, was still under the control of Chinese troops.

After the Japanese Surrender

Between September 1945 and January 1946 the French Govern- 727
ment was preoccupied with obtaining the evacuation of Tongking
by Chinese troops.[1] The negotiations for the evacuation were con- 648
ducted at Chungking, and the Franco-Chinese agreements were
signed on 28 February 1946. The first agreement was concerned 642
with the abandonment by France of the privileges and concessions accorded to her in the past by the 'unequal treaties' (this was following on the renunciation by Britain and America of similar privileges and concessions in 1943). By another agreement the Chinese Government accepted that French troops should relieve the Chinese troops north of the sixteenth parallel and take over their mission of disarming the Japanese. The agreement assured to the Chinese resident in Indochina the maintenance of the territorial advantages of their organization by *congrégations*. It established a customs zone at Haiphong, outlined a future commercial treaty, and fixed the conditions for the re-purchase of the French section of the Yunnan Railway.[2]

The Franco-Chinese agreement on Sino-Indochinese relations contained the following articles:

Title I

Article I. Chinese nationals shall continue to enjoy the rights, privileges, and exemptions which they have traditionally possessed in Indochina, notably in that which concerns their entry and departure, taxation,

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[1] 'Come to disarm the Japanese troops (says M. Roger Lévy, op. cit. p. 17), the Chinese lived on the country and emptied it of its substance.'

[2] The text of the agreements is to be found in Roger Lévy, op. cit., p. 75 ff.

727 648 acquisition and possession of immovable property both rural and urban, entry into commercial contracts (*écritures*), the establishment of primary and secondary schools, the exercise of agricultural professions, fishing, interior and coastal navigation, and other free occupations.

642 *Article II*. The treatment that Chinese nationals shall enjoy in Indochina as regards the right to travel, to reside, and to engage in commercial, industrial, and mining undertakings, and to acquire and possess immovable property shall not be less favourable than that enjoyed by any third or most favoured nation.

Article III. The taxation applied, in keeping with Article I to Chinese nationals residing in Indochina, and in particular the personal taxation, shall not be heavier than that imposed on Indochinese residing in China.

Article IV. Chinese nationals in Indochina shall enjoy in the matter of procedure in law and the administration of justice the same treatment as Indochinese nationals.[1]

727 648 668 Meanwhile, in the northern half of Indochina, despite Chiang Kai-shek's declaration that China had no territorial ambitions, and despite the French gesture in returning Kwong-Chow-Wan to China, the influence of the Chinese occupation was in effect in favour of the Vietnam Nationalists. The French in Indochina found that General Lu Han, commanding the Chinese troops in the northern half of the country, was consistently unco-operative. The Chinese had refused repeated requests from the French to be allowed to bring in soldiers and administrators but the Vietnamese, on the other hand, were allowed to keep their weapons. The control remained vitually in their hands, and their flag, a yellow star in a red field, flew from many buildings. The Chinese, too, brought in Annamite Nationalist groups favourable to China. By international agreement they also occupied north Laos.

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[1] The *Journal Officiel de l'Indochine* of 7 October 1948 contained Decree No. 272/3416 of 28 September 1948, arising from an exchange of notes in Paris between the French Foreign Minister and the Chinese ambassador. The main provisions of the decree were that the groups known as Chinese congregations should be called Chinese regional administrative groups, that the election of chiefs and sub-chiefs of regional administrative groups should be held and the candidates approved by the Chinese consular authorities, that the term of office of the chiefs and sub-chiefs should be fixed at four years, that chiefs and sub-chiefs might be removed if convicted by the French authorities or Chinese consular representatives of abuse of power, administrative irregularity, insolvency, activities contrary to the interests or security of the French Union, the national Governments, or the Government of the Chinese Republic, and that the chiefs and sub-chiefs were to be the intermediaries for receiving administrative orders addressed to the group.

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By the agreement of 28 February the Chinese were under obliga- 727
tion to withdraw all their troops by 31 March, but there was delay
in their evacuating Indochina. There were several clashes between 648
Chinese and French troops, and there was an incident on 6 March 1946 when the French cruiser, the *Emile Bertin*, and auxiliary ships carrying 20,000 troops waiting outside Haiphong for permission to disembark were fired on by shore batteries manned by Chinese. Eighteen men were killed and nearly forty injured in the warships by the firing. It was not until 9 March that the first French contingents landed. There were still 1,200 Chinese troops left in northern Indochina in July 1946. On 4 March the Southeast Asia Command had relinquished authority over south Indochina to the French.

Detailed description of the fretful course of Franco-Vietnamese 648
relations does not belong here, and all that should be given is a
bare summary of developments up to the middle of 1948. A 641
Franco-Cambodian *modus vivendi* was concluded on 7 January 668
1946 which recognized Cambodian autonomy, but ten French
counsellors were to assist the Cambodian ministers in their func- 635
tions and, in certain cases, these counsellors had to be consulted and had as well the right to make suggestions. On 6 March 1946 an agreement was signed between France and the Vietnamese whereby the former recognized the Vietnam Republic as a free State with its own Government, parliament, army, and finances, forming part of the Indochinese Federation and of the French Union. The French Government pledged itself to hold a referendum in Cochinchina to determine whether it should join the other two *ky* (Tongking and Annam) or not. In return the Annamites would not oppose the French Army taking over from the Chinese. But the March agreement did not bring peace. It turned out to be merely an armistice which could not last because there was no agreement on fundamentals.

Analysing the difficulties involved in two years of negotiations between the French and the Vietnamese, M. Jean d'Arcy has pointed out that the fundamental issue was expressed by two questions: what does Vietnam mean by 'independence' within the body of the Indochinese Federation of the French Union, and what does France mean by 'liberty' within the French Union?[1] But what proved the rock on which negotiations were finally wrecked was

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[1] Jean d'Arcy, 'Confrontation des thèses françaises et vietnamiennes', *Politique étrangère* (June–July 1947).

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648 the question of Cochinchina. This territory the Vietnamese re-
641 garded as an integral part of their country as it had been under the
Court of Hué before the French arrival. The French, however, had
668 turned Cochinchina into a colony and for decades had striven to
635 assimilate it with France. Moreover, it was the richest part of
Indochina, contributing the bulk of the country's rice and rubber exports before the war and 40 per cent. of the entire revenue. To the Vietnamese, on the other hand, Cochinchina was essential to their economy, especially as regards rice, and as an outlet for their population. At the Dalat Conference from 19 April to 11 May 1946 they asked for a position for Indochina within the French Union like that of Eire then within the British Commonwealth. The French wanted stronger bonds. Dalat produced very little and the negotiations were resumed at Fontainebleau where the Dalat Con-
[669] ference had left off (July 1946). Meanwhile fighting was continuing
in Indochina between the French and the Vietnamese. The French
had recognized a 'free republic' of Cochinchina which the Vietnamese regarded as a puppet regime intended to disrupt the union of the three *ky*. A second Dalat Conference summoned at this point by the Governor-General, Admiral Thierry d'Argenlieu, with representatives from Cambodia, Laos, and southern Annam alone, cut the ground from under the feet of the Vietnamese delegation then at Fontainebleau. These conferences settled nothing and with a new series of 'incidents' hostilities flared up again into an undeclared war.

668 In France at the same time as the Vietnamese ~~delegation~~ to
Fontainebleau was none other than Ho Chi Minh, the President
609 of the Vietnam Republic. To a newspaper man he is reported to
have said: 'If capitalists come to our country, it will be a good thing for them, they will make money, but not as it was made in the old days. From now on it is fifty-fifty.' He also is reported to have remarked that Communism might come to Indochina in fifty years' time, but not now.[1]

All this, of course, was principally of interest to the native peoples of Annam and Cochinchina, but the Chinese who lived among them in such numbers and to a great extent shared their lives could not be indifferent to the turn of events. Moreover, the movement in Vietnam was in some ways parallel to the Communist movement in China, and the two were likely more and more to be

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[1] *New York Times* (6 July 1946).

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in concert with the advance of the Chinese Communists towards the Indochinese frontier. 668

With the French and the Vietnamese in a state of hostility, the lot of the Chinese in Indochina was not a happy one. Now that the restraints imposed by the French control had been loosened, the resentment of the ordinary people of Chinese trade monopoly and usury was expressed in many overt ways. According to the Saigon radio, Mr Tai Kwai-sheng, the Chinese Vice-Minister of Overseas Affairs, attributed the anti-Chinese atmosphere widely prevailing in Southeast Asia to Japanese propaganda 'assisted by the varying standards of livelihood in the area'.[1] The previous day he had been quoted by the same source as having expressed satisfaction at the goodwill reigning in Indochina between the French and the Chinese who were, he said, 'traditional friends'. 609

As was to be expected, those Chinese who happened to be in an area in which hostilities were in progress were almost certain to suffer losses both of life and property. In April 1947, according to a protest made by the Chinese consul-general, eighty Chinese were victims of French machine-gunning during operations in the Vungliem area near Vinhlong in the Mekong delta. The French had explained that there were no Chinese flags flying. At Mytho about the same time ten Chinese were reported killed by French bombing and many houses were destroyed.[2] 669

One of the effects of the guerrilla warfare now being conducted against the French by the Vietnamese was (as has already been remarked in Chapter I) the concentration of French and foreign nationals in a few centres. Hanoi had a diminished population, but Saigon–Cholon, on the contrary, were now greatly overcrowded and by April 1948 there were said to be 310,000 Chinese living there, whereas in 1936 there had been only 66,000. The area was said to be defended at this time by 25,000 French troops in a 75-kilometre radius from the centre.[3] 166 162

The French and the Vietnamese each claimed to be the protectors of the Chinese from the persecution of the other. It is thus important in recording the events of this period that special account should be taken of the source of the information. It is only occasionally that the statement of a neutral is available, but one such 609 669

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[1] Saigon radio in Cantonese (25, 26 February 1947).

[2] A.F.P. (in morse) (23, 24 April 1947).

[3] *France Vietnam* (15 April 1948).

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669 observer has described the situation as it was early in 1947.[1] He says that, according to a report of a committee representing Chinese
609 victims of recent disturbances, a series of night fires in seven separate districts of the Saigon–Cholon area had made 18,720 persons homeless and had destroyed more than $800,000 worth of property in the preceding month. Seven separate districts where thousands of Chinese and Annamites lived in thatched cottages had been razed to the ground since 15 January in more than ten separate fires. These fires, it was believed, were of incendiary origin. (The committee produced samples of crude fire-bombs made of petrol-soaked cotton which, they said, had been hurled into the fragile huts.) The victims included 7,500 Chinese. Mr Tai Kwai-sheng, the Chinese Vice-Minister of Overseas Affairs, who was in the course of making a fact-finding tour of Southeast Asia, said that the losses from the French-Annamite clash were heavy among the 700,000 [*sic*] Chinese residents of Indochina. In all Southeast Asia, he declared, the greatest damage had been done in Indonesia where several thousand Chinese had been killed.

648 Another of Mr Tai's preoccupations was with the recent tightening up of the Indochinese immigration laws against the Chinese.
167 He proposed to discuss the matter with the French authorities and to point out that few countries had imposed new restrictions since the end of the war.

168 In mid-March the Chinese consul-general in Saigon said that 50,000 Chinese were being evacuated from south Indochina. This
166 action, according to the Vietnamese, followed repeated protests from the Chinese consulate over the loss of Chinese lives and pro-
669 perty in the fighting between the French and guerrilla forces.

731 The evacuation, said the consul-general, was at the request of the French. Chinese were leaving the rural areas at Camau at the southern tip of Indochina, which the French said was one of the largest areas of guerrilla concentration. The evacuees were moved into either French-controlled zones or to large non-strategic towns in the 'guerrilla-controlled sections'. He expected the evacuation to be completed the following month, despite various problems of transport, housing, and food. The consul-general went on to say that during the previous two years the Chinese had spent some 5 million piastres for food, clothing, and shelter for Chinese displaced by the conflict. Three-fifths of this amount came from the

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[1] Robert Trumbull in the *New York Times* (26 February 1947).

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Chinese Government and the rest from Chinese citizens living in 166
Indochina. He said that he was studying the matter of a long-term, 669
low interest loan through local banks to displaced workers to per- 731
mit their re-establishment in new homes.

In May the French authorities in Indochina had allotted 20 mil- 648
lion piastres as a first contribution towards relief of the Chinese in
the country.[1] In August they were reported to have expressed their 731
willingness to accord adequate protection to Chinese nationals re-
siding in Indochina, and had added that equitable compensation 609
would be made to those who had suffered losses in the Franco-Vietnamese hostilities. This followed protests made by the Chinese Government to both French and Annamite authorities over the hardships imposed on Chinese by the fighting. The Chinese Government, the spokesman said, had reasserted its determination to protect the lives and property of overseas Chinese in French Indochina and it had negotiated with the two parties concerned to designate areas with heavy concentrations of Chinese nationals as neutral zones where no fighting should take place. It had also demanded compensation for those who had suffered losses in the conflict.

Meanwhile (according to the same Chinese Government spokesman), relief work for the overseas Chinese in Indochina had been expedited, and the Chinese Government had appropriated 2 million piastres for the purpose, and the Chinese Overseas Affairs Commission Ch. $50 million. In addition, the Government had approved a remittance of Ch. $200 million to the Social Affairs Department of the Yunnan Provincial Government for distribution among Chinese nationals who had escaped from French Indochina to such places as Laokai, Hokow, and Kunming. There were further appropriations for 500 persons who had escaped from Indochina to Kwangtung province and for 1,600 others temporarily living in Ping Siang, Lung Tsin, Cheng Pin, and Min King in Kwangsi province.[2]

Apart from their misfortunes arising from the Franco-Vietnamese 167
clashes, the Chinese had grievances on other counts. One was the
tightening-up of the immigration laws above mentioned, another 651

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[1] Nanking Central News in English (8 May 1947).

[2] *Voice of China* (12 August 1947).

It must be remembered that the open market value of the Chinese dollar at this period was in the region of 20,000 to one United States dollar and the Chinese dollar was continuously depreciating. The sums involved were therefore in reality small and not adequate for the purposes for which they were allotted.

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167 was the imposition of new taxes. In March 1946 the French in
Saigon had promulgated new regulations whereby immigrant
651 Chinese had to pay a yearly tax of 82.75 piastres, which was an
increase of 42.50 on the tax as it was in 1944. The Chinese protested that this was a breach of the newly concluded Sino-French agreement requiring Chinese to be treated on an equality with other nationals.[1] Later on, a 1 per cent. tax was imposed on all Chinese commercial transactions, and in May 1947 we find the Chinese Chamber of Commerce at Cholon asking the Governor-General to intervene with the Hoach Government of Cochinchina to obtain a delay of three months in the application of the tax.[2]

669 The Chinese of Indochina being mostly traders, the prevailing
conditions caused them more hardship than if they had been agri-
609 culturists. The Franco-Vietnamese hostilities were causing enor-
579 mous losses to the Chinese community, the Chinese consul-general,
Mr Tse Kin-yen, stated in June 1947. After enumerating the protests he had lodged with the French authorities, he said that he could not but deplore the numerous instances of sabotage perpetrated by the Vietnamese against the Chinese enterprises, the destruction of several hundreds of Chinese shops, and so forth. The Vietnamese attitude, he said, was inexplicable in view of the friendship shown by the Chinese towards the Annamese.[3]

As against this, the Vietnam News Agency reported that the Chinese nationals in Toky prefecture, between Hanoi and Haiphong, had denounced the French Air Force for bombing and 'strafing' the Chinese in this area.[4] Again, according to the Bangkok newspaper *Liberty*, in the Haininh sector of Hanoi the 'French militarists' were forcing Chinese nationals to pay 90 piastres in default of working for the French Army.

669 By November 1947 the Chinese consul-general, on his return
from a tour of inspection of the Haiphong area, was reported as
648 saying that the condition of the Chinese residents in north Indo-
china was 'on the whole satisfactory', but he remarked at the same time that the outlook was not at all bright since the hostilities had brought about an almost complete paralysis of all economic activity.[5] Of the 100,000-odd Chinese in northern Indochina prior to the

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[1] Chungking radio in English (19 March 1946).

[2] A.F.P. (in morse) (14 May 1947).

[3] A.F.P. Saigon (24 June 1947).

[4] 5 August 1947.

[5] 28 August 1947.
The *Sphere*, London, of 27 November 1948 gave pictures of the sabotage at

conflict, some had returned to China and some were in the area under Vietnamese control. The consul-general had no details regarding the fate of the latter, but he considered that, since they were not being held as hostages, they were probably being accorded freedom of movement and were being relatively well treated by the Vietnam authorities.[1]

In the interests of its nationals the Chinese Government quite naturally did not wish to appear to be taking sides in the conflict, but with the same interests in view it was willing to convey to either the French or the Vietnamese, according to the territory affected, that its sympathies were not opposed to *de facto* authority. The local Chinese residents seconded their home Government in the latter regard. The pronouncements of Chinese spokesmen must therefore be interpreted in the light of this fact. Moreover, the French or Annamite agencies, as the case might be, would naturally select statements or incidents which supported the case of their Governments. Thus we find the Vietnam News Service in Bangkok relaying the news that the Chinese residents of Namdinh had sent to the Committee of Vietnamese Resistance in that province a present of 100,000 piastres as a contribution to the Vietnamese war effort, together with a letter which said, 'profoundly moved by the effective protection assured to the evacuated Chinese by the Vietnam Government, we have followed the Council of the President, Ho Chi Minh, in reducing our expenses during the Fête du Têt (Vietnam New Year) and have saved 100,000 piastres which we ask you to distribute to the different organizations of the Ambulance Service and other organizations in the public interest'.[2] Other evidence of Chinese sympathy cited was the formation of a cultural group of young Chinese to assert the bonds of friendship between the two peoples and to encourage the Vietnamese in their fight to destroy the French colonial yoke.

At the same time the Vietnamese lost no opportunity of pointing out the injury to the Chinese that was occasioned by French action (as, for example, at Huuling in the province of Langson in July 1947, and in Bentre province in March 1948). In the latter month the Chinese population of 4,000 was said to have been evacuated

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Cholon where five Chinese rice-mills had been burnt down by anti-French guerrillas as part of a campaign to cripple Indochina's export economy.

[1] A.F.P. Saigon (27 November 1947).

[2] Vietnam News Service, Bangkok (29 January 1947).

669 648 to areas under Vietnam control following on 'countless atrocities committed against them by French troops'. Nor were the *métis* left out of account. In December 1947 the Vietnamese reported that the Association of Sino-Vietnamese Half-Castes residing in the Nambo had called upon their compatriots from China and Vietnam not to fall into the trap laid by the French colonialists, who, the declaration said, had launched an offensive in the north and were employing every possible means to sever good relations existing between the Chinese and the Vietnamese people.[1]

000 We have followed the Chinese in Indochina through many vicissitudes and must now take leave of them in their hour of greatest trial. In the main issues which are being contested they can take no leading part: all they can do is to await the outcome and in the meantime contrive to adapt themselves to the trying circumstances. As traders and middlemen their sole interest is in peaceful settlement and when that is achieved they will perform whatever function that the regime in power allots to them. A change in the whole political shape of Asia is in the process of taking place, but in whatever state of society emerges from the melting-pot it is likely that for a long time to come there will be a place for the trader and the middleman. In that role the overseas Chinese excel, and it is the one they have filled in the past because it offered the best opportunities and livelihood.

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[1] Vietnam News Service, Paris (16 December 1947).

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Chinese

PART V

THE CHINESE IN MALAYA

CHAPTER XXV

DEMOGRAPHY

[659] 162 Malaya was fortunate in being in 1947 the subject of the first full-dress census of population which had been taken in Southeast Asia since the surrender of Japan.[1] All that it is necessary, therefore, for the writer to do in order to produce an adequate chapter on demography is to give a very short summary of the material in the census report relating to the Chinese and to insert therein some abstracts made from the census tables.

Taking the two components of Malaya separately, there were in 1947 in the Federation (in round numbers), 538,000 Hokkiens, 484,000 Cantonese, 397,000 Hakkas, 207,000 Teochius, and 105,000 Hainanese, while in Singapore there were 289,000 Hokkiens, 158,000 Cantonese, 157,000 Teochius, 52,000 Hainanese, and 40,000 Hakkas. The other tribes were present in smaller numbers in both the Federation and the Colony.[2]

The Chinese population enumerated at the previous three censuses in what is now the combined territory of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore was made up as follows (p. 270).

The Chinese numbered 2,615,000 in a total population for Malaya of 5,849,000—1,885,000 out of a total of 4,908,000 in the Federation of Malaya, and 730,000 out of 941,000 in the Colony of Singapore. (A table of total population by 'race' or communities is given at the end of this chapter.)

[178] One of the most striking features of the 1947 census is the enormous increase in the proportion of locally born Chinese who now number nearly two-thirds of the whole. In 1931 they numbered less than one-third of the whole. This change, together with the great improvement in the sex ratio of the Chinese, is a fact of high politico-economic significance.

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[1] A census of Sarawak was also taken in 1947, but so far only the preliminary report has been published.

[2] Christmas Island (647 Chinese including 382 Cantonese) and the Cocos-Keeling Islands (13 Chinese) were included in the Colony of Singapore.

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	1921	*1931*	*1947*
Hokkien	379,028	538,852	827,411
Cantonese	331,757	417,516	641,945
Hakka (Kheh)	217,697	317,506	437,407
Teochiu[1]	130,026	208,681	364,232
Hainanese (Hailam)	68,200	97,568	157,649
Kwongsai	998	46,095	71,850
Hokchiu	13,821	31,908	48,094
Hokchia	4,058	15,301	12,754
Henghwa	1,659	31,025	17,065
Other tribes	24,496		36,260
Total	1,171,740	1,704,452	2,614,667[2]

The great change is the result of the steady improvement in the sex ratio accelerated as it was in the years 1937 and 1938 by the influx of exceptional numbers of females. The Superintendent of Census considers that the figures are positive evidence, and no mere suggestion, of a general intention amongst the Chinese community to settle in Malaya.

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Chinese born in Malaya

	Number of Chinese born in Malaya			*Percentage of total Chinese population*		
	1921	*1931*	*1947*	*1921*	*1931*	*1947*
Federation of Malaya	178,503	383,172	1,196,089	20·9	29·9	63·5
Colony of Singapore	79,686	150,033	437,243	25·1	35·6	59·9
Malaya	258,189	533,205	1,633,332	22·0	31·2	62·5

As in the past, the five chief tribes between them constitute the bulk of the Chinese population, being 92·9 per cent. of the total on this occasion as compared with 92·7 per cent. in 1931 and 96·2 per cent. in 1921, the drop between 1921 and 1931 being largely due to a change in classification.

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[1] The spelling was changed to Tiechew in the 1947 census report, but for the sake of consistency throughout this survey the spelling of the 1931 census has been retained.

[2] An American observer comments: 'If I were discussing the 1947 census, I would mention the surprisingly low total. If the natural rate of increase prevailing in any other SEA country is applied to Malaya, the 1947 census total is at least a million too low. It is quite possible that there are 500,000 more Chinese in Malaya than were recorded in the 1947 census, due to various problems of taking the census at that time.'

The Superintendent of the Malayan census, however, is satisfied that the returns are very near the truth.

The sex ratios of the chief tribes are as follows: 162

Females per Thousand Males

	Hokkien	*Cantonese*	*Hakka*	*Teochiu*	*Hainanese*
Federation of Malaya	852	888	838	775	553
Singapore	886	1,219	768	825	557
Malaya	864	960	831	797	554
Malaya (1931)	620	581	526	472	151

It will be noticed that the Hokkiens who formerly had the highest [67] sex ratio have given way to the Cantonese who, in Singapore, now show the unprecedented number of 1,219 females for every 1,000 males. This is the result of the great numbers of females who arrived in 1937 and 1938 and who (supporting the view that Singapore keeps a larger than average share of the new immigrants) are still there.

The Teochius continue to be the most numerous group in 463 Kedah, the Hainanese (Hailams) the most numerous in Trengganu, while the Hokchius continue to favour Singapore and the Dind- 162 ings, and the Kwongsai—Lenggong, Kuala Kangsar, and Bentong.

First of all, and particularly to-day, Chinese of all tribes engage in agricultural pursuits—the Hakkas and Cantonese probably to the greatest relative extent and the Hainanese and Hokchias the least. For the rest: (*a*) the Hokkiens are of an urban habit and have a genius for trade and shopkeeping. That, and their old association with it, accounts for their predominance in Singapore, Penang, and Malacca (over a quarter of a million live in the three municipalities alone); but they are also found in great numbers in Johore, Selangor, and Perak where they are widely engaged in agriculture. (*b*) The Cantonese are rather more versatile. They are strongly represented in agriculture and are also numerous in the towns, but their predilection, if they have one, is for mining in which large numbers of them are employed—for instance in the Kinta valley of Perak. (*c*) The Hakkas, or Khehs, are probably the most rurally inclined of all the tribes and with the Cantonese provide the bulk of the tin-mining population (about 80 per cent. of the Chinese population of the Kinta valley for instance). They are also widely engaged in agricultural pursuits and are found in considerable numbers in non-mining rural districts. (*d*) The Teochius, like the Cantonese, are catholic in their tastes but, apart from the peculiar case of Kedah, seem on the whole slightly to prefer urban occupations. In

162 463 Kedah an accident of early association makes them (as they have been since 1921) the most numerous tribe. (*e*) The Hainanese (Hailams) in the towns and villages (for which they show a preference) are chiefly employed in shopkeeping and domestic service, but they are also widely distributed in the rural and in particular the rubber-growing districts.

A great deal of other information regarding the Chinese is included in the census report for 1947 under the various headings, but it is difficult to isolate it without giving a disjointed impression which is not conveyed by the original. The report introduces a number of interesting innovations such as a table showing the comparative strengths of the communities for about the last century and a half (an abstract of part relating to the Chinese is given at the end of this chapter) and figures of inter-territory migration.

[178] The steady increase in the proportion of the Chinese and the sudden fall since 1931 in that of the Indians and the 'Others' are the most obvious changes in the intercensal period of sixteen years. Excluding Trengganu in the case of the Chinese and Perlis in that of the Indians (where, anyhow, the populations of these groups are very small in relation to those elsewhere), the Chinese percentages have increased while those of the Indians and the minority groups combined have declined everywhere. The Malaysian community, on the other hand, shows changes in both directions, having gained ground in Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Perak, Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu (in that relative order) and lost it in Pahang, Penang, Johore, Perlis, and Malacca. The Chinese now outnumber the Malays and other Malaysians in Singapore, Penang, Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Johore. 'Indeed [says Mr del Tufo] it would seem that it is only by a reduction in their exceptionally high infantile mortality rate and, possibly, by a further immigration from the Indonesian islands that the Malaysian community can hope for a permanent and progressive improvement in its position.'

162 212 There had been in the intercensal period an all-round and marked improvement in the general literacy rates of the entire population of Malaya. Says the report:

> 871 727 This improvement was only to be expected during a period of relatively small immigration for the educational facilities offered in Malaya have latterly been much superior to those generally available in China or South India and certainly to those in the rural areas from which the bulk of the immigrants came. However, the advance would have been even

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more clearly marked had it not been for the occupation for, during that 162
time, schools deteriorated into places where the pupils were wont to sing
a Japanese patriotic song, bow towards Tokyo, weed a few rows of 212
vegetables—and 'call it a day'. Parents, naturally enough, soon learnt to 871
keep their children at home or, at any rate, to refrain from urging them
to go to school and the education of the young accordingly stagnated all 727
through 1942 to 1945. The phenomenal enrolment of pupils since the liberation has, incidentally, amply demonstrated the pent-up demand among the people for the facilities so long denied them.

The census tables show that the general literacy rates per mille 162
('literacy' meant the ability to read and write a simple letter in any
language) for first the whole population and then for the Chinese 212
were as follows:

General Literacy Rates per mille for the Whole Population excluding Nomadic Aborigines (1931 rates are shown in brackets)

	Males		*Females*		*Persons*	
	All ages	*15 and over*	*All ages*	*15 and over*	*All ages*	*15 and over*
Federation of Malaya .	445 (347)	570 (407)	157 (65)	165 (67)	309 (232)	384 (278)
Colony of Singapore	519 (416)	647 (466)	199 (139)	225 (164)	374 (314)	465 (365)
Malaya .	457 (356)	584 (415)	164 (76)	174 (78)	320 (242)	397 (290)

General Literacy Rates per mille for Chinese (1931 rates are shown in brackets)

	Males		*Females*		*Persons*	
	All ages	*15 and over*	*All ages*	*15 and over*	*All ages*	*15 and over*
Federation of Malaya .	495 (431)	637 (486)	193 (94)	215 (97)	359 (321)	454 (378)
Colony of Singapore	483 (390)	610 (441)	176 (113)	194 (125)	339 (285)	417 (333)
Malaya .	492 (421)	629 (476)	188 (99)	208 (105)	354 (312)	443 (367)

The general literacy rates for the Chinese show improvements which, though considerable, are not so marked as those for Malaysians. Moreover, in the better-developed parts of the country the rates for Chinese males are now generally lower than those for Malaysian males and a similar circumstance is observable in the case of the female rates in Penang, Perak, and Singapore.

162 212 As regards literacy in English, 148,416 Chinese were returned as literate in English and 2,446,251 as illiterate in English. The per mille rates varied greatly (1931 figures in brackets)—Chinese males in Penang 156 (132) and Chinese females in Penang 77 (44); Chinese males in Singapore 145 (117), females 59 (68): the lowest figures being for Johore, namely 30 (8) and 12 (4), and Perlis 17 (?) and 4·7 (?).

Chinese literacy in Malay was very low, the overall rate for the whole country being no more than 9·9 per mille for those over fifteen years old.

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CENSUS OF MALAYA, 1947

Total Population (excluding Transient Categories) by Districts
Statement by States and Settlements

	Males	*Females*	*Total*
Penang			
Malays	65,346	67,859	133,205
Other Malaysians	1,640	1,318	2,958
Chinese	128,079	119,287	247,366
Indians	35,380	21,777	57,157
Europeans	689	550	1,239
Eurasians	1,108	1,304	2,412
Others	1,027	957	1,984
Total all races	233,269	213,052	446,321
Malacca			
Malays	52,918	62,009	114,927
Other Malaysians	3,014	2,386	5,400
Chinese	51,630	44,514	96,144
Indians	11,531	8,187	19,718
Europeans	169	139	308
Eurasians	882	1,096	1,978
Others	494	387	881
Total all races	120,638	118,718	239,356
Perak			
Malays	148,564	152,141	300,705
Other Malaysians	31,029	28,897	59,926
Chinese	242,954	201,555	444,509
Indians	80,782	59,394	140,176
Europeans	1,475	792	2,267
Eurasians	567	615	1,182
Others	2,724	2,449	5,173
Total all races	508,095	445,843	953,938

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	Males	*Females*	*Total*
Selangor			
Malays	53,457	52,906	106,363
Other Malaysians	43,560	37,401	80,961
Chinese	196,044	166,666	362,710
Indians	84,089	61,095	145,184
Europeans	1,618	1,167	2,785
Eurasians	1,399	1,417	2,816
Others	5,505	4,464	9,969
Total all races	385,672	325,116	710,788
Negri Sembilan			
Malays	50,430	53,721	104,151
Other Malaysians	3,776	2,633	6,409
Chinese	64,960	49,446	114,406
Indians	22,477	15,605	38,082
Europeans	486	275	761
Eurasians	400	480	880
Others	1,657	1,322	2,979
Total all races	144,186	123,482	267,668
Pahang			
Malays	65,469	66,580	132,049
Other Malaysians	2,216	1,507	3,723
Chinese	56,875	40,454	97,329
Indians	9,269	5,475	14,744
Europeans	483	305	788
Eurasians	43	36	79
Others	850	616	1,466
Total all races	135,205	114,973	250,178
Johore			
Malays	108,872	113,239	222,111
Other Malaysians	55,281	46,288	101,569
Chinese	202,615	152,155	354,770
Indians	34,442	20,602	55,044
Europeans	527	354	881
Eurasians	242	236	478
Others	1,827	1,571	3,398
Total all races	403,806	334,445	738,251
Kedah			
Malays	186,606	186,577	373,183
Other Malaysians	2,244	1,648	3,892
Chinese	65,431	50,497	115,928
Indians	30,062	21,285	51,347
Europeans	182	116	298
Eurasians	82	79	161
Others	4,803	4,829	9,632
Total all races	289,410	265,031	554,441

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	Males	*Females*	*Total*
Kelantan			
Malays	203,918	208,563	412,481
Other Malaysians	336	101	437
Chinese	13,031	9,907	22,938
Indians	3,342	1,598	4,940
Europeans	77	37	114
Eurasians	17	8	25
Others	3,783	3,854	7,637
Total all races	224,504	224,068	448,572
Trengganu			
Malays	101,166	106,284	207,450
Other Malaysians	273	151	424
Chinese	9,507	6,357	15,864
Indians	1,433	328	1,761
Europeans	33	27	60
Eurasians	8	6	14
Others	242	181	423
Total all races	112,662	113,334	225,996
Perlis			
Malays	27,456	27,640	55,096
Other Malaysians	59	30	89
Chinese	6,872	4,916	11,788
Indians	1,109	575	1,684
Europeans	6	2	8
Eurasians	4	3	7
Others	903	915	1,818
Total all races	36,409	34,081	70,490
Unlocated			
Malays	272	38	310
Other Malaysians	14	1	15
Chinese	575	207	782
Indians	703	98	801
Europeans	86	12	98
Eurasians	21	8	29
Others	50	2	52
Total all races	1,721	366	2,087
Federation of Malaya			
Malays	1,064,474	1,097,557	2,162,031
Other Malaysians	143,442	122,361	265,803
Chinese	1,038,573	845,961	1,884,534
Indians	314,619	216,019	530,638
Europeans	5,831	3,776	9,607
Eurasians	4,773	5,288	10,061
Others	23,865	21,547	45,412
Total all races	2,595,577	2,312,509	4,908,086

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CENSUS OF MALAYA, 1947, SINGAPORE

Grand Total for Colony of Singapore

	Males	*Females*	*Total*
Malays	38,182	33,972	72,154
Other Malaysians	25,066	18,515	43,581
Chinese	387,883	342,250	730,133
Indians	51,724	17,254	68,978
Europeans	5,182	4,169	9,351
Eurasians	4,445	4,665	9,110
Others	4,033	3,484	7,517
Total all races	516,515	424,309	940,824

Grand Total—Federation of Malaya and Singapore

	Males	*Females*	*Total*
Malays	1,102,656	1,131,529	2,234,185
Other Malaysians . . .	168,508	140,876	309,384
Chinese	1,426,456	1,188,211	2,614,667
Indians	366,343	233,273	599,616
Europeans	11,013	7,945	18,958
Eurasians	9,218	9,953	19,171
Others	27,898	25,031	52,929
Total all races	3,112,092	2,736,818	5,848,910

MALAYA

Chinese Migration, 1931–41

Year	*Arrivals*	*Departures*	*Migrational surplus or deficit*
1931	191,690	304,655	−112,965
1932	138,328	235,846	−97,518
1933	124,460	155,638	−31,178
1934	223,892	162,253	61,639
1935	278,168	187,182	90,986
1936	282,299	206,498	75,801
1937	402,563	222,061	180,502
1938	228,669	175,489	53,180
1939	160,448	146,109	14,339
1940	147,016	143,694	3,322
1941 (Jan. to Oct.)	117,426	110,826	6,600

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Chinese compared with Total Population [illegible]arious Periods
(From 1947 Census Report)

PENANG

Year	Total population			Chinese		
	Male	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*
1812	..	..	26,107	..	..	7,558
1820*b*	..	..	35,035	..	..	8,595
1820*c*	..	..	6,185	..	..	325
1833	..	..	86,275	..	..	11,010
1842*b*	..	..	40,499	..	..	9,715
1844*c*	..	..	51,479	..	..	4,107
1851	65,755	42,159	107,914	19,750	4,438	24,188
1860	76,339	48,433	124,772	27,050	9,172	36,222
1871	84,149	49,081	133,230	30,347	6,214	36,561
1881*d*	122,656	65,589	188,245	54,851	12,503	67,354
1891	150,445	81,558	232,003	68,672	18,316	86,988
1901	154,190	89,904	244,094	72,926	24,545	97,471
1911	167,535	103,821	271,376	77,401	32,805	110,206
1921	176,942	117,273	294,215	86,113	47,121	133,234
1931	197,487	143,888	341,375	101,429	68,556	169,985

b, figures for Penang Island only.
c, „ „ Province Wellesley only.
d, excluding Pulau Pangkor and the Dindings from 1881 onwards.

Note. The census table from which this was taken also gives authorities for the counts.

MALACCA

Year	Total population			Chinese		
	Males	*Females*	*Total*	*Males*	*Females*	*Total*
1750	..	..	9,635	..	..	2,161
1766	..	..	7,216	..	..	1,390
1817	..	..	19,647	..	..	1,006
1827	..	..	33,162	..	..	5,006
1829	..	..	30,164	..	..	4,797
1834	..	..	29,260	..	..	4,143
1842	..	..	46,096	..	..	6,882
1852	35,170	27,344	62,514	7,735	2,873	10,608
1860	36,023	31,244	67,267	7,037	3,002	10,039
1871	41,936	35,820	77,756	9,876	3,606	13,482
1881	52,059	41,520	93,579	15,721	4,020	19,741
1891	50,337	41,833	92,170	14,226	3,935	18,161
1901	51,469	44,018	95,487	15,061	4,407	19,468
1911	75,676	49,276	124,952	29,974	6,120	36,094
1921	90,934	62,757	153,691	33,563	12,290	45,853
1931	105,245	81,632	186,877	42,573	22,729	65,302

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PAHANG

Year	Total population			Chinese		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
1891	..	..	57,444*	..	..	3,241
1901	46,746	35,970	84,113	8,225	470	8,695
1911	72,234	46,474	118,708	21,827	2,460	24,287
1921	88,068	58,199	146,267	27,830	6,424	34,254
1931	105,514	74,603	180,117	37,662	14,629	52,291

* an unreliable census.

JOHORE

1911	122,324	58,308	180,632	56,914	6,633	63,547
1921	186,556	96,038	282,594	79,209	18,188	97,397
1931	323,660	181,929	505,589	158,488	56,769	215,257

KEDAH

1911	137,139	108,847	245,986	28,750	4,996	33,746
1921	194,917	143,790	338,707	47,492	11,984	59,476
1931	237,831	191,860	429,691	53,787	24,628	78,415

KELANTAN

1911	144,319	142,432	286,751	7,225	2,619	9,844
1921	157,723	151,851	309,574	9,497	3,378	12,875
1931	184,705	177,812	362,517	12,029	5,583	17,612

TRENGGANU

1911	76,153	77,920	154,073	3,259	910	4,169
1921	77,309	76,670	153,979	6,167	1,158	7,325
1931	92,631	87,443	180,074	10,468	2,892	13,360

PERLIS

1911	16,808	15,938	32,746	1,319	308	1,627
1921	21,236	18,851	40,087	2,701	901	3,602
1931	26,027	23,269	49,296	4,564	1,936	6,500

PERAK

1879	50,658	30,326	80,984	19,114	1,259	20,373
1889	179,590	..	..	107,274	..	..
1891	158,847	59,022	217,869	89,337	5,940	95,277
1901	242,173	91,605	333,778	137,362	13,530	151,192
1911*b*	349,821	152,538	502,359	183,621	35,814	219,435
1921	386,610	224,559	611,169	165,089	62,513	227,602
1931	476,697	308,963	785,660	221,495	111,089	332,584

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SELANGOR

Year	Total population			Chinese		
	Male	*Female*	*Total*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*
1884	..	..	46,568	..	..	28,236
1887	..	..	97,106	..	..	73,155
1891	67,051	14,541	81,592	47,610	3,234	50,844
1901	136,823	31,966	168,789	98,212	11,386	109,598
1911*b*	221,360	73,106	294,466	124,638	26,534	151,172
1921	267,256	133,847	401,103	122,001	48,725	170,726
1931	327,721	205,814	533,535	154,456	87,040	241,496

b, including an estimated proportion of the shipping population.

NEGRI SEMBILAN

1891	40,561	24,658	65,219	14,845	546	15,391
1901	64,565	31,463	96,028	31,330	1,601	32,931
1911	87,651	42,548	130,199	36,965	3,878	40,843
1921	119,635	59,193	178,8[illegible]8	53,694	11,525	65,219
1931	148,381	85,418	233,799	68,360	24,011	92,371

SINGAPORE

1821	..	..	4,727	..	..	1,159
1823	7,106	3,577	10,683	2,956	361	3,317
1833	15,181	5,797	20,978	7,650	867	8,517
1836	22,755	7,229	29,984	12,870	879	13,749
1840	..	..	35,389	..	..	17,704
1850	42,107	10,784	52,891	25,749	2,239	27,988
1860	70,122	11,612	81,734	46,795	3,248	50,043
1871	74,348	22,763	97,111	47,104	7,468	54,572
1881	105,423	33,785	139,208	72,571	14,195	86,766
1891*a*	141,619	43,498	185,117	100,446	21,462	121,908
1901	171,874	58,030	229,904	131,007	33,674	164,681
1911*b*	222,760	88,543	311,303	166,057	58,173	224,230
1921	292,353	138,992	431,345	220,307	101,268	321,575
1931	362,882	207,246	570,128	265,618	158,175	423,793

a, including Christmas Island and Cocos-Keeling Islands from 1891 onwards.
b, excluding Labuan from 1911 onwards.

The pre-war political divisions of Malaya were as follows:

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The Crown Colony of the Straits Settlements comprised Singapore, Penang (with Province Wellesley, a strip on the mainland), Malacca, and Labuan, total area 1,366 square miles.

The Malay States were made up of the Federated Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang), and the Unfederated Malay States (Johore, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Trengganu). Total area 50,650 square miles.

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Penang was founded in 1786; Singapore in 1819; Malacca was obtained from the Dutch by exchange for Bencoolen in 1824. Labuan was founded in 1846. 641 631

Perak came under British protection in 1874 (the Dindings and Pangkor Island had been ceded in 1874 to the British as posts for the suppression of piracy, and were returned to Perak in 1935); Selangor in the same year; in 1874 and succeeding years the States afterwards constituting Negri Sembilan were brought under British protection; Pahang likewise in 1888; and Johore in 1914. By the Treaty of Bangkok of 1909 the suzerainty of Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu, and Perlis was transferred from Siam to Britain, and the latter entered into treaties of protection with the rulers. 175

In 1895 Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang were federated as the Federated Malay States, and were decentralized in 1935.

A Malayan Union was constituted on 1 April 1946 to comprise all the territories of the Peninsula, and was succeeded by the Federation of Malaya on 1 February 1948. Singapore remains a separate colony.

In 1946 Labuan was returned to North Borneo.

Christmas and the Cocos-Keeling Islands are administratively part of the Colony of Singapore.

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CHAPTER XXVI

TUMASIK AND MALACCA, 1349–1795

175 Our first undoubted landfall in the history of the Chinese in Malaya is in 1349 when Wang Ta-yuan, a Chinese trader, writes of Tumasik, or old Singapore, the 'Sea Town'. He says that when Chinese junks went to the western sea the people of Tumasik let them go unmolested, but when, on the way back, they reached the Carimon Islands, the crew of the junks got out their armour and padded screens to protect themselves against arrow fire, for it was certain that two or three hundred pirate ships would attack them. Tumasik was besieged in this year by Siamese ships, and according to Wang Ta-yuan, the arrival of the Chinese fleet effected the relief of the city. He further states [67] that 'the people live mixed up with the Chinese' in Tumasik. So here, it seems, we have a more or less permanent settlement of Chinese in fourteenth-century Malaya.

Wang Ta-yuan also visited Trengganu in the same year, but he does not mention any Chinese settlement there.

By 1365 Majapahit, the last Hindu empire of Java, claimed Tumasik as a dependency, but within a few years that medieval haunt of pirates fell under the domination of Siam. It was the murder of Siam's governor of Singapore that drove his guest, a Palembang prince married to a Majapahit princess, to flee up country where about 1400 he founded Malacca.[1] From the beginning the kingdom was a tributary of Siam to which it sent 40 taels of gold annually.

At the beginning of the fifteenth century Malacca began to have close contacts with China. In 1403, says the Ming History,[2] the

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[1] Sir Richard Winstedt, *Malaya and its History* (London, Hutchinson, 1948) p. 32. Sir Richard says 'about 1403', but in view of the fact that Yin Ching visited Malacca in that year (though he points out that the Chinese histories can in some cases be wrong) he proposes changing this to the more indefinite 1400 in the next edition of his book.

Godinho de Eredia gives the date of the foundation of Malacca as 1398 in *Meridional India and Cathay* (dedicated from Goa, 1613), translated from the Portuguese with notes by J. V. Mills, *JRASMB*, vol. viii, pt. 1 (1930) pp. 1–288. See also R. O. Winstedt, *The Malay Founder of Mediaeval Malacca*, Bulletin of Oriental and African Studies (University of London, 1948) xii, pts. 3 and 4.

[2] *Chinese Dynastic Histories*, Book 325.

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Emperor of China sent the eunuch Yin Ching to Malacca with presents of silk brocade. The King, Parameswara, 'was very glad' and in 1405 sent a return mission to China. The Emperor spoke in laudatory terms of his master, appointed him the King of the country of Malacca, and gave him a commission, a seal, a suit of silk clothes, and a yellow umbrella. The King, through his representatives, then 'requested that his mountains might be made guardians of the country, to which request the emperor gave his consent; he prepared an inscription with a piece of verse at the end and ordered a tablet to be erected in these mountains'. In 1407 Parameswara again sent envoys to China.

The dates of Cheng Ho's voyages have been discussed in Chapter II.[1] Whether or not he visited the Malayan kingdom in his earlier voyages of 1405–7 when his fleet passed through these waters, it seems certain that he did go there in the voyage of 1414–15, for he brought back with him the King of Malacca, his wife, and his son to present tribute. Cheng Ho took with him on this third voyage the Chinese Mohammedan Ma Huan, who later wrote a book describing the voyages called the *Ying yai sheng lan* or 'General Account of the Shores of the Ocean'.

Ma Huan tells us that at the time of Cheng Ho's visit the soil of Malacca was barren and saline, the crops were poor, and agriculture was not in favour. He states that it was Cheng Ho who in 1409 gave Parameswara 'a silver seal, a cap, and official robes and declared him king, on which', he remarks, 'Malacca ceased to be a dependency of Siam'. But the Siamese, to judge by their subsequent conduct, did not seem to be aware of this fact!

Ma Huan tells us that Malacca 'is visited by Chinese merchant vessels; whenever these come a barrier is made' and to this Groeneveldt adds a note, 'for the purposes of collecting tolls', which seems the most likely explanation. But it does not appear that there was at this time any permanent Chinese settlement in Malacca.

The *Hai Yü*, or 'Report from the Ocean', published in 1537, but like so many Chinese books referring probably to a much earlier period, tells us that the cost of living in Malacca was high, about five times what it was in China, that fowls, dogs, geese, and ducks were imported, and that pork, a forbidden article of food to the native Mohammedans, was eaten by the Chinese 'who live here'. This suggests that some time previous to the writing of the *Hai Yü*

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[1] See pp. 22–3.

175 the Chinese began to reside in Malacca, but a further reference to the 'merchants of ships who live in an hotel' would seem to point to these, at least, being but temporary sojourners.[1] Book 325 of the Ming History states of Malacca that the men and women wear their hair in a knot, but some are of lighter colour, being descendants of the Chinese.[2]

Now we come to the Portuguese authorities on Malacca, most of whom refer to the Malay period. Among them are d'Albuquerque,[3] the natural son of the conqueror of Malacca, Osorio,[4] Barros,[5] and Eredia,[6] and in 1944 their number was added to by the publication of the *Suma Oriental* of Tomé Pires[7] from a manuscript recently discovered.

175 D'Albuquerque says that before the coming of the Malays Malacca's site was occupied by twenty or thirty persons who lived
439 by fishing and piracy. The place, after the founding of the Malay kingdom, depended on passing Chinese junks for trade. A King named Xaquendarsa,[8] after begetting many sons, went to China

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[1] A footnote to the present writer's *The Chinese in Malaya* (London, Oxford University Press, 1948) p. 19, examines the Chinese text of this passage.

According to the *Hai Yü* (cited by Groeneveldt) the King lived in a house of which the fore part was covered with tiles left here by Cheng Ho. The Rev. W. G. Shellabear says that Chinese contacts with Malacca were very early, but that when the Portuguese and the Dutch were fighting for possession of Malacca, there appear to have been few, if any, Chinese remaining there, for Valentijn says that in 1641 the Dutch imported Chinese from Batavia to work in the fields and gardens, and that up to that time the trade seems to have been monopolized by Indian merchants. Up to the end of the sixteenth century (says Shellabear) Chinese immigration into the Malay Archipelago was confined almost exclusively to the island of Java, where they enjoyed the greatest security, and freedom to carry on trade under the protection of the Dutch.

[2] But it is to be remembered that the Chinese dynastic histories were written after the close of the dynasty and by stay-at-home scholars, so that there is little guarantee that facts relating to more recent affairs have not crept in.

[3] *The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque* (compiled by the son), translated from the Portuguese edition of 1774 by Walter de Gray Birch (London, Hakluyt Society, 1880), vol. iii.

[4] Jeronimo Osorio da Fonseca, *The History of the Portuguese during the Reign of Emmanuel*, translated by James Gibbs (London, 1752).

[5] João de Barros, *Da Asia* (see Bibliography).

[6] Emanuel Godinho de Eredia, *Meridional India and Cathay* (dedicated from Goa, 1613), translated from the Portuguese with notes by J. V. Mills, *JRASMB*, vol. viii, pt. 1 (1930) pp. 1–288.

[7] Tomé Pires, *The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires* (London, Hakluyt Society, 1944) (written in Malacca and India from 1512 to 1515), translated by Armando Cortesao.

[8] Xaquendarsa (says Winstedt) son of Parameswara (Paramjçura of Pires) was Muhammad Iskandar Shah. *JRASMB*, vol. xiii, pt. 1 (March 1935) p. 25.

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for three years. 'Sri Maharaja' of Malacca went to China in 1424 175
and sent envoys in 1431 in a Sumatran vessel. These envoys returned with Cheng Ho in that year and were instructed to convey 439
the usual injunctions to the Siamese that they should cease interfering with Malacca. Tribute was sent to China in 1433 and 1435, and in 1445 Malacca sent envoys asking for recognition. There are in these works a number of references to Malacca's Chinese contacts during this century. The second King of Malacca is said to have married a daughter of the King of China's captain (this suggests a more or less settled Chinese community to justify a 'Captain China'). But the impression we receive, nevertheless, is that during this century the merchants of Arab and Indian merchants were more important, at least in the aggregate, than were the Chinese—ships of Cambaya, Chaul, Dabul, Calicut, Aden, Mecca, Shehr, Juda, Coromandel, Bengal, Gores (Liu Chiu Isles), Java, and Pegu are mentioned as coming to Malacca.

There were four court officials at Malacca during the Malay [645]
period, called Shahbandars—one a Chinese, another a Javanese, a third a Cambayan, and a fourth a Bengali. The Malay Temenggong, who was judge of the custom house, was over all these. Malacca (according to d'Albuquerque) was the 'most extensive place in the world for trade'.

This information is amplified by Osorio and the others. The [361]
former remarks that Malacca was about four miles in length, but
its breadth was inconsiderable; it abounded with trees which pro- 175
duced excellent fruits, but most of the staple foods were imported. The walls and buildings of the town were exceedingly elegant and magnificent.

Captain Begbie[1] says that according to the *Malay Annals* one of the five excellent wells at Bukit China was dug by Chinese in the reign of Mansur Shah. Sultan Mansur Shah was (see Winstedt's *History of Malaya*) a young man and reigning in 1459. If this is so, it suggests that there was a Chinese community in Malacca at the time.

In Malacca there is a tablet stating that Captain Li Chi-t'uan was a native of Lu Kiang (Fukien) who left home at the beginning of the Ming dynasty and settled in Malacca. The tablet purports to have been erected in the I Ch'ou year of the Lung Fei reign. There was no such reign in the Ming or Ch'ing dynasties and the

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[1] *The Malayan Peninsula* (Madras, 1834).

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175 invention possibly marks the refusal of the Malaccan Chinese to recognize the new Manchu dynasty.[1] But this tablet is evidence that the early settlers in Malacca came from Fukien province.

[764] Some of the oldest Chinese relics now extant in Malacca (or indeed in Malaya) are to be found at Bukit China, which, together with Bukit Gudong and Bukit Tempurong, forms an enormous burial ground, said to be one of the largest outside China. A very few old graves with coral tombstones, the inscriptions of which are no longer legible, are still discernible at Bukit China. Some of these probably date back to the sixteenth century, if not earlier. There are about a dozen Chinese graves of the second order of antiquity dating from the last decades of the Ming and the first decades of the Ch'ing dynasty. One or two of them have the words 'Imperial Ming' clearly inscribed on them. The Bukit China cemetery is said to have been bought and donated by Li Kap (i.e. Kapitan Li) in the middle of the seventeenth century.[2]

The Rev. Father Cardon, the outstanding modern authority on the history of Malacca, says that, in spite of the fragments of evidence suggesting the contrary, he is driven to the conclusion that the Chinese began to establish themselves in Malacca only at the beginning of the Portuguese occupation.[3] The traditions of the Chinese of Malacca themselves do not encourage setting a very early date to their settlements. The records of no family go back farther than the first half of the seventeenth century. The Li traditions go back farthest, though those of the Tans and the Tays are not much less ancient.

In the year 1509 Diogo Lopes de Sequiera, a Portuguese commander, arrived at Malacca with the intention of attacking it. When he came to anchor in the port he found there four Chinese ships, the captains of which immediately waited on him. Sequiera was much taken by their polite, friendly behaviour and agreeable manners and was at once at home with them. He paid visits to their junks and was well entertained. Noticing that the Portuguese, thinking themselves secure, walked about the city without fear, the Chinese warned him against trusting to the good intentions of the

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[1] A similar device was adopted at the beginning of the present century, when 'Patriotic Debentures' were sold by Sun Yat-sen, for they were inscribed with the name of the T'ien Yun period which had no existence.

[2] Rev. Yeh Fen's article on the Chinese in Malacca in *Historical Guide of Malacca* (Singapore, 1936).

[3] In an unpublished article communicated to the author.

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natives who were, they said, a deceitful, wicked, and perfidious people who would fall on them as soon as they thought it safe. Sequiera disregarded their advice, with the result that a number of his men were seized and imprisoned. He held a council of war at which he said that all ships, except those of the Chinese, ought to be burnt and the city battered down by cannon, but he had not sufficient force to carry out his plans.

Among the instructions given to Sequiera by his superior was one particularly concerning the Chinese. He was to ascertain a whole catalogue of facts concerning them—where they lived and how far away, how often they came to Malacca, whether they were weak men or warriors, whether they were Christians or pagans, and, if the latter, what they worshipped, and many other matters of a similar sort. The answers that Sequiera gave to these questions do not appear to be extant, but it is possible that they may be hidden away in the archives of Portugal.

We now come to the year 1511 when the great Alfonso d'Albuquerque[1] conquered Malacca, professedly in revenge for the treatment of Sequiera, but actually to carry out the project which Sequiera had been unable to accomplish. When the Portuguese fleet announced its arrival with a fanfare of trumpets the Chinese merchants who were at Malacca made their way to present their respects to the commander. There were five Chinese junks in the port and they had been detained there for some days by the King of Malacca who had intended to use them against the King of Daru with whom he was at war. The Chinese were indignant at their treatment and wished to help the Portuguese commander in any way they could, giving him information and placing their junks at his disposal.

The story of the assault on Malacca belongs to the general history of that place, and all that we need do here is to record the fact of the conquest, and to mention that after the city had fallen d'Albuquerque massacred most of the inhabitants without quarter to man, woman, or child. One of the Chinese junks was dispatched with a Portuguese, Duarte Fernandes, to bring the King of Siam news of the event.

Sultan Mohamet fled to Pahang when driven out of Malacca by the Portuguese. He then sent an embassy headed by his uncle, Nacem Mudaliar, to the Chinese Emperor to appeal to him for

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[1] More properly Afonso Dalboquerque, but the above form is more common.

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175 help. The embassy was well received, but whether or not the Emperor was sympathetic to the request for help he had his hands full at the time repelling Mongol invaders.

Tomé Pires (whom Sir Richard Winstedt regards as the principal Portuguese authority for the Malay kingdom of Malacca), who was in Malacca very soon after the Portuguese conquest, says of the Chinese as he saw them:

> All the Chinese eat pigs, cows, and all other animals. They drink a fair amount of all sorts of beverages. They praise their wine greatly. They get pretty drunk. They are weak people, of small account. Those who are to be seen in Malacca are not very truthful, and steal—that is the common people. They eat with two sticks, and the earthenware or china bowl in their left hand close to their mouth with the two sticks to suck in. This is the Chinese way.[1]

[651] The Portuguese followed a policy of exclusive monopoly and as far as possible compelled all passing ships to call at Malacca. In 1546 the duty was 10 per cent. on all Chinese goods and 8 per cent. on all Bengal goods, but this did not include the miscellaneous exactions of officials and others. This policy brought the Portuguese into collision with other nations and for the 129 years of the occupation of Malacca they were almost constantly at war, first with the neighbouring Asian countries, and latterly with their European rivals, the Dutch. Malacca was besieged several times, but was not captured until after the Dutch siege of 1640–1.

175 In Portuguese Malacca the Chinese quarter was known as Campon China (Campon, or *Kampong*, being the Malay for village). 162 There is no record of the number of its inhabitants (the Portuguese in their enumerations lumped together all non-Christian Asiatics as 'infidels'), but, to judge from the size of Kampong China as shown in Eredia's map, the population cannot have been very extensive, and we know that there were only 300–400 Chinese in Malacca after the Dutch conquest in 1641.

When d'Albuquerque left Malacca he did not appoint a separate headman for the Chinese, but it would seem that a captain of the Chinese was recognized soon after.

Malacca was a ruined city directly after the Dutch conquest. War and disease had taken their toll. The suburbs were entirely ruined. There was hardly a house standing. The gardens and

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[1] op. cit. p. 116. Professor A. C. Moule says that this is the earliest European description of chopsticks.

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orchards on both sides of the city had been destroyed and the 175
beautiful fruit-trees had been hacked down. The total population
of Dutch, Portuguese, and slaves and Chinese was counted at 162
2,150. The contemporary Dutch official, Commissary Justus Schouten, compares this poor total ruefully with the 20,000 he estimated to be the population of the city and environs before the siege.[1] No separate enumeration of the Chinese was made, but Schouten estimates their numbers at 300–400. 'The 300 to 400 Chinese shopkeepers, craftsmen, and farmers should be allowed to settle down at their own convenience, provided that they cultivate the gardens within their territory. They can hire or occupy those empty houses which can be saved from collapse or destruction. As it is dangerous to allow a great number of foreigners to crowd in a weakly garrisoned place, admission within the city walls should be refused to all inhabitants and foreigners.'

Schouten expected the Chinese to figure in the reconstruction of Malacca. He said that to assist in the cultivation of the ruined gardens in the southern suburbs (which later the Dutch East India Company would resume and lease out at a profit) 'some 800 to 1,000 Chinese would be very useful'. But, in spite of the temporary remission of poll-tax to encourage the Chinese to come to the settlement, the Dutch terms for trade were not such as would encourage Chinese or other traders to come in any great numbers.

Governor Balthasar Bort in 1678 made a very exact survey of Malacca.[2] There were then 137 brick and 583 atap houses with a population of 4,884 persons. In the city itself the Chinese had 81 brick and 51 atap houses with 127 men, 140 women, 159 children, 93 male slaves, 137 female slaves, and 60 children of slaves; outside the north suburb there were 324 Chinese; outside the north suburb on the seashore, 24; on the way to Bukit China, 78; together with other small communities. The total was 852 Chinese for all the Malacca territory outside the fortress—not a large number, especially considering that the women were natives, mostly Batak and Balinese slaves. In addition there were 40 Chinese within the fortress.

As a means of securing their monopoly the Dutch from Malacca 175
patrolled the Straits as far as Singapore. The instructions given to

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[1] P. A. Leupe, *The Siege and Capture of Malacca from the Portuguese*, translated by Mac Hacobian, *JRASMB*, vol. xiv, pt. 1 (1936).

[2] Balthasar Bort, *Report on Malacca*, translated by M. J. Bremner, *JRASMB*, vol. v, pt. 1 (1927).

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175 the captains of patrol ships in 1667 concerned junks and other vessels manned by Koxinga Chinese.[1] All such vessels were to be regarded as enemies since Koxinga had wiped out the Dutch factory in Formosa, and when sighted were to be overtaken and overpowered. After the capture of such a vessel no more than 'common plundering' was to be allowed to the Dutch crew, the hatches were at once to be sealed, and the complete cargo was to be brought to Malacca and handed over. As regards the Chinese who did not belong to Koxinga's faction, they were to be 'amicably persuaded' to come to Malacca. But if they persisted in going to Johore (with which the Dutch were on terms of hostility) they were not to be obstructed.

[302] The captains were told how to distinguish between the two kinds of Chinese by their mode of doing their hair—the Chinese who had submitted to Tartar rule had their hair shaved or cut to the crown of their head, while the remainder was worn in a long plait or an unplaited tress; very often they wore Tartar (Manchu) caps of plaited rush or straw adorned at the top with a tail of red horsehair or silk. The Koxinga Chinese wore their hair long fastened up at the back, though, to escape recognition, they sometimes dressed their hair in the Manchu fashion—but only at the moment when the Dutch caught up with their ships.

The Chinese of both Dutch and Portuguese Malacca were not prominent in local affairs. Baretto de Resènde's 'Account of Malacca' (still in manuscript) written in 1646, but referring to the period *c.* 1638,[2] and Valentijn's *Account of Malacca* published in 1726[3] make practically no mention of the Chinese. Father Cardon says: 'At first sight one is astonished that the Portuguese historians make practically no mention of the Chinese in Malacca, but, on reflection, this silence explains itself. The Chinese, being merchants, were more adept at handling the abacus than the musket.' Even in 1606, 1629, and 1641 there is no mention of any Chinese element in the defence of the city. 'With them Mars yielded to Mercury.' Ruy de Brito says that they are 'a people who exert themselves effectively in commerce; you will get nothing out of their hands without

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[1] Koxinga himself had died in 1662. See A. W. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* (Washington, Library of Congress, 1943) under Cheng Ch'eng-Kung.

[2] MS. no. 197 Sloane Collection, British Museum. See also G. Maxwell, 'Baretto de Resende's Account of Malacca', *JRASMB*, vol. xx (1911) pp. 1–24.

[3] Translated by Muller, *JRASMB*, no. xiii (1884), no. xxii (1890).

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paying the proper price'.[1] Nor had the Chinese yet begun to supply the artisans for the Peninsula, for after the capture of Malacca in 1641 the Governor is found asking the Laksamana of Acheen to send him 200 Malay carpenters and timber to repair the bridge. 175

Throughout the eighteenth century the Dutch East India Company declined, and the process was accelerated during the latter decades. The English East India Company took advantage of this and built up a flourishing smuggling trade in the archipelago. Gradually the Dutch abandoned their conquests—one group of islands after another. The occupation of Penang in 1786 was a deadly blow to Malacca. By 1795 all that was left of the Dutch East Indian Empire was Java, the Moluccas, Malacca, and a few forts elsewhere. In 1795 England captured Malacca and then the Moluccas. That same year a commission appointed by the States General reported that the Company was bankrupt and its commerce nearly annihilated. In 1798 the charter was annulled by the newly founded Batavian republic and the Government took over the administration of what was left of the Company's possessions.

The conditions in Malacca, as we have seen, were not encouraging to Chinese settlement, but the Chinese population had increased to 2,161 by 1750. How far this increase was due to immigration and how far to natural increase through intermarriage with local women and slaves is not certain. In 1750 the total population of Malacca was 9,635, but by 1760 the Chinese had dropped to 1,390 out of a total population of 7,216. [162]

As a footnote to this chapter we may record that under the more enlightened[2] British administration, immigration revived somewhat, and in the present century rubber has brought a new prosperity. One important fact that hindered Malacca's progress was that its harbour was too shallow for modern ships.

In 1827 the Chinese accounted for 3,989 of the free population and for 521 of the slaves and slave debtors; in 1834 there were 4,143 Chinese in a total population of 29,260; in 1842 the figures were 6,882 in 46,097; in 1860 10,039 in 67,267. In the last year there were only 3,002 females to 7,037 males. [162]

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[1] Letter to King Dom Manoel of Portugal, dated 6 January 1514 (Alguns Documentos do Archivo Nacional da Torre de Tombo) (Lisbon, 1892).

[2] 'More enlightened' because it had learnt by experience. In the matter of corruption (as we now understand it) and nepotism there was little to choose between the Dutch and English East India Companies. The difference was that the English knew, just in time, when reform was due.

CHAPTER XXVII

PENANG AND SINGAPORE, 1786–1900

175 THE British had had a dozen factories in the Malay Archipelago in the early seventeenth century, but, unable to withstand competition backed by the Dutch Government, or, alternatively, to share the cost of Dutch forts, they decided in 1623, after the massacre of their nationals at Amboyna, 'to abandon Malayan spices for the calicoes of India'.[1] They did not, however, withdraw entirely from the Archipelago, holding on at Bantam till about 1683, and at Bencoolen on the west coast of Sumatra until 1824, and they continued to drive a large private trade with Kedah. During the eighteenth century, when the British were frequently at war with the French, the East India Company found the need for a station where its ships could careen and refit during the north-east monsoon. Eventually in 1785 the Company obtained through a young trading captain, Francis Light, a lease from the Sultan of Kedah of the practically uninhabited island of Penang. The British flag was hoisted there on 17 July 1786 and it was soon afterwards named Prince of Wales Island (a name which, however, did not stick). A strip on the mainland named Province Wellesley was added in 1800.

After the foundation of Penang the immigration of the Chinese to Malaya greatly increased.[2] In a letter dated 1 October 1786

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[1] Sir Richard Winstedt, *Malaya and its History*, p. 53.

[2] The day after Light had hoisted the flag some Chinese, headed by a 'Captain China', arrived bringing with them a present of some fishing nets. They may have been from Kedah, but Mr W. L. Blythe, formerly Secretary for Chinese Affairs, Malayan Union, thinks that they may have been inhabitants of the island itself—a few tens only, he suggests.

According to Norman Macalister, *Historical Memoir relative to Prince of Wales' Island* (London, 1803), when the island was first occupied there were only two or three individuals there, 'natives of the island, who subsisted on fishing, and extracting from the trees, dammar and wood oil'.

Thomas Forrest, senior captain of the H.E.I.C.'s Marine, who visited Kedah and Perak in 1783 states: 'Pulo Pinang has plains and gently rising hills with a good soil, and was formerly inhabited, as we may judge by the names of places said to exist in those days; but of which no vestige now remains, except perhaps some fruit trees, Batoo fringey, Tellu batang [bahang?], Sungy pinang, Tellu Kumbock, Tellu be lappas, and Sungy karuang. . . .' *A Voyage from Calcutta to the Mergui Archipelago* (London, Robson, 1792) p. 24.

The names given by Forrest are those of places existing to-day. Batu fringey (Ferringhi) means the 'rock of the Franks', i.e. Portuguese.

[p. 292]

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Light wrote: 'Our inhabitants increase very fast,—Chooliahs 175 (Tamils), Chinese, and Christians; they are already disputing about the ground, everyone building as fast as he can.' In a letter of 1 February of the following year, he says: 'Did not the Dutch keep a strict watch over the Chinese, most of them would leave Malacca: 40 of them were prepared to come in the *Drake*, but were stopped by the order of the Dutch Government, and not a man allowed to leave Malacca without giving security that he will not go to Peenang [*sic*]—a Macau [Cantonese] ship intended to come here, but the Shabandar called the Captain aside, when he was about to depart, and told him by no means to stop at Peenang for there were 34 prows gone to cut off the Settlement; the contempt and derision with which they treat this place, and the mean dirty art they use to prevent People coming here, would dishonour any but a Dutchman. . . .' In December 1788 he reports, however, 'Our town increases very fast, with some very creditable families of Chinese, Malabars, and Malays'. That year more than 400 acres had been cultivated.

Francis Light was eight years in Penang and died there in October 1794. On 25 January of the year of his death he wrote to his superiors in Calcutta an official report giving his considered opinion of the Chinese settlers in which he said:

> The Chinese constitute the most valuable part of our inhabitants; 181 they are men, women, and children, about 3,000, they possess the different trades of carpenters, masons, and smiths, are traders, shopkeepers and planters, they employ small vessels and prows and send 175 adventures to the surrounding countries. They are the only people of the east from whom a revenue may be raised without expense and extraordinary efforts of government. They are a valuable acquisition, but speaking a language which no other people understand, they are able to form parties and combinations in the most secret manner against any regulations of government which they disapprove, and were they brave as intelligent they would be dangerous subjects, but their want of courage will make them bear many impositions before they rebel. They are indefatigable in the pursuit of money, and like the Europeans, they spend it in purchasing those articles which gratify their appetites. They don't wait until they have acquired a large fortune to return to their native country, but send annually a part of their profits to their families. This is so general that a poor labourer will work with double labour to acquire two or three dollars to remit to China. As soon as they acquire a little money they obtain a wife and go on in regular domestic mode to

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175 the end of their existence. They have everywhere people to teach their children, and sometimes they send males to China to complete their 181 education. The females are always kept at home with the greatest strictness until they are married; then they enjoy greater liberty. They are excessively fond of gaming, there is no restraining them from it. This leads them into many distresses and frequently ends in ruin.[1]

175 But in spite of the numbers of immigrants that flocked to Penang the settlement's tenure of existence was precarious for many years. The Directors of the East India Company were not entirely satisfied that this was the place they wanted as a naval and trading station and in which to grow spices. Besides, the expense of the settlement made them inclined to abandon it on more than one [635] occasion.[2] The tide of opinion turned at the beginning of the century and by 1805 the Directors' hopes had risen so high that Penang was made the Fourth Presidency of India and given a governor and an expensive staff. The optimism was not justified. The timber of Penang proved unsuitable for shipbuilding; the trade, while giving promise, became stationary about 1810, and in the 1820s the settlement was entirely outclassed by Singapore. The bottom, too, fell out of the pepper market at the end of the first decade of the century, and in 1860, after a chequered success of the crop, blight practically destroyed the nutmegs. But later Penang attained prosperity through sugar-planting, and when the mainland was opened up, and the tin and rubber industries were developed, Penang, like Malacca, shared in the general prosperity.

175 But this is greatly to anticipate. In the early years the clearing and planting of the island gradually progressed. The Malays cut 241 down the larger trees, and the remainder of the operations necessary for putting the land into a fit state for cultivation was performed by the Chinese at the rate of 20 dollars an *orlong*.[3] But the lack of any systematic encouragement of agriculture by the Government was a great handicap to the progress of the settlement. Among other crops the Chinese were partial to gambier, but this rapidly exhausted the soil. Rice, however, was not a popular crop with them. In the 1830s the Malays outnumbered the other cultivators of paddy in Penang and Province Wellesley by 41 to 4. In the latter

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[1] 'Notices of Pinang', *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, vol. v, p. 9 (1850).

[2] For a detailed discussion of the reasons of this and the land muddle, see [804] Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 41 ff.

[3] The *orlong* varied in different parts of Malaya. In Penang it was an acre and a third.

class were the Indians, Burmese, Siamese, and Chinese. The 175 Chinese, with the exception of the Cantonese, looked down on the 241 paddy planters—a curious fact, 'for what', asks James Low, 'but lack of a paddie-field forced them from their country?'[1]

Other products of the Penang soil were coco-nuts, tobacco (in [438] small quantities, never exported), *sireh* (a leaf with which betel-nut is mixed for chewing), the nipah palm, and indigo. The Chinese were the only real cultivators of indigo, which was not of any importance until after 1822. In the early days, too, they kept orange gardens, but they soon found it more profitable to grow other things instead.

But the crop *par excellence* for the Chinese cultivator proved to [249 be sugar. The Chinese had the monopoly of sugar-planting from about 1800 up to about 1846 when the Imperial Government 651] decided to admit the sugar and rum of Province Wellesley at the reduced colonial duties, while at the same time the same products of Singapore were charged foreign duties. The reason for this was that Singapore was already a great entrepôt for the collection of sugar from China, Java, and Manila, and it would have been very difficult to have distinguished between locally grown and imported sugar. The Government action was a death-blow to Singapore sugar-planting and at the same time gave a great impulse to sugar-planting in the Province. European speculators were not slow to take advantage of the situation. They copied the methods of the Chinese so far as the planting was concerned, but did not imitate their primitive apparatus for manufacturing the product. To their crude methods of extracting the sugar from the canes was due the Chinese failure to build up a big industry.

Penang's agriculture was a disappointment to the Directors and so in the end was its trade. This increased rapidly from 1786 to 1810; it then remained practically stationary, and the establishment of Singapore led to a great falling off in its volume. But by 1840 it had recovered its 1825 figure and there was a steady advance thereafter.

In spite of struggles and setbacks (a big fire had consumed most of the town in 1789), the wealth of the inhabitants, especially the 175 Chinese, increased. This is indicated by the fact that when in 1802 435 the Lieutenant-Governor proposed to acquire a piece of land for

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[1] J. Low, *A Dissertation on the Soil and Agriculture of the British Settlement of Penang* (Singapore, 1836) p. 82–3.

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175 a fort he had to buy it back from a Chinese baker and twenty-five
others for $40,885! This was land on an island which fourteen
435 years before had been uninhabited. When Amie, a Chinese baker
(probably the same one just mentioned), lost his shop through fire
in 1808 and property within a sweep of 250 yards of the port was
consumed, a committee estimated the loss at $534,750.

[622] In the early days the Chinese were left very much to themselves.
They were governed through their headmen appointed by the
175 authorities. Until the first Charter of Law of 1808 there was no
671 proper legal system and Light had been instructed to act according
to 'universal and natural justice' (whatever that may have been).[1]
A magistrate, Mr George Caunter, gave his own interpretation of this in 1797 when he sentenced a Chinese man and woman to have their heads shaved and to stand twice in the pillory from four to six in the evening and the man to be imprisoned and then sent off the island. Headmen were appointed in 1792 for each community to administer justice for petty offences.

The subject of Chinese associations is dealt with in a later chapter
175 in this section, and all that we need remark here is that in 1799,
575 a few years after the foundation of Penang, the existence of secret
societies was manifested in riots, and thereafter at intervals of a
579 few years these riots broke out again. How far these societies were
at work and how far the Chinese were exercising their natural aptitude for organizing obstruction as a community is not certain, but it was a common thing for the inhabitants of a district to turn out *en masse* at the sound of a buffalo horn to resist the police who were trying to effect an arrest or perform some other duty. In 1825 the secret societies even conspired with the Siamese to overthrow the Government of Penang. From 1846 to 1885 there were riots in Penang, Malacca, and Singapore of exceptional violence in which many hundreds of Chinese were killed. The Government was slow to deal with this disease of the community—no doubt partly for the cynical reason that the riots affected only the Chinese themselves, but mostly because it was entirely ignorant of the proper way to attack the problem.

It will be understood, then, that the police of these early days
175 had a heavy task entrusted to them. The police of Penang were
625 principally drawn from the immigrants from Bengal and Madras,

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[1] See Roland Braddell, *The Law of the Straits Settlements, a Commentary* (Singapore, Kelly & Walsh, 1915) p. 7.

but there were a few Chinese and Jawi Pekan (Malay-Indian half- 175
castes) among them. The police of Province Wellesley were some-
what differently recruited (in the 1830s at any rate). They were 625
mostly ex-sepoys armed with muskets and swords. A third of their
total of about seventy were employed in guarding the frontier with
Siam.

The staple article of local commerce was the *sinkheh* (Hokkien) 167
or *sanhāk* (Cantonese), the new recruit from China. Every year the
Chinese merchants engaged in the traffic would charter a vessel 472
leaving in April or May with the southwesterly monsoon for 464
Macao. The charterer usually sailed as supercargo in the vessel.
When the vessel got to Macao or Amoy the charterer set his agents 175
to work to cajole unsuspecting people by alluring promises of quick
fortunes to be made overseas. The bounty money varied according
to the respectability of the victims. The agents received a flat rate
of a dollar a head. The recruits were herded together on the junk
and many had to undergo appalling hardships. In a storm the
passengers were nailed down under hatches.

In January or February the vessels were back again in Penang. 175
The anchor had scarcely dropped when the prospective buyers
flocked on board to buy the *sinkhehs*. The price paid for a master 466
workman—a tailor, goldsmith, carpenter—was 10–15 dollars; a
coolie fetched 6–10 dollars; a sickly coolie 3–4 dollars or less. The 167
sinkheh then agreed to work for twelve months, receiving food,
clothing, and a few dollars for services. If a coolie was not bought
and paid for, he was kept on board the junk or in a godown until
a purchaser turned up. The *sinkheh* was not well treated. Com-
plaints were on occasion lodged before a sitting magistrate and at
his order the *sinkheh* was released on signing a bond to pay his
passage money, an agreement which he usually faithfully honoured.

The annual arrivals of *sinkhehs* in Penang in the third and fourth 175
decades of the nineteenth century were about 2,000–3,000 a year.
The natives of Kwangtung were considered to be more robust than 167
the Hokkiens and Teochius. They made the best squatters and
pioneers in opening up the land for the Hokkiens and Teochius. 463
Unfortunately they had no capital and had to get advances from
their friends. The usual purchasers of the land were Hokkiens or
Teochius. Most of the plantations which came into the hands
of shopkeepers of these tribes, through the default of debtors
who owed them money, had been started by Cantonese. All the

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175 carpenters, blacksmiths, and shoemakers were Cantonese, and so were most of them in the first half of the twentieth century.

167 463 But whilst conceding to the Chinese the credit they deserve as pioneers, we must not be guilty of injustice to the other races who in some directions played as important a part in the development of Penang. For instance, most of the public works, bridges, buildings, roads, and the aqueduct were built by Bengal convicts who had been brought to Penang before 1800. The Malays, too, did most of the heavy work of tree-felling.

177 Before the gates of immigration had been opened up by the modern expansion of industry and by quicker transport, and they had been swamped in numbers by the China-born, the Straits-born Chinese constituted a sort of local aristocracy. Their blood was not pure Chinese, but although they would have Malay, or Malay-Indian or other half-caste mothers, children of the *Babas* (as they were called) were almost all brought up in the ways of their fathers. It was remarkable to consider the tenacity with which Malacca *Baba*, who did not speak anything but Malay, adhered to the Chinese way of life in Penang and Malacca, modified though it was by Malay and other influences. They had a language of their own, and still have, known as Baba Malay. But it differs from Malay in many important respects and is practically a separate language.[1]

175 Strict adherence to chronological sequence would have brought Singapore into our narrative much earlier than this, for it had been founded in 1819 by Raffles. When he had arrived there on 28 January 1819 the only inhabitants were about 120 Malays and 30 Chinese.[2]

635 The histories of Penang and Singapore merge into one another officially with the placing of Singapore and Malacca under the control of the former in 1826; in 1830 the three, together forming the Straits Settlements, were made a Residency subject to Bengal. But the immediate success of the younger settlement had almost from the first deprived Penang of its position.

175 167 Although it does not seem to be clearly stated anywhere, it is likely that the first Chinese in Singapore came from Malacca and

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[1] For a detailed description of Baba Malay see Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 293 ff.

[2] Newbold, op. cit. i, 279. See also W. Bartley, 'Population of Singapore in 1819', *JRASMB*, vol. xi, pt. 1 (1933) p. 177.

Riau (Rhio), the island nearby which had been occupied by the Dutch shortly before this time. 175 Certainly the most prominent Chinese in the early years were Malaccans. Very soon, however, 167 the news of the establishment of a British settlement in a position so favourable for tapping the trade of the archipelago attracted immigration from China direct. The first junk from Amoy arrived in February 1821.

On 11 June 1819 Raffles wrote to the Duchess of Somerset: 'My new colony thrives most rapidly. We have not been established [161] four months, and it has received an accession of population exceeding 5,000—principally Chinese, and their number is daily increasing.' By August 1820, according to the same authority, it numbered between 10,000 and 12,000, the majority being Chinese. But it is likely that the enthusiasm of the pioneer and his wish to impress the Directors with the rapid success of his settlement led him into exaggeration, for T. Braddell, who went carefully into the matter at a later date, gives the total population for 1821 as 4,727 with the Chinese at 1,159. For 1823 he shows an increase to a total of 10,683 with the Chinese at 3,317.[1]

At the beginning the various races of immigrants settled where 175 they liked, but very soon we find Raffles planning his town and allotting areas to Chinese, Klings, Bugis, Malays, &c. He directed 361 that all Chinese should leave the northern side of the river where they had located themselves and form a new village from the bridge down to the river on the site of the present Boat Quay. By 1821 there were 3,374 yards of road 15 yards wide in Chinatown. Raffles considered that the first in importance among the immigrant peoples was 'beyond doubt the Chinese'. 'From the number of Chinese already settled, and the peculiar attractions of the place for that industrious race, it may be presumed that they will always form by far the largest part of the community.'[2] Raffles continued: '. . . in establishing the Chinese campong on a proper footing, it will be necessary to advert to the provincial and other distinctions among this curious people'.[3]

He said that it was notorious that the people of one province 000

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[1] T. Braddell, *Statistics of the British Possessions in the Straits of Malacca* (Penang, 1861).

[2] Raffles's prediction has certainly not been falsified to date. In 1947 the Chinese accounted for 730,000 out of a total population of 941,000. [162]

[3] 'Notices of Singapore', *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, vol. viii, p. 106

000 were known to be more quarrelsome than those of another and that the peoples of the various provinces were liable to quarrel among themselves. A different area should be allotted to resident merchants from that occupied by itinerant traders. The 'Amoi' (Hokkiens from Amoy) claimed particular attention and the committee appointed by Raffles was invited to consider whether it would not be desirable to allot them a separate division 'even to the westward of the Cantonments, beyond the European town and the Sultan'.

622 The intention of the founder of Singapore was to place the Chinese population in a great measure under the immediate control of their own chiefs, and the committee was instructed to 'fix up such centrical and commanding sites for these authorities and appropriate to them such larger extent of ground, as may tend to render them efficient instruments of police, and at the same time raise them in the consideration of the lower classes'.

642 As time went on the system of indirect rule which had been adopted in all three settlements was modified and at length virtually replaced by direct rule.

565 Raffles paid great attention to social distinctions in the communities under his control, though in regarding the merchants as 'the higher and more respectable class', he was ignoring the Confucian teaching which placed the scholar first, the farmer second, ? the artisan third, and the merchant fourth (not to mention the soldier, whom it placed last). In Singapore there were no Chinese scholars. Farmers were (says Raffles) a third and interesting class, particularly of the Chinese population, 'but as no part of the ground intended to be occupied as the town can be spared for agricultural purposes they will not fall under your consideration, except in as far as it may be necessary to exclude them'. The first two classes mentioned by Raffles were those engaged in mercantile speculation and those gaining their livelihood by handicrafts and personal labour.

175 The main concern of Raffles and his successors up to the middle
of the nineteenth century was to increase the importance of Singa-
185 pore as a trading settlement. In this they were singularly successful
439 and the annual value of the trade increased in a phenomenal way.
The various communities were therefore principally of interest as
575 bringers of wealth to Singapore, and so long as they did not disturb
the peace they were left very much to themselves. Thus for a long
time no attention was paid to the activities of the *hui*, or secret

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societies, which often operated to the detriment of the Chinese 175
community but did not interfere with other communities. Gamb- 439
ling, another characteristic institution, if it may be so called, that 185
the Chinese had brought with them, created more noticeable dis- 575
turbances of the communal life and was therefore a matter in which
the Government showed an early interest. Raffles had strictly for- [525]
bidden gambling farms, but Farquhar, his Resident, who had no
great moral objection to gambling and saw the advantage of the
farms to the revenue, disobeyed Raffles's instructions during his
absence and this led to frequent and serious collisions between
the two.[1]

A big problem in the early days of Singapore, as in the early days 175
of Penang, was that of law and order. The Chinese, and the same
is true of other Asiatic immigrants, were not exclusively composed 579
of enterprising merchants and industrious artisans and peasants:
they had brought with them some of the worst characters for whom
China itself had no room. There were frequent robberies and murders, even in broad daylight, and most of them went unpunished. Moreover, there was only a handful of police and as yet no code of laws under which criminals could be punished.

The rudimentary police force was augmented in September 1821. 175
A number of European merchants met at the request of the Resi-
dent to raise funds by voluntary subscriptions to increase the 579
strength of the existing police force. The meeting decided to sug-
gest to the inhabitants of Kampong Glam and China Town the 625
desirability of subscribing to the fund for the purpose of extending 674
the police systems of their areas, but there was no immediate
response. Only when robberies increased did the Chinese begin to
realize the necessity of contributing to the Night Watch Fund.[2]

The first riots occurred in 1824, but, according to Song Ong Siang and Buckley, there is no reason to believe that they had any connexion with the operation of secret societies.[3] It was not until 1831 that there was any mention of the existence of these societies. Then Buckley tells us that Singapore was in a very lawless state, several murders being reported in a week, and no proper measures were available to trace the criminals or to secure life and property

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[1] See Song Ong Siang, *One Hundred Years History of the Chinese in Singapore* (London, Murray, 1923) p. 17–18.

[2] ibid. p. 25. C. B. Buckley, *An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore* (London, Little, 1903) pp. 165, 212–13.

[3] ibid.

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175 579 625 674 [575] in the outlying parts of the town. While a gang of convicts were working in a road, a number of other Chinese ran out of the jungle and rescued ten of the convicts by carrying them off and knocking off their irons. The whole (local?) police force, *eighteen strong*, was mustered and recovered five of the convicts. There was said at the time to be a secret society of over a thousand men established in the jungle where they actually had an armed fort. Twenty more years elapsed before the next Chinese riot broke out. Then from 1851 to 1854 occurred a series of events which culminated in the great riot of the latter year.

175 575 674 579 The secret societies found that the conversion of the Chinese in the interior of Singapore Island to Roman Catholicism had the effect of creating throughout the island groups of men independent of their protection. They resented this, and in 1851 there was a general attack on the Christian Chinese in the country districts. The disturbances lasted for a week, and when the Indian convicts who had been sent out in gangs to follow the rioters and disperse them failed to do so the soldiers were called out. Over 500 Chinese were killed by the secret societies, including many well-to-do converts who had become planters. The grand jury in 1851 complained against the societies 'whose power was dreaded by the Chinese of all classes and which by their recent destruction of numerous *bangsal* (coolie lines) belonging to the Christian Chinese and by their outrageous attack on the police in the vicinity of Bukit Timur had exhibited a dangerous combination against public security and peace'. In August 1853 the grand jury again drew attention to the necessity for adopting stringent measures to detain witnesses in particularly grave cases until the trial of the prisoners came on (to safeguard the witnesses from intimidation). The Government, however, did not take the situation very seriously. Then suddenly in May 1854 occurred the biggest riots that had ever been known in Singapore. These were *kongsi* riots and for ten days the whole island was the scene of pitched battles between the rival factions. Four hundred Chinese were killed.[1]

In a later chapter of this section[2] the nature of Chinese secret societies in Malaya receives attention and it is sufficient in this

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[1] The number has been given in several works as 4,000 and the writer copied this figure in his *Malaya: Outline of a Colony* (London, Nelson, 1946). He is satisfied now, however, that 400 is very much nearer the truth.

[2] Chapter XXIX.

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summarized history of the Chinese in Singapore and Penang to 175
make mention of the successive outbreaks without attempting to
go deeply into their causes. Certain it is that the Thian Ti Hui, or 575
Heaven and Earth Society, was the most powerful and dangerous 674
of these subversive societies, and even allowing that the distinction
between the beneficent *kongsis*, or district and clan associations, 579
and the malevolent *huis* is largely an arbitrary one we may take it
the latter were mainly responsible for the riot outbreaks of 1854.

As early as 1799 secret-society activity caused disturbances in
Penang. There was a long period of apparent acquiescence, when
the system of extortion worked without obvious friction, but from
1846 to 1885 there was a series of outbreaks in Penang and Malacca,
as well as in Singapore. The Government found no effective means
of dealing with the menace until 1889, and until then the societies
continued their depredations without serious hindrance. That their
activities were not entirely anti-social must, however, be admitted
in mitigation of their offence. The eventual solution of the problem
belongs to a later period. At this time the obstacle to any really [647]
effective measures was the lack of any official with a knowledge of
the Chinese language and customs.[1]

Even more serious to the Straits Settlements from the point of 175
view of interference with trade was piracy. Pirates swarmed in the
waters of the Straits and about the neighbouring islands. They were 721
Malays, Lanuns, and others. Their usual prey were the junks
which plied between China and the Straits and the native craft 441
trading between the islands. As late as 1835 attacks were actually 659
made in daylight on boats plying between the shore and ships lying
at anchor at the mouth of the harbour. Many vessels were captured
when barely out of sight of Singapore town. The Government had
only a few armed ships at its disposal and occasional raids by these
were powerless to quell the evil. Criticism in the press and representations
by the merchants produced no results and in 1832 the
Chinese merchants in Singapore obtained the sanction of the
Government to equip at their own expense four large trading
vessels, each manned by thirty Chinese, well armed and carrying
several guns, to go out and attack the pirates lurking just outside

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[1] The ingenious device of Colonel Cavenagh, the Governor of the Straits from
1859 to 1867, may here be mentioned. When trouble started the Governor had [625]
the known lodge masters of the *hui* patrol the streets under the surveillance of
special constables to restore order. See General Sir Orfeur Cavenagh, *Remi*[illegible]*cences of an Indian Official* (London, W. H. Allen, 1884).

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175 721 441 659 Singapore harbour. The vessels went out, attacked two *prahus* and sank one while the other made off. One or two Chinese were killed. The Chinese merchants agreed to pay $200 for every pirate boat attacked, and also $200 to the relatives of any man killed in the expedition. The Government was shamed by this into building two special ships at Malacca for anti-piracy purposes. But measures were still inadequate until in 1836 H.M.S. *Wolf* arrived in response to petitions to the home authorities and the campaign for suppression began in earnest. It was the advent of the steamship which made suppression possible. Between 1835 and 1860 Malay piracy was almost ended and the depredation of Balanini and Lanuns greatly curtailed.

175 578 186 The Chinese in Singapore were drawn from the various parts of the southern provinces of China, and though they had in common the same traditional culture and similar customs, this was not enough to fuse them into a whole. Tribes speaking different dialects regarded one another almost as foreigners, as indeed they do sometimes to this day. There was no hint of Chinese Nationalism in its modern sense. In May 1840 British troops intended for use in the First China War arrived and camped on the Esplanade, arousing no manifestation of hostility on the part of the local Chinese. In 1857, at the beginning of the Second China War, some ill will towards the British was shown by a section of the poorer classes, but when Lord Elgin arrived in Singapore on 6 June of that year, on his way to China as British High Commissioner and Plenipotentiary, he was presented with an address by the Chinese merchants in which they referred to the great advantage the Chinese population was enjoying under British rule. Chinese tribes were brought into a proximity unexampled in their native country, and even when they were of the same tribe from the same village they had not the restraining organization of their village headmen.

175 609 647 In retrospect it seems clear that many of the difficulties of government of the Chinese in Singapore arose from the fact that the governing officials had little knowledge of the usages of the people whom they had to control. Progress towards harmonious combination had therefore to be made in two different directions—the first was by the Chinese getting used to the laws, the habits, and the prejudices of the ruling race, and the second by the ruling race getting to understand the nature of the people they had to govern. It must be admitted that the Chinese made much greater headway

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in their task than the British, for long, did in theirs. Until the 175
Chinese Protectorate was established in 1877 there was practically
no British official who had any knowledge of the Chinese language. 609
Governor Fullerton at one time gave orders that all European
officers were to make themselves acquainted with the Chinese and 647
the Siamese languages, but there is no evidence that he was obeyed.
Until the transfer in 1867 of the Straits Settlements to Colonial
Office jurisdiction the civil servants were from India and were
India-minded; after British intervention in the Malay States in
1874 they became Malay-minded (which they still mostly are
although the majority race has for a decade been Chinese).[1]

The ambition of nearly every Chinese was to return to China as 175
soon as he had amassed a competence, but only a proportion
realized this ambition and the rest remained to settle, making only 556
periodical visits to China. As communications with China im- 484
proved and passage-rates fell, the tendency to pass to and fro
increased. The immigrants did not for long bring their women [562]
with them. This was partly because they preferred to keep their
wives and children in their native land, partly because most of 167
them could not afford to take their families overseas, and partly
because the authorities in China, so lax in preventing the emigration of males, took great precautions to prevent women being taken overseas. Later the prohibition was relaxed and eventually ceased, but up to the 1920s the women of Hainan were not allowed to leave their island.

The result of this attitude was that a large number of Chinese 175
took local wives. This intermixture of races was therefore a factor tending towards settlement, but it was interrupted when emigration of Chinese took place in great numbers and the barriers of race rose up. Many did not go back to China because, as has been said, they were too poor, but some did not return because they were too
rich and dared not leave their property and their interests. There [595]
were 13 women to 100 males at an early period and as time went
on the richer China-born tended to have two wives, one in China and one in Malaya and concubines in addition; but for the majority the sex ratio remained disproportionate.

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[1] So ignorant were the authorities of Chinese matters that in the early years [525]
of Singapore, after the abolition of the gambling farms, the Chinese were allowed
unrestricted gambling for fifteen days at Chinese New Year under the impression that gambling formed part of their religion!

175 589 [548] The ill-balanced sex ratio of the Straits Chinese had a great effect on their social life. For a section it tended to produce miscegenation which might eventually, had it not been for improved communications and the influx of more Chinese caused by the development of the country, have resulted in the creation of a race with interests identified with Malaya rather than with China. For another, and a larger section, it meant celibacy and with this came the problem of prostitution and the traffic in women and girls.[1]

175 654 241 The class of Chinese most encouraged in the early years of Singapore was the merchant. There was, however, an influx of industrious agriculturists as well. The Europeans were interested exclusively in cloves, nutmegs, and sugar, and, so far as Singapore was concerned, the cultivation of these turned out to be a complete failure. Gambier and pepper planting was left almost entirely to the Chinese who owned large plantations of these crops. There were also numbers of squatters, many of whom had worked off the debt for their passage money in the first year or so and who took to agriculture on their own.

175 311 241 651 It is certain that Chinese gambier and pepper plantations were in the long run an evil for Singapore. Gambier had an exceptional power of denuding the soil, so that it destroyed the cultivable land as the Chinese moved on from plot to plot. There were generally three acres of pepper to thirty acres of gambier and when one of these crops died the other soon followed. The wasteful cultivation had begun to exhaust the richness of the island by 1840 and more and more Chinese deserted it for the mainland of Johore where they restarted the same system.

Of vegetable gardening in Singapore the Chinese had the monopoly, but of pineapples the principal cultivators were the Bugis. There were minor crops, such as *sireh*, and a single acre of indigo cultivated by Chinese. Singapore Island was unfavourable to the growth of rice, which succeeded quite well at Malacca and Penang. But human agency had as much to do with the failure of the rice crop as had nature. By 1831 (says the *Singapore Chronicle*) rice planting had become a thing of the past. The Governor, Mr

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[1] For a more detailed discussion of the subject of the sex ratio, &c., see Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 86 ff. The women and girls problem receives attention in Chapter XXIX of this section.

The astonishing improvement in the sex ratio of Chinese as shown by the 1947 census is set out in the tables on pp. 274–80.

Fullerton, had put on a tax or quit rent of one dollar an acre per [651]
month, which completely prohibited the coolies from China taking
up any agricultural employment as they found it impossible to 175
make the jungle produce sufficient to meet such a heavy impost, 311
and the gardens which were prospering were neglected.[1]

Chinese squatters and labourers in Singapore Island in the [164]
1830s had to contend with many dangers and hardships. There
was malaria, for instance, and in the gambier plantations the coolies
clearing the ground often got splinters in their legs which formed
ulcers. Besides disease and the hard life they led they suffered
greatly from robbery and from the marauding of tigers.

As in Penang, it was rarely the original pioneers who profited [426]
from their toil. They were encumbered by advances carrying a
crippling rate of interest.

The principal types of Singapore Chinese were, however, the 175
merchant and the artisan. The Chinese were besides everything
from actors, acrobats, and musicians to druggists and school 463
masters, from fishmongers to pawnbrokers, and from cartwrights,
fortune-tellers, down to *samsengs*, or rascals and thieves.[2] In a
community which was exclusively commercial or agricultural there
was not much scope for the expression of personality. The impor- [181]
tant business of life was getting a living or, if possible, amassing
a fortune, making regular remittances to the family in China, eating
and drinking, placating an unseen world of spirits, and, perhaps
above all, getting buried decently. There was no cultivated leisured
or academic class. The typical successful Chinese is described by
the famous naturalist, Russel Wallace, as he saw him in Singapore
between 1854 and 1862:

> The Chinese merchant is generally a fat round-faced man with an 441
> important and business-like look. He wears the same style of clothing [291]
> (loose white smock, and blue or black trousers) as the meanest coolie,
> but of finer materials, and is always clean and neat; and his long tail [302]
> tipped with red hangs down to his heels. He has a handsome warehouse
> or shop in town and a good house in the country. He keeps a fine horse 554
> and gig, and every evening may be seen taking a drive bareheaded to
> enjoy the cool breeze. He is rich, he owns several retail shops and trading

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[1] The wages of Chinese agricultural labourers of the period are given in an article by F. L. Baumgarten, 'Agriculture in Malacca', *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, vol. iii (1849).

[2] J. D. Vaughan in *Manners and Customs of the Chinese of the Straits Settlements*, p. 16, gives about 200 occupations followed by Straits Chinese.

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564 schooners, he lends money at high interest and on good security, he makes hard bargains and gets fatter and richer every year.[1]

441 Yet there were outstanding characters among the Chinese—Tan Che Sang (*c.* 1763–1836), a wealthy Cantonese, who vainly tried to conquer his weakness for gambling by cutting off the first joint [741] of his little finger with an oath never to play any more; Tan Tock Seng who founded the hospital of that name; Dato' Toh Ah Boon of Johore, who created the Toh Ah Boon scholarship, and in more recent times Dr Lim Boon Keng, onetime Principal of the Un versity of Amoy, Sir Song Ong Siang (or Sir Ong-siang Song Tan Cheng-lock, and a number of others. As wealth became consolidated and leisure more common better-off Chinese found an outlet for their released energies in philanthropy, social service, and, later and in less degree, in politics.

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[1] *The Malay Archipelago* (London, Macmillan, 1869) i. 32–3.

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CHAPTER XXVIII

THE MALAY STATES

THE Ming History says that in 1378 the King of Pahang, Maharaja Tajau, sent envoys with a letter on a gold leaf to China, and these brought as tribute foreign slaves and the produce of the country. Cheng Ho or his associates visited Pahang on his fourth voyage (probably in 1414)[1] and in that year we hear of tribute being sent to China again. In 1436 Fei Hsin, a Chinese Muslim and Arabic scholar, mentions another early visit to Pahang. 175

This is practically all we hear of the Chinese in these eastern parts of the peninsula until the visit of an Englishman named Gray in 1827.[2] Gray's journal of 21 January 1827 says: 'I am informed by the merchants that they have discovered a tin mine, near the river Leppa (Lepar), at the distance of two days' pulling from the settlement of Pahang; it is expected to turn out favourably and to be opened in the dry season by about 800 Malays, besides a number of Chinese.' In 1838 Abdullah,[3] on his way to Kelantan, landed at Kuala Pahang for provisions. He sailed up the Pahang River to Kampong China (Pekan Baharu). There he found hundreds of Malays and Chinese, armed to the teeth, awaiting him on the bank. The Bendahara, with the Chinese headman, was away at the gold-mines at Jelai. The Chinese at Kampong China were Hakkas and they intermarried with Malays or Balinese slaves. Their children spoke Chinese rather than Malay. [316]

The veil over Pahang is rarely lifted thereafter until Clifford's expedition in 1887. In the intervening years these Chinese were engaged in mining in Pahang, though in what numbers is uncertain. They had the monopoly of mining ingot-money, but were permitted to mint only four times a year and up to a certain value. They had mints at Kuantan, Lepar, Semantan, and Pekan Lama. This monopoly survived until 1893. [436]

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[1] See J. J. L. Duyvendak, 'The true dates of the Chinese Maritime Expeditions of the early fifteenth century', *T'oung Pao* (Leyden, 1939), vol. xxxiv.

[2] 'Journal of a route overland from Malacca to Pahang, across the Malayan Peninsula', *Journal of the Indian Archipelago* (1852), vi. 373.

[3] The author of the *Pelayaran*, quoted by Linehan on p. 60 of his *History of Pahang* (*JRASMB*, vol. xiv, pt. 2, June 1936).

175 Let us now pass to the south of the Peninsula and remark the progress of the Chinese in Johore.[1]

[439] The Dutch policy of monopoly had caused the Chinese merchants to seek a centre of operations where they were out of their reach. By 1657–61 Johore had become such a centre. By 1661 all Sumatra, Perak, Malacca, and Johore were reported to be overstocked with English and Moorish cloth brought from Surat and Coromandel by Chinese merchants in the Malay Peninsula. Chinese coarse earthenware, tea, and tobacco are also mentioned as articles of commerce at the time. Although threatened with reprisals by the Dutch, Johore traded with and sold produce to the Chinese.

At the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth centuries Captain Alexander Hamilton (quoted by Winstedt) says of Johore: 'The people of Industry are the *Chinese* who inhabit among them in their towns; and there may be about 1,000 families of them settled in the Johore Dominions, besides a much greater number who drive a foreign trade among them!'[2]

On 2 March 1702–3 five Englishmen from Pulo Condore were shipwrecked on the coast of Johore. At New Johore they found '6 great junks and several proes'. They also saw several Chinese who lived and traded there. At some palace revels the shipwrecked Englishmen saw 600 Chinese armed with swords and targets who 'marched with Chinese plays and then fenced'.[3]

In 1784 Johore was engaged in war with the Bugis and was helped by the Dutch. When the Bugis were defeated the Chinese in Johore who helped them were allowed to keep their property, but had to pay a fine of $20,000. An agreement was made by Johore with the Dutch whereby, among other provisions, Chinese native craft might trade at Rhio provided that they did not come from Celebes or Borneo, or carry cloves or mace, and provided also that they did not carry tin from Palembang or Bangka.

It seems clear that the Chinese did not settle in the interior in Johore until after the thirties of last century. Begbie in 1834 gives

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[1] Winstedt, 'A History of Johore', *JRASMB*, vol. x, pt. 3 (December 1932) p. 49.

[2] *A New Account of the East Indies* (Edinburgh, 1727) as quoted in *JRASMB*, vol. x, pt. 3 (1932) p. 49.

[3] W. Vaughan, *Adventures of Five Englishmen from Pulo Condore, a Factory of the New Company, of the East Indies, who were shipwrecked in the little kingdom of Johore* (London, 1714).

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Johore

the estimated population of the towns of Johore, Pulau Tinggi, Sungai Papan, and Segamat, but does not mention any Chinese. Nor does Newbold in 1839, though he enumerates quite small villages. (Incidentally he estimates the entire population of Johore at 25,000.) But by the late thirties the Chinese squatter from Singapore, whose nature it is to move farther and farther into the interior, had begun the invasion of Johore. 175

At Timiong (Temiang) there were, in 1836, 35,000 Malays and a few Chinese. Newbold does not mention any other Chinese in other parts of the state including Muar and Segamat. Captain MacPherson,[1] who visited Muar in 1857, says of that territory: 'It is useless to hope for energy with the Malay. . . . It wants a strong infusion of Chinese life and skill.'

The British policy until the seventies was strictly one of non-intervention in the Malay States, but long before that the Straits Settlements Government had shown concern for the welfare of the British subjects of whatever race who were living in the Malay States. For example, Cavenagh, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, in his *Reminiscences*[2] tells us that in 1861 he received a complaint against the Temenggong of Johore. The Temenggong's eldest son, a young chief, admitted that his people were in the wrong. 'I then [says Cavenagh] referred to the case of some Chinamen who had been confined on the charge of gambling, remarking that though I did not wish to interfere with his authority, or to prevent criminals from being punished, I could not permit British subjects to be at the mercy of the caprice of any native chief, and, therefore, required them to be sentenced according to some known law. He asserted that the law in force was the Hukum-i-Sharat [Shara'] (ecclesiastical law), according to which the Chinese might have their hands cut off, and he had inflicted a more lenient punishment.' [671]

In 1865 two British men-of-war steamers were sent to Pulau Tinggi to apprehend one Che Bujang, a Malay, who had plundered and murdered a Chinese wood-cutter, a British subject, but he was not traced.

By the early seventies there were twenty-nine Johore rivers with

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[1] 'Narrative of a trip to Dok in the Muar territories', *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, new series, vol. ii (1858) p. 299–300.

[2] General Sir Orfeur Cavenagh, *Reminiscences of an Indian Official* (London, W. H. Allen, 1884) p. 312–13.

175 Chinese estates on their banks. By this time the population was growing fast. In 1885 the Duke of Sutherland found at Johore a 'gay little Malay town' where there had been only a little fishing village in 1855.

[423] It was the demand for pepper and gambier that brought the Chinese squatter to Johore. Those who could satisfy the Malay authorities as to their means were allowed to form settlements, up some named river, for the planting of pepper and gambier, and the titles they received from the ruler were called simply 'Surat Sungai' (river documents). This system was called the *kangchu* system (literally 'owner of a river').[1]

The heads of the settlements received lengthy written instructions. Among other things they were responsible for keeping up the supply of opium and spirits to their men. They had the rights of running the gambling, the monopoly of pawnbroking, and selling spirits and pork. The *kangchu* system continued until 1917 when it was abolished.[2]

We now travel up the west coast of the peninsula, going back a good few years, and find that Thomas Forrest, senior captain of the H.E.I.C.'s Marine (whom we have already encountered in a footnote in the preceding chapter and who will turn up again in our account of the Chinese in Indonesia and the Philippines), visited Perak in 1783. His impressions of his visit to Perak are of exceptional interest to us. He says:

> [644 177] I went up in a country covered boat from Tanjang Putus, where the vessel lay, to pay my respect to the King of Pera, who received me in a large upper-room house with great state, having about 20 guards in the room, dressed in black satin garments embroidered on the breast with a golden dragon: they wore mandarin caps, and appeared altogether in the Chinese style: some were armed with halberts, some held pikes in their hands, and a few had musquets without bayonets. The King bade me sit in a chair before a sofa on which he sat himself; his courtiers, about 12 or 14 in number, all stood. After some conversation, the King asked me if the Dutch meant to return to Pera: I answered that I believed they did; on which he looked grave: he then withdrew; and his brother entertained me with a cold collation, at which two more per-

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[1] See A. E. Coope, 'The Kangchu System in Johore', *JRASMB*, vol. xiv, pt. 3 (December 1936) p. 249.

[2] 'Kangchu Rights Abolition Enactment', *Johore Government Gazette* (1 December 1917). See also J. V. Cowgill, 'Chinese Place Names in Johore', *JRASMB*, vol. ii, pt. iii (1924) p. 221.

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sons sat down. I had presented the King with two pieces of Bengal taffeta, and found when I got to the boat, a large present of jacks, durians, costard apples, and other fruit. I left Pera in December 1783. Much rain fell in November.[1] 175

The dress and regalia of modern Malay royalty are fashioned on an Indian (Hindu) model. This passage from Forrest, however, makes the survival of Chinese influence quite clear. It is only the modern swing away from China which has made the Malay Sultans of the peninsula forget that they were once proud to wear the Imperial Yellow of the Ming. [177]

Newbold's account of the Chinese in Sungai Ujong (later one of the states of Negri Sembilam) is referred to later on in this chapter. He says that the estimated population in 1832 was 3,200 Malays, principally Menangkabaus, and 400 Chinese employed in the mines. [316 465 466]

At this time the wages of the Chinese miners were 5–8 dollars a month, as compared with 3–5 earned by Malays. From daybreak till 7 a.m. they were engaged in clearing away water that had collected in the workings during the night. They breakfasted from 7 to 8, worked from 8 to 11, dined from 11 to 1, and worked from 1 to 5 when they ceased for the day.[2]

Anderson tells us that in 1824 Lukut had recently become a great place for tin.[3] Of its 1,000 inhabitants 200 were Chinese miners. It was at Lukut in 1834 that the great massacre of the Malays by the Chinese took place. In 1874 there were about 10,000 Chinese miners there.

Selangor in the first part of the nineteenth century was much more thinly inhabited than Perak. Anderson in 1824 puts the population of the capital at 400, and says that the inhabitants of the villages on or near the Selangor River occupied 975 houses only.[4] There was an influx of Chinese miners to the state after the fifties. By 1871 there were 12,000 Chinese in Selangor (Lukut was then in Selangor) and the output of tin was 3,000 piculs a month.

There can be no doubt that the Chinese contacts with Kelantan

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[1] Thomas Forrest, *A Voyage from Calcutta to the Mergui Archipelago* (London, Robson, 1792) p. 28.

[2] 'Account of Sungie Ujong, one of the States in the Interior of Malacca', *JASB*, vol. iv, pp. 538, 540 (1835).

[3] John Anderson, *Political and Commercial Considerations relative to the Malayan Peninsula and the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca* (Prince of Wales Island, 1824) p. 202.

[4] ibid. pp. 191–2, 196.

175 date from a very early time, but there is no evidence of any settlement except abandoned gold workings. Anker Rentse[1] speaks of one such settlement on the Sokor River. He then refers to the settlement at Pulai, still existing, which he considers to be of a [407] much later date. However, it was very old. The type of plough used by the Chinese there for their rice cultivation is said to be different from the Malay type. Local Chinese tradition credits the foundation of the Pulai settlement to a Hakka chief, one Chong Pah Chai, who about 200 years ago was a notorious robber in South China and fled to Pulai.[2]

In the 1930s Pulai still had its 'Kapitan' who must have been about the last of the Chinese captains in Malaya.

Of the Chinese in Kedah we hear very little before the nineteenth century, but Thomas Forrest who visited it in 1783 gives us a glimpse of the Chinese trade with that State. This is what he says:

> [439] The government is monarchichal, under a Malay Mohammedan prince, who like many other Malay princes engrosses almost all the whole foreign trade of the port, excepting that of an annual Chinese junk, which pays *a certain sum only* as duty, and then has leave to trade freely with the inhabitants. This junk imports immense quantities of coarse China-ware, thin iron pans, and many other articles from that country, and exports *biche de mer*, called swallow, sharks fins, edible birds nests, rattans, tin, dammer, tortoise-shell, deers skins and sinews, bullocks and buffaloes hides and horns, and many other coarse articles.
>
> The town contains about 3 or 400 houses, inhabited by Chinese, Telingas [Kalingas?] and Malays.[3]

175 575 579 Newbold says that in 1828 the number of Chinese miners on Sungai Ujong was nearly 1,000, divided into nine *Kongsis* chiefly of the Thian Ti Hui, or Heaven and Earth League (or Society). Each was under its respective *Towkay*, or chief. He remarks that their mysterious oaths and secret laws appeared to be not very dissimilar from those which bound the Carbonari of the Europe of his time. Jealousy of their fast-increasing power and numbers, or some alleged offence, but more probably the treasure amassed by the brotherhood of the Thian Ti Hui (whose property was in common), led in 1828 to their massacre by the Malays. But by 1830 the mines

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[1] 'History of Kelantan', *JRASMB*, vol. xii, pt. 2 (August 1934).

[2] S. M. Middlebrook, 'Pulai: an early Chinese settlement in Kelantan', *JRASMB*, vol. xi, pt. 2 (December 1933).

[3] *A Voyage from Calcutta to the Mergui Archipelago* (London, Robson, 1792) p. 24.

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were again worked by 400 Chinese, who continued there until the disturbances of 1833, when many returned to Malacca. [579]

We see, then, that wherever the Chinese went they took their secret societies with them. Indeed, these supplied practically the only social organization possessed by the community. In Perak, Chinese miners appeared in Larut from Penang, whence they brought the rival secret societies, the Ghee Hin and Hai San. 175 575

It now becomes necessary to give an outline of the activities of the Chinese miners and their secret societies which in the seventies were to lead to British intervention in the Malay States and thus to transform the whole position in the Peninsula.

Before 1850 the district of Larut was almost uninhabited. About 1840 a Perak-born Malay named Che' Long Ja'afar had married a daughter of the Panglima Bukit Gantang, or keeper of the pass between Larut and Kuala Kangsar, and had settled near the present township of Taiping. There were said then to have been only three Chinese in the whole of Larut. Che' Long Ja'afar discovered a patch of rich mining-land at Klian Pauh, the site of the present Taiping jail, and soon Chinese miners from Penang were flocking into Larut. Later new mining-lands were discovered at Klian Baharu, the present-day Kamunting. 175 575 316 579

In 1850 Long Ja'afar obtained from the Sultan of Perak a title to the district of Larut as his own property. He died in 1857 and was succeeded by his son, Che' Ngah Ibrahim, who was recognized by the Sultan as the ruler of Larut in succession to his father. Swettenham, who knew him personally, says that Che' Ngah Ibrahim was not pure Malay, but partly Indian and of a shrewdness and business capacity foreign to Malays.[1] He became known as the Raja of Larut, or Mentri of Larut, or Tengku Mentri. [642]

Meanwhile the influx of Chinese to the new mining-fields of Klian Pauh and Klian Baharu was so great that it was beyond the capacity of the Mentri to keep order, and the Chinese, free of any control from above, began faction fights among themselves.

It became customary in the records of the period to describe the cleavage as between the 'Four Districts' and the 'Five Districts'. The former were the members of the Ghee Hin and the latter of the Hai San and Toh Peh Kong organization. In fact the divisions of the Larut 'wars' of 1862–73 were precisely those of the Penang

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[1] Sir Frank Swettenham, *British Malaya*, revised ed. (London, Lane, 1929) p. 123.

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175 575 riots of 1867. The Four Districts were mostly Ghee Hins and Cantonese, and the Five Districts were mostly Hai Sans and Khehs.[1]

316 579 619 But while the fundamental cause of the fighting was the tribal hatred between the Cantonese and the Khehs, the division of forces was not altogether on a tribal basis. Quite often a Hakka would be a member of the Ghee Hin and a Cantonese of the Hai San, or vice versa, and such was the hold of his society on a member's allegiance that it was more powerful than the call of the tribe. As Vaughan and others have pointed out, men of the same tribe, clan, and district of China, even of the same family, might be found ranged against one another in mortal combat through the accident of their secret-society allegiance. This fact will often explain the apparent change of an individual or group from one camp to another as the ebb and flow of power effected new combinations.

In the year 1862 trouble broke out between the Hai San men at Klian Pauh (now Taiping) and the Ghee Hin men at the Kamunting mines, a few miles away. The occasion was a gambling dispute between a party of Ghee Hins visiting Klian Pauh and some Hai Sans. Immediately the cry was raised of 'Kill these interlopers!' Fourteen of the Ghee Hins were seized and thirteen of them barbarously murdered. Only one escaped to tell the tale. Tribal war then broke out between the villages.[2]

Both sides appealed to the Malay head of the district. Ngah Ibrahim was an opportunist. As soon as he saw that the Hai San men (who had begun these disturbances) were the stronger party he threw in his lot with them, put to death the Ghee Hin leader,

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[1] The term 'District' as used to refer to the places of origin in China of the rival factions is a very loose one. Skinner, who first uses the expressions in an official document ('Précis of Perak Affairs', 10 January 1874, published in *Perak Papers*, 1874–9), enumerates the See Kwan, or Four Districts, as the Sin Neng, Sin Whee, Seow Keng, and Whee Chew, and the Go Kwan, or Five Districts, as the Cheng Sia, Poon Say, Soon Tek, Lam Hye, and Tong Quan. Kwan is an obsolete term for prefecture or department. The first two of the Four Districts are districts in the Kwang Chau prefecture, while the last two are complete prefectures in the same province. The Five Districts appear to have been districts proper, but Poon Say is not identifiable. The Districts are differently named in another document of 1 January 1847, but the exact territorial identity of the Districts in China is not important if we remember that the people of the first were mostly Cantonese and of the latter mostly Khehs (Hakkas).

[2] For this period see Winstedt, *A History of Malaya* (London, Luzac, 1935) pp. 230 ff.; the same author's *Malaya and its History* (London, Hutchinson, 1948) pp. 62–77; R. J. Wilkinson, *History of the Peninsular Malays*, 3rd ed. (Singapore, 1923).

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Penang

So Ah Chiang, and drove his followers out of Larut. The dispossessed miners appealed to the British Government.[1] 175

The struggle henceforth was between the Ghee Hin and the Hai San for the exclusive possession of the tin-fields of Larut. 575 316

At this time most of the Chinese in Perak were regarded as British subjects since the majority claimed to come from Penang, though many of them were professional fighting men especially imported from China. Colonel Cavenagh, the Governor, responding to the appeal of the Ghee Hin,[2] ordered a blockade of the coast, and yielding to the pressure Ngah Ibrahim paid a sum of $17,000 as damages. The dispossessed Ghee Hins returned to the occupation of the Kamunting mines and Ho Ghi Siu was appointed as headman in Larut in succession to the murdered So Ah Chiang. 579

So ended the first Larut 'war'.

The following years were a period of quiescence in Perak, but the battle of the factions was transferred to Penang where the upshot was the disturbance of 1867. During this period the White and Red Flag Societies, the Malay counterparts of the Ghee Hin and the Hai San, established themselves alongside their respective Chinese allies in the underground of Perak's politics. The Hai San had been defeated by the pressure brought on them by the British in the Larut troubles of 1863, but they were by no means disposed to accept this defeat as final. The Ghee Hin had burnt some Hai San houses at Jelutong in Penang in 1865, but it was not until 1867 that there was a full-scale trial of strength between them.

The two factions used Penang and Perak alternately as a battleground. In Perak the bone of contention was the mining-land, but the actual occasion for the new conflict about to take place was the alleged intrigue between Lee Ah Kun, the head of the Ghee Hin in Larut, and a woman of the Hai San camp who was said to have been a relative of Chang Keng-kwee, then head of the Hai San in Penang. Lee Ah Kun and the woman were seized by the Hai San, carried round the district in pig baskets, and finally drowned in a mining pool. This was the signal for a retaliatory outbreak of the Ghee Hin.

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[1] 'History of Perak', *JRASMB*, vol. xii, pt. 1 (June 1934) p. 80.

[2] Winstedt and Wilkinson both say that the claim for damages was by the Go Kuan (Go Kwan) British subjects, but, as Mr W. L. Wynne of the Malayan Police remarked in an unpublished study, 'Triad and Tabut', it was the Ghee Hin (See Kwan) who were dispossessed and who appealed to the Governor for redress.

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175 575 316 579 Meanwhile the Mentri of Larut was in a dilemma. He had, under the pressure of the British, made his peace with the Ghee Hin and restored them to their holdings, but secretly he remained the ally of the Hai San. But the Ghee Hin now took the initiative, and, though inferior in numbers to the Hai San, drove them back from Klian Pauh upon the Mentri's fort at Matang. Seeing how things were going, the Mentri evacuated the defeated Hai Sans to Penang at his own expense (the junk hire alone cost $15,000) an~~d made~~ overtures to the victorious Ghee Hins. At the same time he addressed the Governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir Harry Ord, explaining what had happened. The dispossessed Hai San also made a report to him just as the dispossessed Ghee Hin had done in 1862. The Governor declined to interfere.

It is at this point that the Chinese faction-fights became mixed up with the question of the succession to the throne of Perak. Rival candidates for the throne which had become vacant by the death of Sultan Ali in 1871 appealed for the support of one or the other of the Chinese factions. The disorder worked itself up to a climax. An attack by the Hai San in October 1872 at Larut on the unsuspecting and unprepared Ghee Hin was completely successful. 'Hundreds perished in the fighting', says Winstedt, 'several hundreds more died of exposure or privation in the jungle.' In this same month 2,000 Ghee Hin refugees found their way to Penang of whom more than 100 were wounded. All the Ghee Hin women fell into the hands of their enemies. A few preferred suicide to dishonour; the rest were divided up between the Hai San headmen and the Mentri's chiefs, for the Mentri had taken up once more the policy of siding with the victors.

In the third phase which followed, the Ghee Hin were for the first time the aggressors. They prepared a fleet of junks and blockaded the coast of Larut and seized Matang. The struggle lasted for a year and led to British intervention in Perak.

175 642 The detailed history of the British intervention belongs to the general history of Malaya and has been dealt with by Swettenham, Wilkinson, Winstedt, L. A. Mills, and others. We must content ourselves here with a relation of the main facts.

In November 1873 the new Governor, Sir Andrew Clarke, arrived in Singapore charged with the task of bringing about 'limited interference in the affairs of the Malay States for the preservation of peace and security, the suppression of piracy, and for the develop-

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ment of roads, schools, and police, through the appointment of a Political Agent or Resident in each State'. This represented a complete change of policy which was defined in a dispatch from the Secretary of State to the new Governor. It included the passage (since famous): '. . . Her Majesty's Government find it incumbent to employ such influence as they possess with the native princes to rescue, if possible, these fertile and productive countries from the ruin which must befall them if the present disorders continue unchecked.' 175 642

After Mr Pickering (later the first Protector of Chinese) had opened up negotiations with the Chinese headmen of Perak, the latter were summoned together with all the major Malay chiefs of Perak to meet the Governor at Pangkor on 4 January 1874. The result was two treaties, one in Malay between the British and the Perak chiefs present, being the Treaty of Pangkor proper, and one in Chinese between the British and the headmen in Penang and Larut of the Ghee Hin and Hai San. By the latter the representatives of the two contending parties agreed on the unconditional submission of their case to the decision of the British Government.

The main provision of the Pangkor Treaty proper was that Raja Muda Abdullah became Sultan and agreed to accept a British Resident 'whose advice must be asked and acted upon on all questions other than those touching Malay religion and custom'. Mr J. W. W. Birch was appointed first British Resident of Perak on 17 November 1874. He attempted to ensure that the revenues of the various districts of Perak, which were a perquisite of the individual chiefs and which they farmed out to the Chinese, were made available for public purposes. His intention was to replace these perquisites by fixed allowances. This, coupled with his interference with religion and custom (especially with regard to slaves) and his generally tactless and pig-headed behaviour, aroused resentment among the chiefs and within a year Birch was murdered. This was followed by military intervention by the British. The campaign was short and decisive. By 17 December 1875 (Birch had been murdered on 2 November) all organized resistance was at an end though guerrilla warfare followed. The British resolved on the continuance of the 'Residential' system and Mr Hugh Low was appointed Resident.

Hugh Low established a State Council for Perak which had four Malay and two Chinese members, in addition to two British official

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[575] 175 642 members. One of the Chinese members was Kapitan Ah Kwee and the other was Kapitan Ah Yam. Kapitan Ah Kwee was none other than Chang Keng-kwee, who had taken a leading part in the recent disturbances and was now leader of the Hai San in Penang and Larut, while Kapitan Ah Yam had been the leader of the Ghee Hin and White Flag in Penang and Larut ever since the murder of Lee Ah Kun in 1872. Raja Dris (Idris), one of the Malay members, was in sympathy with the White Flag and in fear of the Red Flag,[1] and another Malay member, the Orang Kaya Temenggong, was (says Wynne) probably a member of the Red Flag. So that the first Perak State Council had a decidedly secret-society flavour. But it must be remembered that in those days if you were a Chinese leader at all, it had to be a Triad or Tokong leader. None the less it was clear that the British had very much to learn about the underground machinery of Chinese social life before they could competently govern their newly acquired protectorates.

575 175 579 Secret-society activity continued unabated during the first years of the British regime. Crimes of violence were so common that an attempt was made to secure the registration of Chinese coastal workers on the south coast of Larut—woodcutters, sawyers, and fishermen of the *kongsi*—but it was defeated by the impossibility of giving a Chinese a fixed identity; only the fingerprint system, introduced twenty-five years later, finally succeeded in doing this. On one or two occasions the murders instigated by the societies had Europeans for victims. Such was the killing of Captain Lloyd, Superintendent of the Dindings at Pangkor Island, and his wife in October 1878. The next big challenge by the Ghee Hin was an attempt to seize Taiping town, stronghold of the Hai San, in what became known as the Taiping riots in October 1879. A salvo of artillery fire from Walker, the Chief of the Perak armed police, frustrated the attempt and can be said to mark the end of the Larut wars.

175 575 651 Apart from the rivalry over the tin-fields, the secret societies had another rich source of profit to quarrel over. This was the monopoly of the revenue farms. The farming system was undoubtedly an unavoidable phase in the transition from the feudal exactions imposed during the Malay period to an orderly system

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[1] The White Flag was composed of Malays and Tamils who, in riots, sided with the Chinese Ghee Hin; the Red Flags, also Malays and Tamils, sided with the Chinese Toh Peh Kongs.

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of public finance. The farmer was invariably a Chinese, or a syndicate 175
of Chinese, who by public tender obtained the right to collect
the duty or revenue under the various heads. There was keen 575
competition among the syndicates to obtain the farms, and the 651
Government, once the farm was let, was relieved of further responsibility. It received a fixed sum while the farmers extracted as much as they could from the public. The system lingered on in some States well after the end of the nineteenth century, but was eventually abolished.

In the years following the Perak war there was a great influx of 175
Chinese into the State. In 1882 the Resident, then Sir Hugh Low,
was becoming apprehensive of the upset of the balance of power 167
and of the ability of the Chinese to combine against the Government. In his report for 1882 he points out that 30,000 Chinese might be assembled in a few hours at Taiping. The number of Chinese miners had increased, he said, from about 9,000 in 1877 to probably 50,000 at the time of writing.

A Secretary for Chinese Affairs was appointed at the beginning 175
of 1884 following on the creation of the post of Protector of Chinese
in Singapore in 1877, and Mr C. A. Schultz assumed this appointment. 575
Schultz was inclined to regard the secret societies in a favourable 656
light, believing (like Vaughan in the Straits) that they had and were doing good among their countrymen by assisting them and adjusting minor disputes among members. However, from 1884 to 1889 a series of riots, directly traceable to Triad and Tokong rivalries, was proof of the lawless tendency of these organizations. The facts became too notorious to be ignored. In August 1889 an order in council was issued absolutely prohibiting all Chinese secret societies. The first measures not proving sufficiently effective, a Registration of Societies Enactment was passed on the lines of the Colony Ordinance in 1889, and provided for exemption, registration, and dissolution of societies. This eventually proved an effective piece of legislation.

Perak was the key State, so to speak, for this period, but British 175
intervention was also taking place in the other States one by one.
We will shortly review happenings in Kedah, Selangor, and Pahang in the latter part of the nineteenth century in so far as they relate directly to the Chinese.

Little is heard of the Chinese in Kedah during the centuries, but it is clear that Chinese settling in Province Wellesley must have

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Selangor

[579] spilled over into Kedah from an early date. The riots which took
place in Kedah in February 1876 between Ghee Hins and Toh
175 Peh Kongs, just when the Sultan of Kedah had completed arrangements for the deposed Sultan Ismail of Perak, taking refuge there, to give himself up to the British, are attributed by Wynne to the interest of the Ghee Hin in his escape. The Chinese in Province Wellesley threatened at the time to join in the disturbances.[1]

In Selangor a civil war over a disputed succession led to British
175 intervention. Sultan Mohammed had died in 1857 and Sultan
724 Samat succeeded to the throne on a disputed title in 1860. Civil
war ensued and to the horrors of internal strife was added that of
piracy. Chinese as well as Malay pirates were concerned. Raja
[642] Ya'akob, the third son of the Sultan, who had now more or less
established his rule, was behind much of the piracy carried on by his followers and for his benefit. British intervention followed, and the Sultan was glad enough to accept the appointment of a British Resident. (One item in Selangor's earliest budget was $300,000 owed to a Malacca merchant for munitions of war!)

175 One of the headmen of the Hai San between 1864 and 1884 was
the well-known Yap Tek Loy, a Hakka, who became Kapitan
575 China of Selangor during this same period. In 1884 the acting British Resident referred to Yap Tek Loy as 'the recognized head of the Chinese in Selangor who on this, as on all other occasions, cordially co-operated with the Police in maintaining order in the State'! Actually Yap Tek Loy, being a Tokong headman, was supporting the authorities to the extent of keeping out the Triad influence, which since its collapse in 1880 had been seeking fresh fields of development farther south!

With the progress towards direct government and the blows against the power of the secret societies, the captains became an anachronism. They had, we have seen, already disappeared long ago in the Straits Settlements. In 1901, with the death of the Kapitan China of Perak, Cheang (or Chang) Keng Kwee, who had been an original member of the Perak State Council in 1877, the appointment lapsed.[2]

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[1] It must be remembered that Kedah did not come under British protection until 1909 when the suzerainty over the State was transferred from Siam to the British by the Treaty of Bangkok.

[2] G.B., Colonial Office, *Annual Report for the Federated Malay States, 1901*, Cmd. 1297 (1902). But in spite of the official evidence it appears (from information supplied to me by Mr W. L. Blythe) that the appointment was not abolished

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Pahang

In 1888 Pahang had a population of 50,000 Malays and a few 175 hundred Chinese.[1] The majority of the latter were employed in the tin-mines at Bentong. The Sultan of Pahang, Ahmad, had given 642 large tracts on the Lipis to Europeans, Arabs, Chinese, and Malays without regard to the local chiefs and the small Chinese who had spent $30,000 on prospecting and the small Malays whose gold was taken without compensation. The arbitrary and inefficient rule and prevailing anarchy made the situation ripe for British intervention. The immediate occasion for this arose in February 1888 when a Chinese British subject, Go Hin, was stabbed outside the palace, clearly by the Sultan's orders. The British Government demanded compensation or that the Sultan should accept a British Resident. The Sultan asked for a British Resident to be appointed. In October 1888 J. P. Rodger was appointed as the first British Resident and found himself confronted with the same difficulties that confronted Birch in Perak in 1875. It was years before the Residential system began to work smoothly in the State.

While the field of high politics was monopolized by dynastic 178 wars, and the main forces behind the scenes were the secret societies, wriad and Tokong, Ghee Hin or Hai San, the mass of the Chinese, 433 though they might be members of these organizations, were peacefully occupied in their labour of development. Their progress in opening up the country is readily traceable in the annual reports of the States and of the Federation (since 1896). For example, in 1891 the *Perak Annual Report*[2] states that in Kuala Kangsar a Chinese had tried the experiment of planting rice by Chinese labour and the result was so encouraging that he was formulating a scheme for importing Chinese agriculturists on a large scale. The pepper industry was fairly established in the hands of Malays and Chinese as the result of Government encouragement. Sugar was grown for export by Chinese in Krian. Alluvial tin-mining was still practically in the hands of Chinese, though four or five European and Australian companies had done very well, principally on the

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at that time, but remained without a holder until 1921 when Chung Thye Pin was appointed, and was installed by the Sultan of Perak at Kuala Kangsar. After his death no one else was appointed.

[1] Swettenham, op. cit. p. 270.

[2] *Straits Settlements Annual Reports. Annual Report by the Acting British Resident of Perak* (1891) p. 367. The cultivation of rice by Chinese, however, came to nothing owing to the policy of Malay Land Reservations which meant that the good rice-growing land was largely reserved for Malays.

178 'tribute' system (i.e. their land was worked by Chinese who paid
them a percentage of their output). In 1893 great developments
433 were reported in Kinta. 'The advancement', says the *Perak Annual Report* for that year, 'was almost incredible.' Ten years before it was 'little more than a vast stretch of jungle, unapproachable except by a shallow and rapid river, and possessing not a single mile of first-class road nor a village of any importance'.[1] By 1897 the population of Perak was estimated at 215,000 of whom 100,000 were Malays and 90,000 Chinese.

The record for the other States was different only in scale, not in proportion. The tin industry was expanding; the rubber industry was in process of creation. The revenues of the Federation (which had been formed in 1896 to include Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang) were increasing by leaps and bounds, and were being applied to roads and railways, public buildings, and health measures. Modern Malaya was coming into being.

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[1] *Straits Settlements Annual Reports. Annual Report by the British Resident of Perak* (1893) p. 410.

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CHAPTER XXIX

CHINESE SOCIAL LIFE AND EDUCATION IN MALAYA

THE British administrators of the Straits Settlements in the 175
early days were, by and large, interested in the immigrants
as traders, artisans, and labourers and were not greatly concerned 642
with their social behaviour so long as they did not interfere
with the authorities or with the other communities. They appointed headmen for the Chinese, Chooliahs (Tamils), Bugis, &c., who had powers to deal with minor offences and disputes, and they farmed out the collection of taxes to the highest bidder. The communities were only too pleased to accept this arrangement as it guaranteed them the maximum of freedom to live their own lives with the maximum of protection under the aegis of the British.

When Penang was founded no system of law existed, and Francis 175
Light and his successors were compelled to act according to the
dictates of their consciences. In 1800 Sir George Leith, the 671
Lieutenant-Governor, was instructed to frame regulations that were to be in principle 'the laws of the different peoples and tribes of which the inhabitants consist, tempered by such parts of the British law as are of universal application being founded on the principles of natural justice'. He made no progress towards carrying out these grandiose and impracticable instructions and it was not until 1807 that a Charter of Justice was granted to Penang which introduced English law as it then existed, subject to certain modifications for the native inhabitants, as will be explained below. The law was subsequently modified or added to by statute law. When, however, the Malay States were one by one brought under British protection, the English common law was not introduced. In these States the Indian law was frequently copied (e.g. the Penal Code, the Contract Enactment, &c.).

The establishment of the Recorder's Court in Penang in 1807 175
did away with indirect rule through the native Captains, but in
Singapore from its foundation in 1819 until the Charter was extended 692
to it in 1826, justice was administered through the headmen 622
(the 'Kapitan China' in the case of the Chinese). In the Malay
States the 'Captain' system was continued into the present century,

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692 but in its later stages the title became more and more honorary and
622 was finally abolished.[1]

175 671 In explaining the first Charter of law, Sir Edmund Stanley, the first Penang Recorder, stated that 'it secures to all native subjects the free exercise of their religion, indulges them in all their prejudices, and pays the most scrupulous attention to their ancient customs, usages, and habits'. The operation of the Charter was, however, soon held not to be unlimited and could not be construed as giving to all inhabitants of the Colony the full benefit of their own laws, religion, and customs. In *Regina* v. *Willans* (1858), Sir Benson Maxwell delivered a judgement of which Dr Withers Payne says:

> This judgment lays down the rules that first the Charters have not in any respect modified the law of England by any exceptional adaptation of it to the religion and usages of the East; and secondly, that such native law as had up to 1858 been recognized in this Colony, had been so recognized not because any of the Charters demands an exceptionally indulgent treatment of such matters but simply because of the general principles of the Law of England.[2]

In the course of a later judgement of 1869 Sir Benson Maxwell, C.J., said:

> In this Colony so much of the law of England as was in existence when it was imported here, and is of general (and not merely local) policy and adapted to the condition and wants of the inhabitants, is the law of the land: and further, that law is subject, in its application to the various alien races established here, to such modifications as are necessary to prevent it from operating unjustly and oppressively on them.[3]

177 In short, the law of the Straits Settlements was English law modified where necessary by native custom, not the reverse.

671 428 58 An instance of Chinese custom being followed and not English law occurred in 1843 when it was decided that adopted children of a Chinese were entitled to the joint administration of his estate in preference to his nephew. Polygamy was held to be a Chinese institution in a number of cases (the leading one, well known as

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[1] For the legal history of the Straits Settlements see Roland Braddell, *The Law of the Straits Settlements, a Commentary*, 2nd ed. (Singapore, Kelly & Walsh, 1931) pp. 80–1 and passim, and C. H. Withers Payne, LL.D., *The Law of Administration of Succession to Estates in the Straits Settlements* (Singapore Printers, 1932) pp. 12–14 and passim.

[2] Withers Payne, op. cit. p. 12.

[3] 1 Kyshe, 216, 221 (cf. Withers Payne, op. cit. p. 8, note (3)).

the 'Six Widows Case', was in 1908),[1] and in 1867 it was decided 177
that a secondary wife was entitled to a share of the intestate's property. On the other hand, Chinese custom was departed from in a 671
number of instances. In 1868 administration was refused by the 428
court to the adopted daughter of a Chinese, and since that year
until the present time adopted children have not been recognized 58
by the court as entitled to administration or to a share of the estate. Although (says Braddell) by Chinese law and custom adopted children are legitimate and find a most important place in the structure of Chinese family law, in the Colony this is entirely denied to them as the judges felt themselves bound to hold that 'child' in the Statute of Distribution can only mean a child begotten of the body.[2]

The Chinese at least would have retained a virtual *imperium in* 175
imperio for longer had it not been for certain shortcomings of their
social system which, when transported overseas, were forced on the 656
attention of their rulers. One of the symptoms of this was the civil 579
disturbance caused by collisions between rival secret societies which
led to riot and bloodshed; another was the disorder and abuse 525
traceable to the Chinese addiction to gambling. The latter received much earlier attention from the authorities because its evils were more obvious, and it was only at long last that any effective notice was taken of the activities of the secret societies.

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[1] The Court of Appeal held that all the widows of a Chinese were entitled to share under the Statute of Distribution.

[2] op. cit. p. 88.

I am indebted to Mr J. V. Mills (formerly a judge in Malaya) for the following table of additional cases.

Chinese law and custom followed:

(*a*) Marriage conferred no marital rights on the husband as regards the wife's property. (Withers Payne, pp. 25–7.)

(*b*) A natural child is legitimated by a subsequent legal union of the parents. *Choo Eng Choon* (1911), 12 S.S.L.R. 120, 124.

(*c*) All widows divide equally the one-third share given by the Statute of Distribution. *Choo Eng Choon* (1911), 12 S.S.L.R. 120.

(*d*) Children legitimated *per subsequens matrimonium* divide equally the two-thirds share given by the Statute of Distribution. *Choo Eng Choon* (1911), 12 S.S.L.R. 120.

English law followed:

(*a*) The court declined jurisdiction in (polygamous) matrimonial causes (divorce, &c.). *Meyer* v. *Meyer*, (1927) S.S.L.R. 14.

(*b*) The court refused to recognize legitimation of a natural child by recognition. *Khoo Hooi Leong* v. *Khoo Chong Yeok*, (1930) A.C. 346, 356.

(*c*) Females held to have equal rights of succession with males. *Lee Joo Neo* v. *Lee Eng Swee* (1887), 4 Kyshe 325.

As most of the Malayan Chinese have a Chinese domicile, the law of China has frequently been applied in a determination of their rights and obligations.

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575 175 The societies of Malaya are all generally believed to be offshoots of the Thian Ti Hui (the Heaven and Earth League), otherwise known as the Hung (Flood) League.[1] The Hung League was known to itself under the names given above, and also as the Sam Hup (or Three Unities League) or Triad Society.[2] In China they were originally religious or benevolent 'self help' associations, which assumed a political or anti-dynastic character at the time of the Manchu conquest, and later degenerated into organizations of criminals for exploiting and intimidating the community. Their rivalries, especially regarding control and limits of the 'protection areas' into which they parcelled towns and districts, brought them into collision.

Europeans have made a distinction between the *huis* (as the secret societies were called) and the Kongsis, or district or clan associations, labelling the former as secret and subversive, and the latter as open and beneficial. In Chinese usage, however, Kongsi (as Mr Blythe has pointed out) includes *hui*, and no distinction is made between good and bad. In fact, it is likely that the district and clan associations were as much involved in the early disturbances as the *huis*, and it was only when the society legislation towards the end of the century began to separate the sheep from the goats, allowing the registration of the 'beneficial' Kongsis, and making the rest illegal, that this distinction was made, and even then only by Europeans.[3]

[1] Wynne's contention, however, is that the second of the large rival groups into which the secret societies were divided in Malaya was an offshoot, not of the Thian Ti Hui, but of the Han League ('Triad and Tabut', unpublished).

[2] For a fuller treatment of Malayan Chinese secret societies and their activities, see Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, chap. viii.

[3] There has for a long time been a great deal of confusion over this matter—a confusion shared by the author when he wrote the chapter on secret societies in *The Chinese in Malaya*. The above, however, is the opinion to which he now inclines. Certainly since the registration laws were passed the 'beneficial' societies have been encouraged to come into the open and those which have operated underground have invariably been criminal or semi-criminal in nature. All Chinese social organization was necessarily 'secret' whilst it was not recognized or was banned by the Government. The Chinese municipal organizations in Borneo, the Kongsis, were, and are, referred to as 'secret' societies, as are all Chinese political organizations in Siam where they are illegal.

The whole subject calls for a thorough review and for the reconsideration of the terms used. (Perhaps Dr Tien's study in Sarawak will illuminate the situation, see p. 433.) Mr Maurice Freedman is also conducting researches in the field of social anthropology in Malaya. Professor Firth calls attention to the need for further investigation of the Chinese family and Chinese associations at

Such was the complexity and the secrecy and intricacy of Triad 575 ritual that not enough was known about it to enable the authorities 175 to set about curbing the League's activities until after the publication of Schlegel's epoch-making work in English at Batavia in 1866. Based on documents seized by the Dutch police, this threw a wealth of light on the Triad Society and is still the standard authority.[1]

As early as 1799 the Kongsis or the *huis* (as the case might be) set 575 the administration in Penang at defiance: in 1825 they actually plotted an insurrection in league with the Siamese to overthrow the 175 Government; in 1826 Newbold notes the Triad Society in Malacca 579 as being 4,000 strong; in Singapore the Triad was certainly established before 1825, and about 1840 the Ghee Hin was strongly suspected of executing the most daring robberies and murders, particularly at Singapore where a large body resided among the jungle and fastnesses in the interior of the island. It was, like the Triad at Malacca, composed almost entirely of Cantonese and there was bad blood between it and the Hokkien society lately established.

The list of riots and other violent interferences with the normal life of the community is a very long one, and some of the incidents have been recorded in the two preceding chapters. They culminated in a series of outbreaks at various periods. The establishment 656 of the Chinese Protectorate in 1877 marked a stage towards an understanding of the problem, for hitherto there had been no 575 officials with an adequate knowledge of the Chinese language.[2] 175 After many abortive attempts to legislate for the situation, the Societies Ordinance was passed in 1889 and came into force on 1 January 1890. The principal provision of this law was that a society of any sort was illegal until it had applied for and had been accepted for registration. Power was given to the Governor-in-Council to order the dissolution of any society. This law did not by any means effect the extinction of the *huis*—they continued to operate underground in a restricted way—but it did mean that powers now existed for dealing with them. China-born Chinese

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p. 28–9 of his report on *Social Science Research in Malaya* (Singapore, Government Printing Office, 1948).

[1] Gustav Schlegel, *Thian Ti Hwui or Heaven-Earth-League. A Secret Society with the Chinese in China and India* (Batavia, Lange, 1866). See also J. S. M. Ward and W. G. Stirling, *The Hung Society* (London, Baskerville Press, 1925).

[2] Schlegel, op. cit. p. 11, quotes Oliphant, *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan*, i. 20, as saying that at this period there were 70,000 Chinese in Singapore and not a single European understood their language.

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575 assisting in the management of illegal societies were banished, and
656 deportation to their native land, curiously enough, was something
they feared next to death.[1]

175 It is convenient here to end the reference to the *huis*, for whilst they lingered on into the twentieth century their importance was eventually entirely overshadowed by that of the political associations.

548 Another specifically Chinese problem in Malaya was the traffic
in women and girls. The preponderance of men over women among
656 the Chinese produced a very unbalanced community and this led
to the importation of women and girls to be prostitutes.

The policy pursued with regard to the problem of an incoming traffic in Chinese women may be divided into three periods. During the first period up to 1927 brothels were allowed throughout Malaya and Chinese girls were permitted to enter the ports of the Straits Settlements for the purpose of becoming inmates of these (providing that they did so of their own free will; the duty of the Chinese Protectorate was to prevent the *traffic* in women and girls); during the second period from 1927 to 1930 brothels continued to be allowed but no avowed prostitutes were allowed to enter the country; the third period began in 1930, after which brothels were not allowed in the Straits Settlements or the Malay States, nor were avowed prostitutes allowed to enter the Peninsula.

Upon the closing of the brothels the exploiters turned to various other expedients for profiting by the girls. These expedients taxed the ingenuity of the Protectorate and of the police to counter them. On the arrival of each vessel from China all women and girls on board were taken to a depot where they were examined by Protectorate officials. Those whose bona fides were established were immediately released; if there was any doubt the person into whose charge the girl was going could be required to enter into a bond that she would not be disposed of to others or trained or used for the purposes of prostitution. In cases where there was reason to believe that the girl was the victim of traffic, she was committed to an institution known as the Po Leung Kuk by the Protector. Here she would remain until provision could be made for her welfare or she reached the age of eighteen years. Many girls were placed

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[1] The imperial authorities in China were indeed, it is said, in the habit of executing persons so deported as undesirables. If this were true then the dislike of banishment was more understandable.

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in the home as the result of raids of Protectorate officers on 548
'sly' brothels, together with others who had been the victims of 656
cruelty.

Many girls were married off to Chinese men who applied to the 583
Protectorate for a wife.

Besides the girls arriving from China who were placed in the 855
Po Leung Kuk for protection there were some cases of *mui tsai* who
had been ill treated. The term *mui tsai* was applied to a girl who 593
had been transferred from her own family, either directly or
through a third party, to another family with the intention that she 357
should be used as a domestic servant, not in receipt of regular
wages, and not at liberty to leave her employer's family of her own 656
free will or that of her parents. In fact, a 'slave girl'—though the term is too strong. The system was a by-product of conditions in China where so many families lived on the verge of starvation, where infanticide was common, and the disposal of a girl as a *mui tsai* was often the only way of saving her from death. The lot of a *mui tsai* was rarely a happy one though her employer had some definite obligations towards her, including that of marrying her off when she reached marriageable age.

In 1936 a Commission was appointed to report on *mui tsai* and 656
in January 1937 it had submitted a Majority and a Minority
Report.[1] It was the Minority Report (by Miss E. Picton Turbevill, 855
O.B.E.) that was adopted by the British Government together with some recommendations of the Majority Report. The former included the abolition of the status of *mui tsai*.

Among the problems arising among the Chinese in Malaya 276
should be mentioned that of opium, but since it is one common to
all the Chinese communities of Southeast Asia it has been made 655
the subject of notice in Chapter IV of this Survey. All that need be stated here is that in 1907 a Commission on opium was appointed which made its report the following year, that at midnight on 31 December 1909 the opium farms in Singapore, Penang, and Malacca suspended business and the Government Monopolies Department entered into possession of the premises and reopened them for business as usual the following day; that a policy of gradual suppression of opium-smoking was followed for many years, and that His Majesty's Government on 10 November 1943

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[1] G.B., Colonial Office, *Report of the Commission on Mui Tsai in Hongkong and Malaya* (Colonial no. 125, 1937).

276 655 adopted a policy of total prohibition of opium-smoking in British and British-protected territories in the Far East then in enemy occupation.[1]

871 178 The phenomenal growth of Chinese education during the twenty-five years previous to the First World War brought the bulk of the Malayan Chinese within the sphere of influence of the educational movement which started with the revolution in China, and its importance is primarily political rather than cultural.

In 1938 there was a total of 268,007 pupils of all races attending educational institutions of all kinds in the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States alone.[2] Of these 204,040 were in institutions maintained or aided by Government funds. Of the latter, 18,522 Chinese boys and 8,452 Chinese girls were in Government and aided English schools; 34,813 boys and 14,458 girls were in aided Chinese schools. The total number of Chinese children in all Chinese schools in the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay [191] States was 91,534 (66,645 boys and 24,889 girls). That is to say that the number of Chinese children attending schools in which Chinese was the medium of instruction far exceeded that of the Chinese children attending schools in which English was the medium.

Including vocational schools, Government and private (1,214 boys and 165 girls), it is estimated that altogether 94,619 boys and 36,347 girls of Chinese race (total 130,966) were receiving an [212] education of some kind in 1938. This gives a percentage literacy of total population of 44 per cent. male and 10·7 per cent. female (based on the 1931 census figures; the 'general literacy' rates per mille from the 1947 census are given on p. 273).

873 185 Raffles had in mind an enlightened and far-reaching scheme when in 1823 he set aside a piece of ground for the Singapore Institution and provided an endowment for it. He meant to found a college with 'literary and moral' departments for Chinese, Malays, and Siamese, and with a scientific department attached to the English section but common to all. His intention (so far as we can

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[1] See p. 3, *Report of the Opium Commission* (Singapore, 1908). Vols. i and iii were published as Cmd. 4321 and Cmd. 4322 (1909).

[2] Figures for the Unfederated Malay States are incomplete, so those for the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States alone are given here.

873 185 divine it) was to make Singapore a centre for scholarship in these three Eastern languages, with the idea, perhaps, that the cultural creativeness of the three departments would overflow into the others, and that they should have a common ground in English and in science for which English was the natural medium.

As it turned out, Raffles's scheme came to nothing. His grant was applied in 1827 to elementary schools, and later in 1837 a school was founded with English, Malay, and Chinese classes—the Malay and Chinese failed through the apathy of the pupils, and only the English remained. The school became known as the Raffles Institution. Not until the foundation of the King Edward VII College of Medicine in 1910 did Singapore have any institution of collegiate standing, and it was not until 1928 that Raffles College came into being.

871 797 Meanwhile the various races of Malaya, with the active help of the Christian missionaries, were doing their best to educate their children according to their own lights and resources. A select committee of the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements, appointed in 1870 to inquire into local education, found a great variety and number of schools in the Colony, some purely educational, others combining charity with education, many under the control of the Roman Catholic clergy, but all, apparently, having a system of their own, unchecked, as a rule, by Government supervision.

871 [797] 658 The several Malay Governments took an increasing share in the provision of schools and the control of education. In the 1930s education in English was provided in a number of Government schools and schools conducted by missionary bodies which received grants-in-aid from the Government and were subject to inspection and control. Usually fees were charged, albeit small ones, and there was no approach to free universal education in English. The curriculum led through secondary education for those who could afford it and could profit by it to the Cambridge Examinations and usually to clerical employment in Government service or in private firms. The lucky few were able to proceed to the professions, either through the College of Medicine or Raffles College, or through some university outside Malaya. There were numerous scholarships open to children attending English schools.

In the Malay States primary education in Malay was free for all

[p.334]

871/658 Malay boys and girls, and compulsory for all boys living within a mile and a half of a Malay vernacular school. Estates employing over a certain number of Tamil labourers had to maintain a school and give free vernacular education to the children of Tamil labourers working on the estate. There were no such facilities for Chinese.

874/658 The popularity of education in English led to an over-emphasis on literary education and the production of more clerks than employers could absorb. The Government therefore concentrated more and more on technical and vocational training. Technical and agricultural colleges were established and also trade schools in which a boy could learn any trade from tailoring and book-keeping to plumbing and electric welding.

871/186 Meanwhile the system of English education did not touch the bulk of the Chinese. The fees, though small, and representing only a fraction of the cost to the Government of the pupil, were prohibitive to the great majority, and, quite apart from the question of expense, the migratory nature of such a great proportion of the population meant that many Chinese children arrived in Malaya too old to be received into the English schools. There was also a widespread feeling that English education led only to the 'white-collared' occupations which were already over-crowded. Independent of this was the sentiment which so many Chinese had in favour of education in their own language, a sentiment greatly reinforced by the nationalism fostered by the revolution.

871/658/186 By the beginning of the thirties the Malayan Governments were fully aware that the Chinese vernacular schools were claiming the great proportion of Chinese boys and girls at school, and that unless something was done to provide a counter-attraction the Chinese population of Malaya, even including many of the *Baba* families, would irrevocably be drawn within the sphere of Chinese nationalism and would tend to look, not to Malaya as their country, but to China. Such a happening would vitiate the whole declared official policy which was to create a Malayan spirit and sense of common nationality as the prerequisite for self-government within the British Commonwealth of Nations. The proposal of one Governor was to give to all races in Malaya free education in Malay which was to be made the common language of the country, but this was obviously unacceptable to the Chinese, let alone the other non-Malay communities, for Malay education would have led them

nowhere in this modern world. It was then proposed that there 871
should be universal free education in English. But nothing was 658
done, and the Chinese community was surrendered to Chinese
nationalism and, in effect, to Communism, for this was more and 186
more disseminated through the influence of poorly paid (and therefore leftist) teachers, so many of whom were employed in the Chinese vernacular schools.

The Chinese in Malaya had always done their best to educate 871
their children, but facilities were few and teachers hard to come
by. The schools were originally, of course, of the Old Style in 872
which the Four Books were learned by rote. The teacher, as likely
as not, combined his profession with that of fortune-teller, or [875]
geomantic diviner, and general learned odd man of the village, and 876
any man who could read and write fluently was considered as fully
qualified to teach. The schools themselves had to be seen to be
believed. Most of them were dirty, ill-ventilated, and ill-lighted [346]
basements, out-houses, or attics: the sanitation was non-existent; skin diseases were common among the pupils; the hubbub of pupils 'backing' their lessons was deafening to any European who came within range.

It was in Malaya that the Chinese Revolution of 1911 found some
of its principal supporters, and it was natural that the new zeal for [186]
education which was born with the Revolution should be shared by the Malayan Chinese. After 1917 when the National Language movement started in China, *Kuo yü* was adopted as the medium of instruction in all public schools.[1] It was only in the private schools that the Old System was retained.[2]

While the Governments were preoccupied with education in 871
English or Malay, the Chinese schools were left for some time to their own devices, but in 1920 onwards were brought under Government supervision and inspection.

Chinese schools in Malaya fell into the three following categories:

1. Those managed by properly constituted committees. (These might be run by district or surname associations or by Chinese families in a certain town or district.)

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[1] See p. 180 for general references to Chinese education.

[2] The number of Old System schools and pupils in the Federated Malay States and Straits Settlements in 1931 was 120 and 2,539: in 1938 the figures were 158 and 4,646 respectively.

871 2. Pseudo-public schools, i.e. schools organized by one or more teachers who chose their own 'committee members', i.e. shopkeepers, &c., who had been persuaded to lend their names, the principal teacher running the school to make what he could out of it.
3. Private schools run by teachers who relied on school fees, these schools being usually small and old in type. There were several *ping min* or free schools at which a nominal fee of 50 cents (1*s.* 2*d.*) a month was charged. The fees in the other schools were round about 3 dollars a month.

The main motive of the authorities in bringing the Chinese schools under inspection was admittedly political, but once the inspectorate staff was created and had got going with their work it became clear that political control brought with it some very definite educational responsibilities. In no way were the Chinese schools abreast of the English schools: their methods of instruction, their premises, their sanitation were all inferior to those of their English-speaking contemporaries. This was scarcely to be wondered at when it is remembered that the latter benefited from a system built up in more than fifty years of experience, enforced by a trained staff and supported, or aided, from Government revenue.

871 [875] 658 When a system of Government grants-in-aid was introduced for Chinese schools it was not at first received with any great enthusiasm. The teachers felt that their liberty to teach what they liked and how they liked was being encroached on and their influence for long was enough to prevent many school committees from applying for these grants. However, the pressure of economic circumstances (including the trade depression of 1930–2) brought about a change in attitude and most schools eligible for them applied for and received grants. They soon found the advantages of so doing, for the money made it possible to carry on the schools without debt, the good offices of the medical and health authorities and the municipalities and Sanitary Boards were ensured, and the teaching staff benefited from the advice of the inspectors of schools who held qualifications equal, if not superior, to those of any of the Chinese teachers. Light, ventilation, health measures of all sorts, and precautions against fire received an attention they had never had in the past.

In 1938 $341,369 was paid in grants to Chinese schools in the

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Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States. The Unfederated 871
Malay States had no system of grants-in-aid to Chinese schools.
The State Governments recognized no responsibility in this regard. 635
Thus, those Chinese who wished to have their children educated
in their own language had to maintain their own schools. In 658
Johore alone in 1938 there were 245 Chinese schools with 14,423
pupils.[1]

One problem for the authorities was the subversive teaching of 871
the pupils orally, and another was text-books. Some schools were
not educational institutions at all, merely centres of Communist 668
propaganda, especially the Hailam night-schools for adults, where Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other Communist authors were studied by pupils who had not enough general education to understand anything except the message of opposition to the local Government.

Text-books were an almost insoluble problem. Those used in the 872
Chinese schools in Malaya were all printed in China. The two
principal firms publishing them were the Commercial Press and 656
the Chung Hua Press, both of Shanghai. After 1925 a great deal of
anti-foreign material was introduced into them, intended in par- 186
ticular to stir up hatred of the British. (For example, a drawing in a text-book intended for children of about twelve years of age showed the 'May 30th Incident' at Shanghai in 1925 with British and Sikh policemen in uniform shooting down an unarmed crowd. In the history books much play was made with the 'Opium War'.) That the Chinese school children of Malaya should have race-hatred instilled into them in this manner could not, of course, be tolerated by the Government. The use of these text-books containing seditious matter or matter calculated to incite interracial hatred was forbidden, and the import of such books was prohibited. The outcome of this action was that the two principal Chinese publishing firms each produced a series free from objectionable matter and these were used in Malayan schools.

The solution, however, was a purely negative one. The text-books were about China exclusively: there was no mention in them of Malaya's history, geography, trade, commerce, its mixed population, or interests. It had been found impracticable to produce a series of text-books locally for use in Malayan Chinese schools, though there was an obvious need for one.

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[1] But see p. 338 for the astonishing post-war increase in school population.

871 648 186 Concurrently with these difficulties the Malayan Governments had to meet the increasing interest of the National Government of China in the education of overseas Chinese. Applying the Chinese law of nationality, the Chinese Government naturally regarded all Chinese overseas, including the Straits-born Chinese who were British subjects, as a proper object for their official solicitude. The Overseas Affairs Department (later Ministry) wished to bring the education of the children of overseas Chinese into line with home policy. The Chinese Government sent representatives to inspect the schools, requested that returns should be submitted to Nanking, and even instituted a system of grants-in-aid of their own for overseas Chinese schools. Such an attitude could not be viewed by the Malayan Governments with complacency while they regarded so many Chinese attending the schools as British subjects. Nor was it purely a matter of concern to the Malayan Governments. Many of the Chinese who had been born in Malaya, or who regarded Malaya as their home, were jealous of the pretensions of a remote Government in China to concern itself with what they regarded as a purely domestic matter. In race and sympathy they might be Chinese: politically they regarded themselves as Malayans.

871 Altogether the Malayan educational system was not promising to those who hoped for the achievement of a 'Malayan outlook'. The experience of educationists was in favour of educating a child in its own language before allowing it to learn another, but even so it was certain that if there were ever to be any progress towards the creation of a Malayan nation there must first be a move to unify the diverse and conflicting educational systems operating in the country.

871 727 The years following the Second World War were marked by a really astonishing increase in school population. It seemed as if the Malaysian peoples, made aware by the Japanese occupation of what the absence of education really meant, had decided to make a determined drive to get their children educated. In the Federation enrolment at the end of 1948 stood at 510,000; in December 1941 the figure had been 263,000. In Singapore the figure was 101,000 as compared with 72,000 in 1941 and the former figure did not include about 15,000 in unregistered schools. There is nothing to show what proportions of the increase were Chinese children, but the author would hazard a guess that it was largely accounted for

by the increased attendance in Chinese vernacular schools paid for in the main by the Chinese community.[1, 2]

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[1] G.B., Colonial Office, *British Dependencies in the Far East, 1945–9*, Cmd. 7709 (1949) p. 42.

[2] The Communities Liaison Committee (with Malay, Chinese, Indian, Ceylonese, and British representatives) on 19 September 1949 passed a resolution that 'every encouragement should be given to the establishment of a steadily increasing number of Government and Government-aided schools where children of all races attend together and the medium of instruction is Malay and English. *As such schools increase communal schools should be progressively reduced.*' *The Times*, 20 September 1949. (The italics are mine. V.P.)

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CHAPTER XXX

THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF THE MALAYAN CHINESE

454 One aspect of the share of the Chinese in local industry is the value of their investment and the returns derived from it; the other is the number of Chinese in the labour force of the industry.

Regarding the former only scanty information is available. It is, for example, impossible from existing records to discover with exactness the comparative extent of British, Chinese, and other investments in the basic industries of tin and rubber. However, an attempt has been made by an economist, Mr Helmut G. Callis, to estimate the extent of Chinese holdings in all undertakings in Malaya as they were before the Japanese invasion. In 1937 he estimated that the total Chinese investments in Malaya approximated to U.S. \$200 million (approximately £40 million) as compared with other foreign investments of \$454·5 million (approximately £90·9 million). The other foreign investments Mr Callis divides into rentier, \$82·5 million, and entrepreneur, \$372 million, slightly over 70 per cent. of the entrepreneur investment being British.[1]

[457] Chinese family remittances from Singapore and the Federation in 1948 totalled SS \$15,422,846. This was a decrease of SS \$7,522,287 compared with SS \$22,945,133 in 1947. Of the total remittances to China from Malaya in 1948 Singapore accounted for SS \$10,228,101 and the Federation for SS \$5,194,745.[2]

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464 Tin was the product of the Malay Peninsula in which the Chinese were mainly interested from the time of their earliest trading contacts. It is likely that they did in some instances superintend the mining of it, and Chinese may have been employed in certain undertakings, but the labour up to the nineteenth century was principally Malay. Towards the end of the eighteenth century the annual output in Perak was estimated at 5,000 piculs (16·8 piculs = 1 ton). The bulk of this tin was mined by Malays in Kinta and Batang Padang.[3] Newbold, as we have seen in a previous

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[1] *Foreign Capital in Southeast Asia* (mimeograph) (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942).

[2] *Straits Budget* (3 March 1949).

[3] For an account of Chinese mining see A. G. Macdonald and E. S. Willbourn, *Mining in Malaya*, revised ed. (London, Malayan Information Agency, 1940).

chapter, gives an estimate of the number of Chinese in the various 464 mining areas in the 1830s, but it was not until the discovery of the rich deposits in Larut in the fifties that Chinese miners flocked to 316 the fields in large numbers.

The gradual increase in the use of machinery, combined with 402 an ever-growing efficiency, has enabled deposits to be tackled which owing to depth, poverty of content, or wetness, could not 316 be worked at a profit in the past. Electric power was in 1939 rapidly replacing steam and oil in mines. One result of the developing importance of technology has been that the proportion of ore mined by European methods as against Chinese methods has tended to increase. This rise, however, was arrested after 1931 largely owing to the incidence of the tin scheme.[1] The introduction of the dredge in the first years of this century marked a revolution in the history of the industry. The dredges were owned by European companies, though Chinese and others, of course, were free to invest in the shares of these companies, and did so.

Mining methods of the second quarter of the twentieth century in Malaya were divided into dredging, gravel-pump, hydraulicizing, open-cast, alluvial shafting, lode mining, and *dulang* or panning. Most popular with the Chinese was the gravel-pump method. In this a pressure-pump was generally used to feed monitors which gave jets of water powerful enough to cut and disintegrate the ground. The broken material was washed along a channel in the bottom clay, and water was lifted by the gravel-pump to the head of a *palong*, or flume, which might be anything from 40 to 120 feet above the sump. The heavy tin ore was held in the *palong* by wooden bars, placed one above the other at intervals across the bottom of the flume; most of the lighter sand and clay passed out of the *palong* with the stream of water to be deposited in the allotted dumping space.

In considering the part played by the Chinese in mining in 316 Malaya we must take care to distinguish between ownership and 464

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[1] Source: *Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics relating to the Mining Industry in the Federated Malay States* (1939) vol. xi, no. 4, p. 11 (Kuala Lumpur, 1939). The following are figures for selected years:

	European (%)	*Chinese* (%)
1920	36	64
1925	44	56
1930	63	37
1938	67	33

316 [332] 464 methods, and labour. It is the Chinese who provide the bulk of all the labour.. Thus the enormous excavations in open-cast mines have been made by them—the old mine at Sungai Besi in Selangor is 3,000 feet long and 1,200 feet wide, with a depth of 125 feet, representing 16 million cubic yards of earth, all cut by hand labour using the *changkol* (a form of hoe). An even larger hole is at the Hong Fatt Mines near by, which is 310 feet deep and from which 30 million cubic yards of earth have been removed.

316 462 Open-cast mining by hand labour is a purely Chinese method. *Dulang* washing, or panning, is a method employed for obtaining tin ore in many parts of the country. The work is done by Chinese women, usually Hakkas. A shallow wooden dish, about 30 inches in diameter and 3½ inches deep in the centre, is dug into the sand of the sluice or stream bed and a quantity of sand and water is scooped into it. The dish is then subjected to a peculiar motion by which the waste material is washed over the edge and the ore remains. *Dulang* washers are a fairly common sight in Malaya and [854] are a striking reminder of the toughness of the Chinese. The women are bent double for hours in the heat of the sun, often immersed to the knees in water, and often with a baby strapped to their backs!

316 464 Other kinds of mining in Malaya depend largely on Chinese labour—coal (at Batu Arang in Selangor), gold (at Raub lode mine and, in a minor way, by alluvial mining), wolfram and scheelite, and the pre-war Japanese iron mines in Trengganu and Johore used Chinese labour.

249 464 While the Chinese predominated in the tin industry the Indian labourers were much more numerous in rubber growing. Chinese were used for the heavier work of clearing and planting and in the general opening-up operations, and they were also widely employed as tappers and their women as weeders. Their industry was [465] greater than that of the Indians, but they were more difficult to handle. They were intense individualists and would only work satisfactorily as tappers when they were paid by piece work.

249 162 There were in the Federated Malay States, 84,342 Chinese men and 16,447 Chinese women employed in the rubber industry in 1931 as compared with a total of 131,099 Indians and 27,618 Malays. In the Unfederated States the figures were 61,374 Chinese and 34,776 Malays, while Indians were not separately enumerated.[1]

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[1] Figures from the *Census Report, 1931*.

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A table published in 1932 gives the nationality of ownership of planted rubber estates of 100 acres and over in 1931. It shows that the Chinese in the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States owned 12·5 per cent. of the total as compared with 84 per cent. owned by non-Asiatics (including British, French, Belgians, Americans) and 2·3 per cent. owned by Indians.[1] In addition to this, Chinese owned many small-holdings. Small-holdings under rubber in the whole of Malaya accounted for 1,215,522 acres as compared with 1,855,797 acres for estates over 100 acres. The statistics do not show the extent of the Chinese ownership, but since a large proportion of the rubber holdings owned by Malays were rented by them to the Chinese to tap, 'ownership' does not convey very much. The production of the estates over 100 acres in 1931 was 239,435 tons for the whole of Malaya, and of the small-holdings, 195,422 tons. 249 454 423 433

As estate owners the Chinese had the advantage of smaller overhead costs as compared with the European estates, but the latter were worked on more scientific lines.

Since the war rubber production from small-holdings has just about equalled that from estates, and in a period of falling rubber prices the Chinese rubber owner, particularly the small-holder, is in a favourable position *vis-à-vis* the European estate with its higher costs.

Malaya's important and growing secondary industries were largely in Chinese hands. The pineapple industry, a creation of the 1930s, was entirely a Chinese enterprise. Canned pineapples in 1938 accounted for 1·2 per cent. of Malaya's entire export trade. In Singapore, Penang, Kuala Lumpur, Klang, Ipoh, and elsewhere the Chinese owned oil-mills, biscuit factories, rubber works for the manufacture of shoes, tires, &c., iron foundries, saw-mills, and sauce factories; there were Chinese shipping companies; they ran motor agencies and repair shops; the bulk of the retail trade everywhere was in their hands. 454 [245] 433

It is generally true to say that the Malays are the peasant proprietors and do most of the rice-growing (small though it may be compared with the consumption of the country) and the policy of Malay land reservation keeps the best rice land for the Malays. In the Federated Malay States in 1931 there were 78,009 Malays (44,421 males and 33,588 females) engaged in paddy planting; the 243 464

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[1] Source: *Malaya Rubber Statistics Handbook* (Singapore, 1932) p. 15.

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243 Indian rice-growers were 1,892 (1,689 males and 203 females); the
464 Chinese were only just over a thousand (1,038—including 77 females). In the Unfederated Malay States the proportions were: 159,861 Malays to 5,888 Chinese, while Indians were not separately enumerated. In the Straits Settlements, where the land under rice was small, there were 2,877 Malay, 84 Indian, and 322 Chinese planters.[1]

Fishing was comparatively a small industry. In the Straits Settle-
226 ments there were, in 1931, 9,159 Malay fishermen, 335 Indians,
464 and 6,092 Chinese; in the Federated Malay States, 5,717 Malays, 56 Indians, and 7,291 Chinese; in Johore, 2,552 Malays, no Indians, and 2,257 Chinese; in Kedah and Perlis, 2,185 Malays, no Indians, and 522 Chinese; in Kelantan, 6,601 Malays, no Indians, and 15 Chinese; and in Trengganu, 10,204 Malays, no Indians, and 171 Chinese.

[441] The tendency in many regions of Malaya is for the fresh-fish trade to be in the hands of the Malays and the trade in cured and dried fish to be in the hands of the Chinese. Professor Firth says that the reason for this would seem to be that the handling of the latter commodities, particularly in large-scale export trade, demands distant business connexions, and at some stage the capacity to lay out capital and wait some time before it returns. Malays, Javanese, &c., are not necessarily lacking in these respects, but the Chinese commercial pattern is better adapted to take advantage of the situation. The Chinese *Towkay* advances money, or more often goods such as rice and cloth to the fishermen in the slack season against the security of their coming catches, and he also lends money for the purchase of boats and nets, or he may even lend such equipment without charge. In return he contracts with the fishermen to take their fish at an agreed price, or at a price of his own setting, usually rather below the free-market price.[2] The Chinese have also in recent years extended their participation in the actual fishing.[3]

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[1] It has often been remarked in Agricultural Department reports that Chinese rice planters get a much higher yield per acre than other planters.

[2] Raymond Firth, *Malay Fishermen: Their Peasant Economy* (London, Kegan Paul for the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1946) p. 13–14.

For a discussion of the economics of Malay fishermen *vis-à-vis* the Chinese see pp. 59–62, 68–9, and 333–8 of the same work. See also p. 247 of this study.

[3] The author well remembers when he was Protector of Chinese in Kedah in 1938 acting as a referee in a dispute between the Malay and Chinese fishermen

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Labour and Immigration

In the first part of this chapter labour has been considered purely 167 in its statistical aspect: it must now be regarded from a more human angle.

Collecting-agents for labourers were employed in China in the second half of the nineteenth century 'whose character', says 676 Morse, 'may be fitly expressed by the word "crimp"'. These men were given a capitation fee for every emigrant they brought to the receiving depot, or 'baracoon', at the port of departure. This fee was at the outset 3 dollars a head (figures of 1853) but no check on malpractices was possible, and in addition they appropriated to themselves, on the score of defraying expenses, the money advanced to the immigrants, which at the outset was 8 dollars each, but might, even officially, have been much more, and, in the competition of forwarding agents, might come to 100 dollars a head. With such rewards dangled before their eyes, the reckless and irresponsible crimps lost no opportunity and adopted every known method to draw their fellow countrymen as far as the entrance door of the baracoon—there their responsibility ended. The pledged emigrant was charged with the head-money paid to the crimp, with the advance made (nominally) to himself, and with the cost of maintenance at the depot. Without payment of this charge the emigrant was not free to leave; and as a single dollar was to him a great sum, he ceased to be a free agent from the moment he entered the doors of the depot.[1]

The coolie ships were floating hells. Even the modest space— 505 12 square feet (2 ft. × 6 ft.)—allowed by the Hong Kong Ordinance, was provided only in a few ships, and in general the space was only 8 square feet in slow sailing vessels. The mortality was great: suicides (the Asiatic form of ultimate protest) were common. 'But even the timorous rat', says Morse, 'will turn when cornered, and these timorous coolies not infrequently rose in mutiny against their oppressors.'

This is only the beginning of the recital of misery and horror which would fully describe the ordinary experience of Chinese

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of the State. The former resented the introduction by the latter of 'Siamese' fishing-traps which were much more efficient than those previously in use along the coast and which reduced the catch of the Malay fishermen.

[1] H. B. Morse, *International Relations of the Chinese Empire* (London, Longmans, 1918) ii. 167–72.

167 coolies enticed or conscripted for labour in the Nanyang, from the beginning of large-scale emigration until measures undertaken by the several colonial Governments began to have some effect.

167 Raffles, as in many other things in advance of his time, had as early as 1823 published an ordinance in which he made provision 656 for the protection of immigrants to Singapore,[1] but this ordinance 175 apparently dropped out of notice and for many decades there is no mention of supervision or control of Chinese immigration. Official attention seems next to have been called to the abuses of the coolie traffic by a petition in 1871 to the Governor from a number of Chinese merchants and citizens who spoke of the cheating and deceiving of the *sinkheh* (new arrival) by vagabonds who boarded the ships and clandestinely dealt in the coolie trade, spiriting away the *sinkheh* who was never heard of afterwards. This was the start of widespread agitation in which the *Straits Times* joined, but when the Government introduced a Bill, and, in spite of considerable unofficial opposition, passed an ordinance to protect the immigrants, it did not obtain public support. A large public meeting of the same year (1873) passed a resolution 'that the proposed Chinese Coolie Immigration Act is both impolitic and unnecessary: impolitic because it never can accomplish the object that it is designed to secure'.

These were the days of militant *laissez-faire* and the ordinance became a dead letter. It was not until the appointment of Mr Pickering as Protector of Chinese in 1877 and he had made a report revealing the scandalous state of affairs—gangs of men for shipment to Sumatra and the like—that a second Chinese Immigration Ordinance was passed. It provided for the regulation of ships engaged in the immigration trade and for the establishment of depots to receive the immigrants, and it made obligatory the registration of all contracts of labour by Chinese immigrants. Further legislation followed at intervals to remedy the defects in the existing law which experience had revealed.

A Protector of Chinese was appointed for Penang in 1880 and gradually a chain of Protectorates was established through the Peninsula.[2]

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[1] Ordinance quoted in *Labour Commission Report* (Singapore, 1891) p. 4.

[2] Pickering interested himself in the welfare of *transit* labour as well as that coming into the Colony and thus incurred the criticism of the Deli (Sumatra) Planters' Committee whose position was stated in *The Deli Chinese Question* (1882).

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In Singapore the Protectorate concentrated upon stopping 167
abuses connected with the importation of labour. The standard of
accommodation on both junks and steamers was improved. The 656
coolie had his contract properly explained to him and he was told 466
to whom he should apply for his legal rights. The coolie depots were licensed and supervised and care was taken to stop the kidnapping of labourers, both those who had paid their passage and others, for work up country or even outside Malaya. The number of passengers arriving who paid their own fares steadily increased and the presence of these independent men naturally tended to improve the status of the indentured labourers. Some of the more enlightened employers, such as the Penang Sugar Estates and the contractors from the Tanjong Pagar Dock Company, paid the passages from China of men recruited by their agents and employed them as free labourers.

In the meantime an agreement regarding labour had been made [648]
between Britain and China. In addition to other matters, the treaty empowered consuls to watch over the interests of the emigrants.

Indentured labour lasted, so far as the Chinese were concerned, until 1914, when it was abolished.[1] Thereafter the law provided that no engagement to labour for a period exceeding one month and no written contract to labour should be entered into.

The Labour Code as it stood at the time of the Japanese invasion 466
was the product of extensive experience. Its provisions which
touched the Chinese were numerous and covered everything from 656
the truck system to health and housing regulations. With it went a body of auxiliary legislation such as the Workmen's Compensation Ordinance of 1933, based on English law. Yet compared with the elaborate provisions for Indian labour, which regarded the Tamil labourer as much in need of paternal care, those to protect the Chinese labourer were very sparse. This was due to the belief that the Chinese, as a race, were well able to look after themselves. The inspection of places of labour—estates, mines, &c.—was carried out by Protectorate and health officers, but the duties of the former consisted mostly in mediation between employer and employed. By the thirties the feeling was growing that more should be done for Chinese labour. To this end Mr W. L. Blythe, of the Malayan civil service, was appointed in 1937 to inquire into the

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[1] This voluntary act on the part of the British Government killed the Penang sugar industry, and should be accounted to the British for altruism.

466 conditions among Chinese labourers, and in due course he submitted an exhaustive report.[1]

656 The Blythe Report concentrated on rubber estates and tin-mines, but investigations were also conducted in other industries—saw-mills, rubber and match factories, and in some of the shop industries such as carpentry, shoemaking, and polishing. The most striking general impression received was of the noticeable change in the outlook of the bulk of the labourers in the preceding few years. Progress in the emancipation of the Chinese labourer from indentured labour and widespread debt slavery had been greatly accelerated. Provision had been introduced into the Labour Code to deal with these abuses and much of the work of the Chinese Protectorate lay in their eradication. Difficulties occurred in the unwillingness of labourers to complain of 'old established customs' and they were more or less bound by ties to the contractor. Ten years previously the system had begun to disintegrate as labourers became increasingly aware of their rights, and the death-blow was given to it by the introduction of the Aliens Ordinance in the Straits Settlements (1 January 1933).

[167] Under this Aliens Ordinance the Governor-in-Council was given power to limit the number of aliens landed in the colony. The immediate result of this enactment had been a big increase in the cost of recruitment of labour from China and higher shipping rates charged by the shipping companies. Consequently it became much cheaper to recruit labour in Malaya where there was already an adequate supply. During Mr Blythe's tour no insistence on the old system was encountered. Recruitment was taking place from the local lodging-houses where labourers lived when unemployed, and there were some squatters living on vegetable gardens.

Concurrently with the development of free labour in Malaya a growing labour emancipation movement had also been taking place in China. The stronghold of the movement was Kwangtung province from whence the majority of labourers on estates and mines in Malaya were drawn. [467] Labour unions had been established in Malaya which were associated with the town industries, but they had had a 'leavening influence throughout the whole of Chinese labour'.

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[1] This report was printed in Malaya, but was not published. See also W. L. Blythe, 'Historical Sketch of Chinese Labour in Malaya', *JRASMB*, vol. xx, pt. 1 (1947) pp. 64–114.

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Amongst other developments a change was brought about in [493]
labour conditions by the introduction of cheap Japanese bicycles.
Squatters rode to work on them, labourers on the mines and estates
used them to ride into the villages for supplies, and there was a 466
continuous interchange between labourers and their fellows in the 178
vicinity. Still another development was the extraordinary increase [462
in the employment of Chinese women on the estates. Whole ship-
loads of Cantonese women had been arriving during the previous 167]
few years in search of work. This spate of female immigration was
probably due to the slump in the silk industry in China owing to the widespread use of rayon, and because women were exempt from the Malayan immigration quota. Most of the women employed on estates and mines were imported, and it would appear probable that Chinese labour forces were witnessing a transition from male to family labour. Marketing and cooking were being done by the female and by the contractor. Less opium was being smoked and some mines refused to employ smokers.

There appeared to be more direct contact between the management of European estates and their labour force, although this was far from being general. The proportion of the labourers who could speak Malay was increasing and the system of direct employment was being successfully put into practice to the exclusion of the contractor and to the benefit of the labourer and of these estates.

Wages varied according to local conditions from 48 cents on 465
estates in Perak to as high as $1.27 on the Budu estate (Kuala Lipis
Road). Weeders' wages varied from 55 to 80 cents per man em- 434
ployed on the *Kungsz-kung* (daily rates) and from 50 to 60 cents 511
for women. The monthly budget of the average tapper, buying his own food, amounted to $11, without leaving provision for amusements, opium, or remittances to China; rice, pork, and fish came to about 45 per cent. of his expenditure.

When the price of rubber fell, the Chinese labourers expected to be paid at lower rates, but they counted on having higher ones when the price rose.

In mines the rates of wages varied greatly owing to the many 316
different classes of labour, skilled and unskilled, and wages varied
from $90 to $100 per month in the case of European companies, 465
and from 86 cents to $1 daily paid by contractors. Employees provided their own food; lodging and lighting were provided by the

316 465 company. On open-cast and hydraulic mines rates were lower, but food, lodging, and lighting were, in many classes of labour, provided by the companies. Nominal wages for labourers on lode mines were 70 cents a day for Chinese men, 60 cents for Chinese women, and 40 cents for Chinese youths.

[511] A mining coolie's average monthly budget amounted to $9.70, including the purchase of food.

467 392 466 In foundries and engineering shops the workers were better organized than in most industries, and matters relating to wages, conditions of labour, holidays, &c., were usually settled with the fitters' and mechanics' associations. An eight-hour day was universal, with an increased rate for overtime. Wage rates varied considerably, a no. 1 fitter receiving from $2.72 to $2.96 daily and a general labourer 80 cents.

466 676 [468] The Blythe Report recommended a number of alterations and additions to the Labour Code, including a suggestion of making the principal contractor liable for wages in excess of fourteen days to the labourers employed on the contract. In 1936 and 1937 there had been a good deal of labour unrest. The sub-contractor system[1] lay at the root of many of these troubles.

722 466 468 The outbreak of war in 1939 caused a rise in the cost of living. Wages did not rise in keeping with this increase, though labourers were aware that the profits of the industry had risen too. The result was a number of serious strikes and the discontent was, as always, exploited by the agitator. There had been an excess of labour in 1938 which was employed on relief works, but the war changed the situation. Eventually adjustments of wages were made and the labour situation was comparatively settled for the remaining period before the Japanese invasion.

167 Completely free immigration of all races into Malaya had been allowed up to 1929, but the following year an Immigration Ordinance was brought into force as from August. In 1929, the last year of free immigration, the number of Chinese adult male labourers entering the Colony was 195,613, but in 1930 the number dropped to 151,693, and in 1931 to 49,723. The quota for male immigrants from January to September 1931 was 5,238 a month, and from October to December, 2,500. Emigration from China direct to the

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[1] By this the person who had obtained the contract let it out piecemeal to sub-contractors. Quite often sub-contractors who had failed to make a profit defaulted in the payment of wages.

Federated Malay States was stopped altogether. No restriction was 167 placed on the immigration of women and children.

There were a number of considerations influencing the Government 167 in its decision to restrict immigration. In 1929 the world trade depression had started and was most felt in Malaya from 1930 to 464 1932. There was great unemployment, especially among the Chinese, and the Government repatriated many thousands of them to China at the cost of some millions of dollars. Repatriation was [746] entirely voluntary, but the great majority of the unemployed availed themselves of the concession. It was felt by some that it was a mistake to get rid of labour which might be required again before very long and that a scheme of relief work on a large scale should be undertaken; in 1938, before the war absorbed all surplus labour, the Federated Malay States Governments did indeed adopt a relief scheme in place of free repatriation. There were some employers who thought that there should always be a considerable surplus of labour in order to keep down wages, but the Government did not accept this view: it believed that labour should be introduced only in such quantities as could be absorbed by the labour market.

The Immigration Restriction Ordinance was administered for 167 nearly four years and was then replaced by the Aliens Ordinance on 1 April 1933. From January to July 1932 the quota had been 2,500 656 a month and had been reduced to 1,000 a month from August to December. The quota was fixed at 1,000 from January to the end of March 1933, and remained at 1,000 to the end of the year. It remained at this figure when the proclamation was made under the Aliens Ordinance.

The restriction of immigrants applied to *all* aliens, but since the Chinese were most affected the measure was represented in interested quarters in China as discrimination against the Chinese race. This was not the case, and the considerations were purely economic.

Under the Aliens Ordinance newly arrived immigrants were 167 issued with landing-permits. Certificates of admission were issued either in exchange for a landing-permit or on payment of a fee of 656 5 dollars. They were valid for two years and renewable for further 505 periods of two years. Possession of a certificate of admission meant that the holder was not counted against the quota and could therefore obtain a passage from China to Malaya at a rate far less than

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167 656 505 that payable for quota passages. With restriction the prices of quota passages had soared, and since the sale of these passages was the monopoly of lodging-houses in China it was beyond the power of the Malayan authorities to deal with the 'racket'.

167 464 687 656 Illegal landings, in particular from junks full of Hailams which landed their passengers usually on the east coast of Malaya during the northeast monsoon, were attempted, but rarely with success (those who landed illegally, when apprehended, were returned to China), and the machinery of the new Immigration Department which had been created to administer the Aliens Ordinance worked very satisfactorily. But the intention to restrict immigration on a qualitative as well as a quantitative basis turned out to be impracticable. What was wanted in Malaya were agriculturists and labourers: the persons who could afford to pay high fares were traders and shop assistants of whom Malaya had already a sufficient supply.

167 The improvement in the economic situation in Malaya in the latter part of 1933 was reflected in the immigration figures, when the quota of 1,000 which had not been filled during the first nine months in the year was completely taken up during the last quarter. The tide definitely turned in April 1934 and for the year the excess of arrivals over departures was 142,089, whereas the deficit in 1933 had been 38,449.

From January to April 1934 the quota remained at 1,000 a month, was raised to 2,000 for May and June, to 3,000 for July, and to 4,000 from 1 August to the end of the year. It remained at 4,000 until 1 February 1937 when it was raised to 6,000 a month. It was reduced from 6,000 to 3,000 a month as from 1 January 1938, and again to 500 a month from 1 April, at which figure it remained up to the time of the Japanese occupation of 1942.

467 A suitable footnote to this chapter will be a summary of the facts of the organization of Chinese labour up to the Japanese occupation.

The original associations of Chinese engaged in a trade included both master and man. They were like the medieval guilds of Europe. In the early days in Malaya the various lodges of the Triad Society were not illegal and fulfilled some of the functions elsewhere filled by trade associations. They were large mutual-benefit associations, covering between them the whole of the Chinese population. The trade guilds proper had existed in China from

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ancient times, and were particularly common in Malaya among old-established trades, such as tailoring, shoemaking, carpentry, &c. 467 Each type of guild was governed by a committee composed of employers and employees. Rates of wages, hours of work, holidays and terms of apprenticeship were decided by the guilds. [456] In addition they frequently fulfilled the role of friendly societies, providing funeral benefits for the members and accommodation for unemployed.

Legislation providing for the registration of societies was introduced in the Colony in 1889 and in the Federated Malay States in 1895. The organization of societies specifically for employees did not, generally speaking, take place until the 1920s.

The inspiration of the modern labour movement in Malaya resulted from the development of the movement in China. The first National Labour Conference was held in Canton in 1922. In 1927, when the Kuomintang was purged, the Central Government took action which resulted in the suspension of all labour unions and the cessation of all labour activities until the promulgation of the Labour Union Law in 1929. After that the labour movement in China was under the direct supervision of the Kuomintang.

Political and industrial labour agitation in Malaya became more and more intermingled. After the Double Seventh (7 July 1937) when Japan attacked China, the labour organizations were connected with the Anti-Enemy-Backing-up Society, which took direct action against those dealing in Japanese goods.

The shortcoming of these labour associations, which were registered by Government, was that they had no suitable machinery for [468] collective bargaining. The trade-union legislation, brought into force in 1941, was designed to supply this deficiency. The Japanese invasion interposed itself, and the law was never seen in operation. [722] After the surrender, and under the iron heel of Japanese military government, the free organization of labour ceased entirely. The rule was a simple one—either one worked for the Japanese war effort or one did not eat.

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CHAPTER XXXI

CHINESE POLITICAL SOCIETIES IN MALAYA, 1911-41

668 THE first political society with revolution in China as its object was the Hsing Chung Hui, founded by Dr Sun Yat-sen in 1894 in Honolulu, whither he had come to get assistance for his scheme to overthrow the Manchu dynasty. Dr Sun is believed to have visited Singapore first of all in 1900 (the statement that he was arrested there and deported for five years is not borne out by any official record). From 1900 to 1905 the Hsing Chung Hui was responsible for every armed rising in China. In the latter year it was combined with certain other revolutionary societies under the title of Tung Meng Hui, with Dr Sun as president.

The Singapore branch of the Tung Meng Hui was formed in February 1906. There was already in existence in Singapore a political party known as the Chung Hui Tang which had been formed by Yau Lit, an original member of the Hsing Chung Hui in Hong Kong. Dr Sun returned to Singapore in 1906 and proceeded to form another branch of the Tung Meng Hui in Kuala Lumpur. He failed, however, to do the same in Ipoh because of the opposition of the royalist party (i.e. pro-Manchu). Branches were formed later in Penang, Seremban, Malacca, and Kuala Pilah.

668 From 1905 to 1909 Singapore was a rendezvous for political
204 refugees from China, prominent among whom were Sun Yat-sen, Wang Ching-wei, and Hu Han-min. In 1907 a Chinese newspaper, the *Chung Hing Yat Pao*, was started with the object of advocating revolution in China. Other revolutionary papers sprang up and these were constantly at war with papers supporting the royalist (imperial) cause, notably the *Union Times* and the *Yat Pau Press.* [648] Dr Sun Yat-sen contributed many articles to the revolutionary papers and he received a warning from the Protector of Chinese about his attitude to the Manchu Government with which Great Britain was on friendly terms.

668 After an armed rebellion in China in 1908, arranged by Dr Sun, 700 rebels had to retreat to Tongking. Some of these were sent by the French to Singapore on Dr Sun's representations. They later

became connected with gang robberies in Jurong. It is interesting to note that between 1909 and 1911 a Triad society in Malacca [579] carried out a large number of gang robberies, the proceeds of which were sent to China to aid the revolutionary cause! 668

These years saw the birth of many societies, clubs, and reading-rooms which were a cloak for revolutionary propaganda. Prominent amongst these was the Chinese Philomathic Union in Penang which was registered under the Societies Ordinance in November 1908. In 1910 the *Kwang Wah Yat Pao* was founded in Penang by Tung Meng Hui members.

Dr Sun remained in Penang during 1910 and part of 1911, where he made appeals for funds to finance risings in Canton. His activities here led to a warning by the Protector of Chinese that he should leave the country. He left for Europe, later going to America, where he remained until the revolution had succeeded.

As a result of the revolution the Kuomintang came into being in China on 13 August 1912, and was a fusion of five societies including the Tung Meng Hui.

After the formation of the Kuomintang, Lu Chih was sent from China to organize a society, and in 1912 the Straits Settlements Government decided to register it under the Societies Ordinance, taking the view that the activities of the Tung Meng Hui had never been directed against the authority of the Governments of Malaya and that, the revolution having succeeded, the position of the party would be regularized. The first branch was consequently registered in Singapore on 18 December 1912, under the title of the 'Singapore Communication Lodge of the Kuomintang of Peking'. In 1913 of the eight principal office-bearers seven were British subjects, and one of these was Dr Lim Boon-keng. The lodge was [656] closed in 1914. This was due to the discovery of a scheme by which the lodge was ostensibly to be dissolved and to be replaced by a company, the Southseas Industries Co., Ltd., and in part to pressure put on the lodge by the registrar of societies to furnish him with names and addresses of the members. Hereafter the lodge existed in secret. A secret Penang branch also continued to exist. Other branches were registered under the Societies Enactment in the Federated Malay States, all in 1913, but disappeared or went underground, and were declared non-existent by a *Gazette* Notification of 1922. Other branches registered in the Federated Malay States at one time or another were also dissolved.

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669 Let us consider here briefly the subsequent history of the Kuomintang up to 1927, first in China and then in Malaya.

In 1913 the party came into the open again under Yuan Shih-k'ai, but an incipient revolution was suppressed and the Kuomintang proscribed. Yuan Shih-k'ai's subsequent attempt to make himself Emperor was frustrated, however, by the Kuomintang which roused the southern provinces to rebellion. Under Li Yuan-hung, who had a brief period of power, it aroused the opposition of the northern militarists and was dissolved in 1917. Thereupon Dr Sun Yat-sen formed a Kuomintang faction at Canton with assistance from military leaders from Kwangsi, Yunnan, and Fukien. The history of this adventure was most chequered. Dr Sun was driven out by his lieutenant-general, Chen Chiung-ming, in 1921: he returned again in February 1923, taking with him Michael Borodin, the Bolshevik adviser: he left for Peking again in 1924, probably because Canton had become too hot to hold him, and he died there in March 1925.

Dr Sun's teaching became of political importance only when he had been dead for two years. With the coming into power of the Kuomintang from 1927 under Chiang Kai-shek the 'Three Principles' were adopted as the basis of the policy of government. The fundamental law of citizenship, for example, was based on the first principle, 'Nationalism'. This was to have a considerable implication in the politics of Malaya. It is desirable therefore that we should take account of the *San Min Chu I*, which were embodied in a series of lectures delivered by Dr Sun in 1924–5.

The following is a very brief summary of the *San Min Chu I*.

I. *Nationalism*. The Chinese belong to the yellow race because they belong to the blood-stock of the yellow race. China is the only country where 'race' and 'nation' are the same. To save China we must certainly promote nationalism. The Chinese people are of the Han or Chinese race with common blood, common language, common religion, and common customs—a single race. China is in danger of a 'White Peril'. Not only is there a danger of China being swamped by the superior numbers of the white race—there is a more immediate and pressing danger in foreign political and economic domination and oppression. 'Cosmopolitanism' is merely a camouflage for imperialism. Nationalism must precede internationalism. We are the wronged races. To revive China's nationalism we must awaken the peopl to an understanding of China's position. China must recover her ancient morality. We must learn the strong points of the West—scientific knowledge and methods.

II. *Democracy*. Human government has passed through three stages—the theocratic, the autocratic, and the democratic. We are now in the fourth period—the era within states when people are battling against their monarchs and kings. The issue is now between good and evil, between might and right. The essential question is this: Is China to-day ripe for democracy? We Chinese must now follow world tendencies; nevertheless we must avoid false theories like Rousseau's 'natural rights'. The watchword of the French Revolution was Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. The Chinese do not yet understand what liberty really is. The Chinese have taken personal liberty for granted always like fresh air. The Western doctrine of liberty is out of place in China to-day, and generally misapplied. The aim of the Chinese revolution should be unity and freedom for the nation. Equality, too, is an artificial, not a natural, thing, and the only equality we can create is equality of national status. Because of the nature of her civilization China does not need personal liberty and equality as Europeans did. We will use our Principle of the People's Sovereignty and re-make China into a nation under complete popular rule, ahead of Europe or America. The machinery of government can be this—the people can use the controlling powers of suffrage, right of recall, right of referendum, and right of initiative. The five administrative powers of the Government are the legislative, judicial, executive, examination, and censorship.

III. *Livelihood*. The principle of livelihood is Socialism; it is Communism; it is Collectivism. The problem is a recent one due to the rapid progress of material civilization all over the world. The introduction of machinery brought unemployment. Although Socialism has been a growing force for several decades, Western nations have not yet found a solution for the questions involved in it. Marx was the first Socialist to rely on the facts. Since the interests of capitalists and workers inevitably conflict and cannot be reconciled, Marx said, struggle ensues and this struggle within society is what makes progress. But the actual facts do not bear this out. Socialized distribution has done much to destroy the monopoly of the tradesman; heavier taxation has

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had results beneficial to the workers. When the capitalists improve the living conditions of the workers, and the workers can produce more for the capitalists, this means both increased production and higher wages. Here surely is a reconciliation of the interests of capitalists and workers. Class war is a disease of social progress. The Kuomintang some time ago settled on its party platform that the principles of livelihood were to be carried out by the equalization of land ownership and by the regulation of capital. If we follow those two methods we can solve the livelihood problem in China. Food is the chief problem of livelihood. China has to import food. Because of foreign economic domination China exports food she needs for herself. We must improve agriculture, use scientific methods, study afforestation. We must create native industries. China must champion native goods and boycott foreign goods . . . [here the lectures break off].[1]

Sun Yat-sen's ideas for the salvation of China were formulated in other works of earlier date than the 'Three Principle' lectures summarized above, but the latter were the most explicit expression of his thoughts. The *San Min Chu I* has subsequently become the Bible of the New China. Mr O. M. Green speaks of the 'almost mystical influence on all classes of Dr Sun's "Three Principles"'.[2] He remarks that it is worth recording that almost from the outset of their career the Communists have clamoured for government 'in accordance with the principles of Dr Sun Yat-sen'. In fact both sides were appealing to the same authority. The question was, 'What did Sun Yat-sen mean?'

This study is concerned with the politics of China only in so far as they are reflected among the Chinese of Malaya. The rift between the Kuomintang and the Communists is a fact well known to the world at large: the controversies over the evolution from party to popular government belong to the history of China itself.

The local Government had suppressed the Kuomintang in

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[1] For an extended summary and detailed criticism of the *San Min Chu I* see the present writer's *Problems of Chinese Education* (London, Kegan Paul, 1936).

[2] *The Story of China's Revolution* (London, Hutchinson, 1945). Green says of Dr Sun: 'As a political thinker he was emotional and vacillating. At one moment he is found speaking with glowing admiration of Great Britain and the fruits of her political wisdom and integrity as displayed in Hongkong; at another he denounces her as the World's Public Enemy No. 1; while his famous "Three Principles of the People", the *San Min Chu I*, contain grains of real inspiration overlaid with childish reasoning, absurd inaccuracies and violent anti-foreignism, [illegible] by a farrago of blatant [illegible].'

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Malaya in 1925, since its activities were considered to be subversive of British rule, but it remained well established there. It was the agent for the distribution of a considerable quantity of nationalist propaganda printed in Canton which was strongly anti-British in tone. ('British imperialism feeds on blood . . .' is a quotation from it sufficiently indicating its tone.)

The activities of the Kuomintang in Malaya at this time might be classified under the headings (1) organization, (2) collection of funds, and (3) propaganda. (2) was always an important aim.

There was at this time an endeavour to swing towards the left wing which was issuing increasingly virulent propaganda, and Kuomintang labour organizations began to appear in the country under the name of 'mutual-benefit associations'.

The policy of the Malayan Governments was repressive of the Kuomintang, and a flood of anti-British, anti-capitalist, and anti-imperialist literature was condemned by the censorship. The bulk of the Chinese who took the principal part in this revolutionary agitation were Hailams (Hainanese). In 1926 they organized an association to promote an anti-foreign boycott in Singapore, supported by public disorder.

The Hailams, who provided most of the domestic servants in Malaya, are a race somewhat different from the mainland Chinese and are said to have a good deal of aboriginal blood in their veins. They were the first to take a left line in politics, partly, perhaps, to increase their prestige with the other Chinese by drawing attention to themselves. Later the Khehs (Hakkas) also showed a disposition to leftist politics. They, too, are a type of Chinese distinctly apart from the remainder and with a reputation for impatience of authority and independent views.

Apart from the actual subversive part of the Kuomintang activities, the attitude of the Malayan Governments was decided by the following consideration—that recognition would legalize the position of an *imperium in imperio* and it would legalize a rule of the Kuomintang which provided that in any secret, official or semi-official, non-foreign institutions, such as labour unions, clubs, chambers of commerce, schools, city councils, district councils, &c., the members must conform to Kuomintang organization in order to strengthen the power of the Kuomintang which would give directions to them.

The triumphant progress of the Kuomintang in China in 1926 and 1927 put the Malayan Governments in somewhat of a quandary. The recognition of the National Government of China, with the Kuomintang in the position of dictatorship, caused the British Foreign Office to consider that non-recognition of the Kuomintang was an anomaly. Thereafter ensued an agitation by the Chinese for the removal of the ban, which the Malayan Governments resisted. The Kuomintang argument was that there was general sympathy among the Chinese in Malaya for the Nationalist cause, and there was no disposition by the headquarters to recognize the extremist branches under Hailam directions. The policy of these elements was to support Dr. Sun Yat-sen's principle to unite Soviet Russia with the Communists and to join with the peasants and labourers. Such a policy found little support among the Chinese middle classes and among Cantonese skilled labour.

The purging of the Kuomintang of its Communist elements by Chiang Kai-shek had its repercussions in Malaya. The situation was reviewed for the first half of 1927 by the Governor, Sir Hugh Clifford. Sir Hugh had not been long in the country and first had doubts as to the wisdom of the current policy, but his views subsequently underwent a marked change. He wished at first to draw a dividing line between the moderate and the extremist branches of the Kuomintang. His opinion was that the moderates welcomed the ban on the Kuomintang in spite of their strong nationalist sentiments. The Straits Settlements Government denied that they regarded Chinese nationalism as a thing to be suppressed. All that the Malayan Government asked for was that when aliens came to Malaya they should leave their domestic policies behind, particularly such manifestations thereof as conflicted with the interests and the ideals of the country in which they were temporary residents.

The purging of the Kuomintang resulted in the extremists splitting off into organizations of their own, such as the Modern Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang of China, the Southseas Provisional Commission of the Communist Party of China, the Communist Youth Party, and the Nanyang Labour Union. These groups, consisting mainly of Hailams, diverted their energy to spreading Communism amongst the Malayan Chinese. The Malayan authorities were influenced greatly in their attitude towards the Kuomintang by the following considerations. They felt that an important objective of the Kuomintang in Malaya was the raising of money. Added to this, it was felt that the Chinese

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Government probably wanted on purely nationalist grounds to extend its influence over any large Chinese communities which had grown up in the countries outside its jurisdiction.[1] Also it was remembered that the Chinese secret societies had always relied upon terrorism to compel adherence to their ranks, and there seemed to be no reason to suppose that the supporters of the Kuomintang would depart from this traditional practice. The Chinese Central Government, feeling in a strong position after its success in China itself, persisted in its endeavours to get the ban removed. It has been mentioned above that the British Foreign Office considered that it was illogical to treat the Kuomintang as a prohibited society in view of the fact that *de jure* recognition had now been accorded to the National Government of China which was founded on and closely interwoven with the Kuomintang. Nevertheless, the reluctance of the Governor, Sir Hugh Clifford, to give way continued. He pointed out that large numbers of leading members of the Chinese community viewed with apprehension the consequences of recognition, and they felt that so long as registration was refused the Chinese would have an excuse for declining to be admitted to membership. If registration were allowed the pressure that would be brought to bear on the local Chinese population by the Kuomintang would be irresistible. He added several other arguments, but running through them was the fear of a highly organized *imperium in imperio.*

We need not pursue in detail the history of the struggle of the Kuomintang for the right to organize in Malaya. The aggressive propaganda policy of the Chinese Government did not improve the atmosphere. For example, in July 1929, they published a list of 'Humiliation Days' together with the alleged facts of the events commemorated. These included the Shanghai and Shameen incidents, and the list was calculated to cause bitter ill-feeling against Britain. It was suspected by the Malayan Governments that the Kuomintang regarded Indochina, Hong Kong, and even Malaya itself as *terra irredenta.* Sun Yat-sen's first principle of nationality which adopted the theory that nationality followed the *jus sanguinis* and not *jus soli*, was always in the minds of the Governments of the countries affected. But the situation was in fact an anomalous

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[1] Up to the middle of June 1928 about $2,100 million had been received by the Central Government from the Kuomintang in Malaya, Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines.

668 one, since the Kuomintang continued to organize in great detail in the Nanyang. Voluminous correspondence passed backwards and forwards between the central party and its Malayan branches. Sir Cecil Clementi, the new Governor, who had taken up his post in 1929, took a strong line with the Kuomintang. He summoned the members of the local executive and supervisory committees and told them that their organization could no longer be permitted and must be dissolved.

In November 1930, owing to the reactions in China to Sir Cecil Clementi's policy, it was considered that the time had come to modify it. Capital was being made out of it by Hu Han-min and others to stir up feeling against the Malayan Governments. Discussions took place between Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister in China, and Mr Wang Cheng-ting, and in consequence of this a compromise was reached whereby the Malayan Governments were to take steps to amend their local legislation, making it clear that the Kuomintang of China was not, as such, an illegal society in Malaya, that there was no objection to any Chinese in Malaya being a member of the Kuomintang of China, and that there would be no interference with the members of the *Tang* so long as their activities were not inimical to the interests of the local Governments and provided no attempts were made to re-establish control over branch *Tangpu* or other form of local *Tang* organization in Malaya.

The amending legislation was passed in Malaya, though it cannot be said that it made any difference to the situation. But it was only after the start of the Sino-Japanese hostilities in 1937 that the Malayan Governments had cause for serious complaint. In the meantime, in 1939, the Chinese Government had organized its Overseas Department.

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457 The situation hereafter turns upon the conflicting policies of the Chinese Government and of the British Government. The Chinese were at war with the Japanese and naturally used every means in their power of consolidating sentiment on behalf of their country among persons of their own race, and of embarrassing the Japanese in commerce. The sums of money remitted from Malaya and elsewhere were also an important factor in their resistance to Japan. Britain, on the other hand, was at peace with Japan, and was therefore bound to suppress any activity within her territory against her. The Malayan Governments, none the less, were not at all unsym-

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pathetic to Chinese nationalism during this period and were as lenient as possible, allowing the remission of large sums of money to China for the China Distress Relief Fund, used to help resistance to the Japanese. [457] 648 668

We have now approached the last phase of the relations between the Malayan Governments and the Kuomintang before the Japanese invasion of December 1941. In June 1941 the activities of the San Min Chu I Youth Corps in Malaya in stirring up feeling against Japan (with which Britain was then at peace) were assuming such alarming proportions since the recent visit of a General Wu that the Governor resolved on action against it. The British ambassador in Chungking, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, suggested a visit of two or three Malayan officers to make contacts with Chinese officials to discuss this and related matters. In consequence of this two officers of the Malayan civil service, and the inspector-general of police, Straits Settlements, visited Chungking. This was a short time before the Japanese invasion, which interrupted negotiations regarding the Kuomintang.

We will now resume the history of the Communist Party in Malaya in pre-war years. 668

Evidence of Communist activity came to light in 1934 in the shape of directions issued by the Comintern Parties in Shanghai to the central committee of the Malayan Communist Party. Mass activities were ordered, to include strikes, sabotage in the naval base, transport boycotts, demonstrations against increased taxation, &c. On receipt of this letter the Malayan Communist Party and the Malayan Communist Youth Corps launched a 'purification' campaign, and a 'rushing' period was started to give impetus to the party's forward march to its final goal, the Malayan revolution. During the Jubilee celebrations in May 1935 the Malayan General Labour Union demonstrated against them, anti-British slogans were posted up, and there was some incendiarism against the decorations in Penang, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore, and a few pamphlets were thrown about in the streets. A recital of these incidents, however, gives a more serious impression than is warranted by the facts.

The central committee of the Malayan Communist Party this time requested a sort of secret liaison with the Third International

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668 and asked for relationships to be established between the Malayan Communist Party and those in India and England. It also recommended that students be sent from Malaya to the U.S.S.R. for training and that an inspector be sent to Malaya to inspect party organizations. In order to co-ordinate and unite the Communist effort a unification committee was formed by the central committee, composed of one Indian, one Malay, and one Chinese.

The Communist Party had some limited success in fostering discontent amongst the Cantonese and Hokkien labourers at the naval base, at the new prison, and at the military barracks. During 1935 anti-Japanese and, at the same time, anti-Kuomintang campaigns were launched and demonstrations occurred outside the Japanese Club, but by December 1935 the activities of the party slumped, though a good deal of anti-war and anti-Japanese propaganda continued to be distributed. During 1936 the party took an active share in organizing strikes.

[468] Following the *coup d'état* in China, when Chiang Kai-shek was captured in Sian by Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang, the National Salvation Movement, which resulted from this incident, was brought prominently before the public, and in Malaya a central committee took advantage of the situation to form branches for raising funds to assist the troops fighting the Japanese in Suiyüan.

The outbreak of war between China and Japan in July 1937 was exploited by the Communist Party, which brought new recruits of its own to the National Salvation Association, and in order to foster anti-Japanese feelings an overseas branch of the association was formed with two committees—underground and open. The former became responsible for recruiting Communists amongst its members, while the latter was designed to attract anti-Communists and members of other party organizations who would not have joined had they been aware of any Communist influence. By 1938 there was an outcry against Trotskyites and a new policy was put into practice with an anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist front for organizing strikes. The organization of the party was very complex with the central committee directing all activities, the Communist Youth Section, General Labour Union, a Picket Corps (used for intimidation purposes), a Special Branch (a sort of Communist Gestapo), and a Malayan Racial Emancipation League, to bring Malays and Indians into the Communist fold. Added to this were an Oversea Chinese National Salvation Association to play on the patriotic

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feelings of young Chinese, and, having brought them under its influence, to teach them the principles of Communism, and a Proletarian Writers' Association. The healing of the breach between the Kuomintang and the Communists in China after the Sian *coup d'état* had further repercussions in Malaya. The names of the various Communist organizations in Malaya were changed to suit the general anti-Japanese policy part, e.g. the General Labour Union, now became the Labouring Classes Anti-Enemy-Backing-up Society. (The complexities of the reorganization at this period are difficult to follow and a mere recital of names would confuse the story.)

After the outbreak of war with Germany in 1939 the Malayan Communist Party began to turn its attention to a possibility of war between Great Britain and Japan, and it eventually issued pamphlets setting forth the terms on which it would be prepared to assist the local Government in such an event. These were similar to those presented by the China Communist Party and the National Government of China, and included (*a*) the abandonment of reactionary policy, (*b*) the adoption of the democratic system, and (c) the improvement of the livelihood of the people, in addition to an official expression of willingness to co-operate with the Communists. But, receiving no response from the Malayan Governments, the Communists, notably the Anti-Enemy-Backing-up Society, continued to issue anti-British literature.[1] About the middle of September 1940 the Malayan Communist Party received instructions from the China Communist Party in Hong Kong to the following effect: that all anti-British movements and strike agitations were to cease forthwith in Malaya, and henceforth the party was to concentrate on consolidating an anti-Japanese front and to support the National Salvation Movement in Malaya, and no opposition was to be offered by the party to any campaign initiated by the Chinese community in Malaya to aid the British war-effort. The Malayan Communist Party decided to accept these orders. The movement had been inspired by an agreement reached in 1940 between the Chinese National Government and the Chinese Communist Party in Chungking. But in spite of this the agitation in industry by the party continued.

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[1] It is convenient here to mention that the Wang Ching-wei faction, which never obtained any particular hold in Malaya, issued anti-British literature, some of which found its way to Malaya.

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It seems certain that the local Communists were in a dilemma. Between 22 June 1941, when Germany attacked Russia, and 8 December 1941, when Japan attacked Malaya, their position was anomalous. However, after the attack upon Russia by Germany the Communist Party became much less bitter in its attacks on Britain, and after the invasion of Malaya the policy entirely changed. The party now came up wholeheartedly on the side of the local Government.

It was not until the invasion had been in progress for nearly a month that an effort was made to have the Chinese political parties together in a common war front, and at the end of December 1941 the Chinese Mobilization Committee was formed under the chairmanship of Mr Tan Kah-kee. This Committee had the approval of both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and received the blessings of the Governor, Sir Shenton Thomas. Its members took part in resistance to the Japanese in many ways, and they acted as auxiliary police in Johore Bharu, filling in the gap between the departure of the regular police and the arrival of the enemy. On the arrival of the Japanese in the mangrove swamps of Singapore Island a contingent, part of 'Dalforce', fought with considerable bravery. But this was a last-moment development, and was too late to be really effective. The end came with the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND AFTER

When the war with Germany broke out in 1939 the function 722 allotted to Malaya in imperial strategy was that of producing rubber and tin to feed the war machine and to enable Britain to obtain the United States dollars so essential to the war effort before the days of Lend-Lease. It had never been the policy to arm the peoples of Malaya or to train them for military service. By the fall of France the whole position was altered, and it was obvious that Malaya must take urgent measures for its own defence.[1]

It has often been asked why it was that the Malays and the [723] Chinese were not armed *en masse* in this crisis. The answer was that the supplies wherewith to arm and the personnel to train them did not exist in the country. The only course open was to extend the existing forces as far as possible.[2]

Besides adding to the volunteers and creating the local defence corps, the Government now organized the so-called passive defence services—air raid precautions, medical auxiliary service, auxiliary fire service, and rescue, burial, and demolition squads. In all these services the Chinese were the most numerous race. They were also largely represented in the miscellaneous war services—canteens, blood transfusions and employment in censorship, telephone exchanges, Government offices, and in the departments of the Navy, Army, and Air Force.

Since the outbreak of the war between China and Japan in 1937 722 the China Distress Relief Fund had been generously supported by the Malayan Chinese, but after the beginning of the war between 431 Germany and Britain in 1939 a Patriotic War Fund was started in 741 Malaya which also received liberal support from the Chinese community. Millions of dollars were raised for the comforts of British

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[1] For details regarding the war effort of the several communities in Malaya, see Sir George Maxwell, ed., *The Civil Defence of Malaya* (London, Hutchinson, 1944).

[2] There was one Chinese company of volunteers each in Singapore, Penang, and Malacca with a paper strength of 120 for each company. All the Chinese members were English-educated. There were no Chinese companies in the Federated Malay States. In February 1941 the local defence corps, which until then had for all practical purposes been European, was opened to non-European British subjects and British-protected persons over eighteen.

722 431 741 troops and British people suffering distress in any part of the world. Of this fund, to which the Chinese were the largest subscribers, £375,000 was remitted for the people of London during the German air attacks. In addition to this, £575,000 was raised from local subscriptions for the Malayan Bomber Fund.

722 668 During the Japanese invasion everything the Chinese community could do to assist the British cause they did. Apart from their contribution to the passive defence and other services, there are numerous stories of the assistance given by Chinese squatters and coolies to British troops at the risk of their lives; there was never a case of a European refugee asking for help in the shape of food or money or active support and being refused it.

722 726 In the last week of December 1941 the Chinese Mobilization Committee was organized under the chairmanship of Mr Tan Kahkee for the purpose of recruiting the full man-power of the Chinese community in the defence of Malaya. Many of the recruits were labourers on defence work, but a force of about 1,000, most of whom were Communists, became a part of 'Dalforce', and fought in the mangrove swamps of Singapore Island during the last phase of the campaign. Though inadequately armed, they fought with courage and suffered many casualties.[1]

722 726 579 Chinese gangs, on the other hand, were foremost in the looting and then in the rioting and terrorism that took place during the Japanese advance. The advanced parties of Japanese had themselves engaged in looting and rioting, but when the main body of the Japanese army arrived their treatment of the local looters and robbers was summary and exemplary. Condemned offenders were publicly executed and their heads displayed on poles in the marketplaces and on bridges. This had a deterrent effect, but the wastage created by the looters was colossal—rice, afterwards to be so preci-

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[1] 'Not long after the outbreak of war in the Far East, the Malayan Communist Party had put up a proposal to the Government that the Chinese should be allowed to form a military force to fight the Japanese, and that it should be armed by the British. The Commander-in-Chief at first refused to allow this, but as the war situation rapidly deteriorated he eventually gave permission for the organization [one for training jungle fighters] to train and use a certain number of the Chinese selected and supplied by the Malayan Communist Party. When necessary, sanction for release from gaol for this purpose was also given.' F. Spencer Chapman, D.S.O., *The Jungle is Neutral* (London, Chatto & Windus, 1949) p. 160.

The first batch of Chinese Communists was picked up for training on 20 December 1941.

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ous, was strewn over the roadway and tins of provisions were 722
littered everywhere.[1] Rape, too, was also a real scourge in occupied 726
Malaya. Most atrocious, perhaps, was rape by gangs of armed
robbers, Chinese, Malays, and Indians. But it was the Japanese 579
conquerors who conducted rape on the grand scale.

The Chinese, beyond all others, the Japanese regarded as their 727
implacable enemies, and of the Chinese the Communists stood
first. Soon after the surrender of Singapore on 15 February 1942 668
identification parades were organized to pick out Chinese who had
been active against the Japanese or who were likely to be so. In- 722
formers—men, women, and boys—hooded like members of the
Ku Klux Klan, picked out victims by the hundreds or thousands.[2]
There was mass execution lasting for days. The numbers that
perished in the purge have been variously estimated, even into
the hundred thousand, but from the evidence given at the war
crimes trials in 1947 it would appear that 5,000 or more is nearer
the truth.[3] Eyewitnesses of the murders, Europeans as well as
Chinese, are numerous. Some victims were shot as they stood;
others were tortured to death. Hundreds were put on to lighters,
towed out into the harbour, and forced to jump in the water. From
the launches or naval vessels which towed them Japanese machine-gunned them as they swam or struggled in the water.

Those Chinese who were particularly singled out for execution were (1) all who had had anything to do with the China Relief Fund, (2) rich men, who, presumably, had given most generously

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[1] In this account, *Malaya Upside Down*, by Chin Kee Onn (Singapore, 1946), has been followed and also a manuscript account by Chew Hock Leong.

[2] So say N. I. Low and H. M. Cheng in their book *This Singapore* (Singapore, City Book Store, 1947) p. 18, from which the above analysis of wanted men is quoted. They further give the story of a survivor of the machine-gunning on the beach at Tana Merah Besar, Singapore, in March 1942. The Chinese selected for execution were tied up in bunches of 8, 10, or 12, according to the length of electric wire available. Ordered to move off towards the sea, they were machine-gunned from pill-boxes. 'When the machine-gunning stopped soldiers came running to bayonet us.'

[3] 'Official estimates place the number of Chinese killed in the massacres at 5,000, but this figure is believed to be conservative.' *The Times* (11 March 1947). A Japanese officer, Lt.-Col. Hishakari Takafumi, gave evidence at a war crimes trial in Singapore in March 1947 that first of all he was told that 50,000 Chinese were to be killed in Singapore soon after the Japanese entry into the town but that later he was told that it had been found impossible to kill all the 50,000 people and that after half that number had been killed an order was received 'to stop the massacre'. Two Japanese officers were sentenced to death and seven to life imprisonment for these massacres. *The Straits Times* (3 April 1947).

727 to the Relief Fund, (3) adherents of Tan Kah-kee, an indefatigable
organizer of the Fund, (4) newspaper men, schoolmasters, and high
668 school students, (5) Hainanese (whom the Japanese regarded as
722 Communists one and all), (6) new-comers to Malaya who presumably had left China because they disliked the Japanese, (7) men with tattoo-marks who, according to the Japanese, were all members of secret societies, (8) volunteers, volunteer reservists, and members of 'Dalforce', (9) Government servants and men such as justices of the peace, members of the Legislative Council, &c., who were likely to have pro-British sympathies.

'Many a wanted whale slipped through the meshes of the Japanese net and many a minnow caught in it were not those the Japanese really wanted,' say Messrs Low and Cheng.

727 Next item on the programme of the 'Liberators of East Asia' and
the creators of the 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' was to squeeze every
651 cent they could out of the Chinese community. The leading
Chinese were told that a 'gift' from the Chinese of $50 million
661 had been decided upon. This was to be handed over on 20 April 1942, but when the day came the amount had not been fully subscribed. All that could be obtained in actual cash was $29 million. The rest was to be raised by loans from the Yokohama Specie Bank on security furnished by the contributors themselves and guaranteed by the respective Chinese associations in each State or Settlement. When the 'gift' was presented General Yamashita[1] somewhat ungraciously declared that it in no way redeemed the previous action of the Straits Chinese in having supported Britain and Chungking. 'What really matters', he said, 'is the attitude of the Malayan Chinese in the construction of the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia.'

To the insatiable Japanese the 'gift' was, of course, only a beginning. Within five months of the fall of Singapore the economic exploitation of Malaya had fairly begun. The Kaishas arrived; the Mitsui and Mitsubishi were the first in the field in the wake of the conquering army. Lesser Japanese civilian traders came in shoals for what was left of the spoils. They formed *Kumiai*, i.e. syndicates or guilds. They became, in effect, Government-protected compartments of the black market. They held the monopoly to fleece the public, but they were assisted by unscrupulous, get-rich-quick elements among the Chinese.

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[1] Afterwards hanged by the Americans in the Philippines.

The gambling propensities of the Chinese and other Asiatics [525] were obvious sources of profit to the conquerors, and gambling farms, long abolished by the British, were resuscitated in 1943.

It is clear from all the evidence available that the Japanese [661] regime was marked by bribery, corruption, and incompetence. In the planning of the military campaign there was some effective thinking with streaks of brilliance: in their administration of Malaya the Japanese committed a whole series of foolish errors. Some of these were due to a shortage of trained administrators (they had to rely often on ex-barbers, packers, or photographers) and more were due to a peculiar psychological blindness.

Meanwhile the population, and the urban Chinese in particular, [511] were suffering terrible hardship. Those who lived in the country districts and could produce a little for themselves were somewhat better off than the town dwellers, but all over Malaya malnutrition was general. The Japanese had no shipping to spare for the importation of rice from Burma and Siam, even if they had been disposed to allow the expenditure.

Outwardly there was compliance, and Oriental acceptance of the [181] conqueror; inwardly there was an ever-growing hatred. The Chinese have a capacity for subtle obstruction, for appearing to co-operate when they are working in the opposite direction all the time. They used their ingenuity to escape the face-slapping and other indignities which Japanese soldiers were fond of inflicting without any excuse; they kept out of the way of the Japanese as much as possible; they did nothing willingly for the conqueror, and avoided him by all sorts of devices. There was, indeed, a minority [826] who 'co-operated' with the Japanese for what they could get out of them, but there was even among these disreputable Chinese not a man who did not secretly hate and despise the 'barbarian dwarf'[1] for whom he was working.

A campaign was started soon after the capitulation to compel the [208] population to learn the Japanese language. Bonuses were paid to Government and municipal servants who acquired a certain proficiency, while schools discontinued the teaching of English and included Japanese as a compulsory subject. But the campaign was barren of enduring results.

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[1] The term (in Cantonese) *wo*, a dwarf, was traditionally used for the Japanese, for the Chinese, conscious of their own good proportions, despised the short legs of the Japanese more than any other of their characteristics.

727 671 The general Japanese education policy was that vernacular schools for Malays and Indians should continue as before the occupation, with Japanese teaching added to the syllabus. No Chinese schools were permitted, but Government-managed Nippon Go (Japanese language) schools were instituted and attended by Chinese children and children of other races as well. [191 There was little enthusiasm for a Japanese course of studies, and, although the teaching of English was theoretically prohibited, it was continued surreptitiously. 'It is interesting to record [says the report of the Malayan Union Education Department for 1946] that the oral examination conducted in Malaya as part of the 1946 Cambridge School Certificate examination, gave results that were surprisingly good in view of the years that had been lost.'[1]

726 668 Very soon after the Japanese occupation, resistance groups began to be organized in the country. The Chinese were the only ones in the field for the first two years of the occupation, but thereafter Malay groups were formed under British officers in north Perak and Kedah. The Malays also had a resistance group in Pahang from an early period, called the Wataniah.

There were two kinds of Chinese resistance groups. Firstly there were the armed military groups living hidden in the hills and jungles, and secondly there were underground organizations whose members lived openly in the towns or villages and who either assisted the guerrilla groups or resisted the Japanese in some other way. Intermingled with the underground movement was a political association first called the Anti-Japanese Union (AJU) and later the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Union (MPAJU), an almost entirely Chinese organization controlled by the Malayan Communist Party. The MPAJU supported the guerrillas, formerly known as the AJA, but later called the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). It was also known as the 'Three Star' Army from its badge—one star for each race—Chinese, Malay, and Indian—but it was in essence a Chinese movement. At the same time Kuomintang branches continued to exist underground. Later on, in 1944, a guerrilla force claiming adherence to the Kuomintang was located on the Siamese border. It was said to owe allegiance to Chungking and to be bitterly opposed to the MPAJU. There were clashes between this and sections of the MPAJA, but Force 136, a British

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[1] 'Education in the Malayan Union', *Colonial Review*, vol. v, no. 5 (March 1948) p. 148.

726 668 Force operating in the country, was able to localize it and to prevent serious fighting. The total armed Kuomintang strength was estimated to be not more than 500.

A small group of Malay guerrillas were raised by Force 136 officers in North Perak and were given the name of Ashkar Melayu Setia (AMS) or Loyal Malay Army.

[579] Lastly there were some small gangs who were later disowned by the MPAJA—professional bandits of pre-occupation days who donned the anti-Japanese cloak only to give cover to banditry.

726 725 668 The MPAJA was organized during and after the Malayan campaign of 1942 under the direction of the Malayan Communist Party. It was divided into provincial groups, each with its own group leader. The disposition of the groups was: first group, Selangor; second group, Negri Sembilan; third group, north Johore; fourth group, south Johore; fifth group, Perak; sixth group, west Pahang; seventh group, east Pahang; and eighth group, Kedah. The groups themselves were split up into a number of small camps hidden in the jungle. Their food supplies were received from outside, especially from the AJU, and augmented with the produce of their small gardens in the jungle. In some areas they were greatly assisted by the Sakai tribes (aborigines) who gave them more than they could spare from their own stock of food.

There were two or three officers who had remained behind to organize sabotage, and at least one of these, Lieut.-Colonel Spencer Chapman, D.S.O., had made contact with the MPAJA.[1] But it was not until May 1943 that reconnaissance parties of Force 136 arrived in the country by submarine or were dropped from aeroplanes. The leader of the first party was Lieut.-Colonel J. L. H. Davis.[2] He was able to establish relations with the Perak group of the MPAJA. Eventually an agreement was drawn up by which the MPAJA pledged itself to co-operate with and accept orders and instructions from the Supreme Allied Commander during the period of hostilities and in the period of military occupation there-

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[1] For a detailed account of the MPAJA during the Japanese occupation see F. Spencer Chapman, *The Jungle is Neutral* (London, Chatto & Windus, 1949). This chapter was written before Colonel Spencer Chapman's book was published. The author spent over three years in close association with the MPAJA and his book provides an invaluable account of the Chinese guerrillas. Colonel Chapman, while having great admiration for the courage and other qualities of the rank and file, considers that the leaders were much more concerned with creating a Communist Republic than with fighting the Japanese.

[2] Afterwards Colonel J. L. H. Davis, D.S.O. (of the Malayan police).

726 after, in return for arms, ammunition, and explosives, and the
equivalent of 150 taels of gold per month (roughly $3,000). The
725 MPAJA were not to be used for political purposes and no political
668 questions were to be discussed.

The relations between Colonel Davis, Major Broome,[1] who had now joined him, and the guerrillas was excellent. In all the MPAJA camps the discipline was good. All food and material needed for the camps was bought and paid for in the free market, though the raising of funds by the AJU on behalf of the guerrillas was, it seems, by use of the methods of the old Anti-Enemy-
[702] Backing-up Societies. The men in the camps were given military
training and education in Chinese mathematics. The general atmosphere was almost like that of a Boy Scout camp.

727 While Malaya was still in the occupation of the Japanese, the
Malayan Communist Party published its programme of nine points
668 which were (1) to drive the 'Japanese Fascists' out of Malaya and to establish a republic; (2) to establish a Government with representation from all the nationalities, improve living conditions, and develop industry, agriculture, and commerce; (3) to give freedom of speech, association, &c., and abolish the old oppressive laws; (4) increase wages, abolish high taxation, and money-lending at high interest; (5) reorganize the guerrillas into a National Defence Army; (6) establish free education in the several languages; (7) confiscate Fascist property and restore property confiscated by the Japanese; (8) practise tariff autonomy; and (9) combine with Russia and China to free the oppressed peoples of the East.

After the agreement had been made with the Supreme Allied Commander, the establishment of a Republic was placed in abeyance. The propaganda issued by the MPAJA was not at this time anti-British, but definitely anti-imperialist.

[725] The total strength of the MPAJA proper in 1944 was about 3,000–4,000, and in 1945, before the intended invasion, it had grown to 6,000–7,000. The function allotted to the guerrillas was similar to that allotted to the Maquis in France, but the Japanese surrender changed all the plans, and instead of the invasion there was a peaceful reoccupation.

The British forces of liberation reached Malaya early in September 1945. Forces landed at Penang on the 3rd, at Singapore on the 5th, they reached Kuala Lumpur on the 12th, Ipoh on the 16th,

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[1] Afterwards Colonel R. N. Broome, M.C. (of the Malayan civil service).

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but some outstations were not reoccupied until the end of the 727
month. In the interval between the Japanese evacuation of centres 668
to assemble for surrender and the arrival of the British troops the [579]
MPAJA came out of the jungle and assumed control. There was a great deal of looting by bandits and others during this same interregnum.

Malaya's welcome to the British Services was entirely spontaneous and genuine, but the welcome had been prepared by the Chinese generally on the assumption that the liberating forces would be Chinese, not British. The triumphal arches erected in the towns and villages were inscribed (in Chinese characters) to the 'Allied Armies' and in the interior they were usually inscribed to the various groups or battalions of the MPAJA alone. There is no doubt that many of the guerrillas for years had been so isolated from the world and from all information except what was contained in their own propaganda that they honestly believed that the Japanese surrender had been due to their own exclusive efforts, and this feeling was encouraged in any case by the better-informed leaders of the AJU behind the scenes.

There had been a complete alteration in the political atmosphere 668
of Malaya since 1941. Until then, thanks to British influence, the 578
relations between the Chinese and the Malays, in spite of the con- 722
flict of their interests, had been harmonious. The Japanese occupation had changed that. To begin with, the bulk of the Malays were, it seems, not particularly hostile to the Japanese occupation, and many indeed welcomed the change since it promised to put an end to the economic and political encroachments of the Chinese. It was only later that the clumsiness of Japanese methods alienated the Malays as a whole.

Meanwhile, the Japanese were using the Malayan police force, 625
which was composed mostly of Malays, to suppress the Chinese 727
resistance movement. This fact naturally led to strong resentment, 579
and after the news of the surrender there was retaliation against the Malay police. The result was that the latter became demoralized and a complete reorganization of the force became necessary after the reoccupation before it was of any real value again. In the clashes which took place before the Japanese surrender and in November onwards the Malays were, however, the aggressors. In March 1946 the Chinese retaliated on a village on the Perak River and killed thirty or forty Malays. The measures taken by the

727 625 579 authorities to suppress the trouble took the form of military patrols, including tank patrols when feasible, and the sending of propagandist parties of Chinese and Malays to affected areas to keep the peace.

727 668 At the moment of the British return to Malaya the old Chinese *Towkay* (head of a business) had for the time being entirely lost his leadership of the community. Upon the liberation the leadership passed to the MPAJA leaders who were now converting their union into a 'People's Democratic Movement'. In Singapore and other large towns the Communist Party and the New Democratic Youth Corps were much to the fore. For the time being the Kuomintang and the San Min Chu I Youth were not in evidence. It was clear from the beginning that the leftist leaders were making a determined bid for power. They made it obvious that their promise of 'co-operation' with the British Military Administration was nothing more than a pretence. Colour, however, was given to this pretence by the omission of the first point (a republic) from the now-published Communist Party aims, but it was clear that this was no more than an act of expedience and the original objects were merely in abeyance, not dropped.

[208] Rallies of dozens of leftist organizations, from the General Labour Union (GLU) to the Coffee Shop Workers and the Barbers' Cultural Union, and several women's organizations, were held in strength in open spaces in towns and cities with speeches calculated to stir up the strongest emotion. The serious food situation, the delay in the arrival of rice for relief, and the inflation were exploited to arouse discontent. This led to rice riots in Perak in October. One device used on a number of occasions was to smear banners with the blood of victims—or alleged victims—of 'Fascist terrorism' and to carry them in rallies or in processions, and agitators did their best to work the crowds into a state of vengeful hysteria. When they succeeded there resulted a sound like the snarling of wild beasts. But at the beginning the popular feeling was so favourable towards the British that such incidents could not be developed into an insurrection.

One of the outstanding tasks of the British Military Administration was to disband the guerrillas without incident. The regular Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army numbered now about 3,000–4,000 and to an invitation issued to the remainder of the bona-fide guerrillas to become part and parcel of the MPAJA a couple of

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thousand responded. Then at the beginning of December the 727 MPAJA was disbanded, each man handing in his arms and equipment and receiving a gratuity of $350. Altogether some 6,800 men 668 were disarmed and received gratuities.[1]

The keynote of British Military Administration policy had been the widest possible tolerance consistent with public safety; complete freedom of speech and association were allowed. Apart from the wish of the administration to give the Communists the fullest opportunity to prove the sincerity or otherwise of their offer of co-operation, it was thought expedient in the interests of the mental health of the people that they should, after their long repression, be allowed to indulge their new-found sense of liberty and to 'blow off steam'. Moreover, the BMA had, in order to conform with the policy of the British Government, to avoid any suggestion that they were interfering with the legitimate activities of organized labour. In those early days the food shortage and consequent inflation caused understandable discontent amongst labourers, and [435] of this the Communist Party was able to make use. In its employment of this freedom the leftist press showed itself quite unconstrained by any considerations of what was either fair or sensible, and the *Voice of the People* and the *New Democracy* in Singapore (both Chinese-language papers) were telling their readers that the 'savage British Fascists were worse than the Japanese', without reference to the fact that when the Japanese were in occupation the writers of this invective had not pursued an equally active line.

Against the BMA the obvious weapon was the strike. Soon after 727 the return of the British a series of strikes occurred which while fundamentally economic in origin were worked up by trouble 668 makers for political ends. Concessions were made and a settlement 468 was reached. Then in January the GLU became more ambitious in its aims. Utilizing the fact that about thirty ex-members of the MPAJA had been arrested for offences which ranged from the possession of stolen property to murder, as well as the fact that a Chinese and three Indian labourers had been arrested for voluntarily causing hurt to a public servant during the troubles in December, the GLU demanded the unconditional release of all

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[1] This official figure, however, does not seem to square with the official figures of weapons recovered—i.e. 4,715 dropped and 5,497 recovered, plus 56 recovered from KMT guerrillas. The so-called Kuomintang guerrillas were disbanded in June 1946.

727 these persons under a threat of a general strike. This challenge the
668 BMA, of course, accepted.

The strike began on 29 January 1946, and it was officially esti-
468 mated that the number of persons who stopped work in Singapore, Johore, Negri Sembilan, and Selangor was over 150,000. About 3,500 intimidators operated with lorries and bicycles and also on foot, even intimidating the servants of BMA officials at their houses or billets. But on the 30th, for some reason which is not yet quite clear, the strike was called off. It may be that the GLU saw that the stoppage was not popular, and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Singapore had told the Principal Adviser on Chinese Affairs that they would get their members to reopen their shops at once if they were afforded protection.

But the fact that they had succeeded in bringing about a stoppage
727 on such a large scale had whetted the appetites of the Communists'
668 organizers behind the scenes for even greater successes. A rumour
579 soon began to circulate that the next move of the GLU would be to declare a public holiday on 15 February 1946, nominally as a day of 'humiliation', but quite obviously to celebrate the defeat of the British by the Japanese when Singapore had been surrendered on that date four years previously. Meetings and processions were to be held all over the country. The rumour turned into a certainty when manifestoes were issued declaring that the British in 1942 had abandoned the people of Malaya in a cowardly manner and that it was resolved to mourn this betrayal on the forthcoming anniversary.

Before the strike of January the GLU had got its bands of intimidators out early, but this time the military authorities and the BMA had taken precautions. The result was that on the morning of 15 February Singapore had every appearance of normality, the buses were running, trishaws and rickshaws were on the road, the markets were open, and all essential services were in operation. This was because cordons placed round the city had prevented the movement of intimidators who on the previous occasion had come in by lorry from Johore. One small party did indeed attempt to hold a demonstration, and participants armed with bottles, crowbars, and sticks came into collision with the police. Being assailed by the crowd, the police were forced to open fire and one Chinese was killed and another died later. Up country, however, in north Johore (a notorious centre of disturbance both before the war and

during the terror of 1948) a more serious incident occurred when 727
the police had again to open fire and fifteen persons were killed.

Once more the Communists had challenged the BMA in an 668
endeavour to bring them into hatred and contempt, and they had 579
completely failed. Ten Chinese who were behind the plot were later expelled to their native China.

The immediate result of the firm measures taken by the military 727
and the BMA on 15 February was that an almost audible sigh of
relief went up from all races throughout the country. Now that the 668
authorities had taken firm action, coolies, shop assistants, vegetable gardeners, squatters in remote districts—the great body of the ordinary people—plucked up courage to resist the demands for 'subscriptions' made by the Communists and their proliferating dependent societies. The membership of the leftist organizations fell off in a spectacular way. But the revolutionary elements were by no means defeated. Henceforth they would have to work more underground than they had since the liberation of Malaya.

While the battle was in progress between the Chinese Com- 727
munists and the BMA, which was supported now by both the
Kuomintang and the San Min Chu I Youth, now resuscitated, 665
there were some significant developments among the Malays. 668
These had never formed a political party. They were Malays and Mohammedans—nothing more. But in the post-war world when every race and nation had become politically minded, it seemed merely a matter of time before they too would enter the arena. So when on 30 November 1945 the creation of the Malay Nationalist Party was reported at Ipoh many people jumped to the conclusion that the movement had actually started. But it was soon apparent that the new party was under the auspices of the Malayan Communist Party and advocated identification of Malay and Indonesian interests. The eight resolutions passed at the inaugural meeting were very similar to the Communist Party's Eight Points.[1]

The Malay Nationalist Party after some initial success lost ground rapidly, though later on it recovered somewhat. The Malays as a whole were conservative and wanted no affiliation with the Communist Party, nor did they want any identification of the Malays of Malaya with the Indonesian movement. It was not until March of the following year that a really representative Malay party was formed under Dato Onn bin Ja'afar. This was to become

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[1] So it appeared at the time, but see p. 412, n. 1.

727 the United Malay Nationalist Organization, or UMNO, whose object was the uniting of the Malays of Malaya in an effort to
665 secure a reversal of the whole policy of the Malayan Union. (This development is discussed in the following chapter.)

668 The tactics of the MCP were to watch every new development in Malayan politics. Seeing that there was the beginning of a strong national feeling among the Malays it did its best to anticipate the movement and to get control of it by forming its own Malay Nationalist Party.[1] Similar tactics were employed with regard to the new Malayan Democratic Union whose formation was announced in December 1945. The sponsors were Chinese of the professional class, but the 'guest' speakers included several members of the Communist Party. Since the 'Eight Points' of the manifesto of the MDU began with the key point, Self-government for Malaya within the British Commonwealth of Nations, it was not easy to see what legitimate appeal such a party had for the Communists. Nevertheless, a Communist later joined the committee of the union. But soon after the MDU showed signs of wishing to purge itself of Communist influences and towards the end of the year it took on—at least temporarily—a more democratic colour.

The MDU aimed to be the party of the domiciled non-Malay Communities—Eurasian, local-born Chinese, local-born Indians, and others. In practice, it never became anything more than a small but vocal group in Singapore. The party exercised considerable influence for a time, by reason of the intellectual and professional standing of some of its members. It failed because of its fanatical hostility towards the British regime and its alliance with left wing elements, neither of which was approved by the middle classes of the English-speaking Asian public.[2]

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[1] But see footnote on p. 411.

[2] G. L. Peet, *Political Questions in Malaya* (Cambridge University Press, 1949) p. 13.

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CHAPTER XXXIII

CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT

THE historical summary given in Chapters XXVI to XXVIII 642 shows the piecemeal fashion in which the Malay Peninsula came under British protection. With each Malay State a treaty was 175 made whereby the ruler undertook that the advice of the British Resident or Adviser (as the case might be)[1] would be asked for, and acted upon, in all questions other than those touching the Mohammedan religion or Malay custom. Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang were federated in 1896 and decentralized in 1935. Separate treaties were made with the four northern States, the suzerainty over which was transferred from Siam to Britain in 1909. The result of all this was that at the time of the Japanese invasion a country about the size of England had no fewer than ten separate Governments.

The Federation comprised the four original States that came 642 under British protection. The hope of the British was that the States which subsequently entered into treaties with Britain would 645 join the Federation of their own volition. But for various reasons this did not come to pass. For one thing they observed that the 175 Federation had become very like a Union, and that the sovereignty of the ruler of each State was impaired by the strong central Government that had developed at the federal capital, Kuala Lumpur. Measures taken towards decentralization did not achieve the desired end. In 1909 a Federal Council was created in order to give effect to a desire for the joint arrangement of all matters of common interest to the Federation or affecting more than one State. In 1927 the Federal Council was reconstituted, and the rulers withdrew from active participation in the deliberations of the Council, which was enlarged by the addition of a number of official and unofficial members. In 1936, as a further step towards decentralization, the post of Chief Secretary to the Government was abolished and that of Federal Secretary was substituted, the precedence of which was after that of the four Residents. The intention was to replace the official who had become the virtual

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[1] In Johore the official was called General Adviser, in Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Trengganu, British Adviser. In each of the four Federated States there was a British Resident.

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642 645 175 ruler of the Federation by one whose duties were purely those of co-ordination and liaison, and though the machinery of the Federation was retained to facilitate the disposal of business common to the four States, their full sovereignty was ensured to them so that they were on an equality in this respect with the States outside the Federation. At the same time the departmental advisers were concentrated in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore and they were expected to co-ordinate policy throughout the country. But the system did not work well and the States tended more and more to be self-sufficient entities.

642 All these modifications in the existing shape of the Malayan constitutional 'set-up' were argued by the Colonial Office and by the Governors and high officials of Malaya itself as if the only political realities were the States, their Sultans, and the treaties with the King; the interests of the 'immigrant races' (though the immigration may have taken place a century ago or more) were a secondary consideration. The ruling caste (and through its single-minded advice, the Colonial Office) was emphatically 'Malay-minded'. Since, however, our subject is the Chinese in Malaya, let us see how they were affected by the situation.

[664] Having no share in the administration of the country, the Chinese limited their interest in British intervention in the Malay States to security for their trade and persons if they happened to be engaged in commerce or labour within the boundaries of the Malay States. The Straits Settlements Chinese frequently petitioned the British Government to intervene to restore order in the Peninsula, which was in a state of semi-anarchy. When the States one by one came under British protection the Chinese benefited by the establishment of a system of law and by an efficient administration. [646] Their own part in government was limited to representation on the Federal and State Councils and on various boards and committees. In the Straits Settlements the Legislative Council consisted at the outbreak of war with Japan of 27 members: 13 officials and 13 unofficials presided over by the Governor. Of the 13 unofficials, 6 were Asiatics, of whom 4 were Chinese. The Federal Council in 1940 had 28 members, of whom 12 were unofficials, including 2 Chinese. Each State had also a council which usually included, besides the ruler, 2 Malay chiefs, 2 British unofficial members, 2 Chinese unofficials, and 1 Indian.

Unity in this diversity had been maintained by the guiding hand of the British Government acting through advice given to the rulers. Economic and social rivalries had been kept from developing dangerously, and social harmony had prevailed. This was well enough so long as 'government from above'—paternal government—endured: the question was how could the country be made to stand on its own feet when the time came? How could the several elements be fused into a whole? As early as 1880 Sir Frederick Weld, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, had declared that 'nothing we have done so far has taught them [the people of the country] to govern themselves, we are merely teaching them to co-operate with us and govern under our guidance'.[1] Practically all that had been done in this direction up to the Second World War had been to carry out a policy of progressive replacement of European district officers in the Malay States by Malays, but, apart from giving them a few minor legal and other posts in the Straits Settlements, nothing had been done to give the Chinese experience of administration. 642

This was where the problem rested at the start of the Second World War. Britain was absorbed in her struggle for survival, and it was not until it became likely that the lost dependencies of Southeast Asia might be recovered in the not too distant future that attention was directed towards the question of post-war policy. In July 1943 the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated: 'We are pledged to guide Colonial peoples along the road to self-government within the framework of the British Empire.' The first precise declaration of the policy to be adopted in the case of Malaya came in the form of an answer by the Secretary of State to a question in Parliament made on 10 October 1945. Its gist was as follows: 642 185

Careful consideration had been given to the future of Malaya and the need to promote the sense of unity and common citizenship which would develop the country's strength and capacity, in due course, for self-government within the British Commonwealth. The policy of the British Government would therefore call for a constitutional Union of Malaya and for the institution of a Malayan citizenship which would give equal citizenship rights to all who claimed Malaya as their homeland. For this purpose fresh agreements needed to be arranged with the Malay States rulers and fresh [641]

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[1] Dispatch of 21 October 1880, cited by Rupert Emerson in *Malaysia: A Study of Direct and Indirect Rule* (London, Macmillan, 1937) p. 131.

642 185 constitutional measures for the Straits Settlements. The Malayan Union would consist of the nine States in the Malay Peninsula and all of the two Settlements of Penang and Malacca. Singapore at this stage would require separate constitutional treatment and, in view of its special economic and other interests, provision would be made for it to be constituted as a separate Colony. But the ties between Singapore and the mainland might well work towards ultimate union. The peoples of Penang and Malacca would lose [641] none of their rights as British citizens. There would also be created a Malayan Union citizenship for which the qualifications would be birth in Malaya or a suitable period of residence.[1]

642 648 Simultaneously with this declaration, Sir Harold MacMichael arrived in Malaya to arrange new treaties with the Sultans. He spent three months in the country and then issued a statement announcing that he had 'successfully concluded with each of the Malay Rulers, after consultations conducted with friendliness and good will, an agreement, which, supplementing the existing Treaties, grants full jurisdiction in each State to His Majesty the King of England'.[2]

A White Paper expanding what had been said in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in October was published on 22 January 1946 when the success of Sir Harold MacMichael's mission was announced.

The White Paper[3] specifically stated the intentions of the British Government. It began by giving an account of the previous position and explained the need for reform. The British Crown (said the Paper) must provide the common link which would draw together the communities of Malaya and promote a sense of common interest and the development of common institutions. To secure jurisdiction for His Majesty in the Malay States, Sir Harold MacMichael had concluded an agreement with each of the Malay rulers, which, supplementing the existing treaties, granted jurisdiction in each State to His Majesty.[4]

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[1] 414 H.C. Deb. 5 s, 255–6.

[2] G.B., Colonial Office, Sir Harold MacMichael, *Report of a Mission to Malaya* (Colonial no. 194, 1946).

[3] ibid., *Malayan Union and Singapore*, Cmd. 6724 (1946).

[4] For a detailed discussion of the British proposals see Victor Purcell, 'A Malayan Union: the Proposed New Constitution', *Pacific Affairs* (March 1946); Phyllis Kaberry, *The Development of Self-Government in Malaya* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946) (in mimeograph); and Gerald Hawkins, 'Reactions to Malayan Union', *Pacific Affairs* (September 1946).

After describing the proposals of the Government for the constitution of Singapore as a separate colony, and the administration of the Settlements of Penang and Malacca with the Malay States in a Malayan Union, the White Paper gave details of the new constitution to be created for governing the country. Singapore (including the Cocos-Keeling Islands and Christmas Island) would be constituted a colony under a Governor and Legislative and Executive Councils. The constitution of the Malayan Union would provide for a central authority consisting of a Governor with an Executive and Legislative Council. Subsidiary powers of administration and legislation would be exercised by a local council for each State and Settlement. These councils would consist of both official and unofficial members, 'but while it is the intention that their constitution shall be broad-based and representative, the final determination of the numbers and of the details of representation will not be decided until there has been consultation with local opinion'. In the initial phase after the termination of the Military Administration, the Governor would be empowered to legislate with the help of an Advisory Council to be selected on a basis as broadly representative as conditions in this phase allowed. 642

In view of the special position of the Malay rulers as traditional and spiritual leaders of the Malay people, it was intended that the ruler in each State should preside over a Malay Advisory Council whose members he would appoint subject to the approval of the Governor. The main functions of these Malay Advisory Councils would relate to matters affecting Mohammedan religion; but they might also advise the ruler on any other matters at the request of the Resident Commissioner acting with the Governor's approval. On matters of Mohammedan religion, excepting the collection of tithes and taxes, each ruler, with the help of his Council, would have legislative powers within his State. [635]

Matters of Pan-Malayan importance such as higher education, immigration, currency, &c., would be matters of common arrangement between the Union and the Colony.

The White Paper went on to lay down the policy for the creation of Malayan Union citizenship. The policy of His Majesty's Government was to promote a broad-based citizenship which would include, without discrimination of race or creed, all who could establish a claim, by reason of birth or a suitable period of residence, to belong to the country. It was proposed, therefore, to 641 185 create by Order in Council a Malayan Union citizenship: The following persons would acquire this citizenship:

(*a*) persons born in the territory of the Union or of the Colony of Singapore.

(*b*) persons who at the date on which the Order in Council becomes operative have been ordinarily resident in those territories for ten years out of the preceding fifteen. (In calculating the fifteen years' period, the period of the Japanese occupation would be disregarded.)

It would also be possible for persons to acquire Malayan Union citizenship after five years' ordinary residence in the Malayan Union or Singapore.

Save with the consent of the Governor, no person who was not a Malayan Union citizen could be admitted to public office or membership of central and local councils.

Those acquiring Malayan Union citizenship otherwise than by birth would be required to affirm allegiance to the Malayan Union. But citizenship was not to affect nationality.

In a second White Paper of March 1946[1] Malayan Union citizenship was somewhat differently defined, viz.:

The Malayan Union citizenship Order in Council will provide that the following persons will become Malayan Union citizens:

(*a*) Any person born in the Malayan Union or Singapore before the date when the Order comes into force, who is ordinarily resident in the Malayan Union or Singapore on that date.

(*b*) Any person of eighteen years of age or over ordinarily resident in the Malayan Union or Singapore on the date when the Order comes into force, who has resided in the Malayan Union or Singapore for a period of ten years during the fifteen years preceding the 15 February 1942, and who swears or affirms or takes the oath of allegiance (i.e. to be faithful and loyal to the Government of the Malayan Union).

(*c*) Any person born in the Malayan Union after the date when the Order comes into force whose father is a Malayan Union citizen at the time of that person's birth and either was born in the Malayan Union or Singapore or was a Malayan Union citizen under (*b*) above or had obtained a certificate of naturalization. The minor children (viz. children under 18) of persons in categories (*a*) and

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[1] G.B., Colonial Office, *Malayan Union and Singapore, Summary of Proposed Constitutional Arrangements*, Cmd. 6749 (1946).

The Malayan Union was created by Order in Council of 27 March (1946, No. 463) and came into being on 1 April 1946.

(*b*) will also be Malayan Union citizens. [Japanese nationals were debarred from becoming Malayan Union citizens.] 641 185

The Citizenship Order was, however, deferred until full consultation had taken place.

Soon after the announcement of the British Government's policy for Malaya in October 1945 there had been signs that this policy did not meet with the approval of at least a number of ex-Malayan civil servants. 642 208 On 29 October Sir Frank Swettenham, a former Governor of the Straits Settlements, asked in *The Times*: 664 'Who has asked for these changes and a Malay Union? Certainly it is not the Malays.' There was no public indication of any opposition until after the publication of the White Paper (Cmd. 6724) in January, but there was then a demonstration of Malays in Kedah, said to be 50,000 strong and carrying banners denouncing the recent agreements. On 3 March a Pan-Malay Congress was convened in Kuala Lumpur to discuss the Malayan Union proposals and the question of sending a delegation to London to explain the Malay viewpoint. At this meeting the Sultan of Selangor urged the Malays to be united, declaring that 'many things can be achieved by unity'. At this meeting Dato Onn bin Ja'afar emphasized that the Malays must play their part while yet the time remained, in 'warding off the devastating ignominy of race extinction'. About this time Dato Onn organized the United Malay Nationalist Organization (UMNO) which he claimed was supported by 70 to 80 per cent. of the Malay population.[1] [665]

Meanwhile, in *The Times* of 16 April there had appeared a letter signed by seventeen prominent ex-Malayan civil servants, including two ex-Governors of the Straits Settlements and an ex-Chief Secretary, attacking the Malayan Union (which had come into being on 1 April) and characterizing the MacMichael agreement as 'an instrument for annexation'. The letter said in conclusion: '. . . We have good reason to believe that their Highnesses and the people of Malaya would consider favourably a true federation of the nine states in association with the Straits Settlements.'

The extent of the influence of this letter is a matter of opinion, but there can be no doubt that it powerfully encouraged opposition to the infant Union: it is also reasonable to suppose that it carried considerable weight with His Majesty's Government and strongly

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[1] *Sunday Times* (Singapore, 26 May 1946).

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612 affected public opinion in England as its authors had intended that
664 it should. But there is no reason to believe that the distinguished
208 signatories to the letter ever expected that the agitation would lead to the complete reversal of the constitutional proposals contained in the White Paper or to the abandonment of the principle of equal citizenship. They could not have foreseen that the Government would, in effect, permit the Malays alone to frame a Constitution for the country.[1]

In May two Members of Parliament visited Malaya where they were greeted by widespread mass demonstrations of Malays which were coupled with demands for the repeal of the Union and the 'MacMichael Treaties'. The allegation was that the new agreement had been obtained under duress.[2]

The Sultans had boycotted the installation ceremony of the new Governor of the Union on 1 April when the British Military Administration ceased to exist and civil government was resumed, and Malays refused to serve on any council or board. This deadlock continued until a Federation was substituted for the Union, as we shall see in due course ensued.

To understand how the Chinese in Malaya were affected by these changes we must recall what their position was before the Japanese occupation of 1942.

614 Chinese born in the Straits Settlements were British subjects.
635 Since representative government was in a rudimentary state, this did not confer the same privileges that it does in Britain (e.g. there was no franchise). Nevertheless, the status was highly valued by the Straits-born Chinese. They were eligible for seats on the Executive and Legislative Councils and on the municipalities, which later had Asiatic majorities and were virtually self-governing. They could travel on a British passport. No British subject could be banished from the Straits Settlements.

The position of the Chinese born in the Malay States was, on the other hand, very ill defined in law. In practice they were given passports as British-protected persons, but it is somewhat doubtful whether they had this status in law. They were not generally regarded 635 by the Sultans as their subjects. Since there was no franchise [647] in the Malay States their position led to no discriminatory disability on this account, but the preference given to Malays in 641 the Government services usually meant that the Chinese were excluded from the higher ranks, though in the Federated Malay States they held the majority of the clerkships. The Malays also [651] had the privileges of the Land Reservations which meant that Chinese were virtually excluded from rice cultivation. But at the same time it must be admitted that the Chinese showed no special disposition to grow rice, much preferring more lucrative employment in commerce or in industry. The creation of a common Malayan Union citizenship would have given them an equal status with the Malays except that the Malay Land Reservations were to be retained.

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[1] As one of the signatories remarked to the writer when the proposals for the Federal constitution was announced—'Now they have gone too far the other way!'

[2] The Malay anti-Union agitation focused on the agreement negotiated by Sir Harold MacMichael, but all that this agreement did was to give power to His Majesty to legislate by Order in Council to create a new constitution. The agreement said nothing about the constitution itself.

But, although the Chinese were the race that would gain most by 642 the creation of a common citizenship, it cannot be said that they greeted the proposals with any particular enthusiasm. It seems that 208 they expected many more concessions than were contained in the Secretary of State's announcement. Soon after Sir Harold MacMichael's arrival the *Sin Chew Jit Pao*[1] (an old-established Singapore Chinese-language newspaper) asked why the Sultans had been chosen as the persons with whom arrangements were to be made. The Sultans (the paper said) represented only a small proportion of the Malays and had no claim at all to represent the Chinese. The paper in the same issue said that the China-born Chinese paid rates and taxes and were as much entitled to share in the Government as the locally born. Moreover, the Malaya-born Chinese had only a 'colonial education' and therefore did not understand world tendencies and could not be expected to represent Chinese interests. The leftist papers, of course, pooh-poohed the whole proceedings. The *New Democracy* (*Sin Min Chu*) remarked that the 'feudalistic Sultans should be relegated to the realm of forgotten things'.[2]

As time went on the proposals awakened no more than a lukewarm interest among the Chinese journalists of Malaya. The MCP had endorsed the idea of a unified Malaya but not in the form envisaged by the White Paper; the MDU also favoured union, but was principally interested in the question of democratic

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[1] 15 October 1945.

[2] 12 October 1945.

642 208 representation; the Kuomintang was not interested in local politics except in so far as they impinged on the politics of China. Altogether there was apathy among the Chinese regarding the Union. When in April 1946 the Government of the Malayan Union invited the opinion of representative bodies and individuals comment was practically confined to the Communist press.

642 185 [664] Without encouragement from the Chinese to maintain the Malayan Union, the British Government yielded to the pressure of the Malays and their European supporters. On 25 July a Working Committee consisting of representatives of the Malayan Union Government, of the rulers, and of UMNO was appointed to submit agreed views, if possible, for both sides to examine and criticize. (There was, it will be seen, no racial representation except of the Malays on this committee.) The Malay Nationalist Party was excluded from the deliberations. The committee sat at intervals from 6 August to November 1946 and then embodied its proposals in a report containing a draft of a proposed Federation Agreement and a model State Agreement.[1]

[641] The key consideration behind the Working Committee's proposals was the special position of the Malays, and implicated with this were the meaning of 'citizenship' and the policy to be followed for immigration. 'There was a very real fear (the Report said) on the part of the Malays that they may steadily become submerged in a country in which (except for the aborigines) they are the indigenous people unless the categories of persons admissible to citizenship are confined to those who look upon Malaya alone as their homeland.' The Malays (unlike the immigrant races and, by insinuation, the Chinese) had no alternative homeland. The acceptance of the proposals for citizenship must, moreover, be contingent on a strict control of immigration.

The Report of the Working Committee does not here call for a detailed examination since the proposals contained in it were in principle endorsed by the British Government and embodied in a White Paper published in July 1947.[2] This White Paper said:

> These proposals, while substituting for the Malayan Union a new constitution in Federal form, appeared to His Majesty's Government to

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[1] *Constitutional Proposals for Malaya: Report of the Working Committee appointed by His Excellency the Governor of the Malayan Union, their Highnesses the Rulers of the Malay States, and the Representatives of the United Malays National Organization* (Kuala Lumpur, Malayan Union Government Press, 1947).

[2] G.B., Colonial Office, *Federation of Malaya*, Cmd. 7171 (1947).

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be calculated in general to achieve their own fundamental objects of essential cohesion and a basis for common loyalty. The proposals . . . received the conditional approval of His Majesty's Government. . . . It was made quite clear, however, that there was no question of a final decision until all the interested communities in Malaya had been given a full and free opportunity of expressing their views, *since the proposals had been formulated by the Government and Malay leaders alone.*[1] Accordingly in December the Government of the Malayan Union had appointed a Consultative Committee composed mainly of influential representatives of the non-Malay communities, which was instructed to hold meetings throughout the Peninsula, to receive oral and written representation, to collate the evidence submitted to it and to report the substance of the evidence to the Governor with such comments and recommendations as it should think fit. 642 185

The Consultative Committee[2] consisted of eight members (two of them being Chinese, one of them a member of the Legislative Council) under the chairmanship of the Director of Education, Mr H. R. Cheeseman, C.M.G. (total nine members). The recommendations of the committee (in the words of the White Paper Cmd. 7171), endorsed the retention of the main structure of the Federation proposals recommended by the Working Committee and the greater proportion of its detailed arrangements but recommended an increase in the size of the Federal Legislative Council and an alteration in the terms of Federal citizenship.

The Working Committee had recommended that the Council should consist of the High Commissioner as President with 3 *ex officio* members, 11 official members, and 34 unofficial members to be nominated partly on a direct racial basis and partly as representing various interests, but in such a manner that, excluding *ex officio* and official members, Malays were to include the 9 Malay Presidents of the Councils of State and 1 representative of each of the Settlement Councils. The Consultative Committee, on the other hand, recommended the increase of the official membership to 52, including 1 representative from each Settlement Council, while in addition the 9 Malay Presidents of the Councils of State in the Malay States were to be added as *official* members. The Consultative Committee's net proposals gave 29 seats to the Malays and 29 to the other communities, 3 remaining unallocated. 646 185

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[1] The italics are mine. V.P.

[2] *Report of the Consultative Committee* (Kuala Lumpur, Malayan Union Government Press, 1947).

646 185 The 2 Chinese members of the Consultative Committee wished to include the 9 Presidents of the Councils of State as ordinary Malay members, thus reducing the total Malay membership to 20.

[641] As regards citizenship of the Federation, the Consultative Committee recommended that the following persons should be Federal citizens:

(*a*) Any subject, whether born before, on, or after the appointed day, of His Highness the Sultan of any State.

(*b*) Any person who is a British subject or any person born on any of the Malay States, whether before, on, or after, the appointed day who is permanently resident in either of the Settlements or any Malay State.

(*c*) Any person whose father is, at the date of that person's birth, a Federal Citizen.[1]

The British Government decided to go 'some of the way, though not the whole way, to meet the recommendations of the Consultative Committee'. As regards membership of the Legislative Council it decided to increase the total membership, but it kept a considerable Malay majority. There were to be 50 unofficial seats whose allocation would be likely to give Malays 22 seats and Chinese 14 seats, while Indians would have 5, Europeans 7, Ceylonese 1, and Eurasians 1. While the 9 Presidents of the State Councils would be Malays the 2 representatives of the Settlement Councils might be from any community. This meant that the total Malay unofficial representation would be about 31 as compared with 14 for the Chinese.

641 Malayan citizenship (it should be borne in mind) is not a nationality, and does not affect or impair the status of British or other nationals who become Federal citizens.

The Federal citizenship proposed by the British Government might be acquired either automatically or on application.

The following persons would automatically be Federal citizens:

(*a*) Any subject, wherever born, of His Highness the Ruler of any State.

(*b*) Any British subject born at any time in either of the Settlements who is permanently resident (that is to say has completed a continuous period of 15 years residence) anywhere in the territories to be comprised in the Federation.

(*c*) Any British subject born at any time in any of the territories now to be comprised in the Federation whose father either

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[1] *Report of the Consultative Committee* (Kuala Lumpur, Malayan Union Government Press, 1947), p. 11.

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(i) was himself born in any of these territories; or
(ii) has resided therein for a continuous period of not less than 15 years;

(*d*) Any person born at any time in any of the territories now to be comprised in the Federation, who habitually speaks the Malay language and conforms to Malay custom.

(*e*) Any other person born in any of these territories at any time, both of whose parents were born in any of such territories and have been resident in them for a continuous period of not less than 15 years; and

(*f*) any person whose father is, at the date of the person's birth, a Federal citizen.

The expression 'subject of His Highness the Ruler' of any State means

(i) any person who belongs to an aboriginal tribe resident in any State; or
(ii) any Malay born in that State or born elsewhere of a father who was, at the time of the birth of such person, a subject of the Ruler of that State; or
(iii) any person naturalized as a subject of that Ruler.

The provisions regarding *application* for citizenship are as follows:

The High Commissioner may grant a certificate conferring the Status of a Federal citizen on any person who applies therefore and satisfies the High Commissioner—

(*a*) that either
(i) he was born in any of the territories now to be comprised in the Federation and has been resident in any one or more of such territories for not less than 8 out of the 12 years preceding his application; or
(ii) he has been resident in any one or more of those territories for not less than 15 out of the 20 years immediately preceding his application.

(*b*) The applicant must satisfy the High Commissioner that he is of good character, possesses an adequate knowledge of the Malay or English language, has made a declaration of permanent settlement in the prescribed form, and if his application is approved, that he is willing to take the citizenship oath. In accordance with the recommendation of the Working Committee an applicant for citizenship will be required to be of the age of 18 or over.[1]

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[1] In the actual Federation of Malaya Agreement (*Malayan Union Government Gazette*, Kuala Lumpur, 22 January 1948 and Supplement of 31 January 1948) the rules were varied from those outlined in Cmd. 7171 in some minor ways. For example, for 'wherever born' in the first (*a*) above, was substituted 'whether born before, on, or after the appointed day', and 'permanently resident' was substituted generally for the continuous period of 15 years' residence.

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642 In formulating this new constitution and citizenship the British Government, it was clear, was endorsing what the Working Committee had declared to be the 'Special Position of the Malays'.[1]

These provisions of the Federation of Malaya which was created by Order in Council on 1 February 1948 have taken up a lot of space, but it is necessary that they should be studied in order to receive an idea of the worlds that separated the principles behind the Union and the Federation. Instead of being relegated to being mere heads of religious councils, the Sultans were now restored to more than their pre-war prestige. Instead of the Union which envisaged proportionate representation for the different communities, the Malays were in the Federation given a large majority without 646 421 any relation to their numbers. Moreover (and this deserves italics), *the Appendix A of the new White Paper gives a schedule of the subjects for the Central Legislature. The 144 subjects in this schedule do not include the all-important subject of land.*

641 Under the Federation citizenship rules any subject of a Sultan is automatically a Federal citizen. No definition of 'subject of the Sultan' is given, but it seems that he or she may very well have been born in Java or Sumatra and may have arrived in Malaya only 101 yesterday. The Malay Reservations Enactment of the Federated Malay States 1913[2] says: '"Malay" means a person belonging to any Malayan race who speaks the Malay language or any Malayan language and professes the Mohammedan religion', and such were always accepted as subjects of the Sultans. On the other hand, the majority of the Chinese born in the Malay States were not automatically Federal citizens unless both their parents were born within the Federation.[3]

The Union citizenship proposals certainly came nearer the desideratum of justice and equality than do those of the Federation. The error committed, it seems, was in creating the Union

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[1] *Working Committee Report*, p. 23.

[2] No. 15 of 1913.

162 [3] A Malayan Federal Citizen is a British Protected Person under the British Protectorates, Protected States, and Protected Persons Order in Council, 1949. It was officially estimated that of 1,952,682 Chinese resident in the Federation of Malaya at the end of June 1949, 375,000 were Federal citizens by operation of law. After May 1949, however, when registration of Federal citizens by application began, many Chinese applied for Federal Citizenship. During August and September 4,483 certificates of citizenship were issued to Chinese out of a total of 4,708 certificates issued to all races and it is reported that the number of applications after that date greatly increased.

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before an adequate opportunity had been given to the people of Malaya to consider the proposals, and, having frightened the Malays into demanding the repeal of the Union, the next error was to stampede before their demands. The Chinese were no doubt to blame to some extent for their lukewarm attitude towards the Union and their refusal to defend its principles if not the method of its introduction, and they are now suffering politically for the concessions which have been made to the Malays in default of their speaking for their own rights. But if their realization of what was happening was slow, they have since demonstrated that they regard the new Federal constitution with distaste. 641

Chinese reaction to the constitution expressed itself in a number of ways. The action which most impressed itself on the public and the official notice was a 'hartal',[1] or stoppage of work, sponsored by Mr Tan Cheng-lock's Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action, the Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce, the Malayan trade unions, and (of course) the Malayan Communist Party, as a protest against the proposals for a Malayan Federation. On 20 October 1947 virtually all business and transport were at a standstill and Singapore was without buses, trams, or taxis, and no employees of the Harbour Board were at work. Obedient to the request of the organizers, the Chinese community of Singapore as a whole stayed at home.[2] The hartal, however, was not by any means country-wide, and the Government was successful in persuading Chinese to serve in the Councils, &c. There has, indeed, been considerable Chinese co-operation in the working of the Federation. 642 664

Another protest took the form of boycotting the new Singapore Legislative Council elections when in 1947 only about 20,000 out of 100,000–200,000 eligible electors registered themselves for the elections to be held in 1948. The result of this was that in a city predominantly Chinese only one Chinese was elected.[3] [666]

Before concluding this chapter it would be informative for us 000

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[1] It is strange that the Indian word 'hartal' should have been adopted for a mainly Chinese occasion.

[2] See *Straits Times* (6 October) and *The Times*, London (21 October).

[3] *British Malaya*, April 1948.

According to *British Dependencies in the Far East, 1945–9* (Cmd. 7709) p. 54, persons eligible to vote were those born in Singapore, the Malayan Federation, or the Borneo territories who had resided in Singapore for three years prior to polling day. Of those eligible some 22,000, or 15–20 per cent. of those eligible, had their names inscribed.

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642 Before concluding this chapter it would be informative for us to examine the evidence submitted to the Consultative Committee
664 by the various communities.

578 This evidence was most miscellaneous and various, coming both from individuals and associations. It ranged from mild criticism [186] to downright rejection of the Working Committee's Report. Although the recommendations of the Report were virtually those of the Malay rulers and of UMNO, some diehard Malay associations disapproved of them as being too liberal. For example, the Lembaga Kesatuan Melayu of Johore stated:

> When we look at the handing over of a Government of Islam to the Government of non-Islam we shall find that the action is against the wishes of Islam (holy Qu'rān [Koran] verse 4: 58, 2: 38, 3: 158) . . . according to Islam there is no separation between politics and religion. It is a great sin for Islamic peoples to transfer the Government of the Malay States to non-Islam. . . .

On the other hand, the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce was 'greatly perturbed by these proposals because Chinese interests were to a large extent ignored', and these views were echoed by the other Chinese Chambers of Commerce in the country. But three Chinese associations of Penang—the Chinese Town Hall, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and the Straits Chinese British Association—in a joint 'petition' to the Secretary of State, expressed the general feelings of their fellows most adequately. 'The proposals (the petition said) are vitiated by an anti-Chinese bias. The provisions for the acquirement and loss of citizenship, the immigration policy contemplated, and the ridiculously inadequate representation of Chinese interests in the Federation Legislative Council are unmistakable indications of anti-Chinese bias.' The petition further remarks:

> THIS COMMITTEE deprecates the animosity of certain persons in England who, even before the reoccupation of the country, have been conducting an anti-Chinese campaign in England. The dual object of the campaign was to stir up ill-feeling against the Chinese on account of their numerical strength and vast economic interests, and to invent a pretext to keep them down. In furtherance of this campaign, the protagonists have stooped to misrepresentation and distortion of facts. Even the Parliamentary debates on Malaya on certain occasions were marred by a deplorable exhibition of ill-will towards the Chinese, who are filled with more sorrow than anger and console themselves with the reflection *magna est veritas et praevalebit*.

[208] 642 Such, generally speaking, was the frame of mind of the Malayan Chinese on the eve of the terrorist outbreaks of 1948. Malayan politics had been born from Malay opposition to the Union and from Chinese opposition to the Federation. The story of the development of the political parties is taken up again in the next chapter when it becomes the background to the 'Communist Terror'.

Said Mr Peet, the editor of the *Straits Times*, writing in 1949:

> The conditions of political life as known in Western democracies, and in India and Ceylon, do not exist in Malaya. In the Federation nobody has the vote. All members of the Federal legislature are appointed by the British High Commissioner, and the Federal Government is entirely under British control. In theory the unofficial majority on the Federal legislature represents an important modification of the powers of the British administration: in practice the legislature meets only once a month, and its diverse body of nominated officials does not remotely resemble a democratic parliamentary Opposition, so that the British administration carries on at the centre very much as it did before the war, although there has been a shift to Malay authority in the State [665] governments. The normal machinery of party politics is entirely absent in the Federation, except so far as the branches of UMNO keep the Malay members of the Federal legislature in touch with Malay public opinion. In the Colony of Singapore only six seats in a legislature of twenty-three are open to popular election.[1]

However, Mr Peet goes on to point out that the post-war constitutional reforms had provided for wider and stronger public representation in the Malayan legislatures, and the British administration was much more ready to respond to criticism in those legislatures than it used to be in the days of old-fashioned colonial rule. The fact was that the dispute over the constitution had held up progress towards representation on democratic lines, and the outbreak of the terror was to bring matters, temporarily at least, to a standstill.

641 656 British policy towards the Chinese has for many years been characterized by suspicion verging often on hostility. When Chinese nationalism began to be aggressive, instead of adopting measures to encourage the Malayan-born Chinese to regard them-

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[1] G. L. Peet, *Political Questions of Malaya* (Cambridge University Press, 1949).

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selves first and foremost as Malayans, thus raising a bulwark against the pretensions of Chinese imperialism, the Malayan Governments chose instead to dig themselves in on the line of the treaties with the Sultans. The result was that all persons of Chinese race, whether they liked it or not, found themselves classed with the Nationalists of China. This policy has been greatly reinforced since the stampede took place from the principles of Malayan Union citizenship and the relinquishment by the British of much of the control to the Sultans and their Mentris Besar.

Many years before, in October 1932, Mr Tan Cheng-lock, then the senior Chinese representative on the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements, had said at a meeting of the Council:

> I look in vain for any tangible sign or indication of any active interest, practical sympathy, and encouragement that has been shown by the Government of late years towards that body of worthy, staunch, and traditionally loyal British subjects, viz. the Straits-born Chinese who have formed a continuous Colony in this country for more than 500 years, and the locally-born Chinese subjects of the Protected Malay States who have made this country their home. On the contrary, these loyal citizens of Malaya are, practically speaking, not to be allowed in future to own and cultivate rice lands in this country of their birth though foreign Malaysians from Sumatra and Java are granted that privilege; nor have those of them who are unable to find employment as clerks and in other classes of work in the towns been given facilities to go back to settle on the land; their appeal to have representation on the Executive Council of the Colony has been rejected outright; English education for them has been and is to be further restricted by the raising of school fees and the 'over-age' and other rules, while at the same time Government intends to disown, or has now actually disowned, according to this Council paper now laid on the table, all responsibility for giving them any Chinese education at the expense of the State. They are told that if they want free education they can go to the Malay vernacular schools, which it is impossible for them to do and is therefore not a practicable proposition but a useless concession. . . .[1]

It is worthy of note that this same spokesman of the Straits-born Chinese (whose family had been in Malaya since the eighteenth century) spoke at the same Council meeting of 'the hearty support which Your Excellency's recent ban against the

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[1] Straits Settlements, *Legislative Council Proceedings* (19 October 1932), cited in part by Rupert Emerson, op. cit. p. 513.

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Kuomintang has received from the majority of the Chinese population in Malaya'. 641

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Though the opinion may smack of 'hindsight', it seems that a great opportunity was lost in these pre-war years to encourage the Malayan-born Chinese to resist the pretensions of Chinese Nationalism and to regard themselves as Malayans first and foremost.

[P. 400]

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE COMMUNIST TERROR[1]

669 AFTER the set-back received in February 1946, the Malayan Communist Party found it expedient to conduct their main operations underground. They were active in tightening still further their grip on labour and in fomenting strikes. When the Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce organized their 'hartal' as a protest against the proposals for a Federation of Malaya in October 1947, working through the trade unions and directly, the Communists joined in the movement, exploiting, as always, any popular dissatisfaction. Then, it seems, in March 1948 the party decided to stage an armed insurrection. The way for this was to be paved by widespread labour unrest during April, stimulated by the intimidation (and, if necessary, removal) of trade-union leaders who were unwilling to collaborate, the use of arms, and the burning of factories. A great political demonstration was timed for 1 May. Although these preliminaries misfired, it was decided, nevertheless, to adhere to the original programme and to give the order for the outbreak of armed violence in early June.[2]

The intention was that a revolt should start simultaneously in various parts of the Federation. Terrorism directed against Europeans and Chinese was to prepare the way for the revolt in order to create regions which would, in due course, be declared to be independent Communist areas. These should be gradually extended until the whole country was under Communist control. The declaration of a Communist Republic of Malaya was timed for 3 August 1948.

The outbreak in June was really only an accentuation of the violence and lawlessness which were already sporadic. The Commissioner-General, Mr Malcolm MacDonald, in a broadcast from Radio Malaya on 6 June, spoke of Communist agitators making a desperate attempt to impose a rule of gun and knife, and said that the bestial campaign must be struck down. He added that there

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[1] This chapter carries events roughly to the end of 1948. Appendix IV, 'The Squatter Problem', deals with the situation up to March 1949.

[2] To what extent the outbreak was directed by external authority, and what connexion, if any, it had with the Communist Party conference at Calcutta in January 1948 had not been established when this was written in January 1949.

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was evidence that leaders of International Communism were resolved on a political offensive in the East if they were checked in 669 Europe. Reports began to come in of shooting, violence, and loss of life on estates in the Federation. The Commissioner of Police reported a vast increase in acts of violence; Perak planters asked for drastic action to curb the outbreak. On 12 June three Kuomintang leaders were shot in daylight in Johore. On 13 June Sir [642] Edward Gent, High Commissioner for the Federation, stated that a policy of banishing undesirable British subjects was under consideration, and a Bill was being rushed through giving extensive powers to the authorities in any area where a public emergency was declared. On 15 June three European planters were killed on estates in Perak, and thereafter these incidents were frequent.[1]

A state of emergency covering the entire Federation was declared on 18 June and was extended to Singapore on 24 June. The 669 MPAJA issued a manifesto calling on all former comrades to take 642 up arms against the British. On 20 June 4,000–5,000 guerrillas were 656 reported to be massing in the jungle.[2] On the same day the police station at Mentakab, Pahang, was attacked.

On 23 July the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated in the House of Commons that the MCP had been banned, together with three other satellite bodies which were either involved in the current fighting or were recruiting or supply agencies for the terrorists. The bodies referred to were the MPAJA, the New Democratic Youth League, and a Malay organization of youth, Ikatan Pemela Tanah Ayer (PETA).[3] A large number of persons was detained for

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[1] *The Malayan Bulletin*, published monthly by the Association of British Malaya, is mainly followed in this chapter.

In reply to a question in the House of Commons on 16 June, Mr Rees-Williams, Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State, stated that there had been at least 13 serious incidents in recent weeks, including 10 murders and 3 attacks on European managers of estates.

The Malayan Monitor, a Communist monthly bulletin issued by H. B. Lim from 132 Fleet Street, London, has appeared since the end of 1947. It publishes an account of the progress of the campaign in Malaya from the Communist point of view, and includes a communiqué of alleged Communist successes—e.g. 2 October, guerrillas blow up railway line near Sungei Siput; 20 October, President of Johore Planters' Association shot dead; 28 October, guerrillas shoot 28 police in Perak—and of alleged crimes against the people of Malaya, e.g. 12 October, burning of Poh Leh Sun village, Johore, by armed forces. It has, obviously, the support and assistance of the British Communist Party.

[2] *Daily Telegraph* (20 June 1948).

[3] 'The PETA represents the most militant sections of Malay youth,' *The Malayan Monitor* (February 1949). The Malayan Communists claim also the

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669 642 656 'screening' under the Emergency Regulations, and quantities of arms were captured, including a seizure by the Singapore police and the Netherlands East Indies authorities of a large cargo of arms.

Throughout July and August the terrorism continued, action to check it being tremendously complicated by the nature of the country, four-fifths of Malaya still being under jungle and swamp. At the end of August the General Officer Commanding stated that 'things are improving, and the way in which the bandits are being hit is improving'. This view was endorsed by the *Straits Times* which said that 'the tempo of the onslaught had slowed down'. The successful campaign against the Communists in south Kelantan, where they had been well organized, was a serious defeat for them. Nevertheless, the trouble was by no means over and destructive attacks and wanton murders continued, including the murder of Dr Ong Chong-keng,[1] a Chinese member of the Legislative Council, and other Chinese and Europeans. Chinese bandit gangs on the Siamese border presented another threat to the Federation. [648] Negotiations were in progress with Siam to facilitate action by the Federation security forces against the gangs, and it had been agreed that police and Government officers on both sides might cross the frontier using special passes and might be accompanied by a small escort of police. A British consul was appointed to Singora who had wireless facilities for communicating with the British Embassy at Bangkok and the Federal Government at Kuala Lumpur.[2]

By the end of October it was felt in circles of authority in Malaya that the situation showed distinct signs of improvement. The policy of keeping the bandits on the move (by the use of 'Ferret Force', &c.) had been successful; it had interrupted their training and there

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Peasants' Union, and AWAS (Malay Women's Emancipation Association) as Malay 'democratic' organizations.

[1] Some mystery attaches to this murder, and from information received since the above was written it appears doubtful whether the motive for it was political or that it was committed by Communists.

[2] The Siamese frontier had always been a problem, even in pre-war days, for its thick jungle allowed bandits and others to pass freely to and fro, retreating from either the British or the Siamese authorities. After the liberation the so-called 'Kuomintang guerrillas' were active here. The problem has been complicated since the war by the recrudescence of the Patani question. Patani is a Siamese State whose population is mainly Malay, and some of these had been conducting an agitation to take Patani out of Siam and to join with their brethren in the British-protected Federation of Malaya. This movement has made the Siamese very guarded in their commitments on frontier matters. [186]

669 642 656 had been a decline in terrorist violence. The latest police and services press conference had a note of 'cautious confidence'. In the Legislative Council at Kuala Lumpur the acting Chief Secretary stated on 5 October that the Federation Government intended to take steps to prevent known Communists from Australia, Siam, and Indonesia entering the country, and no exception would be made for British Communist M.P.s who might want to stay on estates and mines.

[249] In spite of the terror, of which a leading motive was to sabotage Britain's economic recovery plan by cutting off the supplies of tin and rubber so valuable in obtaining dollar exchange, the production figures showed that up to that time these activities had had little effect on rubber production. Estate rubber production for August was 33,727 tons, the fourth largest figure since the liberation, and only slightly less than the exceptional output of [704] July. The London *Times* of 12 October stated that the troops, which had now been reinforced by British units, including a contingent of the Guards, were adapting themselves with great facility to the form of battle in which they were engaged; wherever possible they lived off the country, thus adding to the mobility given them by supplies dropped from the air. Specialized training was in hand and the next move would be an extension of army dispositions under the direction of the police to cover the whole of Malaya.

[727] Most of the 223 civilians who had been murdered up to the end of October were Chinese, whilst the Europeans murdered totalled 17. Of the 343 terrorists officially reported to have been killed, 6 were Malays, 3 Indians, and 2 Siamese. The rest were mainly foreign-born Chinese.[1]

669 656 642 At the end of November official statements and private communications from Malaya stated that the main purpose of the Communists, namely, the dislocation of the economy of Malaya and the establishment of a Communist regime, had been completely

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[1] See *British Survey: Communism in South East Asia*, no. 19 (November 1948) p. 16.

In spite of the greater optimism of official reports, letters from rubber planters in the fighting area continued to give a gloomy impression of the situation up to the end of 1948.

The total number of civilians killed at the end of July 1949 was 508, including five casualties officially listed as accidental. The figure included 318 Chinese, 75 Malays, 43 Sakais, 34 Indians, 29 Europeans, 7 Indonesians, and 2 others. *British Malaya*, September 1949.

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669 656 642 defeated. The whole position was said to be better and the morale of the people had improved. Many more troops had been trained and had been rapidly deployed. Estates were better protected and production figures had not flagged. Bungalows in some areas had become miniature fortresses. The terrorists were concentrating their attacks on communications, particularly the railway, and on planters and others on the roads. Despite this, the strain on planters and miners and others in the front line remained severe, and it was clear that, while good results were being obtained, individuals were still liable to murderous attacks, and the time had not yet come to take things easily.

[641 625] As one measure for dealing with the terrorist campaign and its supporters in civilian clothes a scheme of national registration was imposed whereby every person in the Federation and the Colony was required to possess a registration card. The scheme was reported to be working smoothly at the end of the year.

This account of the Communist terrorist campaign brings the story roughly down to the end of 1948.[1] Written as it was during the progress of the campaign it tends to give the impression of a summary of successive official communiqués—from which, indeed, much of it is directly or indirectly drawn. It is difficult at a short distance from the events to reconcile the hopefulness which is natural and (within limits) right in an official communiqué with the gloom and apprehension (equally natural and right) expressed in letters from those in the front line. It was clear, however, that though the Communists had been thwarted in their main purpose a long campaign lay ahead.

The great danger for the Government was that it might allow itself to be led into repressive action against sections of the population which, willingly or unwillingly, were assisting the Communists, and this would arouse enmity against itself. It was obvious that the British, a small minority, could not 'hold down' a population numbering nearly six millions, and that government must be at least with the acquiescence of the governed. Indeed, so long as the British were able to continue their administration this was proof positive that the Communists had failed to secure popular support. But ruthless or unwise action against large sections of the community might easily reverse the situation and make it impossible

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[1] The account of the terrorist campaign is resumed in the Postscript to this Survey.

to hold Malaya. The greatest menace, therefore, lay in that school 669
of thought which regarded all Chinese as Communists and there- 656
fore as enemies. Luckily in 1949 the Malays as a people were not
trapped into such an attitude, and they made a distinction between 642
bandits and ordinary Chinese.

When the Communist outbreak began the Chinese in Malaya 669
were in a condition of political apathy. They were dissatisfied with
their position under the constitution of the Federation of Malaya, 656
even though the Associated Chambers of Commerce under the
guidance of Mr K. C. Lee and Colonel H. S. Lee had withdrawn
their official opposition to the constitution and had agreed to give
it a trial. In Singapore the new elections, as we have seen, had
been boycotted by a majority of Chinese, under MDU leadership,
though the Progressive Party (Chinese) put up candidates for all
districts. It was not altogether surprising, therefore, that they were
first of all inclined to regard the outbreak of terrorism as a matter [578]
between the Government and the Communists. This attitude,
however, afforded an opening for those who wished to regard the
insurrection as a purely Chinese affair, supported openly or tacitly
by the Chinese community as a whole. The reluctance of the
Chinese to join the auxiliary police even though their countrymen [625]
were the major victims of the guerrilla attacks lent colour to the
suggestion.

Typical of the criticism of the Chinese and their leaders was a 669
leading article in the Kuala Lumpur *Malay Mail* of 29 October, 656
headed 'The Towkay and the Terrorist'. The writer quoted a
correspondent of the London *Daily Mail* as saying that the terrorist 204
campaign could hardly last another month unless it had the solid,
if somewhat reluctant, backing the Chinese terrorists still got from
their Chinese kinsmen. The paper commented that the fight
against the terrorists was being carried on 'with little or no help
from the Chinese', and that in addition the Chinese Communists
relied on their own countrymen for the support without which they
could not be kept going. That most of the support was gained by
terrorization and was more or less unwillingly given did not alter
the fact. One source of assistance on which the terrorists relied
was, of course, the squatter community.

A study of the Chinese-language press of the period throws some light on the evolution of the Chinese attitude towards the troubles. On 21 July the Officer Administering the Government, Sir Alec

669 Newboult, made a broadcast in which he appealed to the Chinese
656 community for active co-operation. Prominence in the Chinese
press was extended to statements from the Chinese consul-general,
204 Penang, and of Dr Ong Chong-keng (the Chinese Member of
Council afterwards murdered), who supported Sir Alec's plea, and also to a similar plea made by the veteran Mr Tan Kah-kee of Singapore. The Kuala Lumpur *China Press* published a long editorial denying the charges of non-co-operation. It drew attention to the unenviable position in which the Chinese found themselves—heading the list of arrests for terrorism on the one hand, and topping the list of arrests under the Emergency Regula-
[625] tions on the other. The paper explained that the slowness of
response in joining the special police was due to their lack of experience in this branch of the service as well as to the language difficulty. The Chinese press, however, gave publicity to a subsequent move on the part of the Selangor Chinese Chamber of Commerce to enrol Chinese members for the auxiliary police.

During August the Chinese papers increased their support for the movement for Chinese to join auxiliary police units, and in September the appeal received even greater stress. But the number of Chinese enrolled remained small.

669 The reference to the squatter community calls attention to what
was undoubtedly the main source of Communist strength. Chinese
423 squatters had existed for many years; during the trade depression
656 of 1931–3 their numbers were greatly augmented by unemployed
labourers, and again they received accretions during the Japanese occupation. It is estimated that they numbered between 350,000 and 500,000 in 1948.[1] They occupied their land either on temporary occupation licences, which could be terminated by the Govern-
[657] ment at will, or (mostly) on no licences at all. In the Malay States
there had always been a policy of land reservation in force for the Malays and this meant that nearly all the land suitable for rice-growing had been reserved for Malays. During the Japanese occupation Chinese squatters were allowed to encroach on these Malay Land Reservations and to open up new land for cultivation, and after the liberation, when the country was desperately short of food, the British Military Administration allowed them, for the

[1] This was the official reply to a question by the Hon. Mr Tan Siew-sin in the Legislative Council of the Federation, but it is thought by some authorities to be too high an estimate.

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time being, to remain in the reserved areas. The civil Government, however, resolved to move these squatters as soon as it was feasible.[1]

656 It happened that the areas in which the squatters were principally located are on the fringe of the jungle and they therefore afford a convenient shelter and source of supply for the guerrillas. Also the guerrillas have made levies of men for their forces, compelling them under threat of reprisals against themselves or their families to join them in raids. After the raids the recruits are usually returned to the villages. [722] The British troops on several occasions burnt down the huts of squatters who had collaborated with the terrorists and destroyed their crops, thus sealing the enmity between them and constituted authority.

[208] The *Straits Times* said that public opinion was undeniably worried about the burning of squatters' huts and the destruction of their crops, 'unavoidable though this might be'. It thought that there was a very real danger of turning purely passive or forced co-operation with the terrorists into bitter resentment against the Government. The Chinese press of this period showed great concern at the drastic action being taken, and gave the fullest publicity to the burning by the police of Kachau village near Kuala Lumpur. The paper *Kin Kwok* of Ipoh published a leader headed, 'Don't drive them to the hills'.

[687] However, in this twelfth hour of the emergency, the Malayan authorities had to deal with the situation as it then existed with more regard to immediate expediency than to long-term policy. New measures were introduced in November for the repatriation of any alien who assisted the Communist terrorists in any way. Such repatriation was to apply to any person who paid 'protection money' to them. A number of Chinese miners and shareholders were arrested under the new regulations. By the beginning of January 1949, 500 squatters from the Kajang district had already been moved to a detention camp to await a passage to China. Compensation was being paid them for loss of stock and produce.

Another matter, equally disturbing to public opinion as the squatter question, was that of 'regrettable incidents' in which British troops were involved and in which innocent Chinese lost their lives. One of these became known as the Batang Kali shooting. Another disagreeable happening was the burning of huts at

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[1] See Appendix IV, 'The Squatter Problem'.

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423 656 Kachau without proof that they belonged to persons guilty of collaboration with the terrorists.[1]

669 656 578 To revert now to the leading article of the *Malay Mail* of 29 October. This, after having mentioned the squatter question, concentrated on the alleged complicity of the wealthy Chinese *Towkays* in the current disturbances. The *Towkays*, it said, were not only refraining from joining the auxiliary police; many of them were submitting to intimidation and contributing, admittedly under duress, both money and supplies to the support of the terrorists.

[181] That there is some substance in these charges is very likely. Traditionally the Chinese have always followed the line of the least resistance when subjected to intimidation. 'Protection money' to secret societies and to political societies after them had for long been a heavy item in the budget of a trader and it was paid in dollars and cents by even the smallest farmer. The reply of the Chinese *Towkay* was that in default of protection from the authorities he was taking the only course open to him to ensure the safety of himself and of his family. At the same time it was increasingly apparent that, while the Communists were nearly all Chinese, it was the Chinese also who were the principal victims of the attacks, and the Chinese as a community began to be stirred from apathy and to rally increasingly to the support of law and order. In September a Chinese plan had been adopted for the recruitment of volunteers for the auxiliary police from Chinese firms, estates, and mines.

669 727 In describing the background of the Communist insurrection it is easy to overlook a number of causes which, while small in themselves, were basic. Among these was the psychological state of the ex-members of the MPAJA. After the liberation of Malaya in 1945 the state of mind of the guerrillas passed through various phases. Most of them were mere youths who had been isolated in the jungle during the formative period of their lives. Their education was rudimentary and their sources of information were most

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[727] [1] As an outcome of the unfortunate affair at Batang Kali, near Rawang, early in December, when twenty-four Chinese were shot dead by the military forces as they attempted to escape from custody, considerable hostile criticism was aroused in the press, and the Army instituted an inquiry. The investigations were supervised by the Attorney-General's Department which declared itself completely satisfied that the forces had conducted themselves in a correct fashion. See Appendix IV, 'The Squatter Problem'.

669 127 limited. Then when the Japanese surrendered and concentrated according to the terms of the surrender in certain centres, the MPAJA had come out of their hiding-places and had filled the vacuum as the overlords of the country until the British forces had made a belated appearance. During this interregnum the Communists had tasted power, and it irked them to have to surrender it to the BMA. It is also a fact that a small minority of the personnel of the large force of re-occupying troops regarded the country as if it were an occupied enemy country and treated the MPAJA with scant courtesy. Once they were disbanded many of them were unemployed and had leisure to brood on their grievances. The gratuity of $350 a man did not satisfy them, and they expected to be paid for their services throughout the Japanese occupation. Many of them (and MCP headquarters too) had amassed large quantities of Japanese notes which the British had refused to honour.

[656] These were among the specific grievances of the ex-MPAJA, but the Chinese community as a whole nursed additional resentments. For one thing the European Government and municipal servants who were interned, and also a few who were not interned but were allowed to remain out of the camps to operate public utilities or to engage in scientific work, had received full pay for the period, while Asiatic Government and municipal servants who had not been interned had to fight for years to obtain even a proportion of the pay they would have received if the British had not been forced out of the country. The fact was, however, that the Europeans who had been employed by the Japanese had to refund the amount received by them as payment for this employment.

Another reason for discontent was that many Chinese thought that collaborators with the Japanese had been too lightly dealt with after the liberation. The prosecution of collaborators had not been in the hands of the BMA, but of a special legal branch of the Army which had conducted investigations and prosecutions on their own account without any reference to the administrative authority. A number of suspected collaborators had been arrested after the liberation, but nearly all of these were eventually released since the evidence against them was not thought to be strong enough. The military legal authorities apparently took the view that it was better to let a guilty person escape punishment than to convict an innocent one. And, indeed, during the occupation almost any individual

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669 727 who carried on his ordinary occupation was liable to be suspected of collaboration. The ex-MPAJA and the Communists, in particular, agitated for the wholesale arrest of persons they claimed to be collaborators, but by 'collaborator' they usually meant anyone who was opposed to their political views.

467 656 185 It was the policy of the post-war Governments in Malaya to encourage the growth of trade unionism; the necessary legislation had been passed before the Japanese invasion, and in 1946 English trade unionists of experience had been sent to Malaya to assist the labourers to form their unions. At least one of these English officials confessed himself as very disillusioned by what he found. In February and March 1948 two other British trade unionists, Messrs S. S. Awbery, M.P., and F. W. Dalley, visited Malaya to report on developments. Their report was issued in November 1948. It emphasized that the trade-union movement in Malaya had a very different history and tradition from the British movement. It derived from associations which had social rather than industrial functions, from anti-Japanese resistance groups, and from new [669] trade unions established after the war. The report described the clever and ruthless attempts made by Communist leaders to gain control of the movement and use it as a weapon for seizing political power. The mission approved the Government decision to encourage responsible trade unionism by collective bargaining. It said, however, that the Federation of Trade Unions, established at different levels, though disclaiming Communism, worked according to Communist directives and maintained contact with Communist associations in other countries. On the other hand, the report considered the trade-union position 'as good as we had hoped and much better than we had feared'. The mission recommended improvement of the negotiating and arbitration machinery, measures to suppress intimidation, compulsory national education, and improved housing.[1]

669 369 With the outstations of the mainland in the grip of Communist terror (though the towns remained tranquil and Singapore's crime statistics were smaller than before the war), and with emergency regulations in force, the setting was not congenial in 1948 for the

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[1] S. S. Awbery and F. W. Dalley, *Labour and Trade Union Organization in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore* (Kuala Lumpur, Government Printing Office, 1948). *Three Reports on Malayan Problems* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1949), International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1949, (in mimeograph) contains a summary of this report at p. 22 ff.

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growth of healthy democratic politics. But there was, nevertheless, some notable development.

We have noted in a previous chapter the birth of the MDU in December 1945 and how the Communists sought to dominate a party formed with the declared object of securing representative government within the British Commonwealth. The following year the party assumed a much more genuine appearance under the leadership of Philip Hoalim and of an English-educated Eurasian, John Eber. However, in December 1946 the MDU leaders, in a move to offset the influence of UMNO, formed a federation of all parties which opposed the UMNO programme. This included, in addition to the MDU, the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP),[1] the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions, the Malayan Indian Congress, the MPAJA Old Comrades Association, the Malayan New Democratic Youth, the Angatan Wanita Sedara (Women's Party), and the Angatan Pemuda Insaf (Youth Party). The federation called itself the All Malaya Council of Joint Action (AMCJA). Its six objectives were—the unity of Malaya including Singapore, a fully representative elected legislature, equal political rights for all who regarded Malaya as their real home and the object of their loyalty, the assumption by the Malay Sultans of the position of fully sovereign and constitutional rulers, the control of Mohammedan affairs and matters affecting Malay custom to be in the hands of the Malays, and lastly the encouragement of the advancement of the Malay community.

This collection of strange bedfellows did not last long. The MNP with the Angatan Pemuda Insaf seceded from AMCJA to form a Malay Council of Joint Action, and this was followed by the creation of yet another front, namely, the Pusat Tenaga Ra'ayat (People's United Front) or PUTERA, comprising the main body of MNP, a youth organization, a woman's organization, and many smaller bodies. The leading spirit in this new creation was Dr Burhanuddin, the founder of the MNP. PUTERA added four more points to the six-point programme of AMCJA—that Malay should be the official language of the country, that foreign affairs should be jointly controlled by the Malayan and British Govern-

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[1] On p. 380, the MNP was said to be under Communist auspices. So it seemed at the time, and certainly it has Communist blessing; but although accused of being Communist by its opponent UMNO it was permitted by the Government to continue when the MCP was banned in the summer of 1948.

668 186 ments, the term *Melayu* to be applied to all citizens of Malaya, and the national flag of the country to incorporate the Malay national colours.

AMCJA was thought to be a Chinese-dominated and Chinese-financed front, while PUTERA ostensibly represented anti-UMNO Malay feeling and was guided, no doubt, by its founder. A certain amount of bargaining ensued between the two federations, the Chinese element making concessions in the shape of proposing Melayu as the name of Malayan citizenship and the retention of the Malay Sultans as constitutional sovereigns; PUTERA, for its part, dropped its Communist associates and omitted all reference to the question of immigration.[1]

668 The outbreak of the Communist terror temporarily at least effected a cleavage of Malaya into two sides—Communist and anti-Communist. The grave turn of events in China itself had naturally a strong influence on the Chinese politics of Malaya. The victories of the Communist armies and the break-down of the National Government leading to the resignation of President Chiang Kai-shek gave great encouragement to the Malayan Communists to continue their campaign.

On 24 June the MDU decided to dissolve 'in the present political situation and curtailment of civil rights.' The MCP and the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) ceased to function at the same time. Soon afterwards the MCP, the MPAJA Old Comrades Association, the New Democratic Youth League, and PETA were declared unlawful by the Malayan Governments. The Malayan

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[1] The above represents the author's information regarding the political developments in Malaya at this period, but the situation was so complex and confused that it is desirable to include here another version of what was happening. Mr Peet in *Political Questions of Malaya* (Cambridge University Press, 1949) p. 13, says:

> All these opposition bodies [i.e. the MCP, MDU, MNP, Malayan Indian Congress, and Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions] except the Communist Party, banded together after it was announced that the Malayan Union had been scrapped and that a new constitution was to be drafted. This coalition became known as PUTERA-AMCJA, those being the initials of the principal member bodies. PUTERA was the Malay wing, AMCJA the non-Malay wing. The following of PUTERA among the Malay population appeared to be small. AMCJA was mainly, though not entirely, based upon the trade unions which were under strong Communist influence and were mainly composed of Chinese and Indian immigrant workers.

See also the same pamphlet for an account of the 'Peoples' Constitutional Proposals' produced by this coalition.

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Indian Congress, the sole survivor of the AMCJA, called a truce with the Governments during the emergency.[1] 668

In an attempt to fill this large void Mr Tan Cheng-lock, in September 1948, contemplated the formation of a Malayan Chinese League with the basic idea of the combination of the Chinese, not only in the interests of racial unity, but to bring about Sino-Malay friendship. At the same time Mr Tan stated that there was much to be done before the League would become an accomplished fact.

The most hopeful development of the early months of 1949 was the formation of the Communities Liaison Committee and the Malayan Chinese Association with Mr Tan Cheng-lock as president. The first was intended to bring together the leaders of Malay, Chinese, Indian, Ceylonese, and European communities. In welcoming the new Malayan Chinese Association, Sir Henry Gurney, the High Commissioner of the Federation, said: 'The Chinese community is undoubtedly placing great hopes on the successful formation of this new body which will represent the Chinese point of view and promote and assist the maintenance of peace and good order.'

Malayan politics are indeed a tangled skein. Yet before the 668
Second World War it was often said, and with a great degree of 578
truth, that Malaya had no politics—that is, of course, in the domes-
tic sense. There is no near analogy to the Malayan situation in any /185
other part of the world. Though the Communists claimed that the terrorists were a Malayan Army of Liberation, this was quite obviously not the case. There was in 1949 nothing resembling a national movement in Malaya, and there could not, for this reason, be any valid comparison between the situation in this country and that in Indonesia or Indochina. Malaya's case was *sui generis*, the product of a very rapid opening-up of virgin territory, accompanied by immigration which had resulted in the Malays being out-

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[1] The Societies in Singapore excluded from the provisions of the Societies Ordinance as political Associations (i.e. allowed legally to function) at the beginning of 1949 were the China Democratic League, Kuomintang, Malayan Indian Congress, Malayan Nationalist Party, Malay Union, Pusat Tenaga Ra'ayat, Progressive Party, and the Labour Party of Singapore. In May 1949 the China Democratic League and the Kuomintang were deleted from this list as foreign political organizations. The position thereafter was that these Societies now came under the provisions of the Societies Ordinance and if they wished to maintain branches in the Colony they would have to apply for exemption from registration. The move was a reflection of the developments in China and the wish of the Singapore Government to eliminate foreign political activity. [642]

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668 numbered. Even when the terrorists have been suppressed, the
basic problems of Malaya will still be very much to the fore. The
578 problem is not merely one of a *form* of government: it is of recon-
185 ciling the interests of large, and fairly equally balanced, racial
elements.[1]

[1] The dilemma of those who would like to adopt a position pro or con regarding Malaya is underlined by the case of Australia. After the war Australia manifested a very strong sympathy with national movements in Southeast Asia. Yet when Mr MacMahon Ball led an Australian goodwill mission to Malaya early in June 1948 he met with a hostile reception. The reason was the White Australia policy and the refusal to receive Asiatic displaced persons back in the Commonwealth. Mr MacMahon Ball made a statement in which he implied that there would be a change in the White Australia policy within the next ten years, but this statement was immediately disowned by the Australian Prime Minister, Mr Chifley, who asserted that the Australian Government did not intend to surrender the right exercised by every country in the world to determine who should become its citizens (*Malayan Bulletin*, 25 July 1948).

In September 1949 the Progressive Party authorized its representative, Mr C. C. Tan, to introduce a Bill into the Legislative Council of Singapore 'intended to keep out of the Colony immigrants whose country does not accord reciprocal immigration privileges to citizens of Singapore'. The Bill was aimed at Australia (*The Times*, 10 September 1949).

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PART VI

THE CHINESE IN BRITISH BORNEO

CHAPTER XXXV

DEMOGRAPHY

101 131 The term British Borneo (which is purely one of convenience and has no constitutional sanction) comprises the Crown Colonies of Sarawak (area 50,000 square miles) and North Borneo (area 29,387 including the island of Labuan (35 square miles) which was previously one of the Straits Settlements but which has been part of North Borneo since 1946), and the protected State of Brunei (area 2,226 square miles) making a total area of about 82,000 square miles.

161 162 A census was taken in Sarawak in 1947 (total Chinese 145,000), but for North Borneo and Brunei the last census was in 1931 and since then only estimates of total population are available. Therefore to arrive at a probable figure for the total number of Chinese in British Borneo is not easy. However, on the assumption that the Chinese population of North Borneo has increased since 1940, when the estimated number was 59,610[1] in a total of 309,618, at about the same rate that it has in Sarawak (which is probably not far from the truth) then the figure for 1947 would be 70,000.[2] Adding an estimate for Brunei (1931, 2,683) and Labuan (1931, 2,257) on a similar basis, this would give a total of about 220,000 Chinese in British Borneo in 1947.

722 162 Sarawak was under Japanese occupation from 16 December 1941 to 10 June 1945. North Borneo was similarly occupied from 20 January 1942 to September 1945; the country suffered heavily and the principal towns and villages were destroyed.[3]

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[1] Office of the Special Commissioner for South-East Asia, Social Welfare Conference 18–23 August 1947, *Condition of North Borneo in reference to Social Welfare*, Paper no. 1b.

[2] For food control purposes in 1946 the figure for the total population was taken to be 335,379. See (in mimeograph) E. W. Ellison, Development Secretary, *North Borneo: Reconstruction and Development Plan, 1948–55*. *The Times* of 11 August 1949 in a dispatch from its special correspondent in North Borneo estimates the Chinese at about a fifth of a total population of 335,000 (i.e. 67,000).

[3] *The Statesman's Year-Book 1948*, pp. 188 ff. Labuan was occupied on 31 December 1941, the West Coast Residency of North Borneo on 1 January 1942,

722 It appears that during the Japanese occupation the Chinese as
a whole remained in British Borneo. There were, according to
162 UNRRA report, only 1,669 Chinese displaced from the whole of Borneo, British and Dutch, awaiting repatriation on 18 April 1946. About a thousand Chinese artisans from the China coast and Java were said to have been brought in by the Japanese to man the slipways they had set up in the Kuching River.

Let us now consider the territories separately, in order of the size of the population.[1]

Sarawak

162 The total population of Sarawak increased by 11 per cent. between the enumeration of 1939 and the census of 1947 from 490,585
167 to 546,385 persons. Of this figure 295,429 were classed as indigenous people (Malays, Melanaus, Sea Dyaks, and Land Dyaks, together with 'other indigenous' groups including Kayans, Kenyahs, Penans, Kelabits, &c.) and 150,932 were classified as 'non-indigenous'. The Chinese in the same period increased by 21,493 to 145,119, which made them 27 per cent. of the population.[2]

The distribution of Chinese is stated as follows:

Chinese in Sarawak 1947

	Males	*Females*
First Division . . .	34,442	27,616
Second Division . . .	4,851	3,186
Third Division . . .	32,701	26,264
Fourth Division . . .	8,336	5,884
Fifth Division . . .	1,064	775
	81,394	63,725

Total persons

1939 . . .	123,626
1947 . . .	145,119
	+21,493 or 17·4 per cent.

Chinese for the purposes of the 1947 census means 'all those people claiming to be Chinese by birth, wherever born'.

Part of the increase of the Chinese (says Mr Noakes) must be

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and the East Coast Residency on 19 January 1942. All contact with the outer world had, however, ceased abruptly on 8 December when the last steamer to arrive in the territory left for Singapore.

[1] In Chapter XXXVI the territories are dealt with in order of their creation as States.

[2] The authority followed is J. L. Noakes, 'Some Notes on the Census', *Sarawak Gazette* (1 May 1948).

attributed to immigration during the years 1940–1, but in the 162 absence of statistics it is not possible to make a firm estimate. 167 Observers generally agree that the natural increase has been great, particularly in the years of the Japanese occupation when the marriage of young adults partially secured them from Japanese interference. Usually a Chinese arrived in Sarawak as an adult, and often was of marriageable age, thus reinforcing the adult population and in a very short time reproducing and thereby accentuating the natural increase of births over deaths. This is more clearly understood if one takes, for example, a case of five young male and five young female adult immigrants. If within five years these ten persons between them have increased 50 per cent., it might take ten people born in Sarawak twenty years to achieve the same result.

Chinese males were in excess of females by 17,669, due, of course, to the excess of male over female immigration, and from this the extent may be gauged of the Chinese immigration. However, the problems arising from an excess of males are not particu- [584] larly outstanding in Sarawak because numbers of Chinese in the rural areas marry Land and Sea Dyak women. The progeny of these unions are usually regarded as Chinese, and thus we have a further contributory cause of the very great increase.

In 1948 6,342 Chinese arrived in Sarawak and 4,189 departed.

North Borneo

The total population of North Borneo in 1931 was given by the 162 census as 270,223, of which number the Chinese accounted for 47,972 (including transients).[1] According to the food ration cards in 1946, the total population was then 312,374, and the estimated total population in 1947 was 331,361. The Chinese population in 1921 was, according to the census, 37,642, so that there had been an increase of 26·98 per cent. in the *inter-censal* decade 1921–31. As stated in the summary above, the Chinese on the mainland were estimated in 1940 to number 59,610, and in 1947 the number of Chinese in North Borneo (including Labuan) in 1947 was probably in the neighbourhood of 69,000.

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[1] The total population on North Borneo was (in thousands): 1891, 67,000; 1901, 105,000; 1911, 208,000; 1921, 258,000; 1931, 270,000. A. N. M. Garry, *Report of the Census of the State of North Borneo* (1931) p. 28.

Note. The alleged relation of the Dusuns to the Chinese is discussed on p. 25 of this Survey.

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Chinese

162 The principal Chinese tribes (1931) were as follows (excluding a sea-going population of 600-odd):

	Adults		Children		Total	Percentage of total
	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Cantonese	7,748	2,238	1,245	1,228	12,459	26·07
Hailam	1,010	119	141	175	1,445	3·02
Hakka	11,203	6,956	4,668	4,198	27,025	56·54
Hokkien	1,623	640	608	584	3,455	7·23
Shantung	156	14	12	14	196	0·41
Teochiu	1,436	394	293	277	2,400	5·02
Unspecified	402	161	133	123	819	1·72

Chinese in British North Borneo, 1931

Residences and districts	All races		Chinese	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
Tawau Residency				
Tawau	10,536	6,177	4,022	2,155
Lahad Datu	16,249	3,952	2,976	976
Sandakan and Kudat Residency				
Sandakan Town	13,723	10,962	6,324	4,638
„ Suburbs	9,555	3,882	2,550	1,332
Kinabatangan	10,513	704	662	42
Labuk and Sugut	14,184	332	241	91
Kudat	29,555	3,992	2,387	1,605
West Coast Residency				
Kotabelud	23,049	418	286	132
Tuaran	18,894	1,050	695	355
Jesselton Town	4,594	2,696	1,703	993
„ Suburbs and District	17,624	4,080	2,467	1,613
Papar	17,731	3,562	2,246	1,316
Beaufort	12,702	2,945	1,993	952
Mempakul	9,464	495	336	159
Sipitang	5,508	405	274	131
Interior District				
Tenom	8,970	1,491	1,006	485
Keningau	9,230	481	385	96
Tambunan	28,636	156	110	46
Pensiangan	9,252	19	15	4
	269,969	47,799	30,678	17,121
Add sea-going population	254	173	166	7
	270,223	47,972	30,844	17,128

162 Hakkas, who formed the majority of the small-holders, claimed
241 over half of the total Chinese population. The Cantonese formed
463 21·04 per cent. of the Chinese estates population as compared with

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10·66 per cent. as shown by the Hakkas, and were the 'backbone of the Chinese commercial population'. Chinese agricultural workers amounted to 3,191. 162 241

The small Shantung settlement at Jesselton is worthy of note: it must be unique as a compact settlement of northern Chinese in Southeast Asia. 463

Labuan (since 1946 reunited to North Borneo)

In 1945 the total population according to the ration cards was 9,253. In 1931 the population according to the census was 7,507, of whom 2,257 were Chinese. 162

Labuan: Chinese by Tribe, 1931

	Male	*Female*	*Total*
Hokkien	668	511	1,179
Teochiu	72	39	111
Hakka	223	176	399
Hokchia	1	1	2
Cantonese	217	155	372
Hailam	105	39	144
Hokchiu	3	6	9
Kwongsai	4	..	4
Others and undetermined	19	18	37
Total Chinese	1,312	945	2,257

Brunei

The estimated population of Brunei at the end of 1946 was

Brunei: Chinese by Tribe, 1931[1]

	Male	*Female*	*Total*
Hokkien	487	218	705
Teochiu	155	57	212
Hakka	668	166	834
Hokchia	..	..	..
Cantonese	333	77	410
Hailam	159	23	182
Hokchiu	37	17	54
Kwongsai	26	4	30
Others and undetermined	195	61	256
Total Chinese	2,060	623	2,683

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[1] G.B., Colonial Office, *Report: Brunei 1946*. Brunei and Labuan were included in the Malayan Census Report, 1931.

Figures of the 1947 Census (received when this Survey was in the press) gave: Malays, 16,748; Chinese, 8,313; Dusuns, 2,759—besides other races. Total, 40,670.

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162 48,634. In 1931 the total population was given by the census as 30,135, of whom 2,683 (2,060 males and 623 females) were Chinese.

The increase in the population was largely due to the development of the enormous oil field after 1931.

Of the alien races the Chinese were by far the most numerous. They were mostly from the southern provinces of China and were chiefly employed as traders, shopkeepers, small farmers, and labourers.

In 1948 3,441 Chinese arrived in Brunei and 2,829 departed.

CHAPTER XXXVI

HISTORY

SOME account of early Chinese contacts with Borneo has already 175
been given in Chapter II of this Survey, and the story is
now resumed with the arrival of the Europeans.

Brunei

Early in the sixteenth century the Sultan of Brunei was overlord 643
of the territories which are now occupied by Brunei, Sarawak, and 175
North Borneo (including Labuan), as well as of Sulu and some
parts of the Philippine Islands. In the sixteenth and seventeenth 177
centuries 'European intrusion of an unenlightened character' re- 674
duced the power of Brunei. Lawlessness ensued, and by the middle 642
of the nineteenth century piracy had become such a scourge that
the official charts warned merchants against trading in these waters. 101
In 1841 James Brooke obtained the cession of a large area of the Sultan of Brunei's territories, and subsequent areas were ceded to Sarawak at various dates up to 1905. Labuan was ceded to Britain in 1846. In North Borneo British and American traders endeavoured at an early period to get a footing, but it was not until 1877 that Alfred Dent and his associates obtained a large area in return for annual payments. Brunei now became the smallest of the four territories over whose total area it had once held at least nominal sway.

In 1888 an agreement was concluded with the Sultan under [648]
which the control of foreign relations was placed in the hands of
the British Government, and in 1905, by a further agreement,
Brunei received a British Resident.[1]

We have seen that Pigafetta did not find any Chinese in Brunei 175
(or 'Borneo Proper', as it was afterwards called) when he visited it
in 1521, but it is nevertheless certain that both before and after his 439
visit a large trade was carried on direct with China in pepper, 241
gambier, birds' nests, tripang, dried fish, rubber, wax, sago, and
jungle produce.[2] The hills around Brunei town are terraced with

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[1] See G.B., *Colonial Office List* (1948) p. 196–7.

[2] Peter Blundell, *The City of Many Waters* (London, Arrowsmith, 1923) p. 126.

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Chinese

The hills around Brunei town are [illegible] with

175 the gardens of former cultivators. Treacher puts the total popula-
439 tion of Brunei in 1889 at about 12,000–15,000, with about 80
162 Chinese and a few Tamil shopkeepers. He also tells us that in the
241 old days, when 'it enjoyed a numerous Chinese population', the
178 surrounding hills were covered with pepper plantations, and there was a large junk trade with China.[1] 'But Brunei' (says Peter Blundell) 'gave up pepper and grew pirates and naturally the trade languished.' There is no pepper grown in Brunei now; there are few Chinese plantations, indeed, of any sort. 'Wise through experience, the Chinese let others sow and tried themselves to reap.'[2]
463 (This observation holds good for all Southeastern Asia: the Chinese forsook agriculture for trade because the latter was more profitable.)
438 The Malay cuts down the sago palms in the swamps, brings the trunks up to Brunei, rasps them into powder, and treads and washes out the raw sago for shipment to Singapore. The Chinese advances the money while he is doing his work, takes over the sago in exchange, and reaps the profits on the sale. This is also the case with jelutong. The Chinese is thus the 'hated capitalist'!

There were few places in Brunei where the Chinese was not to be found:

> . . . He goes out singly or in pairs in his clumsy row-boat far up to rivers where savage chiefs reign undisturbed over tribes of naked brown men . . . and seemingly regardless of the fact that he might pay forfeit for his temerity with his head, proceeds to swindle every man jack of the blood-thirsty tribesmen of their stores of gum, wax, rubber, rattans and other articles of value. He weighs the articles in his own scales, which all present are aware are doctored in his favour, and pays them with tobacco, knives, cotton cloth, looking-glasses, and beads of hardly any value at all.[3]

(The writer of this unsentimental account of the Chinese trader in Brunei concludes by wondering that the latter isn't murdered!)

The main history of the Chinese in British Borneo belongs, however, to the vastly greater territories on Brunei's borders and not to this small rump of a once considerable empire.

Sarawak

175 Within the last century or so political accident has drawn a line
177 through the Chinese of Borneo, placing some of them on the Dutch

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[1] W. H. Treacher, 'British Borneo; Sketches of Brunei, Sarawak, Labuan, and North Borneo', *JRASSB* (1889) p. 27.

[2] Blundell, ibid.

[3] Blundell, ibid.

side of it and some on the British, but the history of each section 175
must be considered as complementary to the other. That of the
Dutch section begins much earlier than that of the British—even 177
before the Dutch had established their effective rule the Chinese Kongsis were flourishing—and will be told in Part VII of this survey. Both are continuations of the story of the Chinese in pre-European Borneo which began hundreds of years ago.

Both the Dutch and the British colonies have so far (and despite a three and a half year interruption by the Japanese) defied the gloomy prophecy of John Crawfurd that

> all attempts on the part of European nations to establish a permanent territorial dominion over Borneo, we may rest assured, will, in the long run, be baffled by the insuperable obstacles of an uncongenial climate, a stubborn soil, a rude and intractable population, and the absence of all adequate financial resources.[1]

It is not too much to say, however, that these European nations might not have been as successful as they were without the help of the Chinese.

In 1839–40 Sarawak (which comprised the districts now con- 175
stituting the first and second divisions) was in rebellion against the
tyranny of the Malay officials, insufficiently controlled by the Raja 177
Muda Hassim, and the insurgents held out at Blidah fort in 669
Siniawan district. The insurrection was suppressed through the instrumentality of James (afterwards Sir James) Brooke, who in September 1841 became Raja of Sarawak.[2]

It seems that before Sir James Brooke arrived in Borneo the [161]
scattered population of the extensive district which afterwards
came under his control as Raja of Sarawak may have amounted to 162
about 20,000.[3] Brooke himself relates that when he visited the 175
River Lanou in 1839 he found about two and a half miles from the
south of the river mouth a settlement which had been recently 241

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[1] John Crawfurd, F.R.S., *A Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands and the Adjacent Countries* (London, Bradbury & Evans, 1856) p. 66. Commenting on the passage 'uncongenial climate, a stubborn soil, a rude and intractable population', an ex-North Borneo official of many years' experience says: 'Did ten words ever contrive to convey so many gross libels as these amount to? . . .' He points out that North Borneo is particularly healthy, the soil of prolific fertility, the Chinese of North Borneo was, generally speaking, the salt of the earth, the natives, also generally speaking, most tractable.

[2] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed. (1910–11) xxiv. 208.

[3] Anonymous article in *China Review* (1878–9) pp. 1–11. (The writer adds that this was thought to be an exaggerated estimate.)

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Chinese

175 established by Chinese. It was on the same side of the river as
Tumgong, and consisted of thirty men ('real Chinese') with five
162 women of the mixed breed of Sambas. 'Nothing [said the future
241 Raja] could be more flourishing than this infant settlement, and I
could hardly credit their statement that this had been formed for
only four or five months. The soil they represented as the most
excellent, and none are better judges.' Many acres were cleared
and under cultivation. Rice, sireh, sweet potatoes, Indian corn, &c.,
were growing abundantly and they were able to supply Brooke's
party with seven piculs of sweet potatoes without noticeably
[438] diminishing their crop. They also showed their visitors some birds'
nests, bees-wax, lignum aloes, and ebony collected in the vicinity.[1]

Brooke considered the mixed breed of Chinese and Malays to be
162 a good-looking and industrious race, partaking much more of the
144 Chinese character than that of the natives of the country. This
mainly arose from education and early formed habits which were
both altogether Chinese, and in religion and customs they likewise
followed in great measure the paternal stock. '*They are a race
worthy of attention* [he said] *as the future possessors of Borneo.*'

[161] The numbers of this people could not be estimated, but they
must have run to thousands—3,000 of them were said to be on their
way to 'The Bornean territory'. The head of the settlement, which
was near the town of Tumgong, was a Cantonese who had long
resided in the vicinity of Sambas.

175 It was clear that James Brooke already had his eyes on the
Chinese as future settlers in his territory, for he says, 'I shall be
168 strengthened by incomers, especially Chinese.'[2] He also adumbrated
his policy—'divide and rule is a good motto in my case'.[3] He
thought that in attracting them to Sarawak their dissatisfaction
with the territory where the Kongsis still held sway, especially at
Montrado, would stand him in good stead. He mentions a report
received the day before which stated that a man sent by the Sultan
to demand gold from the Chinese Kongsis had been killed and that
the letter from the Sultan, after being defiled, had been publicly
burnt. The Chinese of Sarawak, Brooke added, were undoubtedly
intriguing with those of Sambas.

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[1] Captain the Hon. Henry Keppel, R.N., *The Expedition of H.M.S. Dido for the suppression of piracy, with extracts from the Journal of James Brooke, Esq., of Sarawak* (New York, Harper, 1846) i. 67.

[2] ibid. p. 172.

[3] ibid. p. 179.

175 Although the future Raja of Sarawak had formed a favourable impression of the Chinese as colonists for his territory, he was undoubtedly put on his guard against them by the reputation of the Kongsis, even though he sympathized with their resistance to the tyranny of the Bornean native chiefs. In another place in his journal the Raja concedes that the Chinese have many good points —'they are active, industrious, and commercial', and he adds that considering the badness of the Government under which they have lived, deprived of trade and subject to all the evils of extortion and monopoly, one should give them much credit for the qualities they display.[1]

175 439 361 463 An early description of Kuching (1843) says that the *Julia*, a ship belonging to Mr Brooke, sailed every month for Singapore laden with antimony ore, and, at the same time, she acted as a mail-packet between Singapore and Kuching. At the point near the bend of the river was the fort. It was a strong building of large timbers and mounted 24-pounder iron guns in excellent condition. This was a very necessary defence, as the European Raja had many enemies. Another building, of which the top just appeared over the trees, was the Chinese 'joss-house' or temple, for there were many Chinese settlers in Kuching who were most useful as carpenters, blacksmiths, and agriculturists.[2]

[67] On his return to Sarawak after an absence in October 1850, Brooke was pleased to hear that some thousands of Chinese had passed over from Sambas into Sarawak and thus had begun the long-wished-for migration.

175 463 669 167 In the Dutch-protected State, Sambas, southwest of Sarawak, there were two distinct parties among the Chinese—those who sided with the gold-workers of Montrado, and those who, on account of their position, were under the influence of the Dutch. The latter were the agriculturists of Pamangkat and a few small companies of gold-workers. At the beginning of 1850 there had been trouble between the factions. The Chinese of Montrado had gained the upper hand and had driven the few Dutch soldiers into the town of Sambas, and then set upon their allies. The Pamangkats had fled for their lives into Sarawak, where they had settled

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[1] Captain Rodney Mundy, R.N., *Narrative of Events in Borneo and the Celebes down to the occupation of Labuan, from the Journals of James Brooke Esq., together with the operations of H.M.S. Iris* (1848) i. 286.

[2] Frank S. Marryat, *Borneo and the Indian Archipelago* (London, Longmans, 1848) p. 98.

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Chinese

175 down as agriculturists or among the established gold-workers.
463 This movement was encouraged by the British officers, who did
their utmost to aid them, and more than a thousand of them were
669 supported by the Government at one time. They well repaid this
167 attention (says St John) as in a few months they had tripled the
revenue.[1] The Chinese immigrants attempted for years to form
secret societies in Sarawak, but the Raja's vigorous hand had
crushed every attempt. On the surface this policy appeared to have
575 been successful—indeed, it was so far as the Chinese of the capital
621 were concerned, but in the interior, among the gold-workers, the
Kongsi stood in the place of the secret society, and its chiefs carried
on an exclusive intercourse with their fellow-countrymen in
Sambas and Pontianak and with the T'ien-tei Wui (Heaven and
Earth Society) of Singapore.

669 Smuggling was one of their main activities, and some Chinese
who were convicted of being connected with it were fined, and
575 others were punished for gross assault on other Chinese. But these
439 trivial cases were not the cause of the Chinese insurrection which
took place in 1857. One of the real causes was that the second war
175 between China and Britain was now in progress, and all the Chinese
in Southeast Asia had been greatly excited by the rumour that the
British had retired from Canton and that the Viceroy had offered
£25 a head for every Englishman slain. Everywhere in Southeast
Asia the secret societies were extremely active, seeing in this news
an opportunity to stir up a rebellion against the British and to seize
power for themselves. The Heaven and Earth Society sent an
emissary from Malacca and Singapore to incite the gold-workers
to rebel. The arguments used were not only that the British were
crushed at Canton but also that the British Government was discontented
with the Raja, Sir James Brooke, and that it would
therefore not interfere if the Kongsi destroyed only him and his
officers, and did not meddle with other Europeans or obstruct the
trade.[2]

648 This alleged discontent with Brooke on the part of the British
643 Government referred to the long campaign against him by his
enemies in England and elsewhere. These for the most part be-
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[1] Sir Spenser St John, *The Life of Sir James Brooke, Rajah of Sarawak, from his personal papers and correspondence* (Edinburgh and London, Blackwood, 1879) p. 225 ff.

[2] St John, op. cit. p. 293.

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longed to that stay-at-home school of British humanitarianism 648
which systematically attributed the basest motives to the proconsuls 643
of the empire, and it was alleged that the Raja had been guilty of 175
brutality towards the Dyak pirates and head-hunters, who in reality were not pirates or head-hunters at all. Eventually a commission of inquiry was appointed to sit in Singapore and this exonerated Brooke, though it caused him great annoyance 'and introduced some embarrassment into his relations with the natives under his rule who not unnaturally conceived that he had forfeited the favour of his own government'.[1] This misguided opinion was shared by the Chinese secret societies.

Already in 1856, before the Raja's return, the Chinese Kongsi, 175
or 'Gold Company', had been behaving with so much violence
that Mr Crookshank, who was in charge of the Government, 669
thought it advisable to man the stockades in Kuching and to bring up a force from Sekrang. This action temporarily overawed the Chinese, but in the following year, after the Raja's return, they attacked the Government House and other British residences and murdered several of the British. Brooke escaped in the darkness by jumping into the river, diving under the bow of a Chinese barge, and swimming to the other side. After having occupied the capital for a few days and destroying a good deal of property, including the Raja's house and his valuable library, the Chinese retired, followed by a large body of Malays and Dyaks who had stood by the Raja all through, and who, intercepting the Chinese in their retreat, destroyed a considerable number of them.

> Thus terminated [says Sir Spenser St John] the most absurd and causeless rebellion that ever occurred, which, during its continuance, displayed every phase of the Chinese character—arrogance, secrecy, combination, an utter incapacity of looking to the consequences of events or actions, and a belief in their own power and courage which every event belied. The Chinese have never fought even decently, and yet, till the very moment of trial, they act as if they were invincible.[2]

One thing the rebellion proved without a shadow of doubt was 175
how firmly the Brooke regime was based on the support of the 669
Malays and Dyaks, for at no moment was there any sign of waver- 651
ing. Though more than 3,500 Chinese were killed or driven out of
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[1] *Dictionary of National Biography* (London, Smith Elder, 1886) vi. 429.

[2] St John, op. cit. p. 312.

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175

669 651 439 the country, the revenues from the Chinese soon rose, instead of falling, which was proof that smuggling had been carried on. The breaking of the 'Gold Company' was felt by the Chinese community as a whole as a great relief.[1]

175 181 The Chinese of Sarawak with whom the Raja had to deal were of an especially stubborn and lawless kind. Speaking at the end of the century F. Wells Williams says:

> 437 In North Borneo the protectorate may be passing through certain phases that marked the early years of Penang and Singapore. Here, and in Raja Brooke's dominion of Sarawak, the Chinese are for the most part either pirates or the descendants of pirates and the old hostility between them and the truculent Malays is apt to break out at any time in bloody frays.[2]

In the light of these happenings it is important to note the development of the point of view *vis-à-vis* the Chinese of the second white Raja of Sarawak, Sir Charles Vyner Brooke, the nephew of the first Raja. He is writing in 1866, nine years after the insurrection, and his memories of the treachery of the Kongsis had had time to soften. He says:

> John Chinaman as a race are an excellent set of fellows, and a poor show the Eastern countries make without their energetic presence. They combine many good, many dangerous, and it must be admitted, many bad, qualities. They are given to being overbearing and insolent (unless severely kept down) nearly to as great a degree as Europeans of the rougher classes. They will cheat their neighbours and resort to all manner of deception *on principle*. But their redeeming qualities are

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[1] St John, op. cit. p. 314. The above account follows St John and other observers. However, an anonymous writer in the *China Review*, vol. vii (1877–9), criticizes Brooke's policy towards the Chinese in Sarawak, contrasting it unfavourably with that of the Dutch in their part of Borneo. The latter (says the writer) in modern times had adopted a policy of treating the Chinese with confidence, inviting them to take part in the administration of justice and regulating their taxation according to their own traditional arrangements and customs of the natives, whereas the writer quotes from Brooke's journal to show that he had early in his career acquired a distrust of the Chinese which did not allow him to treat them with understanding. This isolated article, though it is written with skill and restraint, conceding to Brooke many fine qualities, is not sufficient, of itself, to prove a case; but it nevertheless merits the attention of the historian making a close study of the period. It must be borne in mind, however, that at the time when the article appeared feeling was still high, and the party in England which had persecuted Brooke may have had some influence on this anonymous writer's views.

[2] 'The Chinese Immigration in Far Eastern Asia', *American Historical Review* (April 1900).

charitableness and liberality; a fondness for improvements; and, except 175
in small mercantile affairs or minor trading transactions, they are honest.
. . . The Chinaman would be equal to the master, or white man, if both 181
worked fairly by the sweat of his brow. . . . Upon my first arrival I was
strongly possessed by the opinion that the Chinamen were all rascals and 437
thieves—the character so generally attached to the whole race at home.
But to be candid, and looking at both sides, I would as soon deal with
a Chinese merchant in the East as with one who is a European, and I
believe the respectable class of Chinese to be equal in honesty and integrity to the white man.[1]

In spite of the tolerance of Sarawak's rulers towards them the 162
number of Chinese in that State did not grow with any great
celerity. There were about 5,000 of them at the time of the census 175
in 1871,[2] and in the later seventies the anonymous article above 463
quoted does not place them above 7,000. After their display of
turbulence in 1857 they seem to have sought a quiet life. A visitor
to Sarawak in 1890 notes that 'the Chinese are not a communicative race', and states that he was naturally, therefore, unable to
obtain any information as to the average yield per ton of gold ore.
The women workers, he found, earned 40 to 50 cents a day (a good [434]
rate for that period). At Lundu he saw a Government tobacco and
coffee estate which had been abandoned by the Chinese in order to

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[1] Sabine Baring-Gould and C. A. Bampfylde, *A History of Sarawak under its Two White Rajahs 1839–1908* (London, Sotheran, 1909) p. 31.

[2] The census of 1871 was, according to Baring-Gould and Bampfylde (op. cit. p. 32) 'made in a very imperfect manner', and from the allowance made by the report for its error we can well believe it. These are the figures:

Malays	52,519
Dyaks	70,849
Chinese	4,947
Indians	364
	128,679
Allowance for evasion and omission 10%	12,867
	141,546

The estimates from the Consular Reports,* 1877 (presented to both Houses of Parliament by royal command in February 1878) are much more probable, viz:

Malays	60,000
Chinese	7,000
Milanuas	30,000
Sea Dyaks of the Batang, Lupar, and other reserves	90,000
Land Dyaks	35,000
	222,000

* Cited by Sir Spenser St John, *Life of Sir James Brooke* (London, Blackwood, 1879) p. 379.

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Chinese

175 grow pepper elsewhere. At Sibu there was a large population,
162 mostly of traders, who exchanged European goods for jungle pro-
463 duce. It was noticeable that the Chinese alone traded direct with Singapore; the remainder, both here and at the other outstations,
[439 being merely agents for the business houses at Kuching. At Kapit there was a good Chinese bazaar. In 1890 the revenue farms pro-
651] duced: opium $144,240; gambling $34,096; arrack $20,780; pawnshops $3,196—the Chinese, as usual, being the farmers.[1]

The year 1899 saw the establishment of the Foochow Chinese colony at Sibu.

175 The second Raja Brooke (the first had died in 1868) had had the great idea of bringing to Sarawak some experienced farmers who
168 would settle on the jungle land and show the Dyaks what might
241 be done with energy and perseverance. He said that the idea came to him during the years when he was developing his garden at the *astana* (palace) at Kuching. He and his Ranee had almost to stand over the Malay and Dyak workers in order to get the lawns, flowers, and vegetables into shape. 'These brown men simply could not—probably would not work properly.' As he tried to direct the gardeners in the difficult job of making the jungle take on order he wondered if he could not find farmers in some overcrowded land whose misery would make them listen to the appeal of a new home.[2]

[795] The Chinese pioneer who was persuaded to come from China to form the colony at Sibu or 'New Foochow' (as it was to be known) was a Christian named Hwang Nai-siang from Mintsing in Foochow province. He and his fellow converts belonged to the American Methodist Episcopal Church. The party started off in a junk and at Hong Kong they were joined by an American bishop named Warne.

[423] On arrival at Sibu the immigrants were assigned plots of jungle land which, however, belonged to a private owner. 'By some erratic reasoning (says Mr Cartwright) the proprietor had prophesied that the people would be self-supporting in six months, but the strain of clearing and planting the land quickly disproved the prophecy.'

Dyaks were hired to fell the trees and to slash away the jungle vines and undergrowth. Slowly and painfully, with sickness and

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[1] G.B., Foreign Office, N. P. Trevenen, *Notes of a visit to Sarawak and its Trade* (Misc. Series no. 210, 1891).

[2] This account of the Chinese Foochow colony at Sibu is taken from Frank T. Cartwright, *Tuan Hoover of Borneo; an Odyssey of Chinese Pilgrim Fathers* (New York, Abingdon Press, 1938) p. 54 ff. and passim.

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accident claiming their toll, small clearings were made. Rice was 175
planted, but the crop utterly failed. Whereas in China the rice 168
lands had been cultivated for many generations and all the stones
had been removed, here, on the contrary, the earth was full not 241
only of stones but also of widespreading jungle roots: the soil was porous and irrigation was therefore next to impossible. Crude heavy axes, made by local blacksmiths, and saws, equally simple, were all the tools at command. Torrential rains came on in their season and washed out the rice that was approaching maturity.

The second year there was a slightly better success, but heavier rains than usual back in the mountains drove out the wood rats, which swarmed down towards the plain and played havoc with the swelling heads of rice.

That the settlement eventually made headway was largely due 175
to the American missionary, Mr Hoover, who, when the private 621
ownership of the land was abolished, became an unpaid Govern-
ment official and nursed the settlement into vigour. In 1912 the 797
aged Raja wrote in the *Sarawak Gazette*: 'We have much to thank the Americans for, for their missionary work is quite promising, and they have introduced Chinese for cultivation of different kinds.' Another settlement of the same kind was made at Baram.

A Chinese, writing in 1940 of the Chinese settlement at Sibu, 162
says that 99 per cent. of the inhabitants were from Fukien province with a small percentage from Kwangtung.

This same Chinese writer tells us a number of other things of 871
interest.[1] He says that the education of the Chinese in Sarawak had made progress entirely under their own efforts. The majority of all classes could read and write their own language. Of late years (pre-1940), fifty primary schools and ten middle schools with complete courses were established in Kuching and Sibu. The best known of them were the Fukien school, the Ming Teck public school, and in Sibu the Kwang Hua middle school and the Tung Hua middle school. All these followed the Chinese system of education.

After the 'Double Seventh' (7 July 1937) when the Japanese 175
attacked China, the people of Sarawak (says Mr Hwang) were
inspired with a spirit of patriotism; some returned to China to 722
fight, others raised money or collected clothes for relief in the

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[1] James P. Hwang: 'The Chinese in Sarawak', *The China Critic*, vol. xxix, no. 6 (9 May 1940).

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175 ancestral country. The funds collected from voluntary contributions amounted to some $5,000 a week. Mr Hwang regrets that a Chinese consulate had not been established in Sarawak up to that time, and complains of the restrictions on trade imposed by the British after the outbreak of the war with Germany in 1939.

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871/ After the liberation of Sarawak from the Japanese, the Chinese resumed their active interest in the education of their children. Wherever they are concentrated in any numbers, their own schools, organized and financed almost entirely by the local Chinese communities, are to be found. At Kuching the Chinese Chamber of Commerce was found in 1949 to be levying a tax of its own on all incoming and outgoing Chinese cargo in order to obtain funds for the Chinese schools (a common practice with Chinese Chambers of Commerce in southeast Asia). When arrangements were being made for the establishment of a local authority at Limbang in the fifth Division (whose population includes 6,802 Malays and 742 Chinese), it was discovered that, whereas the Malays would be contributing only Malayan $220 in school fees towards the maintenance of the Malay school and its teachers (the rest of the money coming from Government grants), the Chinese would be contributing M $7,080 to the Chinese school, which, with four teachers, was completely independent of Government assistance.[1]

'Not only is much of the wealth of the Colony in their hands (says Mr Ian Morrison, writing in 1949), but they [the Chinese] are at a far higher stage of political consciousness and educational advancement than their neighbours.'

871/ In Sarawak the British policy of preparing colonial peoples to govern themselves is being advanced mainly by the development
647 of local government institutions. The 'plural' nature of Sarawak society is proving an obstacle to the establishment of local authori-
178 ties. In only one Authority, at Limbang, has it been possible so far (1949) to bring in the Chinese. There the school fees paid by the Chinese, far higher *per capita* than those of the non-Chinese, are paid into the Treasury and paid out again to the Chinese school. The non-Chinese in Limbang have accepted the fact that the Chinese are accustomed to a far more expensive type of education than the non-Chinese have had hitherto and that they are entitled to enjoy it if they are prepared to pay for it.

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[1] Ian Morrison, 'Local Self-Government in Sarawak', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. xxii, no. 2 (June 1949).

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It is hoped that Limbang will provide a precedent for all other 871
authorities where there are Chinese.[1]

Much more remains to be discovered regarding the Chinese in 647
Sarawak, but there is enough in the available records to provide a 178
complement to the histories of the race in other countries of
Southeast Asia.[2]

North Borneo

On 29 December 1877 a treaty with the Sultan of Brunei gave 175
the title of three adjoining territories to Alfred Dent and his
associates in return for a payment of $12,000 per annum. The 642
Sultan appointed Dent and his associates and successors as 648
Maharaja of Sabah and Raja of Gaya and Sandakan, with power of life and death over the inhabitants, and with all the absolute rights of property vested in the Sultan over the soil of the country, with the rights of making laws, coining money, creating an Army and Navy, levying customs, &c. The same day another treaty with the Pangeran Temenggong (Chief Minister of Brunei) was executed for the transfer of two additional provinces which were his private property. The Sultan of Sulu received $5,000 for his claims over North Borneo.[3]

In November 1881 the British Government granted a charter to the company which had taken over the concessions from Dent and his associates, and it assumed charge of the territory under the title of the British North Borneo Company.

When the company took over from the provisional association 175
on 1 July 1882 the stations of Sandakan, Penangan (eighteen days'
journey up the Kinabatangan River), Silam, Papar, Kudat, and 168
Gaya had already been established, and every effort was being 463
made to attract Chinese to the country. William Medhurst, who was appointed immigration commissioner, organized a system of obtaining immigrants from southern China which at first met with success. Streams of Chinese began to pour into North Borneo—whole families, often including grandparents—mostly of the labourer or farmer class, with a sprinkling of traders and shopkeepers; all

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[1] ibid.

[2] The investigations of Dr Tien Ju-Kang, who in 1949 was in Sarawak studying Chinese associations in Kuching, should add much to our knowledge of the subject besides throwing light on Chinese social organization in general.

[3] George McT. Kahin, 'The State of North Borneo 1881–1946', *Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol. vii, no. 1 (November 1947) passim.

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Br. Borneo OC4
Chinese

175 were under advances from the company, and these advances were
sometimes supplemented by grants of land with the produce of
168 which the settlers were to repay their loans. This experiment was
463 only too successful, for the inflow of immigrants was not properly
controlled. The result was an overwhelming inrush which the young country could not stand. The labour market became overstocked; the Government had to retrench, finding it impossible to give out unlimited loans; the traders who had come down direct from China found themselves at a disadvantage with the Straits-born Chinese, who were versed in trading with the natives and could speak their language; and many of the farmers, dismayed at the sight of the Borneo jungle, absolutely declined to squat upon the land allotted to them and took to picking up a living as best they could.[1] A reaction set in and a return current began which by 1883 had carried hundreds back to their native shores.

175 Nevertheless numbers of Straits-born Chinese continued to flock
to the country, and the two leading Chinese firms in Singapore put
167 on the North Borneo run steamers of their own which competed
successfully with the European lines even though the latter were
439 subsidized by the Government. When Mr Pryer took over Sandakan in 1878 there were only two Chinese there, and in 1883, notwithstanding the fact that many had returned to China, the number had risen to 3,000. A large number of Hakka Christians had settled happily at Kudat, where their descendants were living and thriving when the Second World War interrupted their prosperity.

The country soon attracted notice among capitalists in China too, and the first two companies to start operations were both Chinese—the Chinese Sabah Land Farming Company and the Yaen Yew North Borneo Cultivation Trading Company, with concessions of 40,000 acres and 10,000 acres respectively. A large sum was laid out also in a new Chinese immigration scheme which, however, failed, as did others in 1883 and 1902.

175 The failure of these schemes did not deter the authorities in
North Borneo from initiating others. Mr W. H. Treacher, the first
168 British Governor of British North Borneo, had declared in 1891:

> Experience in the Straits Settlements, the Malay Peninsular and Sarawak has shown that the people to cause rapid financial progress in Malayan countries are the hard-working, money-loving Chinese and

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[1] Owen Rutter, *British North Borneo* (London, Constable, 1922) p. 131 and passim. See also W. H. Treacher, 'British Borneo', *JRASSB* (1889 and 1890).

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Chinese

these are the peoples whom the Company should lay themselves out to 175
attract to Borneo. . . . Once get them to voluntarily migrate and the 168
financial success of the Company would, in my opinion, be secured.

Treacher's views have dominated the country's labour and immigration policy ever since.[1]

From 1924 to 1930 inclusive an average of 6,928 Chinese, 6,810 464
Javanese, and 3,866 natives were employed annually in North
Borneo out of an average of 17,606 labourers in enterprises em- 162
ploying 20 or more persons. The Superintendent of the 1931 census was able to declare with jubilation: 'The one bright spot in spite of all these adverse conditions [i.e. those arising from the trade depression] is the increase that is still shown in the number of Chinese, who can fairly be regarded as the mainstay of the commercial and agricultural population.'[2]

The increase shown by the census report was just over 27 per cent. in the inter-censal decade, while the increase in Chinese females was over 72 per cent., 'thus justifying to the full the policy of state-aided immigration that had been barely started when the 1921 census was taken and which has been still further encouraged and developed in the last ten years'.

But the satisfaction felt by the authorities with the success that 167
had attended their policy of attracting Chinese to North Borneo
was followed later in the thirties by a mounting apprehension. In 168
1937 a total of 7,912 Chinese arrived, mostly labourers, which was 464
a number much more than labour requirements necessitated. Therefore in 1938 a regulation was introduced raising the minimum sum required to be in the possession of Asiatic immigrants from SS $10 to $70 for each adult and from $3 to $10 for each dependent minor. Even so the number of immigrants for that year was 3,342. Already in 1936 powers had been granted to the Protector of Labour and other Government labour officers to deport Chinese on grounds of health, unsuitability for the work for which they had been engaged, unjust treatment by an employer, unemployment, &c.[3]

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[1] Similar views had earlier been expressed by Joseph Hatton in *The New Ceylon, being a sketch of British North Borneo* (London, Chapman & Hall, 1881) p. 124, who said: 'It would seem, then, that the principal hope of civilizing and making prosperous the islands in the Indian Archipelago lies in the power to attract the very class of labourer which America has obtained from China, with power to control and economise it.'

[2] Census, p. 1.

[3] To escape the charge of being destitute, each adult European or American

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463 The general economic structure of North Borneo was not different from that of other Southeast Asian countries. Enterprises requiring relatively large outlays of capital (estates and timber undertakings in particular) were chiefly in the hands of Europeans, with a few wealthy Chinese participating. Some of the labour was indigenous, but the greater part of it was Chinese, Javanese, &c., imported for the work. The Chinese constituted by far the majority of the commercial and artisan sections of the community, while most of the natives pursued a subsistence agriculture.

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To encourage the immigration of Chinese agriculturists, especially with the object of increasing rice production, the Government granted a free passage from Hong Kong to the relatives or friends of any Chinese freeholder within the State. The result of the policy for the encouragement of rice production was that by 1938 the area planted with paddy was 90,195 acres, second only to rubber, which occupied 126,640 acres.

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In North Borneo the Chinese money-lender was adversely criticized. Laws were introduced by the Government to control his activities, but their effectiveness was not likely to have been greater than in other Southeast Asian countries; even so the maximum legal interest was 10 per cent. per mensem on loans of $1 or less, 7 per cent. on loans of $10 or less, and was not reduced until 1939, when the maximum legal rate was made 4 per cent. per mensem.[1]

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As in Sarawak, a considerable proportion of the Government revenues in North Borneo was obtained from gambling and opium farms which were leased to Chinese. The policy followed, however, was much on the lines of that in Malaya. The chandu monopoly was taken over by the Government about 1911, and the farms were finally abolished in 1930.

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was required to possess $500 and $200 for each dependant; for Eurasians the sums were $150 and $50; for Asiatics $70 and $10. Since naturalization was open only to persons who had lived for five years or more in North Borneo, a large portion of the Chinese population was subject to this law.

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Indentured labour was abolished in North Borneo in 1933; probably, as in the Netherlands Indies, it was no longer necessary to maintain an adequate labour supply by this means. (George McT. Kahin, op. cit.)

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[1] Kahin, op. cit. My experience as a magistrate in Malaya was that it was extremely difficult to ascertain what sum had actually been advanced as the money-lender (in Malaya usually a chetty and not a Chinese) made the borrower sign a promissory note for a sum much greater than he actually received. The remedy for usurious practices lay, it seemed, not in the reform of the law to any extent but in the extension of Government and co-operative society credit facilities,—V.P.

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As in the other countries of Southeast Asia, the Chinese in 871 North Borneo concerned themselves with organizing and supporting their own schools, in which the Chinese language was the medium of instruction and the text-books were, generally speaking, those approved by the Chinese Ministry of Education. Certainly in North Borneo there was little counter-attraction offered to Chinese parents for their children, for in 1938 only $33,000, a mere 2 per cent. of all Government expenditure, was spent in education. This went to maintain or to assist 18 Malay vernacular schools and 1 Chinese school (96 pupils out of a total of 1,347 pupils for all the registered schools). To mission schools was allotted $7,800. There were also 72 unaided schools with 3,776 pupils, most of which were Chinese, supported by the Chinese community. The total enrolment for all schools was 8,912. No secondary education existed outside Chinese schools.[1]

The Government did its best to control the instruction in Chinese schools, and in 1935 100 Chinese text-books were blacklisted.

When the Japanese occupied British Borneo in 1941–2 the 000

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[1] Since the liberation of North Borneo there has been considerable progress, as is reflected in the following statistics (from Paper 1b of the Social Welfare Conference convened by the Special Commissioner in Southeast Asia at Singapore, 1947, already cited):

Education Statistics—June 1947

	No. of schools	*Enrolment*		*Total*
		Boys	*Girls*	
Government . . .	49	2,938	366	3,304
Mission . . .	43	3,300	1,361	4,661
Chinese . . .	52	4,161	1,707	5,868
Others . . .	7	154	30	184
	151	10,553	3,464	14,017

In 1947 it was estimated that there were about 65,000 of school age (6–14).

Expansion in the School Population

Expansion in the school population is reflected in the fact that the total number of Government schools prior to the war was 32, and that in 1949 there were 49 in existence and 11 being built, whilst the total school population had increased from 10,268 in September 1946 to 14,017 in 1949. It is possible that this figure would have been higher, but the marked decline in the price of rubber was considered to have affected adversely the attendance in non-Government schools in which fees were charged. As the result of planned expansion, it was estimated that the school population would increase to about 22,000 in the year 1951.

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Chinese

722 463 241 When the Japanese occupied British Borneo in 1941-2 the Chinese from the first adopted a policy of passive resistance.[1] There was a tendency for them to move from their usual centres of commerce on the coast or the main rivers and to establish themselves as peasant farmers in less accessible and conspicuous places. This meant a considerable curtailment of trading activity which in turn had a detrimental effect on the Japanese war economy as the occupation continued.

722 Many Chinese helped unfortunate Europeans, sometimes at grave personal risk. The doyen of the Sarawak Chinese community, Mr Ong Tiang-swee, himself took part in organizing the smuggling of news and material into the prison camps.[2] Very few Chinese can be said to have done anything voluntarily or readily to help the Japanese, whereas a number of Dyaks, Indians, and others were tried after the war, and in some cases executed, for treachery. One occasion when the Chinese distinguished themselves by the assistance they gave to prisoners was when the Japanese moved the occupants (mostly Australians) of the great camp at Sandakan southwards in the terrible 'Death March' which only a handful of them survived. The Japanese became increasingly concerned about the attitude of the local Chinese and it was as a result of their counter-measures that Mr F. Selous, Secretary for Chinese Affairs, met his death in internment.

In 1943–4 Lt.-Col. Gort Chester, D.S.O., O.B.E., established an intelligence system in North Borneo, though on a small scale. He and his party were hunted day and night by the Japanese, several of them losing their lives in the process; but they inspired new hope among the Chinese and others in North Borneo. Eventually a considerable number of Chinese, led by those who had been in contact with Colonel Chester, organized a force, staged a rising, and actually took over control in a number of places. But this uprising was entirely premature and correspondingly short-lived. Retaliation was immediate and brutal. All who had taken an active part were executed, the leaders first being tortured to disclose information. In North Borneo the effect of the gallant but ill-conceived insurrection was to handicap the development of the Chinese guerrilla force.

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[1] These facts concerning the Chinese during the Japanese occupation are taken from Tom Harrisson, 'The Chinese in Borneo, 1942–46', *International Affairs*, vol. xxvi, no. 3 (July 1950).

[2] He was awarded the O.B.E. for his services and other Chinese were also honoured after the liberation.

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Chinese

722 In early 1945 a number of paratroopers were dropped in British Borneo in preparation for the intended attack by the South East Asia Command (among them being Major Tom Harrisson, D.S.O.). The Chinese welcomed them with enthusiasm, and were ready to help the Allied troops in any way open to them. One Chinese, Miaw Siang, the headman of Sipitang, a small town on the west coast of Borneo, organized a mixed force of Chinese and natives, and successfully harried the Japanese in that area. On the great Rejang River in Sarawak Major W. L. Sochon, D.S.O., relied for his assistance largely on Chinese mixed with more numerous Sea Dyaks.

Over in Dutch territory the Chinese trading groups in the interior put up an astonishing performance as nuclei for intelligence and other stations.

After the liberation there was a great shortage of all necessaries, including food. The population, especially the Chinese, depended largely on rice obtained from outside the territory. In July 1946 the daily rice ration was only two ounces per head.[1]

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[1] Labuan, a small island of 35 square miles, does not lend itself to separate
historical treatment so far as the Chinese are concerned. It was ceded in 1846 to 101
Great Britain by the Sultan of Brunei as a place where Her Majesty's ships might
careen and refit. After a chequered administrative history it was reunited with 642
British North Borneo in 1946. In 1881 the total population of Labuan was
placed at 5,995 with 300–400 Chinese who were traders, shopkeepers, coolies, 175
and sago-washers.

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PART VII

THE CHINESE IN INDONESIA[1]

CHAPTER XXXVII

DEMOGRAPHY

659 As is the case with the other countries in the area, it is essential to ascertain what the census officials of Indonesia had in mind when they enumerated the Chinese. The law recognized a category known as 'Foreign Orientals' and, generally speaking, did not make a distinction between Chinese and other foreign Orientals[2] except for census purposes when 'all persons hailing from China and their descendants' were counted as 'Chinese'.[3] Under 'Other Foreign Orientals' were included all non-indigenous population groups not belonging to the European or Chinese portion [562] of the population. All women not by birth Chinese or other foreign Oriental but who were married to a foreign Oriental were enumerated in the population group of their husbands. Vice versa, women born of those population groups, but married to a man of some other population group, were enumerated in the group to which their husbands belonged. (The group of other foreign Orientals was made up principally of Arabs, natives of India, and Malays from the Malay Peninsula, and their descendants.)

The census to which reference here is principally made is that of 1930. No general enumeration of the population of these islands

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[1] 'Indonesia' is an expression which has now been adopted both by the Indonesian Nationalists and the Dutch, and is here used in preference to the terms Netherlands East Indies, Netherlands-India, the Dutch East Indies, &c., though 'Indies' is sometimes used for variety's sake or as being more appropriate to a period (see p. xv).

'Indonesia may be a name not yet familiar to Americans. It is very likely that it will come into general use after the war for the simple reason that the term is preferred by the people of the Indies as a whole.' Raden Loekman Djajadiningrat, Director of Education and Public Worship in the Netherlands Indies, *From Illiteracy to University* (New York, Netherlands and N. I. Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942) Bulletin no. 3, p. 7.

[2] Many statutes did, in fact, make the distinction (e.g. the ordinances of 1917–25 which apply the family law of the civil code to the Chinese and in civil ordinances regarding regulations for labour). But the law does not give a definition of Chinese.

[3] *Chinese and Other Non-Indigenous Orientals in the Netherlands Indies*, reprinted from the Census of 1930 in the Netherlands Indies.

[p. 441]

I 659 has been taken since then, and until a lasting peace has been established in Indonesia it is unlikely that any thorough census will again be attempted. This means that the figures concerning the I [162] Chinese in Indonesia were in 1949 already eighteen years out of date. However, since there had been no essential alteration in the distribution in this period[1], we may, by taking into consideration the increase of other Chinese communities in the region as well as sex ratios, immigration, and other factors, hazard a guess that the ethnic Chinese population of Indonesia was by 1947 in the neighbourhood of 1·9 million.

The 1930 census of the Netherlands Indies, then, deals with 'ethnic' Chinese, as do those of Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines, whereas the censuses of Siam and Indochina deal in terms of nationality and not of race. SEA

162 I 162 Mr Unger's map of the distribution of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia which is reproduced as a separate folder[2] is a very useful companion for a survey of the Chinese in Indonesia, but certain facts regarding it must be borne in mind when it is used.[1] It shows the areas in which the Chinese are most concentrated, but it must by no means be presumed from this that the Chinese are not resident in other parts of the region, for indeed they do exist there and in considerable numbers. For example, the areas shown white in Mr Unger's map prove on reference to the map accompanying the 1930 census to be dotted with a considerable number of isolated groups of Chinese, some numbering between 250 and 500 persons and a few of between 1,250 and 3,000. But these two maps have different purposes—the first conveys a general impression and the second the minute detail in which only the specialist is interested (it indicates every group from one person upwards).

I 162 In considering the settlements in which the Chinese have attained considerable numerical strength there are only four which call for attention—one in a great circle round Singapore, another in the western part of Borneo, in the tin islands of Bangka and Billiton, and the Rhio (Riouw) Archipelago, a third in the Division of the East Coast of Sumatra, and the fourth in Batavia and its environs. In the first three areas live about 450,000 Chinese, or 17 per cent. of the total population of these parts: in Batavia and its environs their percentage of the total is 5. In the remainder of the

1 [i.e. 1930-49 -- Analyst]

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[1] *See* Leonard Unger, 'The Chinese in Southeast Asia', *Geographical Review*, vol. xxxiv, no. 2 (1944) pp. 196–217.

2 [See end papers, cat. 116 -- Analyst]

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Indonesia OB1
Chinese

Indies they account for only about 1 per cent. of the population. Though they are largely urban, relatively more of them live in the country than is the case with the other foreign Orientals.

The Chinese community of Indonesia is made up of a number of heterogeneous components differing from one another by reason of the period of time they have resided in Indonesia—which may range from over three centuries to a single day—by reason of the different tribes in China from which they have been drawn, and by reason of the difference in their occupations, not to mention their politics.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century there were estimated to be about 100,000 Chinese in Java and Madura. In the year 1815 they were enumerated at 94,441.[1] The figures for the Outer

Indonesia: The Population in Various Years[2]
(*in thousands*)

Year	*Indonesians*	*Europeans*	*Chinese*	*Arabs*	*Other Asiatics*	*Total*
			Java and Madura			
1860	12,514	..	149	6	..	..
1870	16,233	37	175	8	..	..
1880	19,541	44	207	11	..	..
1890	23,609	55	242	14	..	..
1900	28,386	72	277	18	..	..
1905	29,979	73	295	19	..	..
1920	34,429	134	384	28	3	34,978
1930	40,981	193	582	42	11	41,719
			Total Indonesia			
1860	..	44	221	9	..	..
1870	..	49	260	13	..	..
1880	..	60	344	16	..	..
1890	..	74	461	22	..	..
1900	..	91	537	27	..	..
1905	37,348	95	563	30	..	..
1920	48,300	168	809	45	22	49,344
1930	59,138	240	1,233	71	45	60,727

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[1] Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, *History of Java* (London, 1817) table facing p. 70 (51,332 males: 43,109 females in a total population of 4,615,270).

Dr Vlekke remarks: 'I am inclined to be rather doubtful about Raffles' statistics. He had little means of *exact* information regarding the number of Chinese or of any other population group.'

[2] *Statistical Pocket Book of Indonesia* (Batavia, Department of Economic Affairs, Central Bureau of Statistics, 1941) p. 5.

162 Islands are conjectural, but will be given as is appropriate in the historical synopsis to come. The rate of increase of the community as compared with the other races is set out in the table on p. 443.

It will be seen from these figures that the number of Chinese in Indonesia has more than doubled since the beginning of the century. The increase was greatest during the decade 1920–30 and amounted in that period to an average of 4·3 per cent. per annum. This figure, compared with the normal increase of a people under settled conditions which is from 1 to 2 per cent., is indeed high.

162 Although no exact figures were adduced by the census, it is safe to say that in 1930 the Chinese community was divided roughly 167 into 750,000 born in Indonesia and about 450,000 immigrants. (The Indonesian-born were known as *Peranakans*, and the China-born as *Sinkhehs*.) Of the group of Indonesian-born 500,000 had fathers who were also born in the country, and belonged therefore to families who had been in the Indies for more than one generation. The immigrant group divides itself into those who are only temporarily resident in the country and who pass frequently to and fro, and those who definitely settle, marry, and beget children. The growth in size of the Chinese community was thought to be due mainly to the increase in the number of the class who settle permanently and to the natural increase among those who have been in the country for more than one generation. Other factors such as the fecundity of marriages and the death-rate (though improved hygiene has undoubtedly affected both infant mortality and the expectation of life) are considered to have been of much smaller importance than the increase in the number of new-comers who become permanently domiciled and the rise in the birth-rate due [595] to this cause. Nor is concubinage thought to have contributed significantly to the increase in the Chinese population.

In Java and Madura the majority of the Chinese adults were born in Indonesia and only about 30 per cent. were born elsewhere; the Western Division of Borneo also has a large proportion of native-born Chinese. But in the other parts of Indonesia, especially in Sumatra, the foreign-born Chinese are in the majority. In Sumatra, of 100 adults of 20 years of age and over 80 were born outside Indonesia.[1]

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[1] The proportion of Indonesian-born to foreign-born Chinese varied very much indeed with the tribe. Only 22 per cent. of Hokkiens, for example, were born outside Indonesia as compared with 66 per cent. for Cantonese and 62 per

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Chinese

It was only within the decade or so before 1930 that the immigration of Chinese women attained dimensions worth mentioning. There were fewer women than men amongst the Chinese inhabitants because few women were included among the immigrants, but amongst those born in Indonesia women were in the majority. The distribution of women is very unequal, but the overall ratio was 642 women to every thousand men: in Sumatra there were only 450 women to every thousand men. Many of the Chinese coolies in Sumatra's East Coast were unmarried.[1]

Now as to the tribes from which these Indonesian Chinese are drawn. Those who came first of all to the country in large numbers were Hokkiens, that is to say natives from Fukien Province in the neighbourhood of Amoy and not the Hokchius from the same province of China. The numbers of other tribes of Chinese do not appear to have been considerable until the nineteenth century. The Hakkas (Khehs), however, first settled in West Borneo about 1740 to 1745. They and the Teochius, greatly in demand as estate coolies, began to be numerous in east Sumatra, Bangka, and Billiton in the second half of the nineteenth century, when Western agriculture and mining began to develop. By 1930 there were about 550,000 Hokkiens in Indonesia. In Java and Madura they formed the great majority, and in the east of the Archipelago accounted for more than half of the Chinese inhabitants. In Sumatra, with the exception of the Division of Sumatra's West Coast and Bengkalis (in the latter of these divisions many of them are occupied in fisheries) and also in the Western Division of Borneo, they were less numerous than the Hakkas and the Teochius.

Since in some parts of Indonesia (e.g. a few remote parts of the Outer Islands, the interior of Borneo, and some parts of the Moluccas) it was possible only to carry out a simple enumeration, no distinction was here made between the various tribes of Chinese, but it is probable that the great majority of the race residing in West Borneo were Hakkas; 200,000 of this tribe were enumerated in the area of the complete census—some 45,000 in Bangka and Billiton, nearly 14,000 in the estate area of Sumatra's East Coast,

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cent. for Teochius. *Census of the Netherlands Indies* (1930) p. 294. For many other interesting demographical details, especially regarding the sex ratios, the reader is referred to the reprint of *Chinese and Other Non-Indigenous Orientals in the Netherlands Indies* here cited. It is mentioned, for instance, that among the young women born in the Indies there were many who were later divorced.

[1] ibid. p. 6.

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Indonesia OB1
Chinese

162 and some 65,000 in East Java. There were also small communities of them elsewhere.

167 In numerical position next after the Hakkas, the Cantonese (Kwong Fus) aggregated about 135,000 in the Indies, fairly distributed over the entire Archipelago, but were slightly more numerous in the estate area of the East Coast of Sumatra, in South Sumatra, East Borneo, and Celebes.

Less numerous than the Cantonese (Kwong Fus) were the Teochius. The great majority of their total of 90,000 were to be found in the large circle round Singapore; about 32,000 in the estate area of Sumatra's East Coast, also in Rhio (Riouw), Inderagiri, and Djambi, and almost 22,000 of them in the northwest part of Borneo.

From the large percentage of them born in Indonesia, the more normal sex ratio, and their fairly regular age-groups, it was to be assumed that the majority of the Hokkien community were domiciled in the country. This was also true of the Hakkas in western Borneo. The other groups of Chinese consisted of migrants. 'If these other Chinese races [i.e. tribes] are becoming domiciled, the movement must still be young', says the census report.

463 *Occupation.* Of all the Chinese working in Indonesia the merchants in 1930 formed the largest group (172,000, or nearly 37 per
162 cent. of the total). More than half of the working Hokkiens were merchants, but in West Java in the neighbourhood of Batavia and in the West Coast of Sumatra the larger number had taken to agriculture and market-gardening, while in Bagan Si Api Api in Sumatra the Hokkiens were generally fishermen. The Hakkas of Java and Madura also included many merchants, but the tribe was also interested in industry. In Sumatra they were engaged in mining and in West Borneo in agriculture. The Teochius were also mostly engaged in agriculture and market-gardening, but in the estate area of the East Coast of Sumatra the majority of them were coolies on tobacco estates, for which work they appeared to be especially adapted. In West Borneo business claimed this tribe as well as agriculture. In the other parts of the Indies the majority of them were merchants, while a few engaged in industrial enterprises.

The Cantonese were rather sharply differentiated from the other Chinese tribes by the fact that two-fifths of them were employed in industry in contradistinction to trade or the production of raw

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Chinese

materials. In Sumatra, however, many Cantonese were also agriculturists, market-gardeners, or miners. In Bangka they formed an important group among the mine workers, while in Palembang numbers of Cantonese artisans were employed in the petroleum industry. 463 162

The Chinese immigrants were usually limited to the craft or occupation which brought them to the country, but among the descendants of this race there was a broader choice of occupation. [161]

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Chinese
Land Dyak OC8

CHAPTER XXXVIII

CHINESE, DUTCH, AND ENGLISH IN THE EARLIER DAYS

I 167 THE principle here adopted is the same as that followed for the other countries of Southeast Asia, namely, that interest in the Chinese is reserved for them from the time when they formed more or less settled communities in the region, and little account is taken of trading voyages or the visits of isolated travellers.

Generally speaking, the Chinese came later to the seas of the Archipelago than the Arabs, Hindus, and Persians; they did not venture on visits abroad until after they had received regular visits from foreign traders, and they did not settle abroad in large numbers until after the establishment of European power had created stable conditions. Nor is this general proposition discounted by such facts as the finding in 1345 or 1356 by Ibn Bathoutha, the Arabian traveller, of Chinese junks at Calicut in one of which he embarked for Sumatra. As far back as the ninth century Chinese traders are known to have visited Java, and Chinese contact with Borneo is believed to have anticipated the founding of the Malay kingdom. However, Pigafetta (who had been with Magellan) does not mention their being in the port of Brunei, or 'Borneo Proper,' when he visited it in 1521, though (as Crawfurd suggests)[1] this may be accounted for by the time of year —the month of July—which would be after the sailing of the junks on their return voyage with the southwest monsoon. He mentions, however, the silks and porcelains of China which he saw in Borneo and he notes the adoption by the natives of the weights and money LD of China, facts sufficient to prove the existence of a trade which was afterwards known to have yearly employed four or five junks of large burden. Another curious fact attests the existence of the trade [778] and proves it to have been of some antiquity. That is the finding among the aboriginal inhabitants of Borneo of Chinese vases 'of an ancient pattern which cannot now be imitated'. These vases were preserved by the Dyaks as sacred heirlooms.[2]

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[1] John Crawfurd, F.R.S., *A Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands and Adjacent Territories* (London, Bradbury & Evans, 1856) p. 62.

[2] The present writer has examined a number of these vases or jars preserved

[CP. 448]

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Chinese

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Horace St John[1] states that when the Dutch first landed in Java they found a scattered population of Chinese working in every province of the island; Amry Vandenbosch remarks that the Chinese were in Indonesia before the Dutch and have always outnumbered them;[2] and Cator says, 'Although the Chinese had had contact with the Indonesian islands for centuries and had formed a number of permanent settlements, they did not here as elsewhere, take up their abode in any large numbers until after the Dutch began to establish themselves.'[3]

Before the arrival of the Dutch in Java there is practically no material for an account of the Chinese settlements: their denizens were anonymous, their years unmarked except by the alternation of the monsoons, and their record to us is little but an inventory of merchandise such as Linschoten and his contemporaries retail.[4] But with the coming of the Dutch fleet to the Archipelago in 1596 and the establishment of their power in Java in the second decade of the seventeenth century begins an association that has continued for well over 300 years, and of the contacts and conflicts of these two very diverse peoples is born a fascinating history from which all sorts of political and economic lessons can be drawn.

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The English writer, however, who takes it upon himself to retell the story, seeing as he must through the glass of his own reading and experience, is under obligation to examine his authorities with care. Many of the standard works in English date from the period when there was strong Anglo-Dutch rivalry, and often enmity, and the histories of Raffles, J. H. Moor, and Horace St John (to mention but three), though valuable for reference, have often an anti-Dutch bias, apparent or concealed. Clive Day, an authority of half

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in the Sarawak museum at Kuching. Those he saw were of provincial design and coarse workmanship.

[1] *The Indian Archipelago* (London, Longmans, 1853) ii. 1.

[2] *The Dutch East Indies* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1941) p. 100.

[3] *The Economic Position of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies* (Oxford, Blackwell, for the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1936) p. 193.

[4] Jan Huygen Van Linschoten, *Voyage to the East Indies*. English translation 1598. (London, Hakluyt Society, 1885) lxx, lxxi, 124: 'Those of China trafficke with these islands (Philippines and Indies) and bring thither all sortes of commodities out of their country, as al silkes, cottons, porselynes, powder for shot, sulphur, brimstone, iron, steele, quicke silver, and other metals, coper, meal nuttes, chesnuttes, bisquit, dates, al sorts of lynnen cloth, diskes, and such like, and of al curious things that may be found. . . .' To China they took in return pepper, tin, spices, &c.

167 [114] a century ago, remarks in the preface to his book on Indonesia,[1] 'When I was first drawn into a study of some of the features of Dutch policy in Java, I was surprised by the wide divergence between the descriptions of the policy current in English and the facts as they appear in the writings of Dutch historians and in the original documents'. This is a warning which should be borne in mind.

At this point an impressionistic history of the Dutch in Indonesia is called for as a back-drop. The following may serve.[2]

The Dutch first reached the Indies in 1596; the Dutch East India Company was founded in 1602, the first Governor-General was appointed in 1609, and the city of Batavia was founded in 1619. Operations were begun against the Dutch by the British in February 1810, but Java remained in Dutch hands until 1811, when the Netherlands were incorporated in the empire of Napoleon I.[3] The Dutch East Indies were consequently seized by the British but were restored by them to the Netherlands in 1816 after the final defeat of Napoleon. The rule of the Dutch in Java and the Moluccas was established at an early date, but it was not for a great many years that the whole of the Archipelago was placed under effective Dutch control. By the middle of the seventeenth century the Portuguese influence was at an end in Indonesia except in Timor. After the interval of British rule in 1811–16 when Java was administered by Sir Stamford Raffles, England retained some posts in Sumatra. By 1876 the greater part of Sumatra was under Dutch administration, though the Achinese in the north were conquered only after long wars which ended in 1904. The new Governor-General appointed in that year, Van Heutsz, undertook military patrols of nearly all the islands, and when he resigned in 1909 conquest was complete and Dutch administration largely consolidated.

439 Long before Jacatra was conquered by the Dutch under Jan Pieterson Coen in 1619 and Batavia founded, the Chinese were

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[1] Clive Day, *The Policy and Administration of the Dutch in Java* (New York, Macmillan, 1904) preface.

[2] Derived from *Netherlands Overseas Territories*, Information Department Papers (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1941) p. 24.

[3] It may be noted that the East India Company of Great Britain had held posts on the west coast of Sumatra without a break since the later seventeenth century, and these were not ceded to the Dutch till 1824.

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installed at Bantam and other places in Java. In the Moluccas, Chinese, Arabs, and Bugis came to Dobo to buy tripang (bêche-de-mer), mother-of-pearl, turtles, birds-of-paradise, and edible birds' nests. In the beginning of the seventeenth century the Dutch made an attempt to take part in the pepper trade of Banjermasin which was mainly carried on by Chinese. Their ships met with a hostile reception; some of the Dutch traders were captured and members of their crews were killed.[1]

Spices, especially pepper, nutmegs, and cloves, were in great demand in Europe where, before the introduction of winter feeding-stuffs in the eighteenth century, cattle had to be killed off in the autumn and the meat was likely to become tainted before the following spring. There was a deadly rivalry between the Portuguese, the English, and the Dutch for the trade. The feeling among the English and the Dutch was that the Chinese were reaping greater profits from the trade than they were. Says John Jourdain in his Journal of 1617: 'Notwithstandinge soe much money as is brought to Bantam yearlie by us and the Dutch, which wee paye for pepper, there is a great scarcitie of money, by reason that the Chinese junkes carrie itt yearlie to China.'[2]

During this period the Dutch often treated the Chinese as enemies and were not above carrying out piratical raids upon their shipping. There is news of such a raid in 1607 when the Dutch Admiral Matelief was reported to have seized a Chinese junk trading at Ternate with the Spanish, bartering linen and wearing apparel for cloves and *reals*. The admiral is said to have removed her cargo and to have given the junk to the people of Gilolo.[3] Another letter (this time from Captain Christopher Harris to the East India Company, dated on board the *Peppercorn*, 25 August 1617)[4] relates that the Dutch had again seized the junks of the Chinese 'for while they rode in the road they took their junks and sent their men ashore'. There was talk, too, of the English themselves engaging in this piracy, though the report that Sir Edward

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[1] E. S. De Klerck, *History of the Netherlands Indies* (Amsterdam, Brusse, 1938) i. 112, 245.

[2] Cited by Cator at p. 6 from *So Bing Kong*, by B. Hoetink. In a letter to the East India Company of 5 October 1614 Jourdain says that there was a shortage of money among both the Dutch and English. *Letters Received by the East India Company from its Servants* (London, Sampson Low, 1897–1902) ii. 315.

[3] Letter from Gabrial Towerson from Bantam to the English East India Company dated 16 December 1607. *Letters*, &c. (ibid.) (1896) i. 6.

[4] ibid. vi. 89.

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439 Michelborne had in 1606 taken a Chinese junk was not brought home to him.[1]

577 Most English and Dutch agreed, it seems, in having a low opinion of Chinese honesty (though Captain So Bing Kong became a personal friend of J. P. Coen). Speaking of Andrea Dittis, the Captain of the Chinese in Firando (Japan), George Bell, the English East India Company's agent at Bantam, writing to Richard Cocks at Bantam on 9 June 1617 says,

> his endeavours are had in suspicion and accounted as bent to none other than to deceive you, and it disagrees not with my opinion, for never yet, having dealt with many, could I find an honest and faithful Chinesa [*sic*]; and it is not to be marvelled at, their serving so faithless and fraudulent a master, father of deceit, cannot but have inspired his disciples with his rules of perdition.[2]

George Cockayne, another of the company's servants, speaks of 'Chinese and other rogues,'[3] and in 1615 there is a reference in these same letters to the 'dishonest dealing of the China merchants of Bantam, who are indebted to the Worshipful Company to the quantity of 16,000 sacks of pepper'.[4] The 'Flemings' (Dutch), we are told, have had the same experience in dealing with the Chinese.

But what is admitted elsewhere by these downright English merchants of the ruthless, pioneering days is evidence that the Chinese had at least some virtues. Richard Cocks (writing home to the company) gives his opinion that Captain Jourdain need not be afraid of the company's lending money to the Chinese, and he mentions that when the Chinese themselves lend money they do so at 20 per cent. per annum, whereas no Japanese would lend at less than 33 per cent., and would demand double the security into the bargain![5] On another occasion we find the company's servants

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[1] *The First Letter Book of the East India Company* (London, Quaritch, 1893) p. 135, n. Michelborne said he paid for all he took.

'Thereafter they fought a little with a Chinish [*sic*] ship, from which they took some silks, giving twice as much in exchange; but learning soon after from some Hollanders that the King of Java would assault the English merchants of Bantam because of the taking of the Chinish ship, whereby the King of Bantam had lost his custom, Sir Edward thought it would be very dangerous for the English merchants if he remained in those parts so determined to return home.' Purchas, ii. 347, cited by G. B. Harrison in *A Jacobean Journal 1603–1606* (London, Routledge, 1941) p. 320.

[2] *Letters Received by the East India Company* . . . (1617) vi. 13.

[3] ibid. (1617) v. 168.

[4] ibid. (1615) iii. 262.

[5] ibid. (1617) v. 14.

doing their best to persuade the Chinese to accept their goods on 577
credit to be paid for in pepper 'at the vintage'.

The English realized that whatever their shortcomings the 439
Chinese were great merchants and that they bought very much more of their merchandise than the Japanese did. Therefore it was obviously good policy to treat them well. Thus Richard Cocks, writing to Captain Jourdain at Bantam, on 25 February 1615, repeating the letter to the agents at Patani and in Siam (Ayuthia), gives instructions that the Chinese 'may be kindly used, and not beaten and misused as heretofore.'[1]

The Dutch treatment of the Chinese, according to their rivals, the English company, was not good. They robbed their junks, seized their crews, and at Patani their ill-usage of the race had driven all the junks away to Singora.[2] The Malays also treated the Chinese in a violent manner, which, combined with a storm, kept their junks from reaching Musulpatam for a whole year.[3] Altogether the large profits gained by the Chinese merchant venturers were well earned, for in addition to the ill-usage they often received from the Europeans, especially the Portuguese and the Dutch, they were in danger of being captured and made into slaves.[4] But they were not deterred from their trade: in July 1615 George Cockayne reports the arrival of a Chinese junk at Macassar ('it being the first that ever came to this place') with a great cargo of raw silk, woven silks, porcelain, and all other Chinese commodities, and for sale at cheaper prices than at Bantam.[5]

When the Dutch came to Bantam they found the Chinese 463
quarter surrounded by a strong palisade and a moat, containing the
finest, *and the most insanitary*, houses in the town, and the only 361
stone building. Most of the inhabitants of the quarter were traders, but in the suburbs there were also cultivators of pepper and rice. There were Chinese likewise at Jacatra where they imported rice and made arrack. In Nieuhoff's work[6] there is a pictorial map of the

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[1] ibid. iv. 52.

[2] ibid. v. 168.

[3] ibid. iv. 28.

[4] John Browne writing to John Jourdain on 19 August 1616 mentions the arrival of a Borneo junk in Patani roads with 140 men on board her, 'whereof most being slaves taken at sea, both Chaynnemen [*sic*] and Javaes: amongst whom, as they say, were two Chaynemen [*sic*] were employed by the English in Bantam'.

[5] ibid. iii. 136.

[6] Johan Nieuhoff, *The Embassy of the Netherlands East India Company to the Great Tartar Cham* (1655–67).

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439 seventeenth century showing the Chinese quarter outside the main palisade of the town at the western corner by the water's edge. In the same volume there is an engraving of three Chinese of a superior class. Many of them owned slaves.[1]

Bantam is described in a contemporary English account quoted by Purchas (and he incidentally provides an early estimate of the Chinese and Javanese character):

> [342] . . . This town of Bantam is about three English miles in length and is very populous. The houses of the Javans are altogether built of great canes, but at one end of the town is the China town, for the most part built of brick, every house square and flat overhead. . . . The Javans are exceeding proud but extremely poor, for not one in a hundred will work, for that the Chineses being frugal, suck away all their wealth from them. . . . They are a dull, blockish people, whereby all strangers overreach them, and especially the Chinese, who are a very crafty people in trading, using all sorts of cozening and deceit.[2]

That the Chinese quarter of Bantam was insanitary need not be doubted when we remember the general condition of such enclaves for the next three centuries, but in any case we have explicit contemporary evidence on the subject for Nicholas Downton, at sea homeward bound, on 20 June 1613 records:

> . . . three days after I passed the Straits half my people were disabled for labour, some with flux, some with fever, and many with sore legs, for I hold that he that escapes without disease from that stinking stew of the Chinesa's part of Bantam must be of a strong constitution of body, or else of a temperate and well governed life.[3]

The belief was common that the old natives of Java were sprung from the Chinese who had escaped to the Indies in the path of the Mongol conquest of the thirteenth century, and we also find this contemporary belief regarding the natives of Macassar.[4]

A striking account of Bantam is given by Sir Thomas Herbert[5] whose travels to the Indies began in 1621. Herbert says:

> The town [Bantam] of its own growth affords little save rice, pepper,

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[1] K. Verboeket, 'Geschiedenis van de Chineezen in Nederland Indië, . . .' *Koloniale Studiën*, nos. 5 and 6 (1936).

[2] Purchas, ii, 496–502. Cited by G. B. Harrison, *A Jacobean Journal 1603–1606* p. 302.

[3] *Letters received by the East India Company* . . . (1613), i. 260.

[4] Johan Nieuhoff, *The Embassy of the Netherlands East India Company to the Great Tartar Cham* (1655–67), quoted by Verboeket, op. cit. p. 9.

[5] The text here is taken from John Crawfurd, F.R.S., *History of the Indian*

and cotton-wool; albeit pepper for the greatest part brought thither by the infinitely industrious Chyneses, who each January come to anchor 439 in multitudes at this port, and unload their junks or praws from Jamby in Sumatra, Borneo, Malacca, and other places, making Bantam their magazine; out of which, for *rials*, or by exchange for other commodities, they supply the English, Dutch, and other nations.

The Chyneses are no quarellers, albeit voluptuous, venereous, costly [525] in their sports, great gamesters, and in trading too subtle for young merchants, oftimes so wedded to dicing, that, after they have lost their whole estate and wife and children are staked; yet in littel time, Jew-like, by gleaning here and there, are able to redeem their loss; if not at the day, they are sold in the market for most advantage.

Internal evidence suggests that Herbert is prone to exaggerate for effect (e.g. the staking of wife and children), but another passage in his *Travels* regarding the Siamese and their alleged homosexual habits gives the impression that at times he can be a gaudy if entertaining liar. None the less there is enough of truth in his description of the Bantam Chinese to give it verisimilitude.

During the siege of Jacatra in 1619 Chinese were employed, using the Chinese language as a medium, to act as intermediaries in arranging the capitulation to the Dutch by the Pangeran or native ruler, as nobody in the fort knew how to read or write the Javanese language.[1] Very soon after the foundation of Batavia the Chinese established themselves outside the walls, and in spite of wild beasts and molestation applied themselves to agriculture, planting rice and sugar-cane and making market-gardens.[2] The citizens of Batavia who were not in the service of the company and who were known as *vrijburghers*[3] were unable to compete with the Chinese. From the beginning the Governor-General, Coen, declared that there was no people he desired to have more than the Chinese and that there could not be too many of them in Batavia. Following the practice of the Portuguese in other parts of the Indies, and indeed that of all the great marts of the East where each people had its own ruler, a native Captain was appointed for the Chinese

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Archipelago (Edinburgh, Constable, 1820) i. 136 (from *An Itinerie of Some Years Travaile through divers parts of Asia and Africke, with the description of the Orientall Indies etc.* (London, Stansby & Bloome, 1634).

[1] Verboeket, op. cit. p. 9, quoting L. H. W. Van Sandick, *Chineezen buiten China* (The Hague, van der Beek, 1909) p. 165.

[2] De Klerck, op. cit. pp. 260, 268.

[3] Europeans who were *compagnies-dienaren* were not *vrijburghers*.

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of the new city.[1, 2, 3] There were no more than 350 of them at the time.

Governor-General Coen set out in a letter to the company what he considered to be the wise policy for the settlement. The Company, he said, should limit its trade to that of 'a mighty wholesale dealer'; the burghers should be active as middlemen, whereas retail trade should be left to the Chinese ('retailers who in this connexion, and even as merchants, far exceed ours in ability').[4] As far as the Chinese were concerned, the scheme succeeded to an extent that called forth laments from some of Coen's successors.[5]

The Dutch East India Company under Coen's prompting proposed to secure to itself the monopoly in buying and trading in native products (pepper, tin, spices) and it was vindictively indignant when the Chinese attempted to compete with it in these preserves. At the same time the intention was to give the Chinese as much encouragement as possible without allowing any interference with the company's monopoly. In particular, the Chinese were to be encouraged to maintain shipping between Java and

[1] Simsuan and Lak Moei are mentioned as early *Towkays*, or leaders, in Bantam, and So Beng Kong (known to the Dutch as Bencon) was the first Kapitan China in Batavia. Verboeket, op. cit. p. 11.

[2] So Beng Kong was unanimously selected by the Chinese community as their Captain. Shortly afterwards he was given a seat on the magistrate's bench and in the closing years of his life was elected one of the official executors. He had the monopolies of gambling and coining, and he was the overseer of the weigh-house so that all Chinese goods passed through his hands. He was in addition a merchant, ship-owner, and public contractor. He was also an intermediary with Bantam. He retired in 1636 to Formosa (*not* China for obvious reasons), but returned in 1639 to Batavia. He died in 1644. His successor was a Muslim Chinese named Lam Luk Ko (died 1645).

A Lieutenant China was first created in 1678 and a second Lieutenant in 1685; also Ensigns and Sergeants in 1678 (but these lasted only a short time). C. R. Boxer, *T'ien Hsia Monthly* (1937) pp. 447–68.

[3] There is a photograph of Bencon's grave at Batavia in *Netherlands Indies*, vol. iii (1930) pp. 283–91, and in the same issue another of seventeenth-century Chinese houses in the same town.

[4] Herman Theodor Colenbrander, *Koloniale Geschiedenis* (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1871) ii. 181. Quoted by Cator at p. 7. Also *Jan Pietersz Coen* (same author and publisher, 1919) ii. 181.

[5] M. Charles Robequain in *Le Monde Malais* (Paris, Payot, 1946) p. 91 gives 1632 as the date at which the company began officially to encourage the Chinese. 'Does this (asks Dr. Vlekke) refer to the slight improvement of the status of the Chinese in judicial affairs (viz. their testimony admitted in the courts in certain cases)? Governor-General J. P. Coen always showed his respect for the Chinese by accepting invitations to dinner from the Chinese Captain So Bencon and the Company's officials "encouraged" the Chinese long before 1632.'

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China. To protect the company's monopoly, as early as 1620 an *ad* 439 *valorem* duty was levied on all imports and exports, but a good deal of latitude was allowed to Chinese trading to Batavia with their junks, and the duties in their case were not strictly levied. In 1643 a regulation was made freeing them of 'all vexations' on payment of an overall sum of 550 *reals* a junk.[1]

Before the Dutch came the demand for sugar had been greater 257 than the supply, and the Dutch had set themselves to encourage cultivation in their own territories, especially by Chinese immigrants. 439 It was the latter who had introduced the real cane-sugar industry to Java, although the natives had prepared sugar in a somewhat primitive way. Shortly after the foundation of Batavia sugar-mills had been established there under Chinese who knew their business. They pressed the cane between millstones turned by oxen or by water-power.[2] In 1637 the excise duty was remitted and it was decided to make advances to sugar manufacturers. The result was that the output which previously had been only 196 piculs rose by 1653 to 12,000 sold by the Chinese Captain, Jancon, to the company. As usual, the company lowered prices when supplies increased, but it would not fix the quantity it would pay for, although growers had to supply the company with all they grew. But the company's control over sugar was not so great as its control over coffee, which in this century was grown only by the natives, since there was a large local demand for the former, and, moreover, it was required in the manufacture of arrack which was an important article of commerce in the interior. As Furnivall remarks: 'Thus the Chinese cultivators were in a stronger position than the natives who grew coffee and, being Chinese, had a keener economic sense and greater powers of resistance.'[3]

Gradually the number of sugar refineries in the vicinity of Batavia increased, so that in 1710 there were 130. Then followed a slump caused by exhaustion of the soil, scarcity of labour, the pillaging raids of the Bantamese, and finally, by the events following on the revolt of the Chinese in 1740. In Daendel's time only thirty mills remained. All sugar had to be delivered to the company.

Tea came originally not from China direct but from Japan. As 439

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[1] Cator, p. 9.

[2] Compare the method of sugar refining followed by the Chinese in Province Wellesley in the nineteenth century. Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 47 n.

[3] J. S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India, a Study in Plural Economy* (New York, Macmillan, 1944) p. 41.

139 demand for it increased the Dutch East India Company tried to obtain it from China, but on the whole it was found more convenient to buy it from the Chinese junks which came to Batavia. The usual price paid was $60 a picul, but when in 1717 an attempt was made to reduce the price to $40 a picul, the Chinese junks stayed away, much to the chagrin of the company's directors of Amsterdam, who never forgot this unfortunate attempt to 'buy cheap'. Later a factory was established at Canton. There was no question of a monopoly, for other European nations also had factories at Canton through which tea was procured.[1]

167 Though Coen had wished to make Batavia as soon as possible the 'largest commercial town of the entire Indies', particularly by encouraging the settlement of Chinese engaged in commerce, industry, and agriculture, the intention did not make much headway in the early years of the Dutch regime.[2] This was mainly due to the continued war with native States. In spite of the steady arrival of Chinese immigrants (2,000 in 1629 and Valentijn records another 2,000 new-comers in 1706), the Chinese population of Batavia which in 1619 had amounted to 400 had increased to 2,000 in 1629, but did not reach 10,000 until after 1725. In 1706 the number of immigrants per junk was limited to 100.

Coen used both fair means and foul to achieve his end of peopling his newly created metropolis with Chinese, for on the one hand he held out inducements to those in the neighbouring Bantam to remove themselves to Batavia (as did Francis Light later to the Chinese of Malacca to remove themselves to the neighbouring settlement of Penang), whilst on the other, he carried out a series of piratical raids on the coasts of Fukien and Kwangtung in an endeavour to seize large numbers of able-bodied Chinese for transportation to Batavia, Amboyna, and Banda.[3]

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[1] *Mission Interrupted*, ed. Dr. W. H. van Helsdingen and others (Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1945) p. 35.

[2] Cator, p. 11.

Compare the situation in Malacca under the Dutch where the population was 852 in 1678, did not rise to 2,161 until 1750, and had dropped to 1,390 by 1760. Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya* (London, Oxford University Press, 1948) pp. 30, 36.

[3] C. R. Boxer, 'Notes on the Chinese Abroad in the late Ming and Early Manchu Periods Compiled from Contemporary European Sources (1500–1750).' *T'ien Hsia Monthly* (1937) pp. 447–68.

Compare the kidnapping tactics of Chinese slave dealers in Sumatra in the 1840s as described by G. F. Davidson in his *Trade and Travel in the Far East*

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Meanwhile, Valentijn records under the year 1625 the arrival of the first Chinese in Amboyna.[1] They were charged a head-tax of eleven rix-dollars a year. In 1631 the Captain of the Chinese, Herman, so named after a previous Dutch Governor, who was a Christian, was murdered by a Chinese whom he had refused to help in a just cause, and was succeeded by another Christian Chinese who took the name of Artus Gysels after the then Dutch Governor. Valentijn mentions the Chinese in Ternate in 1665.[2] 167

Seventeenth-century Impressions of the Chinese in Indonesia

From the beginning the company's policy (like that of the British in Malaya) was to interfere with the life of the Chinese only in matters in which it had a direct material interest, and beyond that to leave them to their own devices and the management of their own affairs. The intermediaries between the Dutch and the Chinese were headmen of the latter community (appointed by the Dutch) whose title was later 'Captain or Chief of the Chinese'. [622]

The community was to adhere to its own usages and customs under which heading were generally included religious observances. But in 1651 (ordinances of 7 March and 28 November) the intolerant Governor-General Reyniersz issued an order that natives and Chinese were not to be allowed to follow their religion even outside the town limits, which so far had been allowed on sufferance, though, needless to say, he had little success in enforcing the order.[3] 798

But it should not be inferred that this was typical of Dutch policy. During the whole of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries *all* non-protestant religions (Mohammedanism, the Jewish religion, and also Roman Catholicism) were forbidden *on paper* (by ordinances) both in Holland and in the Indies, but *in practice* they were all tolerated. When a short-sighted man like Reyniersz tried at a particular moment to put these ordinances into practice, he succeeded only for a very short time or not at all. The last attempt in Batavia of the Calvinist clergy to enforce the paper prohibition against 'false and fallacious religions' was made under Governor-General Camphuijs (1684–91), but they received a

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(1846) p. 87. (See p. 495 of this Survey.) According to Davidson the traffic was with Dutch connivance, but confirmatory evidence is lacking.

[1] Francois Valentijn, *Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien* (*Ambonsche Zaken*), vol. i, p. 55 (Dordrecht, van Braam, 1726).

[2] ibid. i. 140.

[3] De Klerck, op. cit. i. 255.

798 rebuke from the Gôvernor-General who answered that they, the *kerkeraad*, should redouble their efforts to get the heathens and Mohammedans baptized and thereby render any measures by Government of the sort asked for unnecessary.[1]

527 The Surgeon-traveller Gautier (Wouter) Schouten (1638–1704) (to be distinguished from Joost (Justus) Schouten who was a company's official in Siam and Malaya) takes note of the 'idolatrous Chinese merchants', natives of Bantam, who had been permitted to reside in Batavia.[2] On 23 January 1659 they celebrated their New Year with many superstitions, monkey-tricks (*singeries* in the French translation), and idolatries.

> Among other things [he says] this degenerate race, degenerated from the Chinese who are their ancestors, held great festival. They erected scaffolds and theatres like those of our own countries, and gave representations of their most famous heroes with gestures most appropriate to their humour, which went on all night for nights on end. They also had buffoons disguised, as at Mardi Gras at home, as wild animals and fabulous beasts, with much beating of drums. Those who were more religious lit candles while others celebrated the New Year by gambling.

302 567 558 The worst disgrace that could happen to any Chinese, remarks Schouten, was, when he had lost everything else, to lose the hair of his head, which was very long. When at length it was cut off their whole countenance was changed and they were covered with infamy to such a point the other Chinese refused to speak to them or even to help them in their direst need, so that at last in an attempt to recover some money they even came to staking their own persons and freedom, and when they lost they became slaves. The Regency at Batavia had not failed to make the most rigorous regulations to stop this abuse.

181 Schouten has a good deal to say about the nature and customs of these strange beings whom he compares, on account of their acquisitiveness, to the Jews (a comparison frequently to be made during the centuries to come—even in a series of newspaper articles written by King Vajiravudh (Rama VI) of Siam, see p. 153). He repeats that not all of them were born in China. They married

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[1] Dr. F. de Haan, *Priangan* (Batavia, 1910) i. 431 ff.

[2] *Voyage de Gautier Schouten aux Indes Orientales. Commencé l'an 1658 et fini l'an 1665* (translated from the Dutch) (Rouen, le Boucher, 1725) i. 35 (from Dutch original *Aanermerklijcke Voyagie, Gedaan door Wouter Schouten naar Oost-Indiën* (1676)).

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natives and have transmitted to their posterity the greater part of 181
their manners, customs, and religious culture. With a penetrating
and subtle spirit and full of the wiles of commerce they were able
to deceive the Christians. They were good seamen, loved aromatics,
spices, and flowers—above all flowers with a powerful
scent. They had (as he has already made clear) an extreme passion
for gambling, and for women, of whom they had a considerable
number. What was deplorable about them was the cursed cult of
theirs which had rendered devotion to the Devil.

Chinese children (continues our informant) ran about naked [291]
until seven or eight years of age, then they put a piece of cloth
round their middles. When they suffered some injury or from some 857
defect they were rubbed from head to foot with Borreborri, which 871
was a kind of Indonesian saffron which they mixed with coco-nut
oil, sandal wood, and other things. When they became older they
received a very good education. They learnt to read, to do arithmetic,
and to keep books of account, using all their written characters
for this purpose. They learnt trades and they became expert in
making things. The girls were taught to sew, to embroider, and to
knit, to ply the distaff, and even to engage in trade, 'as are girls of
our country'.

There follows a description of the Chinese dress. Although the 291
Ming dynasty had fallen in China, the Ming costume was still *de* [302]
rigueur in the Nanyang—especially the way of doing the hair before
the pigtail had been adopted. To help us visualize the detail and
the effect there is extant an engraving (previously mentioned) in
Nieuhoff's book which shows three Chinese of the headman class
at Batavia. The Chinese of Batavia, says Schouten, and those of the
greater part of the other places in the Indies, dress in shirts of
white or blue cotton with wide and hanging sleeves which they call
Cabaiës, and they put them on over naked shoulders, but they pass
them over their drawers or pants. Some wear them long and reaching
down to their feet: others wear them shorter. Their footwear
consists of sandals which have no leather band passing over the
foot; they have only a piece of wood in the form of a button or of
a peg which passes between the big toe and the others.

The hair (says Schouten) is plaited and fixed behind the head 302
like that of our women. They pull out their beards, leaving only a 301
few hairs on the lower lip. Some of the more important persons 291
among them wear a woven cap or a silk *ress* on the head. This cap

[291] covers the head from the forehead to the back and keeps the hair,
which appears sideways, in position. It is their hair which is their
302 principal ornament: its tresses are rubbed with coco-nut oil, or
301 some other oil, to make it more lustrous and smooth. They also
wear on their heads a needle of gold or silver, ivory, brass, &c. 'In
fine, those who have never seen Chinese before do not fail at first
to take them for women, and it has often happened that lascivious
sailors have seized them in error.'

291 The women, on the other hand, do not plait their hair: they do it
up at the back of the neck with a button or with a cord. Some of
302 them have red gorgets of cotton cloth, or of very light-coloured
cambric, which hang down and half cover their na[illegible]s.
Others have their bodies naked from the middle upwa[illegible]ept
for the piece of cloth or taffeta which they twist round their waists.
This they wear higher than the other women of the Indies, and
sometimes the swathes pass over the ends of the breasts. The lower
part of this sort of dress reaches to the feet.

142 Most of the Chinese are white enough: their wives, however,
are browner, and some are quite black. The greater number of the
567 women are from the Island of Bali, where the Chinese men go to
583 buy them as slaves, and afterwards often make them their wives.

The Chinese houses at Batavia are substantial but not very clean,
342 for the simple reason that the women are not clean in their habits,
however rich they may be.

264 Wouter Schouten then proceeds to describe the domestic
arrangements and eating habits of the Chinese, and notes the fact
that rice is eaten at the end of the meal.

291 The dress of the Chinese as described here did not, except for
the manner of doing the hair, alter substantially for centuries.
302 During the third quarter of the seventeenth century the pigtail was
adopted, and it had a political significance. We read in the
instructions of Governor Bort of Malacca to his sea-captains of
the Koxinga Chinese who wore their hair in the old Ming fashion,
and of the Chinese who had yielded themselves to Manchu rule
and who had their hair shaved or cut short to the crown of the head
leaving a long plait or unplaited tress.[1]

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[1] *JRASMB*, vol. v, pt. I (1927) pp. 187–8. See also Purcell, op. cit. p. 32. Stavorinus, 'Account of Java and Batavia', in *Pinkerton's Voyages*, ii. 179, describes the Chinese men's dress about 1790: 'They shave their heads all round, leaving a bunch of hair in the middle of the crown, which is twisted with a ribbon, and hangs down the back. Their dress consists of a long robe of nankeen, or thin

In Tavernier's *Voyages*[1] is an amusing account of the way in which the Batavia Chinese of this period got even with the Dutch soldiers who helped themselves to refreshment intended for the ghosts of the Chinese departed. After a Chinese funeral the kindred and friends of the deceased gathered round the coffin. 764

> . . . Besides that they put money in a little Box, and bury it by the deceas'd; and leave good store of victuals upon the Grave, out of an opinion that they rise and eat. Which the souldiers of Batavia observing, us'd to fill their Bellies at these Graves every time they walk'd their rounds. But when the Chinese perceiv'd it, they poysoned the victuals to spoil the Dutchmen's feasting. . . .

The townsmen took the soldiers' part in the ensuing unpleasantness and accused the Chinese of poisoning several of the Dutch, but the Chinese pleaded that if the soldiers surfeited themselves with what was left for the dead to eat,

> 'Twas none of their fault; for that they did not leave their victuals for the souldiers; and besides that, among all the multitudes which they had buried, they had never had the least complaint before of any one that ever came at any harm by eating their food . . .

The matter was hushed up and the pilfering stopped.

In the year 1685 Father Guy Tachard (*c.* 1650–1712) of the Jesuits came to Batavia on his way to Siam, where he was to take part in the embassy sent by Louis XIV to the Siamese court.[2] The number of Chinese in the city and environs he puts at from 4,000 to 5,000, of which the greater part, he says, had retired to Batavia in order to avoid submitting themselves to the Tartars when the latter made themselves masters of China. Of this community he remarks: 162

> Since the Chinese are industrious and clever, they are of the greatest value at Batavia and without their help it would be difficult to live at all comfortably. They cultivate the land; there are scarcely any artisans excepting Chinese; in a word they are nearly everything. There are many rich men among them and we were informed that one of them who died a short time ago left a million in silver money. 181

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silk, with wide sleeves, and under it they wear drawers of the same which cover their legs.' [291 302]

[1] *The Six Voyages of Jean Baptista Tavernier, a noble man of France now living, through Turky into Persia and the East Indies, finished in the year 1670* (London, 1678) iii. 173.

[2] *Voyage de Siam des Pères Jésuites, envoyés par le Roy, aux Indes et à la Chine* (Amsterdam, Mortier, 1687).

764 Hearing from a Catholic soldier that the Chinese had their temple and their cemetery at about half a league from Batavia, Father Tachard and his companions requested him to take them to witness something of their ceremonies. They came first of all to a burial-ground in an ornamental wood not far from the little fort of Jacatra which was used for the burial of Chinese 'of low birth', but later they were taken to a second cemetery where the bonzes interred the 'people of quality' of the nation. They saw several small and grotesque idols hanging from the branches composing the roof of the rustic lodge to which the priests invited them. Here, it was said, the priests prepared the feasts for the dead. Most of the tombs were small mausoleums, very pretty and well kept. The graves were very much alike, except that some had dragons and others lions, and with steps that varied in number and in height in proportion to the magnificence of the tombs. The party, hearing the sound of kettledrums and hand-bells, repaired to the temple, where the Chinese and their priests were assembled to make a sacrifice.

000 Since the Chinese appeared astonished to see Father Tachard and his friends, the Jesuits explained that they were priests of the God of heaven and that they were going to China to preach the one and true religion, and in reply the Chinese bonzes said that they knew that in their country there were many Fathers who were very clever servants and who were held in great esteem by the Emperor and the great men of the empire. Father Tachard would have waited to the end, but hearing that the service, which was intended to drive the devil away from the body of a sick person, would last until evening, he stayed nearly an hour and then he and his companions withdrew 'with a feeling of much compassion for the blindness of this people, and a great desire to work for the conversion of their compatriots'.

167 About three years after Father Tachard's visit to Batavia we can take another peep at the Chinese as they were in these parts through the eyes of the celebrated William Dampier,[1] the ex-buccaneer and discoverer. It was at Achin (Atjeh) that he saw them, and though this part of Sumatra was not to come under the effective control of the Dutch for many years, it is nevertheless within the region we now call Indonesia, and the Chinese at Achin were the kith and kin of the Chinese of Batavia.

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[1] William Dampier, *Voyages and Discoveries* (London, Argonaut Press, 1931) p. 195. (Quoted by Crawfurd in his *History*, ii. 136–7, from the original edition.)

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> But of all the merchants that trade to that city [says Dampier] the Chinese are the most remarkable. There are some of them live here all the year long, but others only make annual voyages hither from China. The latter come hither sometimes in June, about ten or twelve sail, and bring abundance of rice and several other commodities. They take up houses all by one another, at the end of the town by the sea: and that end of the city is called the Chinese Camp . . . they brought with them several mechanics, viz., carpenters, joiners, painters, &c. These set themselves immediately to work, making of chests, drawers, cabinets, and all sorts of Chinese toys; which are no sooner finished at their working houses, but they are presently set up in shop, and at the door for sale. So for two months or ten weeks this place is like a fair. . . . As their goods sell off they contract themselves to less compass . . . if not at work they had as lieve be without victuals as without gaming. If before their goods are all sold, they can light on chapmen to buy their ships, they will gladly sell them also, or at least some of them, if any merchant will buy, for a Chinese is for selling everything. (Having sold their ships) they return as passengers with their neighbours. . . . They commonly go away about the end of September.

Dampier also tells us of the Chinese trick of making Europeans drunk while they keep sober themselves (no doubt with mercantile motives).

We see, then, that in spite of the Dutch policy of encouraging their immigration, and of the fact that wherever the company set up military establishments the Chinese followed close behind and set up trading posts, the Chinese community in Java at the end of the seventeenth century was still small.

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CHAPTER XXXIX

BEFORE AND AFTER THE TROUBLES OF 1740

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THE sentiment of the Dutch from early days was always hovering between two opposite opinions as to the advantages or disadvantages of the presence of the Chinese who followed the Dutch settlements wherever they were established. On the one hand, they were useful as intermediaries in the sale of the company's own imported goods; on the other hand, they were deeply involved in smuggling the native products over which the company claimed a monopoly. Moreover, they had imported with them criminal element that was always a menace to law and order.[1] I was nearly two centuries before Schlegel's revelations of the natur and activities of the Heaven and Earth Society, but it is possibl that the secret societies were responsible for some of the earlie outbreaks of disorder. The Dutch also realized in time that their policy of utilizing the Chinese as middlemen meant that the latter were by their money-lending and their manipulation of mortgages and land leases extending their control over the native villages, with a consequent dislocation of the native economy.

Dr Cator says that during the two centuries of the company's existence the Chinese enjoyed many advantages from the latter's 'well-nigh permanent friendliness'. Certainly the tragedy of 1740 was an interruption of the ordinary relations between the two. Before that, on the whole, they prospered, some making great fortunes in sugar, and preserving the even tenor of their ways. [167] Though not more than 100 were allowed in each ship coming to Java their numbers by 1733 had risen to 80,000 in the Batavia district alone. This sudden rise was due to the great increase in clandestine immigration which the Dutch failed to check.[2]

But the friendliness of the company's policy was one thing and the relation between Dutch officials on the spot and the Chinese

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[1] Cator, p. 11 ff. The Dutch, however, made full use of the Chinese. Beeckman (see p. 486) in June 1714 at Arabaya in Madura saw two Chinese who called themselves *Shabanders*, 'which signifies Governors of a port, who were serviceable in keeping the natives in subjection, and managing the whole trade of the place', i, p. 107.

[2] De Klerck, op. cit. i. 362. According to Horace St John, *The Indian Archipelago*, ii. 1, 2, the expulsion of the Chinese in the Philippines at the beginning of the eighteenth century had driven crowds of them to Java.

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was another. The Dutch police for their part oppressed the 439 Chinese through extortion, and there was a general feeling that the rise of the community in wealth and importance, as well as the 609 turbulence of its hooligans, was a threat to Dutch rule. In 1740 the Dutch decided to send as slaves to Ceylon any Chinese who could 463 not prove that they were making an honest livelihood. This action brought to a head the rising discontent among the Chinese and resulted in rebellion, followed by a massacre. 'The Chinese bandits from the outer districts', says Dr Cator, 'raised the standard of revolt and began to attack the forts around Batavia, while many Chinese from the town now also joined the armed groups wandering about in the vicinity.'[1]

The Government seems to have lost its head, and, being unable to bring the situation under control, initiated a promiscuous slaughter in which thousands of Chinese were killed.

A tragedy of this scale has naturally been the subject of conflicting accounts and varying judgements, in which national prejudices have at times played a great part. Horace St John, a British writer of the mid-nineteenth century, for example, censures the Dutch administration and its treatment of the Chinese in these words:[2]

> The Dutch discouraged the Chinese in every possible way. They imposed crippling taxes on them and their trade, inflicted arbitrary punishment upon them, executing them in hundreds, and subjected their residence in Batavia to a series of harsh rules. To settle there the Chinese were supposed to have written permission from the Resident, and to pay a fee of ten shillings. They were forbidden to ride out beyond the jurisdiction of the city under a penalty, unless given express permission to do so by the Dutch commissary appointed to supervise the interests of the natives. All who, when called upon, could not explain the origin of their subsistence, were arrested and sent to China. Bare suspicion was sufficient grounds for imprisoning a Chinese.[3]

The modern Dutch historian, E. S. de Klerck, states, on the other hand, that up to about 1727 the Chinese had always enjoyed much

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[1] Cator, op. cit. p. 18.

[2] Horace St John, *The Malayan Archipelago* (London, 1853) ii. 1 ff.

[3] Before this period the conditions to which the Chinese were subjected seem to have been less rigorous, though de Klerck mentions that in 1717 the Governor-General compelled the Chinese tea traders to reduce their prices by one-third (*History of the Netherlands Indies*, i. 416), and Beeckman in 1714 says, 'A certain annual toll is imposed on the Chinese here (in Batavia) for the liberty of wearing their hair, which brings in no small income to the Government.' 'A Voyage to and from the Island of Borneo, 1718', in *Pinkerton's Voyages*, xiv. 105.

439 609 463 'leniency' at the hands of the company.[1] They were appreciated as quiet and industrious inhabitants and were therefore favoured to some extent above the natives. The latter was protected by the Government, and so, incidentally, were the Chinese, so that little by little they spread over all the north coast of Java, and from Japara to Sidayu there was scarcely a factory that was not managed by [167] Chinese. Eventually the Government took measures to restrict the number of immigrants, stipulating that each ship coming from China to Java should bring in no more than 100 men at a time. However, this regulation was often evaded or was not enforced, and the result was that there was great and growing unemployment among the Chinese. The Government became concerned and stiffened its policy towards this immigrant race. Chinese were forbidden to go wandering in search of work, the keeping by them of *waroengs* (i.e. little shops) in the interior was no longer allowed (though it was still possible by bribing the company's officials), and many were deported to Banda, Ceylon, or the Cape of Good Hope. 'For the flattering treatment of former days [says de Klerck] cruel persecution was substituted, and it therefore hardly could cause surprise that the Chinese rebelled'.[2]

609 579 In July 1740 Van Imhoff, the leader of the political faction opposed to Governor-General Valckenier, proposed in the Council that all Chinese suspected of plotting against the Government should be arrested. This proposal caused much difference of opinion and led only to a resolution which was not carried out. In November of that year a revolt of the Chinese started. A rumour had been circulated that a number of Chinese who were sentenced to banishment had instead been flung overboard from the vessels transporting them. The rumour was without foundation, but many Chinese who believed it left Batavia for fear of meeting a similar fate. They joined the groups of their unemployed countrymen roaming the countryside and with them formed gangs, which used the sugar plantations as rallying-places. Fearing a general Chinese attack, the Governor-General recommended in Council that the town of Batavia be cleared of Chinese. This decision was finally taken, and the attempt to carry it out led to the 'deplorable and horrible massacre' which is known in Dutch colonial history as the 'Batavian Fury'.

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[1] E. S. de Klerck, *History of the Netherlands Indies* (Rotterdam, Brusse, 1938) i. 363.

[2] De Klerck, op. cit. i. 364.

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Ni Hoe-kong, the Captain China, attempted to escape disguised as a woman, but was captured, tortured, and banished to Amboyna. The Captaincy lapsed, but was revived in 1743.[1]

De Klerck (p. 364) says that over 10,000 Chinese were killed by the enraged mob. But Cator states[2] that after the excitement 3,431 Chinese still remained, including 1,442 merchants, 935 cultivators and gardeners, 728 workers in sugar and timber, and 326 craftsmen. So the massacre did not amount to a complete extermination of the race in those parts.

Without going more deeply into the rights and wrongs of the matter, or the degree of provocation given by the Chinese, we may with safety accept the judgement of the Dutch historian Temminck.[3] He sums up:

> The impartial historian must agree, with M. van Hoëvell,[4] that this catastrophe must be imputed only to the ineptitude, to the negligence and the arbitrariness of the Governors-General who were invested with power from 1725 to 1740, and without whose administration the elements of this revolt would never have been formed. . . .

But Temminck adds, 'the Chinese were nevertheless the aggressors . . . and if they had succeeded in their design all the Europeans would have been massacred'. Of this there can be no doubt either. The crime lay in the wanton slaughter after all effective resistance had ceased.[5]

The above was written before the author had had access to J. Th. Vermeulen's elaborate and authoritative work on the troubles of 1740,[6] but although this study brightly illuminates the background and provides detailed information not available to the earlier authorities the above facts remain substantially correct. Dr Vermeulen confirms the judgement of Temminck and says that for the

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[1] Boxer, op. cit. p. 465, quoted from B. Hoetink, 'Ni Hoe Kong, Kapitan der Chineezen te Batavia in 1740', *Taal, Land en Volkenkund v. Nederl. Oost Indië*, lxxiv. 74, 447–518.

[2] Cator, op. cit. p. 18.

[3] *Possessions Néerlandaises dans l'Inde Archipélagique* (Leyden, Arnz, 1847) i. 4.

[4] Quoting *Batavia in 1740* (Batavia, 1840).

[5] J. Chailley-Bert, not remarkable for his sympathy for Oriental peoples, and a strong critic of the Chinese, refers, however, to the '*cruauté inutile*' of the Dutch authorities (*Java et ses habitants* (Paris, Librairie Armand Colin, 1901) p. 127).

[6] Johannes Theodorus Vermeulen, *De Chineezen te Batavia en de Troebelen van 1740*, dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Letters, Leyden 1938 (Leyden, Ijdo, n.d.).

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609 579 massacre of innocent Chinese in Batavia the blame must certainly be laid at the door of the weak Dutch Government. This, divided into two parties, was headed by an irresolute and tactless person, who in the crisis was unable to take command of the situation and who deliberately neglected to resist an outburst of unrighteous fury on the part of the Dutch and others in Batavia.[1]

Their first rage having subsided, the Dutch began to think of their trade and of what the Emperor of China would say when he heard of the affair. Valckenier, behaving as the Spaniards had done in like instance after their massacre of the Chinese at Manila in 1603,[2] dispatched warships to meet the trading fleets expected from China, and sent a letter to the Emperor couched in humble and submissive terms. But when the Emperor showed but little interest in the matter, Valckenier changed his tone and began to bluster. He accused Imhoff of opposing his will and had him arrested and sent to Holland. The story raised a storm in Europe. Valckenier followed Imhoff at a short interval but was arrested at the Cape, and, investigation into his conduct being protracted for several years, he died a prisoner.

Meanwhile the Chinese troubles continued in Java. Survivors from Batavia retreated into the east of Java. Here they opened negotiations with the Susuhunan (Susu) of Mataram, who longed to break the Dutch yoke. Some Chinese became Mohammedans to secure the goodwill of the Javanese. The insurrection continued until 1742, but in the end it was crushed by the Dutch.

After the rebellion (if it can fairly be so called) had been suppressed and things had settled down again the Chinese resumed their function as middlemen and extended their operations. Their numbers were soon made up by further clandestine immigration. The sugar industry, however, had been practically ruined in the troubles.

[551] 427 One of the principal causes of the Chinese penetration of Java was the farming-out by the Dutch to the Chinese of the right to levy taxes. This had been done even under the native rulers before the Dutch arrived, and the first Captain China, Bencon, was a large holder of these monopolies.[3] The principal method, however, by which the Chinese increased their hold over the people and the land was to obtain the lease of large territories (entire villages or

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[1] Vermeulen, op. cit. p. 106.

[2] See p. 592.

[3] See footnote, p. 456. Also Cator, p. 18 and passim.

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even districts) from the native rulers. The native princes and chiefs, on behalf of the entire population of the leased districts, contracted to deliver stated quantities of produce, to provide labour (regulated by statute) as agreed, and to pay land rent to the lessee, either in money or in kind. The lessee usually maintained control as a kind of feudal lord. This system was responsible to a great extent for the disrepute in which the Chinese were held by the natives. By 1768 discontent had grown so strong that the people begged the Government of Batavia to depose the Sultans and to establish direct Dutch rule over the whole territory. They believed that this would protect them from the extortion of the Chinese. However, their request was refused.[1]

During the second half of the eighteenth century the Chinese gained in strength. They had in fact become necessary to both Dutch and natives as middlemen, and it was no longer possible, even if it had been desirable, to root them out.[2] Towards the end of the century the company took to farming out to them large areas, and in 1796 out of 8,536 villages (*negorijen*) belonging to the company 1,134 were leased out to Chinese.[3] This example was followed by the regents. On the Chinese estates near Batavia the people were better treated than elsewhere, but in the villages leased to them for only a short period the people were most miserable; for the Chinese were not landowners, but overlords: it was not the *land* that was leased or mortgaged to them but the *jurisdiction*, and the land went with the people and not, as in Europe, the people with the land; so (in Furnivall's analysis) they were able to exercise quasi-sovereign powers and the people were wholly at their mercy. Moreover, when the regent leased land to the Chinese, *his tribute to the company had to be made good from the remaining villages*, and the company was liable to suffer loss. This may explain why the company was so sensitive to the sufferings of the natives on these Chinese farms, and why in official reports the Chinese are consistently referred to with disfavour. One of such reports calls them 'a pest to the country' (a phrase borrowed by Raffles in the extract given below).[4]

Stamford Raffles, who was Lieutenant-Governor of Java during 181
the British occupation of that country (1811–16), has recorded his

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[1] B. H. M. Vlekke, *Nusantara: a History of the East Indian Archipelago* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1943) p. 206.

[2] Furnivall, op. cit. p. 47.

[3] Bergsma, ii. 297, quoted by Furnivall at p. 46.

[4] Van Hogendorp, *Schets of Proeve*, ii. 152, cited by Furnivall at p. 46.

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18 impressions of the Sino-native and Sino-Dutch relations as he saw them in his time when the system had reached full development.[1]

> The Chinese, in all ages equally supple, venal, and crafty, failed not to recommend themselves to the equally crafty, venal, and speculating Hollanders. They have, almost from the first, been the agents of the Dutch, and in the island of Java in particular, they have almost acquired the entire monopoly of revenue farms and government contracts. At present many of the most respectable Dutch families are intimately connected with the Chinese in their contracts and speculation, and it is only very lately that Marshal Daendels sold the whole province of Pasuki [Besoeki] to the Capitan China, or head Chinaman of Surabaya. It is even rumoured that this is not the only instance in which the Marshal has assigned whole provinces over to the unfeeling oppression of the Chinese, for the purpose of raising temporary resources in money. The Chinese have, in Java, been generally left to their own laws, and the regulation of their own chiefs: and being merely temporary residents in the country, they devote themselves entirely to the accumulation of wealth, without being very scrupulous concerning the means. When therefore, they acquire grants of land they always contrive to reduce the peasants speedily to the condition of slaves.
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> . . . A late report from the Counsellors of Batavia on this subject, accordingly states that 'although the Chinese, as being the most diligent and industrious settlers, should be very useful, they are, on the contrary, a very dangerous people, and are to be remarked as a pest to the country; and there appears to be no radical cure for this evil but their extermination from the interior, a measure which cannot now be effected.'

This opinion of Raffles, it should be noticed, dates from *before* his experience as Lieutenant-Governor of Java, and is therefore obtained second-hand, though he had had an opportunity of observing the Chinese in Penang, and to a less extent in Malacca, but under entirely different conditions and where the abuses referred to regarding land tenure did not exist. In the same letter he adds, 'The Chinese must, at all events, be admitted to be industrious: but the Arabs are mere drones, useless and idle consumers of the produce of the ground.'[2]

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[1] *Memoir of the Life and Public Services of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles*, by Sophia (Hull) Lady Raffles. Letter to Lord Minto dated from Malacca, 10 June 1811 (London, Murray, 1830) p. 72.

[2] D. van Hogendorp's other strictures on the Chinese include: 'The lessees, like bloodsuckers, took as much as they could get.' (*Berigt*, 1800, p. 18, cited by Cator at p. 21.) 'The Chinese have been made the owners of Java', *Coup d'œil sur l'île de Java et les autres possessions néerlandaises*, 2nd ed. (Brussels, Mat, 1830).

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When he undertook the administration of Java, Raffles resumed 427
a number of tracts that his predecessor had leased to Chinese. But Daendels himself, to do him justice, had early set his face against the alienation of villages to Chinese, and during his first year he redeemed 56 which had been mortgaged for a sum averaging only 13 rix dollars. But he was the victim of circumstances. He was compelled against his principles to sell land to Chinese because Javanese produce could not find a market abroad as all ships, other than American, had been driven off the seas by the British.[1]

But the Dutch generally, in their projects for reform from late in 425
the eighteenth century onwards, had the Chinese in mind as the chief fomenters of abuses. Measures were introduced forbidding the alienation of villages, and it has since remained a fixed rule of Dutch policy that land should not be alienated to non-Indonesians, including the Dutch themselves. This rule, Furnivall points out, has given protection to the natives, but it has emphasized the plural aspect of society. This has cut both ways. The Chinese were, on the one hand, prevented from obtaining a monopoly of the land and dispossessing the Javanese: on the other hand, any progress towards the assimilation of the Chinese into the Javanese community and making it a single homogeneous society was arrested.[2]

In addition to land, the company farmed out to the Chinese tolls 651
and taxes, including the customs duty. By Raffles's time their control of these farms had been reduced, though, as he remarks, 'in the native provinces they are still farmers of the revenue, having formerly been so throughout the island'.

After the Treaty of London had restored Java to the Dutch (he 609
was actually relieved of his post some months before the handing-over) Raffles set himself to compose a *History of Java*, in which he set down his considered opinions of Dutch policy.

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[1] 'The Chinese were forbidden (by Daendels) to lease any *dessas* (villages) even to reside in the interior; and what was probably not less necessary, the sultans were also forbidden to let out *dessas* to Chinamen', M. L. Van Deventer, *Daendels–Raffles, Governors of Java*, translated from *Indische Gids* by George G. Batten (London, Marlborough, 1894) p. 26.

Daendels, however, initiated a project in 1810 for the encouragement of Chinese colonization in the Preanger Regencies in order to obtain more regularity in the supply of coffee, but it was a failure. Cator, op. cit., p. 21.

See also *Staat der Nederlandsche Oost-Indische besittingen, ouder het bestuur van den gouverneur-generaal Herman Daendels . . . in de jaren 1801–11* (The Hague, 1814). Daendels, like Raffles, appreciated the essential part played by the Chinese in the economy of the Indies.

[2] op. cit. p. 47.

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609 In all their eastern settlements the favourite policy of the Dutch seems to be to depress the native inhabitants and give encouragement to the Chinese, who, generally speaking, are only itinerants and not children of the soil and they follow the almost universal practice of remitting the fruits of their industry instead of spending them where they are acquired. The Chinese, in all ages, equally subtle, venal, and crafty, failed not, at a very early period . . . [and here Raffles repeats the passage he had included in his letter of June 1811 to Lord Minto, before cited].

Raffles's recipe for checking the Chinese was 'by bringing forward the native population of Malaya and Javanese and encouraging them in useful and industrious habits'.[1]

Raffles is quoted here at some length because his opinions are of weight and he went out of his way to express them, but we must exercise care in accepting his criticisms of Dutch policy in the Indies. For one thing, he was interested to discredit the greatest rivals of the British in these seas, but he still spoke of the Chinese as the 'life and soul of the commerce' of Java, and to his own settlement of Singapore (founded by him in 1819) he was anxious to attract them above all other races. Moreover, it is something of
[651
427] an irony that the reforms he introduced in Java, whereby a money payment of taxes was substituted for payment in kind, had the effect of creating a need for money where none had existed before, and putting the natives more than ever into the hands of the Chinese, this time as money-lenders. Cultivators unused to handling money, but faced with a demand for the payment of revenue in money, mortgaged their crops, so that more land passed to the Chinese than under the former practice, reprehended by Nederburgh and Van Hogendorp alike, of obtaining estates on mortgage from regents.

439 At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Chinese had an almost uncontrolled command of the Javanese market for foreign commodities. Almost all the inland commerce was in their hands, for, possessing considerable capital and frequently speculating on a large scale, they bought up the principal articles of export from the native growers, conveyed them to the maritime capitals, and in return supplied the interior with salt and the principal articles imported from foreign countries.[2]

In the earlier days the Javanese merchants held their own with

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[1] *Memoir*, by Lady Raffles, p. 72 (see p. 472).
[2] Cator, op. cit. pp. 8, 9.

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the Chinese, as some enterprising merchants still do in Minangkabau.[1] Fortune had favoured the Chinese rise to prosperity as well as their industry and acumen. Jacatra was of very small importance as a trading centre before the Dutch came, and they were quick to see the advantages of using the Chinese as their agents. For one thing, the Chinese already had trade relations with the rice-producing East Java and they could obtain rice where the Dutch could not. When the Dutch suppressed the trade of the native merchants of East Java the Chinese were at hand to take their place. 'The Chinese', says Furnivall, 'were mostly immigrants, naturally men of enterprise and character, with a long tradition of commercial affairs and craftsmanship, and it was not strange that they got the better of a mass of an oppressed peasantry in every economic transaction in which the two parties engaged. From the beginning they were playing against the natives with loaded dice.'[2]

The Dutch East India Company had been long in decay, and owing partly to its policy of monopoly, partly to its parsimony in dealing with its servants, which encouraged corruption, and partly to other causes, it had been declared bankrupt in 1798 and its assets had been taken over by the newly created Batavian Republic from 1 January 1800. Some reforms had been initiated by the Dutch when the British occupation of Java put the policy of the country once again into the melting-pot. After its restoration to the Dutch in 1816, domestic policy had to be reconsidered all over again, and this resulted in far-reaching developments in which the Chinese community were naturally involved. But before dealing with these developments it will be profitable to turn back for a few decades to see how the Chinese community was progressing, considered rather as a social organism than an intermediary or entrepreneur.

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[1] Furnivall, op. cit. p. 47.

[2] ibid. pp. 47–8.

CHAPTER XL

CHINESE SOCIETY IN THE LATER DAYS OF THE DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY

167 WE are dealing, it is well to remember, almost entirely with the Hokkiens in the first two centuries of the Dutch connexion with the Indies. An impetus was given to emigration from the province from which the Hokkiens came in the second half of the seventeenth century when the Manchu conquest of China was completed and the civil war bore particularly hard upon it. In the second half of the nineteenth century the impetus was to come from the T'aip'ing rebellion and the resulting disorder, but this time other provinces besides Fukien suffered the depredations of the warring sides. The early Hokkien stock from the region of Amoy was very hardy and active, and their descendants still form the aristocracy among the Chinese in the Southern Ocean.

Crawfurd (whose experience dates from the early years of the nineteenth century) states that the Chinese who came to Java, &c., were from Canton and Fukien province, and adds: 'Those from the latter have a much better character than those from the former. They are rarely from the lower orders of society, and they are less gross and abject in their manners.'[1]

181 577 The Chinese have, as a whole [according to Duyvendak][2] never been a seafaring people with the love of enterprise and adventure which has characterized some of the Western nations and which has made them conquerors in so many parts of the world. The spirit of adventure was really not at all in keeping with the Chinese attitude to life. The ideal life was rather the one of filial piety and it was difficult to reconcile personal love of adventure with the fulfilment of duty towards one's parents.[3]

167 Although in disregarding the Confucian precept the sea-going Hokkiens showed themselves unfilial, they were nevertheless more

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[1] *History*, i. 137.

[2] J. J. L. Duyvendak, 'Chinese in the Dutch East Indies', *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. xi (1927) pp. 1-13.

[3] Duyvendak mentions a recorded saying of Confucius that a son should not travel while his parents are alive, that he should not climb to high and dangerous places, and that he should be careful not to incur any harm or so much as scratch his skin. For if he were to die or sustain an injury it would cause grief to his parents and prevent him from caring for them in their old age.

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imbued with the culture of China than the immigrants of other 167
provinces of a later period. They came, generally speaking, from
a better class of society. They knew something about, and therefore 181
valued, the ancient civilization of their homeland, and, once in the Indies, they learned the value of the Indonesian civilization as well. In preserving the cultural treasures of Java many Chinese, descendants of seventeen- and eighteenth-century immigrants, had a part. The immigrants of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century came mostly from Kwangtung and belonged to quite another class of people.[1] This judgement is borne out by other recent testimony.[2] The author of an article on Java pays tribute to the taste and culture of the settled Hokkien families of the country in these words:

> As many of the Chinese came from China centuries ago and have not 532
> ceased to hold intercourse with their native country, the houses of the wealthier men among them are often rich in ancient specimens of Chinese art. The special exhibition organized by Henri Borel and other enthusiasts showed how much of value in this matter might be brought together in spite of the reluctance of the owners to commit the sacrilege of exposing to public gaze the images of their ancestral gods and heroes. Borel has given exquisite examples of images of Kwan-yin, of Buddha, of the ghoulish god of literature, of Lie-Tai-Peh (the Chinese poet who has gone to live in the planet Venus) &c. in illustration of his papers in *L'Art flamand et hollandais* (1900), a translation of his monograph published in Batavia.

This aspect of the overseas Chinese in Indonesia is in rather sharp contrast with the indifference of some of the other communities in Southeast Asia to the refinements of their traditional civilization. In Malaya, for instance, there are very few houses where objects of vertu, images, hangings, &c., are to be found in any number, except in Malacca which also is an ancient Hokkien settlement.

We have already had a glimpse through the eyes of Wouter 872
Schouten at the education that was carried on among the seventeenth-century Chinese of Batavia. It was, it seems, mostly of a domestic nature and not carried on in formal schools. Indeed, it was not until 1900 that the first school was established on modern lines by the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan in Batavia and it was the first in

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[1] Vlekke, *Nusantara*, p. 330.

[2] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 13th ed. (1926) xv. 294.

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872 the whole of the Indies. However, education was given for centuries before that, mostly through home instruction. De Haan says,[1] 'The Chinese have always had schools, to the annoyance of the Council of Church Elders (*Kerkeraad*) because it meant that the Chinese boys received instruction in them at home.' A separate school building for Chinese and other non-Christian children was added to the Chinese Hospital in 1729 by the Government when the hospital was rebuilt—a remarkable proof (says De Haan) of the progress in the spirit of tolerance among the Dutch. The school, of which the Chinese Captains and other officers bore the cost of upkeep, was on the side of the hospital opposite the Company's school for the poor.

In 1753 the Dutch authorities decided to place some Dutch boys in this Chinese school in order that they might learn the Chinese language, which it appears the authorities regarded as an easy task.

Later in the century the school, which from thirty to forty pupils had formerly attended at one time, ceased to function owing to mismanagement, and in 1787 the Chinese Lieutenants wanted to open a new school at Klenting.[2]

771 777 Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism remained the religion or social code of the majority of the Chinese immigrants, but a number of them became Mohammedans. There is a mosque in Batavia which was built by the Mohammedan Chinese in 1786. Near this mosque is the grave of the wife of its Chinese architect: it is ornamented with Chinese designs and inscribed with Chinese characters which would be regarded as sacrilege by an orthodox 665 Muslim. The number of Mohammedans was small, but at Macassar it became considerably larger than anywhere else in the Indies and this town later became the seat of a Chinese Muslim Party, the *Partij Tionhoa Islam Indonesia*.[3, 4]

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[1] Dr F. De Haan, *Oud Batavia*, 2nd ed. p. 392, cited by Nio Joe Lan in 'De Eigen Onderwijsvoorziening der Chineezen', *Koloniale Studiën*, no. 1 (February 1939) p. 67.

[2] *Oud Batavia*, 2nd ed. (1935) p. 392, cited by Nio Joe Lan in 'De Eigen Onderwijsvoorziening der Chineezen', *Koloniale Studiën*, nos. 5 and 6 (1936) p. 68.

[3] Kwee Kek Beng, 'Het Cultureele Leven der Chineezen in Nederlandsch-Indiën', *Koloniale Studiën*, nos. 5 and 6 (1936) citing De Haan, op. cit. i. 396, and ii. n. 16.

[4] Dampier tells of 'a Chinese Renegado (Renegade) who was Captain of the China Camp (at Acheen) who got himself so entangled with the law that he would have been ruined had he not disentangled himself by turning Mohammedan,

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181 Since the immigrant males married native wives they generated a mixed race 'inferior in energy and spirit to the original settler, but speaking the language, wearing the garb, professing the religion, and affecting the manners of the parent country'. 'The Chinese settlers', continues Crawfurd[1] (adding yet one more European judgement of the Chinese to the scores that sprinkle the pages of Southeast Asian history), 'may be described at once as enterprising, keen, laborious, luxurious, sensual, debauched, and pusillanimous.'

536 197 (The statement that the descendants of the Chinese settlers spoke the language of their forebears requires modification, for many lost their ancestral language altogether. They became, indeed, like the Babas of Malacca, speaking Malay which was often a Malay of their own.[2] This fact resulted in the coming into being of Malay-speaking theatrical companies which gave Chinese plays in Chinese costume with Chinese music and according to Chinese stage technique—but the actors and actresses spoke Malay instead of Chinese!)

114 Opinions of the Europeans held by the Chinese are, on the other hand, very few and far between—not, we may be sure, because the latter refrained from forming opinions, but because they rarely recorded them. One important exception is the book by Ong Tae-hae in Chinese published in the 56th year of Ch'ien Lung (1791) and referring to the author's experiences some years before in Java.[3] He lived ten years in the Indies, first at Batavia, then at Semarang, after that at Pekalongan, and then returned to Batavia. Medhurst says:

> The author appears to have been a man of education and observation, equal to the generality of his own countrymen. His distorted views and occasional mistakes are to be ascribed to his early habits and partial information: considering the circumstances under which he wrote, however, his remarks display not a little good sense and good feeling.

He was a Hokkien by birth. His book has three prefaces by Chinese scholars other than his own, and is accompanied by a map of the Nanyang which has to be seen to be believed. A European child of six would have made a far better attempt at cartography.

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whereupon he was carried in great state through the city of Acheen on an elephant, with one crying before him that he had turned Believer', Dampier (ed. Wilkinson) op. cit. p. 96.

[1] *History*, i. 135.

[2] Purcell, op. cit. p. 293.

[3] Ong Tae-hae, *The Chinaman Abroad: An Account of the Malayan Archipelago* (Shanghai, Mission Press, 1844).

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[114] Ong Tae-hae gives a long and factual account of the Indies and
the Dutch and their administration, and his statements appear to
186 be substantially accurate. The territory of Batavia, he tells us,
originally belonged to the Javanese, but the Dutch, having by
stratagem and artifice got possession of the revenues, proceeded to
give orders and enact laws, until, squatting down all along the
sea coast, they have exacted duties, issued passports, guarded in-
gress and egress, put down robberies, and brought the natives
under their entire control. The Hollanders have long noses and red
[660 hair. The Chinese rich merchants and great traders amass in-
exhaustible wealth, whereupon they give bribes to the Hollanders
554] and are elevated to the ranks of great Captain, Lieutenant, Com-
missioners of Insolvent and Intestate Estates, or *Boedelmeester*,
Secretary, Choo-kat-tat, and suchlike appelations, but all of them
[692] take the title of Captain (or Cap-pit-tan). When the Chinese
quarrel or fight they represent their cause to the Captain, before
whom they make a low bow without kneeling, and refer to them-
selves as 'juniors'. The rights and wrongs, with the crooked and
straight of the matter are all immediately settled either by im-
prisonment or flogging without giving the matter a second thought.
With respect to flagrant breaches of the law and grave crimes, how-
ever, together with marriages and deaths, reference must invariably
[489] be made to the Hollanders. Those Chinese who journey by water
or by land must all be provided with passports to prevent them
going or coming in an improper way. From this may be inferred
how strict the Hollanders are in the execution of the laws, and how
minute in the levying of duties.

The Chinese is perplexed, however, by the Dutch method of in-
186 vestigating crimes of violence and by their criminal procedure.
695 For example, in China when a dead body upon which violence has
been committed is found, the nearest inhabitants are apprehended
and are required to deliver up the culprit. (This was strictly in
accordance with the Chinese theory of corporate responsibility.)
Ong Tae-hae laments that this is not also the practice in Java. The
Dutch instead lay great stress on evidence, requiring the witnesses
to submit to examination and to take an oath by cutting off a cock's
head (in the Chinese manner) before they will give judgement in
any matter. But when a man meets with a violent death, his body is
either thrown out into the streets or suffered to float down the
000 streams, and nobody dares to come forward as a witness. Alas!

Alas! exclaims our author, that human life should be treated so lightly! 000

The Dutch are very much like the man who stopped his ears up when he was stealing a bell.[1] Regarding them by the rules of reason, they possess scarcely one of the cardinal virtues[2]—husbands and wives separate, with permission to marry again, and before a man has been dead a month his widow is allowed to go and live with another man. Thus they have no rectitude. They make no distinction between superior and inferior, and men and women are mingled together. Thus they are without propriety. They are extravagant and self-indulgent in the extreme, and thus they bring themselves to the grave without leaving any inheritance to tranquillize and aid their posterity. They have no wisdom, but of the single quality of sincerity, however, they possess a little. 186 114

Every seven days, says Ong Tae-hae, there is a day of ceremony, or a sabbath, when from nine to eleven in the morning they go to their place of worship and mumble charms, the congregation hanging down their heads and weeping as if there were something very affecting about it all. But after half an hour's jabber they are allowed to disperse, and away they go to their garden-houses and spend the remainder of the day in amusement without attending to any business. Then you may see the dust of their carriages and the pacing of their horses all along the road, presenting a very lively scene.

The book further tells us that in their habits the Europeans aim at being polite and affect an elegant air. They seem delighted at meeting their friends and are lavish in their compliments to one another. If a man should become poor and call upon them for help they will not turn him away; whether he be of the same clan or only distantly connected they will not look upon him slightingly.

In stating this, Ong Tae-hae is admitting that the Dutch possess one further virtue in adding to a tincture of sincerity and that is *I*, 186 181

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[1] Insinuating that they try to hide their vices from themselves and imagine that they are equally concealed from others. They have a story in China that while a man was stealing a bell he stopped up his own ears to prevent himself from hearing the noise and imagined that others would be deaf to the sound (Medhurst's note).

[2] The Chinese cardinal virtues are benevolence (or humanity), *Jen*; the duty of man towards his neighbours, *I*; politeness, *Li*; sagacity, *Chih*; and sincerity, *Hsin*. See Purcell, *Problems of Chinese Education* (London, Kegan Paul, 1936), p. 37. [181]

[181] or the duty of a man towards his neighbours. But the Chinese interpretation of the virtue is somewhat different and does not in-
186 volve responsibility to anyone outside his own clan.[1]

This small book of only eighty pages in the English translation is
114 taking up a good deal of our space, but this is justified by the fact that it is undoubtedly genuine (as is proved by internal evidence), that it belongs to the period contemplated by our sub-title, and that it represents a unique attempt of a Chinese to regard foreigners objectively and not to apply to them the cast-iron judgements of a 'three-legs essay'. And in addition to revealing a great deal of the frame of mind of an immigrant Chinese, it gives valuable information about their affairs.

554 When any Chinese is appointed a Captain by the Dutch, a dis-
574 patch asking for permission to do so (says Ong Tae-hae) is sent to Holland. Having received notification of his appointment, the new Captain selects a lucky period and assembles his relatives and friends, the guests of the family, and visitors from the villages, amounting to a score or so of persons. Then on the appointed day the Hollander appears bringing with him the order for the appointment. An elaborate ceremony ensues, there is an interchange of compliments, 'and this', says our author, 'is the way the Dutch get our people into their net'.

554 We are further told that the power of the Captains in Batavia was divided and that the profits of the appointment were uncertain; whereas in Samarang the Captain's authority was fixed and his profits were more regular. The boiling of sea water to make salt and the cultivation of the fields to produce revenue were both perquisites of the Captain, and he was thus enabled to amass a great deal of wealth.

581 The habit of the Chinese of the Nanyang was to prefer for sons-
583 in-law those who were born in China, and not to regard those born in the country with great esteem. In the case of a China-born bridegroom a pair of wax candles would suffice as a marriage portion 'which was most delightfully cheap'.

361 The visitor from Fukien includes a striking picture of the luxurious lives of the richer Chinese in these parts. They lived in
342 fine houses with gardens planted with splendid shade-trees, they

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[1] It must be borne in mind that all this criticism is uttered at a time when the
556 Chinese code had fallen into a state of great ritualism and ossification from which it has not subsequently emerged.

were waited on by scores of female slaves, and the food they ate 361
was of the finest quality. In Pekalongan the Chinatown faced the 342
hills and bordered the sea. It consisted of a row of houses—perhaps
fifty or sixty of them, with high stories, joined to one another. 351
Towards the west was the Captain's residence, to the right of which 556
was a garden of perhaps an acre in extent beautifully shaded with trees. In the garden was a pavilion called the 'pavilion of floating clouds' in which the Captain relaxed. (Ong Tae-hae ~~describes~~ how he himself was entertained to dinner by the Captain.)

The book includes several short biographies of eminent Chinese 114
sojourners in the Nanyang, starting off with the famous Ong Sam-
po.[1] One of the celebrities was the wife (presumably a Javanese) of 186
a Chinese. The Chinese returned to China, and his wife, hearing of his death, braved the seas to come to China in order to look after his impoverished relatives. Another was Tan P'ak-kung, first cousin of Yang, Captain China of Samarang. When Yang died he was succeeded by one Kh'eng. The author describes a visit to Kh'eng by a native chief, the Temenggong, who came in a great procession accompanied by several hundred horsemen. The Chinese Captain sat exalted and apart and received the Javanese chief with only a slight inclination of the head. That he should have attained such a lofty position in a far land, says Ong Tae-hae, 'shows what our Flowery Chinese are capable of'.

We see, then, these two races, the Dutch and the Chinese, of widely separated homelands combining together to administer and exploit a great territory but with no great degree of sympathy with, or understanding of, one another. Their common interests were exclusively material. There was indeed a mutual respect based on an appreciation of the other's administrative or commercial qualities as the case might be, but nothing more. Dutch opinions of the moral nature of the Chinese were almost invariably unflattering: we have seen from Ong Tae-hae above that the Chinese, for their part, were not willing to concede much in the way of virtue to the 'red-haired'[2] conquerors.

As an example of the extent to which prejudice and ignorance 114
could reach, we could not improve on the libels of the Dutch 186

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[1] R. J. Wilkinson says that Chêng Ho's name is often wrongly given by the Chinese of the Straits as Ong-Sam-po, the Ong really being the clan name of his second-in-command. See 'The Malacca Sultanate', *JRASSB*, vol. xiii, pt. ii (1935) p. 25.

[2] To the Chinese the Dutch were always the 'red-haired race'.

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114 Admiral Stavorinus (even though some of them are of the kind that
186 Gibbon usually relegates to Greek footnotes).[1]

Stavorinus is by no means, however, a stupid or an unobservant man, and to him we owe fresh sidelights on the social life of the Chinese in the later eighteenth century. He tells us, for instance, that the few Chinese who in the 1790s lived within the city of Batavia had very wretched houses. Most of them dwelt in the southern or western suburbs which were together called the Chinese Campong. Before the revolt of 1740 they had the best quarters in the city allotted to them, to the west of the great river, but when, in that commotion, all the houses were burnt to the
[651] ground, the whole quarter was made into a *pasar*, or market. The Chinese were taxed, he says, at the monthly rate of half a ducatoon (one ducatoon equals 36 stivers or 6 shillings sterling). Women and children and those who had no trade were exempted from the tax which brought in a total revenue of 40,000 rix dollars a year. A flag was hoisted at the door of the Chinese Captain in the 1st or 2nd of every month and the Chinese who were liable to the tax had to come and pay it. Most of the sugar-mills, he records, were run by Chinese.

It is when he comes to the Chinese in commerce, their religious observances, and their alleged immoralities that Admiral Stavorinus reveals his prejudice and his credulity. In business, he says,
[778] they are 'like the Jews in Europe'. He describes the images (or *Joostyes*) in every house, painted on Chinese paper and hung up in a niche, in front of which one or more lamps were kept always burning, and the incense made into thin tapers. Their idol is depicted as an old man with a square cap upon his head and with a female, designed for his wife, next to him. He also notes the practice of throwing lots with sticks in the temples. He says 'It is worthy of observation, that whilst the practice of the most abominable idolatry is allowed, the Roman Catholic Religion is obstinately prohibited.' (From which the presumption is that Stavorinus is a Catholic.) He ends up with the passage to which reference has already been made: 'The Chinese are of a very lustful temper. They are accused of the most detestable violation of the laws of nature and it is even said that they keep swine in their houses, for purposes the most shameful and repugnant.'

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[1] Account of Java and Batavia from the voyages of Stavorinus in *Pinkerton's Voyages*, vol. xi, pp. 159 ff. Johan Splinter Stavorinus (1739–88) was writing of the period 1768–71 (see *Biografisch Woordenboek* (Leyden, Sijhoff, 1912) vol. ii).

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There is nothing to encourage the belief that either Europeans or Chinese in the Indies took any real trouble to understand one another. This is true of the Straits Settlements in the first century of their existence as it is of the Dutch East Indies. The Chinese were regarded as materially useful and left to their own devices as much as possible. It was not until 1877 in the case of the former and 1900 in the case of the latter that there came into being a department of experts whose business it was to acquaint themselves as closely as possible with the Chinese outlook, and to advise as to the best methods of dealing with that important community.

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CHAPTER XLI

THE CHINESE IN THE OUTER ISLANDS[1]

167 DISREGARDING earlier contacts and several smaller and often intermittent settlements,[2] the serious Chinese penetration of west Borneo began in 1760 (or in 1770 according to Veth[3]). About this time the Chinese gold-miners employed by the Sultan of Sambas rebelled against him and took over the management and the working of the gold mines for themselves. It is said that the extortionate and tyrannous behaviour of the Sultans of Sambas precipitated this revolution.[4] After this the Chinese miners took little further notice of the Sultans but the tribute agreed upon was still paid more or less regularly. Nor did their action deter the rulers from ceding tracts of territory to them. But when disputes arose between the Chinese and the Dyak population the rulers declined to intervene. There were many conflicts with a great deal of bloodshed.

437 The Chinese in Borneo did not confine their activities to mining. To begin with they came at long intervals and in small numbers. They carried out their usual systematic procedure, clearing large tracts of land, cultivating pepper, and laying out vegetable gardens. From clearings near the mouths of rivers they wandered into the interior and began felling the timber trees and floating them down stream to primitive docks they had erected. They built large and

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[128] [1] For the sake of convenience the various Chinese settlements in Southeast Asia are here dealt with according to the political divisions of the territories. The Chinese in Sarawak, Brunei, Labuan, and British North Borneo are therefore discussed separately since they come within the British area, but the account should be read in conjunction with the present one of the Chinese in Dutch Borneo since the history of the two communities is connected though the former, generally speaking, belong to a later period.

[2] Daniel Beeckman, who visited Borneo in 1714, says: 'The Chinese who live among them [the Borneans] are the only persons that have ships tolerably well furnished: they set them off with coarse chintz, calicoes, bastees, tea, drugs, china-ware, and many things—the current money is dollars, half, and quarter dollars: leaden cash as small change, in strings.' Captain Daniel Beeckman, *A Voyage to and from the Island of Borneo* (London 1718), reprinted in *Pinkerton's Voyages* (1812) xi. 125.

[3] Prof. P. J. Veth, *Borneo's Western-Afdeeling, 1854–6* (Zaltbommel, J. Norman, 1854–6).

[4] Cator, p. 139 ff.

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solid junks from this timber which they steered for China loaded 439 with their merchandise. When they had disposed of the merchandise for considerable sums they sold their junks, secured inferior craft for their return journey, and then started the process all over again.[1] A Mr Jesse who visited Borneo about 1774–5 reported to the (English) East India Company that he had himself seen a junk of 580 tons laid down in a Chinese building-shed at Brunei at the beginning of March that was launched at the end of May. He mentions that the Chinese artificers built her and completed her at an outlay of $4,250 or, to use his own words, 'about 30 shillings a ton, an example of cheap shipbuilding without a parallel in any other country'.[2]

Thomas Forrest (whose work is quoted in the first footnote below) gives a vivid impression of the animated commerce of Borneo town (Brunei, or Borneo proper) in the year 1776. He tells that the town stood about three or four miles up the river Patatan, consisting of about a hundred houses on the water-front. Above the town were many pepper gardens belonging to the Chinese in a delightful country-side. Regarding Borneo's market, 'Imagine', says Forrest, 'a fleet of London wherries, loaded with fish, fowls, grain, &c., floating up with the tide from London Bridge towards Westminster: then down again, with many buyers floating up and down with them; this will give some idea of the Borneo market.' Great quantities of blackwood for furniture were bought at about $2 a picul and sold for $5 or $6. Also rattans, dammer (*damar*), cloves, swallo (bêche-de-mer), tortoiseshell, edible birds' nests, &c. The best camphor sold for $10–$12 a Chinese catty. Seven junks were in port when Forrest arrived.

Forrest has a note, too, on Chinese pepper-growing which 244 it would be interesting for the agriculturist to compare with

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[1] 'At Borneo town the Chinese sometimes build junks which they load with the rough produce of the Island of Borneo, and send thence to China. I have seen a dock close to the town in which a Chinese junk of 500 tons has been lately built, worth 2,500 taels, and 8,000 in China. Could these junks come readily at our (British) woolens, they would distribute immense quantities through the northern parts of China.' Thomas Forrest, *A Voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas etc. performed in the Tartar Galley belonging to the Honourable East India Company, during the years 1774, 1775, and 1776* (London, Scott, 1780) p. 382.

Though the title reads thus, it appears that it was a galley named the 'Tartar' (10 tons burden!) and not a 'Tartar Galley' which Forrest navigated.

[2] 'The Chinese in Borneo' (anon.), *China (Quarterly) Review*, vol. vii (July 1878 to June 1879) p. 4.

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244 other notes of Chinese pepper-growing at various times and places:[1]

> They do not let the vine, which bears the pepper, twist round a chinkapin tree, as is the custom in Sumatra; but drive a pole, or rather short stout post, into the ground, so that the vine is not robbed of its nourishment. The Chinese keep the ground very clean between the rows of vines; and I have seen them pull off the vine leaves; saying they did it that the pepper corn might have more sun. I have counted 70, sometimes 75, corns of pepper on one stalk—more than Sumatra.[2]

439 Our English traveller tells us that the Chinese here in Borneo were very active and industrious. They brought with them all sorts of Chinese manufactures and kept shop on board their junks as well as on shore. But the Borneans did their best to prevent them dealing with the Muruts, wishing to reserve the trade to themselves. The Muruts did not plant pepper: this was the monopoly of the Chinese and all their produce went to China.

[501] As for the Chinese junks, it gave a European pleasure to see the regularity and cleanliness on board them. The fact that they did not use tar contributed not a little to the latter condition. They had instead an art of putting a mixture of lime and oil into the seams of their decks which hardened them and kept them tight. This was much cleaner than pitch, but if the deck 'worked' at sea, Forrest apprehended that the caulking would break open and the junk prove leaky. The tanks for water were sweet and clean: the cooking galleys remarkably neat; the crew all ate off china. In harbour everyone was employed without noise on his own business.[3]

But the Europeans were well aware of the existence of this trade and had for centuries regarded it with jealousy. The Portuguese first, and after them the Dutch, made treaties with the Malay princes which allowed them to undersell the junk masters. And, says Hunt, 'these powers went further; by setting at ports in Borneo their *guardas de costas*, they compelled the traders of Borneo to send their produce calculated for the China market to Malacca or Batavia, which at length completely cut up the direct trade with China by means of the Chinese junks'.[4]

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[1] See Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 45, re Penang; p. 218, of present Survey, re Indochina.

[2] op. cit. p. 382.

[3] Compare, however, the experiences of Dr Ruschenberger in Siam, *c.* 1833, when he found the Chinese junks kept in a filthy condition. See p. 125.

[4] 'The Chinese in Borneo' (anon.), *China* (*Quarterly*) *Review*, vol. vii (July 1878–June 1879) p. 5.

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The Kongsis

De Groot and Schlegel date the Chinese arrival in Borneo from 167
the arrival of a Chinese junk during the reign of Sultan Oumar Alamoudin (*c.* 1772). 'The Chinese deputation, pale and exhausted by the misery suffered during the long and difficult crossing of the sea, directed its steps humbly towards the Sultan's palace and threw themselves on his magnanimity, praying for the grant of a small portion of his territory where they might settle.'[1] Their prayer was answered and they were assigned the district of Larah. For long they were regular in the payment of their taxes, industrious, and peaceable. They intermarried largely with the Dyaks. But the tyranny and the inexhaustible thirst for riches of
the Sultan brought about a change in their attitude. As their 476
numbers increased the Chinese formed themselves into so-called 575
Kongsis, and thus, gradually feeling their power, they backed out 621
of their obligations.

Schlegel traces their origin to rural and village associations of China which make the base of the political constitution of China. Absolutely republican in government, they made a real counterpoise to the autocracy of the sovereign.[2] The Kongsis formed, as it were, petty republican communities, which, though occasionally in strained relations with one another, had one thing in common which was that they cared little for the authority of the native princes or, later, when it was established, that of the Dutch Government.

The founder of the original Kongsi, *Lanfong*, whose name was Lo Fong-phak, went to Borneo in 1772 with 100 members of his family. (The *Lanfong*, like the *Thian Thi* Kongsi, was exclusively agricultural and had nothing to do with mining.)

At the time of the arrival of the Chinese, native affairs seem to 361
have been in a very fluid state, but soon afterwards the first Sultan Abdul Rahman succeeded in attracting round him several groups

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[1] Dr J. J. M. de Groot, *Het Kongsiwezen van Borneo: eene Verhandeling over den Grondslag en den Aard der Chineesche Politieke Vereeningingen in de Kolonien mit eene Chineesche Geschiedenis van de Kongsi Lanfong*. (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1885.)

Reviewed in Professor G. Schlegel, 'L'Organisation des Kongsis à Borneo', *Revue Coloniale Internationale* (Amsterdam, de Bussy, 1885) i. 448–65.

See also Raymond Kennedy, *The Ageless Indies* (New York, John Day, 1942) p. 48.

[2] Schlegel, op. cit. p. 456. Cator, p. 148 ff.

361 of Chinese, Bugis, and Malay settlers, and built a town. Soon after, in 1786 (says Hunt[1]), the Dutch appeared with two brigs and fifty troops to establish their factory.

The early Chinese establishments in Borneo were all on the fringe: there was no settlement of the huge interior. In the map accompanying Raffles's 'History of Java' (1817) Borneo is described as a 'blank'.

316 About 1812 the principal gold-mines were at Sambas and thirty-odd of them were worked by the Chinese. There were about 300 coolies on each mine. The pay of each coolie was on an average $4 a month. The mines were rented from the Raja at the rate of 50 bunkals of gold per mine per annum, besides a capitation tax of $3 per head for each Chinese. There were 30,000 Chinese in the Sambas district: in addition about 12,000 Malays and Dyaks.[2] At Salako, up a river 15 miles south of the Sambas river, and lying nearly 40 miles up it, was a settlement where 20,000 Chinese were engaged in mining. At Montrado there were (says Hunt) about 50,000 Malays, Dyaks, and Chinese. At Mandor, where many Chinese were settled, their numbers were annually increasing. There were Chinese in the Songo district and also in Matan. The mine at Tampasuk was a very valuable one. The Chinese settlement, 'Campo China', at Pontianak contained 2,000 souls. The town of Borneo proper (Brunei), 'situated 15 miles up one of the finest rivers in the world', had a population of 15,000 including Chinese, Malays, Muruts, &c.

Hunt's comment on the situation in Borneo is:

> Living as the Chinese do, under the rapacity of despotic and ferocious freebooters, who are actuated by no principle of honour, justice, or good faith, it is their interest to conceal the riches they amass, not only to preserve themselves from the clutches of these tyrants, but as the most compact substance to transport to their native shores.

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167 The effect of the Dutch policy in diverting all trade via Batavia was that the transport of *gruff* (coarse) goods—rattans, sago, cassia, pepper, ebony, wax, &c.—was too expensive. But the loss of direct intercourse with China had even more fatal effects:

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[1] J. Hunt, *Sketch of Borneo or Pulo Kalamantan*. Communicated in 1812 to the Hon. Thomas Stamford Raffles Esq., Lt.-Governor of Java. Printed as Appendix IV to *The Expedition to Borneo of H.M.S. Dido for the suppression of piracy*, by Capt. Hon. Henry Keppel, R.N. (New York, Harper, 1846).

Hunt's sketch supplies most information about this period, but Crawfurd questions its reliability.

[2] Hunt, op. cit. p. 390.

> . . . it prevented the arrival of large bodies of annual immigrants arriving 439
> from China and keeping up the prosperity of the country by commerce,
> handicrafts, and tillage. The old Chinese settlers by degrees deserted 167
> these shores, and to fill up the chasms in their revenues . . . the Rajahs
> have been tempted to turn their views to predatory habits, and have permitted their lands to run to jungle, by dragging wretched labourers from agricultural to maritime and piratical enterprises.[1]

After the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars had restored to 316
them their Indonesian dominions, the Dutch were resolved to establish direct control over Borneo. They were attracted in particular by the Chinese mines, and were assisted in their designs by the appeal of the Sultan Abou-Bakar-Tadjoudin to them in 1818 for assistance against the Kongsis.[2] The Dutch obtained authority from the Sultan of Sambas to purchase mines, and sent several expeditions to Borneo beginning in the year 1816. But the invasion of the Chinese sphere was at first defeated by such weapons as poisoned water. Though between two enemies, the natives and the Dutch, the Chinese held out for years. In 1826 intervention was interrupted for a long period by the Great Java War. Finally, Chinese obstinacy was defeated by Dutch phlegm. The year 1854 476
saw the 'complete extinction' of the Kongsis. However, the 575
Captain Liou A Sin of the Kongsi, *Lanfong*, was granted independence until his death by the Dutch in return for services rendered, 621
but when he died in 1884 and the Dutch Government took possession 316
of his territory there was a serious revolt.

There are extant at least two contemporary accounts of the Kongsis during the height of their power, one Dutch and one English. Temminck tells us that the Kongsis were democratic communities formed with the object of exploiting for their profit the gold and diamond mines. They were divided into public associations of which three accounted for the greatest number of members and these three Kongsis occupied the leading position and exercised control over the smaller ones distributed through the interior. All Chinese belonging to the Kongsis shared in the gains and the losses of the mining enterprises. The *Lanfong* Kongsi in the Sambas Residency had an armed force of 6,000 fighting men: the Taykong and the Lara Sin-ta-kiou Kongsis in the Sambas Residency had 10,000 and 5,000 fighting men respectively.[3]

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[1] Hunt, op. cit. p. 385.

[2] Schlegel, op. cit. p. 450.

[3] op. cit. ii. 399.

476 In February 1834, a report having been brought to Singapore
575 that the people of a Chinese colony on the west coast of Borneo
were anxious to establish a permanent commercial intercourse with
621 the British Settlement, some merchants of Singapore dispatched
Mr G. W. Earl in the schooner *Stamford* to that part with a cargo
316 of opium, tea, and other commodities to exchange for the product
439 of the gold-mines of Borneo.[1] He found the Chinese colony between
two small Dutch settlements on the banks of the principal
rivers, one at Pontianak and one at Sambas. Sinkawan, the chief
seaport of the Chinese, was not down in the charts. It was defended
by a barricade of stakes. He found the Chinese boiling sea water to
make salt. He was given an audience by the Kongsi, and found the
court-house filled with half-naked Chinese 'each of which considered
himself authorized to join in the discussion which ensued,
and endeavoured to make himself heard above his neighbour'. The
noise at last became perfectly deafening and Earl was glad to
escape under the plea of wishing to inspect the town. The Chinese
[361] were vexed and some bad feeling ensued. The town he found to
consist of a single street of low wooden houses, the front rooms of
each being shops for the sale of grain, meat, groceries, &c., or
[342] rooms appropriated to opium-smoking. The court-house, which
was detached from the town, contained a large room for the transaction
[344] of public business, and several apartments which were
occupied by the Kongsi and their families. It was surrounded by
a low turf wall with a gate opposite to the town near which several
long *jingals*, or swivel guns, carrying balls of about one pound
weight, were placed muzzle up, leaning against the wall. Many of
the women were Chinese, though the majority were Dyaks.[2]

The Kongsi at Sinkawan hesitated to open the port for trade for fear of a breach with the Dutch and wished Earl to wait until they could communicate with the Chinese Governor who dwelt at Montradok, the capital, about thirty-five miles in the interior. Earl, however, decided to make arrangements with the Dutch at Sambas and thereupon proceeded to that place. The Dutch representative, Mr Rumswinkle, informed him that he must make use of Sambas which had lately been a free port to vessels of all flags.

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[1] George Windsor Earl, *The Eastern Seas, or Voyages and Discoveries in the Indian Archipelago in 1832–33* (London, W. H. Allen, 1837) p. 28.

[2] The Dyak women were shapely: the Chinese women were all 'large-footed' (i.e. their feet were not bound). Earl, pp. 272, 292.

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Before the arrival of the Dutch, says Earl, Sambas was a nest of 316
pirates. In 1812 it was destroyed by the British, but in 1823 the Dutch again settled in Pontianak. They purchased the monopoly of the diamond mining from the Sultan for $50,000 and dispatched troops to take possession of the Chinese mines. The Chinese poisoned the wells and harassed the invaders by cutting off their supplies, and finally forced them to evacuate the territory. But the Dutch still held the trump card, and this was the control of the sea. It was clear the Chinese would eventually have to come to terms. The Dutch derived their revenues from salt, opium, customs duties, and a capitation tax on all Chinese who arrived in or left the country. Before the Dutch took possession of the west coast[1] in [167]
1823, 3,000 Chinese used to arrive annually, but immigration had now almost entirely ceased.

Earl[2] estimates the total number of Chinese in west Borneo to [162]
have been 150,000—about 90,000 in the Chinese districts and the remainder in districts under the control of the Dutch. The Malays he puts at 50,000, the Bugis at 10,000, the Arabs at 400, the Javanese and Amboynese at 150, the Dutch at 80, and the Dyaks in the neighbourhood of 250,000. The Chinese were 'chiefly of the tribe which forms the lowest class at Canton, being, I believe, of Tartar origin' (namely, Hakkas (Khehs)).

The belated Dutch victory was an empty one. For years they 439
had had control of the main ports such as Pontianak and had refused to trade with the Chinese except through these ports. The 167
Chinese, though virtually shut off in the interior, had refused to yield to coercion and had learnt to exist without commerce. Immigration from China practically dried up.

Nor did the extinction of the Kongsis bring about a cure of the 476
political and economic ills of Borneo. De Groot and Schlegel (and they make a powerful combination) are agreed as to the nature of 575
the trouble. This is how Schlegel expresses it: 621

> De Groot says: after the end of the wars against the *Kongsis* they 316
> [Sambas, &c.] were reduced to poor agricultural districts, mines nearly abandoned. We entirely share his opinion that the abolition of the *Kongsis* and the diminution of the Chinese population resulting from this abolition, have dealt to the development of Borneo a blow from which perhaps she will never recover.[1]

De Groot asks why the Government leave the Javanese their

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[1] De Groot, p. 163; Schlegel, p. 458.

1[i.e. of Borneo--Analyst]
2[See footnote (1), p. 492, cat. 116--Analyst]

476 communal institutions and take away those of the Chinese. Why,
he repeats, this sinophobia, this fear of a population which has
575 never given any reason for fear to the Netherlands Government?

621 The fact was that without their kongsi organization the Chinese
316 became much as a nest of white ants becomes when its central ganglion, or brain, the 'queen', is removed. (Or with such a useful community as the Chinese it would perhaps be more fitting to resort to the bees for an analogy!) But the Chinese, as ever, had strong powers of recuperation.

At this point it will be convenient to leave Borneo for a time while we resume the story of the Chinese in other parts of Indonesia.

Sumatra and the Rhio (Riouw) Archipelago

167 Chinese immigration to Sumatra is comparatively recent. Trading contacts were, of course, of ancient date, and the account of the annual visits to Achin (Acheh) by Dampier in 1689 has already been given. Captain Forrest, who visited Achin in 1762, 1775, and 1784, found no Chinese there, though he adds 'Chinese were there in Commodore Beaulieu's time'.[1] There was also a very early settlement of Chinese at Palembang.[2] Marsden, too, speaks of the Chinese at Bencoolen in his *History of Sumatra*. He mentions in particular Kee Soon, 'one of the most able cultivators among the people who worked the ground with indefatigable pains and dunged high', and who nearly had his heart broken by struggling against nature, the soil being so ungrateful, and he would have become bankrupt had it not been for the help of the (English) East India Company.[3]

It is said that the Dutch East India Company bought tin from the Sultan of Palembang as early as 1710, and the directors of the

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[1] *A Voyage to the Mergui Archipelago*, p. 59.

[501] [2] On 21 May 1687 Dampier's vessel overtook at Pulo Condore a great junk from Palembang, laden with pepper. It was full of little rooms or partitions 'like our well-boats'. *Dampier's Account of the Philippines*, in *Pinkerton's Voyages* (1808–14) xi. 2.

Beeckman (op. cit. p. 147) in 1714 found at Palembang 'some Mohammedans and a few Chinese'.

[3] William Marsden, F.R.S., *The History of Sumatra, Containing an Account of the Government, Laws, Customs, and Manners of the Native Inhabitants, etc.* (London, 1784).

James Lancaster visited Achin in June 1602, but did not find any Chinese there. He mentions Gujarats, Bangalis, Malabaris, Peguans, and Patani Malays. See Hakluyt Society, Series II, vol. lxxxv (1940) p. 90.

company signed a contract with this Malay potentate in 1722. By 167
doing so the Dutch obtained a trade monopoly.[1]

The native rulers of Palembang soon discovered that the skill
of the Chinese miners was superior to the primitive methods of 167
their own subjects. They therefore sent their recruiting agents to 316
the southern provinces of China to enlist workers for their mines at
Bangka. In 1812 the Sultan of Palembang ceded his mineral rights 464
in Bangka and Billiton to the King of England. From this time onwards a representative, first of the British and then of the Dutch, resided in Bangka and contracted with the Chinese miners. When the Dutch took over from the British in 1816 the mines became the property of the Netherlands Indies Government.[2]

The Chinese miners continued with their own primitive methods 316
until after the middle of the century, after which Western experts began to modernize the mining operations. In Billiton the native population managed very cleverly for a long time to conceal the richest mining deposits, but these were eventually worked by the Billiton Maatschappij and after 1923 by the Netherlands Indies Government.[3]

In extension of this account by Mr Ter Braake, we may quote 316
from Dr Cator who says that when a representative of the Nether-
lands Indies Government in 1825 restarted mining the tin deposits 167
in Billiton, there was no other mining enterprise in the whole island. Nor were any mining operations going on in 1851 when extensive surveys were made. It may be assumed, therefore, that before 1851 there had been no real exploitation of these fields, though the existence of deposits was widely known. To begin with, free Chinese coolies were employed, but owing to the rivalry of the Bangka mines it was decided in 1853 to solve the problem by sending recruiting agents to China: in consequence, 253 men were brought from Hong Kong and Whampoa.[4]

Bangka's history is somewhat similar to that of Billiton. The 167
Chinese settlements in Sumatra were relatively inconsiderable

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[1] Alex. L. Ter Braake, *Mining in the Netherlands East Indies* (New York, Netherlands and Netherlands Indies Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944) Bulletin 4, p. 36.

[2] 'The Dutch employ Chinese miners to whom they pay 6 dollars for every pecul [picul] of tin delivered on the coast in a pure state, which they sell in Java for 16 dollars a pecul.' G. F. Davidson, *Trade and Travel in the Far East* (London, Madden & Malcolm, 1846) p. 87.

[3] Ter Braake, op. cit. p. 36.

[4] Cator, p. 184 ff.

167 until the third or fourth decade of the nineteenth century. Collet says that the epoch of the foundation of Singapore fixes the period of this new immigration, but it was not until the development of the tobacco cultivation at Deli, Langkat, and Serdang (1864–70) that there was an inflow sufficiently considerable, taking the good years with the bad, to compensate for the losses due to death and, above all, to repatriation.[1]

The above are the main facts concerning the Chinese in this area
during the period under review: the rest are miscellanea explaining
or high-lighting them. Temminck tells us that by order of the
[362] Sultans the Chinese in the town of Palembang were not allowed to
live on land; they were compelled to live on the river in boats and
[567] on rafts.[2] We learn from Davidson of the disgraceful traffic carried
on in the 1830s and 1840s by Chinese between Padang and Nias.
They visited the island of Nias and purchased hundreds of its
inhabitants for whom they found markets all along the coast.
Those brought to Padang were not, indeed, sold as slaves, but they
were registered in the Resident's office and held as 'bond-debtors'
for terms ranging from 7 to 15 or even 20 years. During this period
of servitude they were treated as slaves but were free at its expiration. They also had the option of buying their liberty in the meantime if they could raise the money.[3]

567 But as an offset to this example of callous Chinese rapacity (remembering, however, that slavery still existed in other parts of the globe, including America, and was not abolished in the Dutch East Indies until 1860) Earl in 1834 (or early 1835) gives us a picture of Ban Ok, the Captain China of Rhio, 'whose hospitality and benevolence were exercised indiscriminately to all who approached him, without distinction of country or colour'.[4]

46 Chinese labour in Sumatra in the second half of the nineteenth century is referred to in the following chapter.1

167 As regards the Chinese in Eastern Indonesia, as long as the Dutch monopoly of the spice trade was maintained (until 1854) the

1[i.e. Ch. XLII -- Analyst]

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[1] J. A. Collet, *Terres et Peuples de Sumatra* (Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1925) p. 193.

[2] op. cit. ii. 46.

[3] op. cit. p. 87.

[4] Ban Ok, a plump, good-humoured looking man, advanced towards Earl and his companions, and, 'after giving each a hearty shake of the hand, called for chairs and bottles of Hodgson's pale ale'. George Windsor Earl, *The Eastern Seas, or Voyages and Discoveries in the Indian Archipelago in 1832–33–34* (London, W. H. Allen, 183[illegible]) p. 140.

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Chinese were not wanted in that area. After that time there was no inducement for the Chinese to go there for the Moluccas were now poor. There were no plantations; therefore coolies were not needed. The same was true of the Celebes and the Lesser Sunda Islands from Bali to Timor. There was some trading with the natives of the smaller islands and of the New Guinea coast, but this was not considerable, for the whole area remained infested with pirates until the last quarter of the century.[1]

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[1] It has been suggested with some show of reason that the Chinese need a developing community as an economic environment and that a decaying area does not attract them.

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CHAPTER XLII

NINETEENTH-CENTURY DUTCH ECONOMY AND THE CHINESE

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AFTER the resumption of Dutch rule in 1816 many changes were made and strong pressure was put on the natives to produce for export. During the brief English occupation of 1811–16 Raffles sought to introduce the system of peasant proprietorship prevailing in British India, using the village headman as his agent.[1] In doing so he was following a policy already advocated by Dirk van Hogendorp, the protagonist of a colonial administration on liberal lines. The machinery at the disposal of Raffles was insufficient, and the peasants he established fell in many cases into the hands of Chinese money-lenders. The system, with many other of Raffles's reforms, did not long survive the British administration, but the tradition of a liberal policy on the lines of van Hogendorp's proposals and the Raffles experiments survived and bore fruit in the last decades of the century.[2]

The famous 'culture system' was formally inaugurated in 1830 by Governor-General van den Bosch. Under this scheme native cultivators were exempted from the ground-tax, but they were compelled to devote one-fifth of their land to crops indicated by the administration, and to hand over the yield in lieu of taxes. Under van den Bosch himself the scheme seems to have worked fairly well, but, involving as it did a combination of the *métayer* and the forced labour system, it was liable to great abuses, which increased until the home Government took action in 1854, when the whole colonial system was overhauled. The Regulations for the Government of Netherlands India promulgated in that year miti-

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[1] In this section *Netherlands Overseas Territories*, Information Department Papers, no. 28 (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1941) is followed.

[2] On this passage Dr Vlekke comments: 'The problem of peasant proprietorship retained the attention of the Dutch administration. The number of proprietors grew gradually. I do not think that Raffles "established" any. He indicated a line of policy (which was easier to indicate than to carry out) and, as always, tried to suggest that his ideas had been realised. Therefore there was no relapse after his departure. Most of Raffles' reforms were retained after 1816. Even under the Culture System they were not abolished.'

[p. 498]

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gated the despotic character of the administration and paved the way for the progressive reduction of servitude of all kinds, including the culture system. Extensive agrarian reforms were delayed until 1870. By that time the compulsory cultivation of pepper, cochineal, and indigo for the Government had already ceased, and from 1878 onwards the sugar plantations, at that time cultivated by forced labour, by the reforms of De Waal, the then Minister of the Colonies, were restricted and compulsory cultivation ceased altogether in 1890.[1]

The De Waal agrarian reforms prepared the way for the steady development of native agriculture which went on until the Japanese invasion in the next century. Not only was the peasant protected against economically stronger groups by the prohibition of the expropriation of his land, but also assistance was provided for the sale of the product. Native ownership of land was in many cases hereditary and individual, but part of the land was the common property of the village.

Simultaneously a sound foundation was laid for estate agriculture which did not encroach on native-tilled land but was mainly established on hitherto unused Crown lands, obtained on long lease from the Government. The estates, however, could in the case of some export crops, notably sugar and tobacco, rent native land, and later on the greater part of these two crops was grown on rented land. Government policy was in the direction of preventing the rise of non-native agrarian groups and the prevention of the formation of a rural native landless proletariat.[2] Exceptions to this occurred in special areas, particularly in west Bangka where large Chinese holdings came into being.

In 1848 the *Grondwet*, or fundamental law of the Netherlands, recognized, for the first time, the responsibility of the Dutch nation for its colonial dependencies. The *Grondwet* involved certain important changes which were embodied in an Act passed in 1854 and commonly known as the Regulations for the Government of Netherlands India. They reformed the judicature, introduced

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[1] 'A delusive appearance of prosperity under the "culture system" was given by the immense increase in exports, and the great profits made by European and Chinese manufacturers, contractors, and officials. . . . The native population increased by some 50 per cent. (1870–1900) but decreased in average wealth.' Sir Alan Pim, *Colonial Agricultural Production* (London, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946) p. 21.

[2] *Netherlands Overseas Territories*, p. 47.

43 elementary education for the natives, and abolished slavery in Java as from January 1860.

24 The remainder of the nineteenth century from the beginning of the disappearance of the 'culture system' is known as the 'Liberal period', and is characterized by the development of private Western enterprise, mainly Dutch. The Chinese in this period made even greater progress than the Europeans, though they did not increase so rapidly in numbers.[1] There were already nearly 150,000 of them in Java and Madura alone by the middle of the century, and by 1900 there were 277,000 in Java and Madura and some 250,000 in the Outer Provinces.

651 Reference has already been made to Raffles's reforms: they demand further mention at this point since they have an important
427 bearing on the economic position of the Chinese in the succeeding decades. The plan of requiring, not a fixed amount, but a proportion of the average crop, while it seemed to promise the Government the maximum that it could fairly demand, led to difficulties and frauds.[2] When Raffles wrote his minute of 1814 in which he had adopted the system of individual settlement as the normal, he had had actual experience of this form of settlement only in its application in districts formerly subject to Chinese farmers. It was said that the new system, when introduced into a district in Pekalongan formerly under Chinese, gave a net revenue nearly fourfold that formerly received, which was collected with perfect ease. On the other hand, De Salis, in his report on Pekalongan and Kedoe, 1816, said that one district that was formerly leased to Chinese and was now under individual settlement, was always in arrears.[3] Raffles also proclaimed the abolition of internal duties and ordered that the market tolls should be administered directly by the Government instead of being farmed out to Chinese, but his regulations had little practical effect. Even in his own time, it is said, new toll gates were established where none had existed before, and the existing revenue-farmers persisted in their abuses.[4] After the restoration of the Indies to Holland in 1816 the predominant posi-

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[1] Furnivall, op. cit. p. 213.

[2] Furnivall points out that Raffles required the payment of taxes in money with the result that 'cultivators unused to handle money but faced with a demand for the payment of revenue in money, mortgaged their crops, their cattle and their land, so that more land passed to the Chinese than under the former practice'.

[3] Clive Day, op. cit. p. 183.

[4] ibid. p. 201.

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tion of the Chinese in the economy of the islands was maintained 651 for many years, for, although imports of most kinds were no longer 441 in the hands of the Government, the sale of salt and opium and buying up of sugar, tobacco, coffee, indigo, &c., at first remained almost exclusively in its hands, but the Chinese were often used as intermediaries. Moreover, the system of farming out taxation (poll-taxes, slaughter-house taxes, bazaar taxes, opium monopoly, &c.) continued until after the middle of the nineteenth century, so that the Chinese, as farmers, retained their influence.[1]

The Chinese were the obvious contractors, for, as van den Bosch 441 remarked, the Dutch themselves 'could not be beaten out of their home (in Holland) with sticks "Gentle pressure" had to be exerted to induce even the Chinese in some cases to accept the onus of being middlemen, and in the 1830s a leading Chinese was warned that he could not expect to succeed his father as the Chinese Captain unless he accepted a contract. After vainly offering $5,000 for a substitute he had to comply, and within a few years he was the wealthiest man in Java.'[2]

The position had been consolidated by the middle of the century and, as Mr Jan O. M. Broek says, 'generally speaking, the natives form the agrarian base, the Chinese and Arabs the commercial middle class, and the Westerners the small but ruling apex of the socio-economic pyramid'.[3] Standing between Europeans and natives, and necessary to both classes, the Chinese were able to levy toll on both. So much of the newly created wealth as went to the Javanese passed immediately to the Chinese as holders of all the opium shops, pawnshops, and gambling houses. Furnivall points out that while in 1900 the natives were buying much less cloth per head than in 1880, the revenue from opium had risen from fl. 10·5 million in 1867 to fl. 1,817 million in 1897 and, during the same period the pawnshop revenue rose from fl. 365 thousand to fl. 1·23 million, the gaming revenue from fl. 365 thousand to fl. 844 thousand, and the excise revenue (also largely collected through the Chinese) from fl. 112 thousand to fl. 7·37 million.[4] At the same time the Chinese profited on a similar scale from the growth of trade, both wholesale and retail. All that the natives sold to

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[1] Cator, op. cit. p. 97.

[2] Furnivall, op. cit. p. 107.

[3] Jan O. M. Broek, *The Economic Development of the Netherlands Indies* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942) p. 5.

[4] op. cit. p. 213.

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441 Europeans they sold through Chinese, and all that the natives
bought from Europeans they bought through Chinese. Chinese,
[463] too, were at hand to supply the demand for clerks, accountants,
salesmen, or artisans and at rates which commerce and industry
[288] could pay. This race took part in the organization of native production so much so that an inquiry into the *batik* (cloth) industry in 1892 revealed that the replacement of native cloth by imported cloth, which the *batik* workers bought through Chinese, had resulted in the transfer of the whole industry to the Chinese, 'with native workmen in a position not unlike slavery'.[1]

441 With their undoubted energy and acumen it may be wondered
why it was that the Chinese did not threaten to oust the Europeans
181 from their supremacy as capitalists. They did indeed compete with the latter in production, many of the large estates (*particuliere landerijen*) having passed before 1900 into their hands and they were conspicuous in the timber business.[2] But the bulk of the larger undertakings continued to be European. There seems, indeed, to be a limit to the ability of the Chinese to organize on the big scale, a limit arising perhaps from the family system and making them less capable of running large joint-stock enterprises with the anonymous character of their shareholders. They seem to lack, says Clive Day, the breadth and boldness of conception that would enable them to enter upon large enterprises as rivals of the Europeans, but between the Dutch and the natives they have an assured
[443] position. Even in retail trade they did not everywhere have things
their own way, and in the Outer Provinces the Chinese played a minor role. Here the native retained the initiative and reaped the profit, whereas in Java he was all too often simply a cog in the complicated machinery of Western trade.[3]

181 No two authors (in Clive Day's opinion) can agree in describing
the moral characteristics of the Chinese, and certainly there is a great deal of contradiction in the accounts that have been preserved for us. Schlegel said that the Chinese were easy to govern; Temminck tells us that in west Borneo 'the Chinese miners formed the most boorish, the most turbulent, and the least tractable part of the population'.[4] He admitted, however, that they were regular

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[1] Furnivall, op. cit. p. 213.

[2] In Sumatra the timber *Panglongs* in the forests were a Chinese monopoly and their trade was with Singapore.

[3] Broek, op. cit. p. 35.

[4] op. cit. p. 301.

enough in their family morals and in their marriages with women 181 of the country, and their establishments were always tranquil and well regulated. But, like the Jews, they were always greedy of gain. G. W. Earl, writing in the 1830s, is critical of their function and their value to the community as a whole:

> By some persons [he says] the Chinese are supposed to confer great benefit on Java, but on closer examination it will be found that their settlement on the island has been productive of very injurious effects. That they have enriched themselves and contributed to the aggrandisement of the Europeans cannot be doubted, but the interests of the natives have suffered proportionately . . . the accumulation of wealth forms their sole object, and being more energetic, and also more crafty than the Javanese, they have also managed in their commercial transactions to trammel the latter with debts from which they can rarely afterwards extricate themselves. . . .

Earl (and he seems a reliable witness in spite of the comparative 406 shortness of his stay in the Indies) tells us that the Chinese adopted an artful and ungenerous system in their dealings with the native cultivators. They prevailed upon the cultivators to take goods in advance to be paid for by the produce of the ensuing harvest at a stipulated price, always much below its real value.[1] The following year the price of goods supplied by the Chinese would be augmented and that to be paid for the produce reduced, and the cultivator was nearly certain ever afterwards to be in debt and a slave to his creditor. The minor Government imports were farmed exclusively by the Chinese, and since these included all the smaller articles consumed by the natives the impositions pressed hardly upon those who were least able to support them. A hawker of sweetmeats or of fruit could not follow his calling without a daily *chop* or licence which had to be purchased from the farmer, and numbers of Chinese were always prowling about ready to pounce and carry off to prison any unfortunate beings who tried to avoid the imposition. It was not surprising, said Earl, that the natives detested the Chinese, for they saw in them the active agents of a system of oppression by which they were frequently reduced to beggary.[2]

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[1] Dr Vlekke notes, 'Was not the advance sale of the harvest customary in Indonesia—and probably in other parts of the world? It certainly existed in the Spice Islands before the arrival of the Europeans.'

[2] Earl, op. cit. pp. 30, 31.

556 Immigrant Chinese arriving in Indonesia usually brought nothing but a bundle of clothes, a mat, and a pillow. When they made money, as so many did, they were careful not to flaunt the fact in the faces of those from whom they made it. 'The main streets', says Earl of Javanese towns, 'were appropriated by the Chinese merchants, who, however, make not outward display, since, from the mean appearance of their shops, a stranger could never for a moment suppose that the occupants were rolling in riches.'[1]

181 No one, however, speaks with greater asperity of the Chinese and their role than the ardent French colonialist and defender of European pretensions, J. Chailley-Bert, writing of the situation as it was at the end of the nineteenth century. 'Who other than the Chinese', he asks, 'would mix with the natives, speak their language, take part in their life, capture their confidence, condescend to the most disgusting details, harshly exact their due and sometimes more than their due, and take advantage of the least infraction of the letter of a contract to impose harsher conditions?' (He cites as an example the case of the farming out to the Chinese of cattle slaughtering, by which three florins went to the farmer for every animal slaughtered.) The Chinese admitted no moral obligation whatsoever, and there was everywhere evidence of their 'harshness, their immorality, and their work of demoralisation'.[2]

486 Yet the privileged position that they held in the economy of the
Indies did not entail any great improvement in their civil liberties.
167 They were still confined to certain towns and to certain areas of
554 these towns; they could not land without a permit, and they could not travel in the interior without a pass.[3] The restrictions on immigration, however, were slackly enforced. But in one respect their position improved, for in 1855 they were brought under the European Civil Code in most of their commercial transactions, and this gave them a higher social standing than the natives. But nevertheless they continued in all other ways to be a race apart from both natives and Europeans.

Chinese Labour in Sumatra

167 New currents of Chinese immigration were flowing into the

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[1] ibid. p. 28. But as against this we have the evidence of Raffles, and Ong Tae-hae and others, of the ostentation shown by the Chinese of Indonesia in their luxurious houses and fine equipages.

[2] *Java et ses habitants*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1901) p. 113.

[3] Temminck, p. 301; Furnivall, p. 213.

Indies before the end of the century and from different tribes of Chinese. This was notably the case in Sumatra's East Coast. In 1870 there were only about 150 Javanese in the East Coast region of Sumatra, the majority of the 4,000 labourers being Chinese.[1] 167
From 1864 onwards thousands of Chinese coolies were recruited for the tobacco plantations. After the question of the protection of labour had attracted attention, recruiting was done either through the (British) Protector of Chinese, Singapore, or through the official bureau in Swatow.[2] Later on this Chinese labour on rubber and tobacco plantations was largely replaced by Javanese labour.[3] 464 167 249

Between 1888 and 1931 some 305,000 Chinese landed at Belawan. The great majority came from Swatow or Hong Kong where the Association of Deli Planters (D.P.V.) had recruiting offices. Between 1864 and 1888 the labourers were obtained through coolie-brokers in Singapore. From 1890 to 1914 German shipping companies transported Chinese labourers backwards and forwards between Belawan and south China, but from 1914 to 1931 ships of the K.P.M. brought the labourers to Sumatra.

For some sixty years the tobacco planters of Sumatra relied on Chinese labourers, but in the 1920s the number of Chinese declined while that of Javanese increased. The recruiting and importation of labourers from China stopped on 31 December 1931 on account of the high immigration fee, which was raised to 150 guilders when the penal sanctions against labourers were dropped.

Number of 'Field' Labourers employed by Sumatra Tobacco Estates[4]

1930:	21,000 Chinese 'field' labourers;	5,000	Javanese
1931:	19,000 " " "	6,000	"
1939:	8,000 " " "	10,000	"

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[1] De Kat Angelino, *Colonial Policy* (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1931) p. 504.

[2] Pickering, the Singapore Protector of Chinese, made himself unpopular with the Deli (Sumatra) Planters' Committee over charges he made against them of repudiating contracts made by their agents in the Colony, and he spoke of the substitution of inferior men for those brought to engage at the Protectorate. This charge was denied in a pamphlet, *The Deli Chinese Question* (1882).

[3] Measures for the control and protection of Chinese contract labour in Sumatra are contained in *Eerste Verslag van den Dienst der Arbeidinspectie in Nederlands-Indië* (Batavia, G. Kolff, 1913) and *Derde Verslag van den Dienst der Arbeidinspectie on Koliewerving in Nederlands-Indië* (Weltevreden, Filial Albrecht, 1914).

[4] See Karl Pelzer, *Arbeiterwanderungen in Südostasien* (Hamburg, 1935) pp. 90–6, from which these details are taken.

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CHAPTER XLIII

THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIVIL STATUS OF THE CHINESE

622 THROUGH the Chinese headmen the company transmitted its orders to the Chinese notables for execution, and these officials for their part kept the Government informed as to what was going on in their communities. They served as petitioners, confidants, and representatives of their group, while at the same time they filled a semi-official position. It was the policy of *laissez-faire* so long as peace and order prevailed, but it was also one of indifference, and with the evolution of ideas as to governmental responsibility was regarded as being one of neglect.[1]

692 Up to 1824 in Java the civil affairs of the Chinese were dealt with by the European courts of justice (*Raden van Justitie*); their criminal affairs by the *Landraden* (courts of justice for the natives) in the inner territories (*binnenlanden*), and in the districts of Batavia, Samarang, and Sourabaya by the Raden van Justitie. The private law applied was in the case of the Raden van Justitie the European law (with a few exceptions as to Chinese law of inheritance), and in the case of the Landraden customary (i.e. Indonesian, [586 Chinese, or Arab) law. But the Chinese did not bring their marriage and divorce disputes before the courts.

By a 'publication' of 1824 (that is to say by an Order of the Governor-General van der Capellen in Council published in the *Staatsblad*, or Government Gazette) it was ordered that the Chinese all over Java in their civil and criminal affairs should be judged by the native courts. Those who complained of this were not the Chinese but the Dutch merchants who were of the opinion that their disputes with the Chinese were better dealt with by the Raden van Justitie than by the Landraden.

671 The East Indian Government Act of 1848,[2] whereby foreign Orientals were placed on the same footing as natives, did not alter

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[1] Vandenbosch, *The Dutch East Indies*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1941) pp. 356 ff., and compare the situation in Malaya in Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 142 ff. and Chapter XXIX of the present work.

[2] This apparently is a translation of 'Indisch Reglement' of 1848 ('The Indisch Reglement is a Code of Police and Criminal Procedure for natives', J. S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India*, p. 214).

[p. 506]

the position of the Chinese in Indonesia, which position was 671
confirmed by the Koninklijk Besluit Bepalingen van Wetgeving (Royal Decree on the Principles of the Law). In the same decree permission was given to individual non-Europeans to submit themselves to European law for some definite transaction (e.g. for a contract of sale or hire, &c.) and this was extended later—in 1917—to allow a person to submit himself to the whole of European civil law.

By an ordinance of the Governor-General of 1855, made at the request of the Dutch merchants of Batavia, the Dutch law of property, contract, commerce, torts, and of testamentary succession, as laid down in the Netherlands Indies Civil Code, was declared applicable to foreign Orientals, which meant that when questions in these fields of law arose they had to be judged in the European Courts. Whereas most of the legal disputes which were brought before the courts were matters of contract, torts, or property, it may be said that from 1855 onwards the ordinary jurisdiction in Chinese civil matters was by the Raad van Justitie.

The Chinese never complained of this ordinance of 1855 which in the long run proved to be a great benefit to them, although it was intended by its originators to benefit the Batavian merchant.

The great grievance of the Chinese was that in *criminal* matters 692
they had to be judged by the Landraad and not by the Raad van 671
Justitie. After 1918 the criminal law for Europeans, Chinese, and natives was substantially the same though, as we shall see, the law of procedure differed.

Simultaneously with the growth of the belief in the minds of the 186
Dutch Government that they should take a closer interest in Chinese affairs, the Chinese themselves were becoming conscious 671
of their own nationality. Hitherto those who went abroad and deserted the graves of their ancestors were looked upon as unfilial 692
rascals, but towards the end of the century there was a complete reversal of the official attitude. In 1894, in China, the ban on emigration (so long a dead letter) was officially removed, and this was followed up by a series of acts designed to bind the Chinese more closely to their mother country. The Chinese in the Indies became increasingly resentful of the fact that they were classed with 'other foreign Orientals' and were tried in the same courts, and that to them was applied the same law of procedure, whilst Europeans and others assimilated to them were tried by the European

186 courts with much greater procedural protection. That by being
so classified they retained the application of Chinese custom,
671 appeared to them as of less and less consequence as time went on.
692 The recognition in 1899 of the Japanese as Europeans in their legal
relations, while the Chinese in most of their activities were left
under the native courts, the Chinese received as a slight upon
themselves.

186 The special object of Chinese dislike was the *politie rol*, a court
having jurisdiction over minor offences and conducting preliminary
692 examinations.[1] Here an officer of the local civil service often sat
as a judge.[2] According to Fromberg it was a court, 'deeply penetrating
695 into the life of the people, in which the administrative
power in the person of the chief of police, without obligation to
hear witnesses, and, if he hears them, without obligation to place
them under oath, sentences in accordance with his finding of the
facts, with an immediate execution of sentence, which originally
was not suspended even when an appeal was made for pardon'.
Often (said Fromberg) acts were punished that were punishable
under no existing law, and cases were brought before the *politie rol*
which no one dare bring before the *landraad*.[3]

692 The *landraad*, the intermediate court for natives and foreign
Asiatics, was also the object of criticism both from Orientals and
693 Europeans, because it was composed of a legally qualified chairman,
usually a European, two native active or pensioned officials,
a native officer of justice, a Chinese adviser, and a clerk. 'The non-jurist
character of the layman and the recruitment of his service
from the official class subjected the court to much the same
criticism as was brought against the *politie rol*.'[4]

186 Another grievance of the Chinese was that, like the natives, they
were often subjected to a long confinement before trial, and in
694 house-search and criminal pleading the Europeans had far greater
protection against arbitrary action.

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[1] Vandenbosch, op. cit. 410.

[2] This was true also of Malaya until the 1930s when a newly created Colonial legal service began to take over the magistracies. This was, however, because of the development of government on the lines of specialization—not through the influence of the principle of the 'separation of powers'.

[3] J. H. Fromberg, *Verspreide Geschriften Verzameld door Chung Hua Hui* (Leyden, Leidsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1926). This collection of the writings of the champion of the Chinese with a *prae-avis* written on his death-bed fills over 800 pages.

[4] Vandenbosch, op. cit. p. 356.

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Chinese agitation, assisted by the unification policy of Van Deventer and other Dutch Liberals, led in 1914 to the abolition of the *politie rol* and in 1917 to a measure which permitted individual non-Europeans to submit themselves to European law, thus participating in its benefits. 671 692

Commenting on this, De Kat Angelino in his monumental work says:

> The abolition of the police roll [*politie rol*] in Java was also caused to no small extent by a desire to end some disagreeable dualism in matters of justice and to purify it from the appearance of putting Indonesian and other groups as Asiatic populations behind Europeans. In the Residency Court there was a procedure which gave better guarantees than under the police roll. The more fully conscious Chinese group has especially, since about 1905, protested continually against this system. The reform of 1914 was, therefore, important in principle for more than one reason.[1]

Subsequent legislation from 1917 to 1925 had the effect of removing the Chinese completely from the civil jurisdiction of the *landraad*, but by the time of the Japanese invasion their demand to be placed on the same legal footing as Europeans in criminal procedure as well had not been granted.[2]

In 1928 a new regulation passed by the *Volksraad* abolished the jurisdiction of the Chinese headmen.[3] 622

The legal position of the Chinese in Indonesia is thus summarized by Professor R. D. Kollewijn:[4] 671

> . . . The Civil Code for Europeans was declared applicable to the Chinese in 1855 in Java (and later in the Residencies of the Outer Islands) as far as the law of contracts, torts and property and of testamentary succession were concerned, and it may be said that this has never given any great difficulty either in or out of the Courts. However, in 1919 for Java and certain of the Residencies in the Outer Islands, and in 1924–25 for the whole of the Netherlands Indies, the European family law (with the exception only of the Chinese law of adoption) and the law

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[1] De Kat Angelino, *Colonial Policy* (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1931) (abridged translation from the Dutch original by G. J. Renier) ii. 154.

[2] The explanation given to the present writer when he visited The Hague in September 1946 was that the creation of the additional courts necessary to deal with the Chinese on an equality with Europeans was still at the moment a practical impossibility.

[3] De Kat Angelino, op. cit. ii. 154.

[4] R. D. Kollewijn (Professor of International Law, Batavia, later at Leyden), *A Suggestion for the Undertaking of Research Work in the Field of Private Law by the Institute of Pacific Relations* (*in Particular the Application of Western Private Law to Chinese*), in mimeograph, no date [*c.* 1938].

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671 in intestate succession were also declared applicable to the Chinese who were Netherlands subjects (i.e. Chinese born in the Netherlands Indies of domiciled parents) and we cannot be easy in our minds about the social effect of these legal measures. It is already certain, for instance, that in one of the important centres of Chinese population in the Netherlands Indies, West Borneo, this statute law has not been able to drive out the law of custom, while there is also justified doubt about the following of the provisions of the European family and inheritance laws in other places.

With respect to the foreign Chinese (*foreign* according to the definition of the nationality law in the Netherlands Indies) the Netherlands Indian judges, according to Netherlands Indian private law, in questions of status and competency, dowry and property law must apply their national laws. Since these Chinese almost without exception come from Chinese provinces where the new Chinese Civil Code is being effectively applied *by the judges*, this implies therefore the modern codified Chinese law.

The comment of another jurist of note is that the European Dutch law was applied to the Chinese by the Dutch in the fixed belief that it was in their best interests, as, for example, when they were brought under the European commercial law in 1855.

Where the European law was inadequate to secure justice, the legislature included a special provision for the Chinese (e.g. *Adoptie*).[1]

It has been suggested that the adoption of the European law was not consistently beneficial. For instance (according to one writer in *Mission Interrupted*) the application to the Chinese of the Dutch Commercial Code had, by the end of the nineteenth century, 'severely shaken the old Chinese business morals'.[2] Professor Kollewijn considers, however, that there is no reason for believing that this was so. Again it is said that although the Company, and [428] after it the Netherlands Government, wished to leave the Chinese in undisturbed enjoyment of their own institutions and customs, they had sometimes erred through inadvertence in their interpretation of Chinese law. In support of this contention it is stated that under the Company there had already been an effort to codify the Indonesian and Chinese law of inheritance; nevertheless it had been held that Chinese husbands and wives were not married 'in community of goods' so that the Chinese law of inheritance had been ignored, for according to the old Chinese patriarchal law, far from 67 having no property, the wife herself was the husband's property. If 428 this is stated (says Professor Kollewijn), it must also be added that this ordinance supposed that *all* the property was owned by the husband and that if the wife contended that she was the owner of any particular piece of property she had to prove her claim by way of a deed drawn up by a notary. So that in practice the ordinance conformed very well with the Chinese customary law. (The divergences of the new law of 1917–25 from the old law were much greater, but so also are those between the new Civil Code in China and the old law.) Nor is it correct to say that as a result of the interference with the old Chinese customary law a 'so-called Indo-Chinese customary law developed which varied from place to place, or rather was interpreted differently by different courts according to the lights of the various "experts" consulted.'[1] There were some differences in the opinions of the courts, and even the highest Court of Justice (*het Hooggerechtshof*) did not always adhere to its own precedents, but these differences must not be over-estimated.

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[1] M. H. van der Valk, 'De Rechtspositie der Chineezen in Nederlandsch-Indië', *Koloniale Studiën*, nos. 5 and 6 (1936) p. 30.

[2] *Mission Interrupted*, p. 63.

Emancipation of the Chinese from Restriction of Movement

In 1900 the Chinese could in principle live only where there 361 were Chinese quarters (or *ghettoes* as they have been termed). For every trip he wished to make into the interior a Chinese merchant 486 had to obtain a pass. The system was relaxed in 1904 by the grant of passes valid for a year instead of for a single journey, and in 1910 the right was conceded of free passage along the main highways without a permit, and Chinese notables were exempted from the obligation to obtain a pass. Thus for the first time since their arrival in Indonesia some hundreds of years before (and it must be remembered that restrictions were even more severe under native rule) the otherwise privileged Chinese were allowed to move about at will like free men.

National Status and the Growth of National Feeling

It is often said that the Chinese became national minded only 186 after the impact of Western nationalism upon their country. Before then they had merely a sense of family, clan, district, or province. It is indeed true that strong localism prevented them for long from thinking or acting as a nation, and that the natives of one

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[1] De Kat Angelino, *Colonial Policy*, i, p. 163.

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186 province were quite willing to assist a foreign enemy operating in another province;[1] but at the same time they were conscious at all periods in their history that they were the Black-haired Race of the Middle Flowery Kingdom and that all others were 'Outside Barbarians'. It was probably due more to a sense of race consciousness than to rising nationalism that the Chinese regarded it as a slight upon themselves that they still had the status of foreign Orientals. At the same time it is unlikely that the feeling would have had any great strength or direction had it not been for the ferment already in process in their ancestral country and for the impetus given to it by Mr Fromberg. Hitherto they had asked for nothing except the opportunity to improve their own economic position, and had accepted their unequal legal position with equanimity or with resignation.

When with the help of guns and rifles China was opened up to Western trade, the Chinese could not help but remark the importance the Europeans attached to the protection of their own nationals. How very different from their own traditional indifference to the Chinese beyond the seas! And these barbarians had shown themselves superior at least in material strength. There must be some virtue and use in exiled nationals. Her statesmen, too, were able now to see that a great source of strength resided in the Western colonies whose obvious counterpart for China was the Chinese Overseas. But before this great arsenal in the battle with the West could be mobilized it was necessary to defeat the die-hard conservatives on the home front. In 1894 the prohibition of emigration was removed, and those who had gone overseas during the centuries were pardoned. In 1898, when the young Emperor tried to engineer a *coup d'état* to oust the entrenched forces of reaction and to modernize the educational system, he was defeated by the Empress Dowager and interned on an island in the Imperial Palace. Nevertheless, the reform movement gathered strength and when in 1903 the old examination system was finally abolished the way towards educational reform and the modernizing of China was open; but it was not until after the Revolution of 1911 that the new movement gained momentum.

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[1] Classic examples of this are the coolies recruited by the British in Canton to help them in their advance against Peking in the Second China War (1857–60), and the welcome given to Lord Elgin during the same war by the Chinese notables of Singapore. See Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, p. 85.

186 China's new-found interest in her overseas children manifested itself in many ways—some of which were to be obnoxious to the Dutch Government. As early as 1887 the Chinese Government had sent a committee to the Indies to study the commercial relations of China with that country. Permission to send the committee was obtained through diplomatic channels by way of The Hague, and the Netherlands Indies Government received the members as visitors from a friendly State. Then in 1891 the Peking Government requested permission to collect funds among the Chinese in the Indies for flood relief in China. Again in 1906 a Chinese official made a protracted visit to Java for the purpose of bringing about greater uniformity among Chinese commercial societies.[1] In 1907 the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Yang Shih-tshi,[2] visited the Indies to study commercial problems, and as a result of his visit many addresses and petitions were sent to Peking from the Chinese in Indonesia. These were some of the earlier Chinese missions with an allegedly commercial purpose, but already there had been Chinese emissaries with an avowed interest in education, a subject that was to be the source of much controversy and feeling between the two Governments, an important matter which is dealt with in a separate chapter.

186 641 As the Chinese Revolution grew nearer the increasing sense of unity and nationalism among the Chinese began to bring matters to a head. In 1908 Wang Kang-ky, secretary to the Chinese legation at The Hague, travelled in the Indies for several months. At Sourabaya he held a semi-official census and recommended that Chinese residents in the Netherlands Indies should choose between Chinese and Dutch nationality. In 1909 two Chinese cruisers appeared in the harbour at Batavia carrying Wa Ta-cheng, Secretary of the Department of Education, who spent some time in Java for the alleged purpose of studying commercial conditions. In 1910 Chao Ts'ung-fan, Adviser to the Department of Agriculture, Industry, and Trade, came for the same purpose.[3]

641 Against a background of growing nationalism and increasing diplomatic activity the question of national status assumed a new importance. The Dutch law on the subject was not at all clear, and

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[1] Vandenbosch, op. cit. p. 359.

[2] This is the name as given by Vandenbosch, but *Tshi* is not an accepted rendering of any sound in the English romanizations (Wade, &c.). This is perhaps the Dutch rendering?

[3] Vandenbosch, op. cit. p. 360.

641 in view of the controversies which were developing with several States it was necessary that it should be clarified.

The East Indian Government Act of 1854 referred to all persons living in the Indies as 'inhabitants', but as a qualification for Government service it demanded Dutch citizenship, and referred to the laws of the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the definition of such citizenship. Of these laws there were two, one of which regulated public law citizenship and the second, civil law citizenship. Under the first citizenship were included all persons born in the Netherlands and their descendants. The latter could not lose their citizenship by residence in Dutch territory outside Holland. Thus the descendants of Dutch citizens born in the Indies remained [692] Dutch citizens. Under the civil law, citizenship included all persons born in the kingdom and the colonies of persons domiciled there. *Natives and Chinese born of parents there were specifically included.* Natives and Chinese could therefore sue in the courts of Holland as Dutch citizens, a right they did not enjoy in European courts in the Indies. A law of 1892 put an end to this duality of citizenship, but did nothing to clarify the status of natives and of the children of foreign Asiatics domiciled in the East Indies. Article 12 of the Act even designated them as foreigners, and at best they were regarded only as inhabitants of or residents in Dutch territory, and this had the effect of making their status abroad uncertain. It affected, for example, those Chinese from the Indies living in Siam who wished to claim Dutch citizenship in order to avoid the special tax system applying to the Chinese.[1]

Whatever were the grounds for claiming a Chinese as a Dutch citizen, they were bound to conflict with the Chinese law of nationality (until 1909 unwritten) which was based on the *jus sanguinis* and claimed all persons of Chinese descent through the male line as Chinese. This fact delayed a consular convention between the two countries and it was not signed until 8 May 1910.[2] Although the Chinese strenuously objected to the Dutch nationality law they had to accept it as the price of the right to consular

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[1] See pp. 177–8.

[2] The first permanent Chinese legation was appointed to London in 1877. The minister was accredited to London and Paris. A Chinese legation was opened at Washington in 1878, in Tokyo the same year, in 1879 at St. Petersburg. Consuls were appointed in various ports abroad in the next decade or so. See Dr Tung Ling, *An Historical Study of the Establishment of Chinese Diplomatic Organs* (Leyden, 1946).

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jurisdiction in the East Indies. By a subsequent exchange of notes it was agreed that the East Indian legislation would be conclusive in determining Dutch or Chinese nationality.

But it was not to be assumed from this agreement that the Chinese Government, especially after the Revolution on the eve of which the consular convention had been signed, had abandoned its claim to the moral support, if not the technical allegiance, of all of Chinese race in Southeast Asia.

To continue this technical but essential description in Vandenbosch's words:

> The law of 1910 dropped the classification of Dutch citizens and foreigners, and substituted for it that of citizens and subjects. The law adopted the *jus soli* and declared all children born of parents vested [domiciled] in the Dutch East Indies were Dutch subjects even if not Dutch citizens. The status of Dutch citizens would be lost through nationalization in a foreign State, marriage with a foreign man, government or military service under a foreign State without the consent of the Governor-General, and by sojourn in a foreign State without registration with a Dutch consular official within three months of arrival, and, in the case of continuing sojourn, failure to register within the first three months of each calendar year.[1]

Fromberg criticized the law on two grounds—first, that it sought to put under Dutch jurisdiction as many as possible of the inhabitants of the country, and secondly, it allowed the status of subjects to lapse as quickly as possible when outside Dutch territory. The law (says Vandenbosch) does indeed have the aspect of forced naturalization and must frequently create a dual nationality, for no provision is made for repudiation on attainment of majority. The requirement of repeated registration was very unfair to the natives abroad, especially when they were employed at some distance from a consulate, and, as might be expected, many failed to register. The defect was remedied in 1929 when the law was revised to exclude the indigenous peoples of the East Indies from this provision.[2]

To the Chinese of the Indies this law was a great disappointment, for it conferred no rights, benefited them but little, and yet removed them from the protection of the Chinese consuls.

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[1] op. cit. p. 363.

[2] 'Chinese and Indians in Malaya who are Dutch subjects but have not reported to the Netherlands Consul-General since the liberation must do so before 30 April, otherwise they will cease to be Dutch subjects', *Straits Times* (Singapore, 2 February 1948).

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CHAPTER XLIV

DUTCH-CHINESE RELATIONS 1900-42

128 In the preceding chapter the questions of status under the law and the nationality of the Chinese of Indonesia have been discussed: in this chapter it is intended to cover a wider field, bringing in Dutch-Chinese and Indonesian-Chinese social and economic relations, though legal questions of a similar or related character will again arise.

186 In the nineteenth century Raffles, van der Capellen, and Van den Bosch had all tried to attack the position of the Chinese, but these
609 had always responded by finding new means of livelihood and growing richer and more powerful. We have seen, too, that during the Liberal period it was the Chinese who made the greatest material advance proportionately with the new-found freedom of enterprise. When in 1900, however, there was a decline in profits, the jealousy of the Europeans was directed to the Chinese who were enabled to trade successfully by reason of their lower standard of living, which meant a lower wages bill. Their strong economic position in the Indies (much stronger than in 1850) was held to be due to their exploitation of the improvidence and vices of the natives.

Indeed, with both Europeans and natives the Chinese of this period had an unsavoury reputation. They were accused of exploiting the natives and of dishonesty in trade with the Europeans. They were also known to be prominent in the bribing of officials with handsome gifts at New Year and on other festivals. But it should have been clear that, whatever their guilt in these several respects, it was not the Chinese who invented the system, nor had they a monopoly of the abuses. Theirs was the uneviable position of middlemen, exposed to the animosity of two opposed forces, the natives and the Europeans, though useful as a buffer between them. In any case, high officials of the period gave support to the theory of the detrimental role of the Chinese in Indonesian Society, and many regarded them as the 'main cause of the diminishing welfare of the Javanese'.

The Indies were now on the eve of the inauguration of the 'ethical policy', when, as a result of what is sometimes called a 'change of

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heart', the Dutch suddenly became acutely aware of their responsibilities towards the native peoples of their empire.[1] Since the 186
Chinese were thought to be inimical to the welfare of the natives, 609
many officials interpreted their duty of protecting the natives as necessarily meaning baiting the Chinese. The Dutch Colonial Minister, Fock (who, incidentally, made a fortune as an advocate of the Chinese in Batavia), shared the common view as to the baneful nature of the Chinese, and in his Report on measures for the relief of the Indies placed in the foreground the pressing need for stricter control over Chinese problems. 'It is unnecessary', he said, 'to argue that they exercise a pernicious influence in the interior.'[2]

The year of the Boxer Rebellion was a significant one for the 651
Chinese of the Indies since it was marked by several governmental acts of great importance to them. In that year the farming of 655
opium was abolished and a Government monopoly to restrict the use of opium substituted; the decision was made to extend the 652
Government monopoly of pawning throughout Indonesia; and in the same year the Government began its system of agricultural credit banks with the object of furnishing cheaper credit to the farmers and rescuing them from the clutches of the usurers.[3] These measures all were detrimental to the interests of the Chinese, for in one case they took away a business that had been theirs for centuries, and in the other they created competitors to them backed by all the capital and resources of the Government.

From this year, too, dates the establishment of the Bureau for 647
Chinese Affairs to meet the need keenly felt by the Netherlands Indies Government for expert advice. The personnel of the Bureau 656

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[1] The 'ethical policy' is usually dated from 1901. In a speech from the throne that year by Queen Wilhelmina occurred the following significant passage: 'As a Christian Power the Netherlands is obligated in the East Indian archipelago to regulate better the legal position of native Christians, to lend support on a firm basis to Christian missions, and to imbue the whole conduct of Government with the consciousness that the Netherlands had a moral duty to fulfil with respect to the people and these regions. In connection with this the diminished welfare of the population of Java merits special attention. I desire to institute an investigation into this.'

[2] Fock, *Beschouwingen*, p. 4, cited by Furnivall, p. 240.

[3] De Wolff van Westerrode was the pioneer both in the initiation of the 'paddy banks' and of Government pawnshops. In the Government pawnshops the people could raise money on more advantageous terms than when they resorted to Chinese pawnshops, there was a fairer valuation, the rates of interest were lower, the clients were assured of the protection of their interests, and better care was taken of pledges. Furnivall, p. 359.

647 underwent a long period of preparation in Holland, China, and the Indies and had a thorough acquaintance with the Chinese languages 656 and customs. The Bureau, which kept in close touch with movements in China and among the Chinese community in the Indies, furnished information and advice to all branches of the Government, prepared a bi-monthly report on the Chinese and the Chinese-Malay press in the Indies, and gave special attention to Chinese schools. 'Appointed originally as a watch-dog against Chinese aggression', says Furnivall, 'the Adviser on Chinese affairs has come to function rather as a Protector of Chinese.'[1] To assist in these matters the Governor-General had also the advice of an expert in international law.

Fock's proposals for dealing with the Chinese problem proved impracticable, but in any case the Indies Government was becoming increasingly aware of the rapid changes taking place in the international situation, and towards the Chinese it adopted a policy of conciliation by which most of their civil disabilities were re-[361 moved. In 1911 it made an important concession to Chinese sentiment by recognizing Chinese consuls; in a succession of orders 486] between 1914 and 1916 it allowed them a greater freedom of residence and movement; in 1919 it abolished all restrictions on their place of residence within Java, and in 1926 it extended the order to the Outer Provinces. Thus, since 1900, the whole policy of segregation had been abandoned. In legal status, too, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, the Chinese advanced more and [186] more towards complete equality with the Europeans. But Chinese Nationalism was now getting into its stride and creating a state of mind which allowed of no compromise with its slogan of 'Once a Chinese always a Chinese'. Dutch policy had conserved a plural society: an external force claimed one of the members of the society as an extension of itself, however mingled in blood it might be.

The Volksraad

186 In 1911 the foundation of the Chinese Republic aroused intense enthusiasm among the Chinese of Indonesia, not only among the large number of recent immigrants, but also among Indonesian Chinese, who, thanks in part to Dutch separatist policy, were more

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[1] This statement is, however, strongly contested by some Indonesian Chinese to whom I have spoken. V. P.

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Chinese than Indonesian. Regarding the introduction of the symbols of a foreign country as a threatened invasion of their sovereignty, the Dutch discouraged the display of the new Republican flag (the 'five-barred' flag) which the Chinese were everywhere flaunting, and this led to boycotts and riots which had to be suppressed by force. Yet, in spite of these demonstrations, the Indian Government pursued a policy of courting the goodwill of the local Chinese. 186

It is indicative of the real situation that the *Sarekat Islam* (Javanese Muslim Society) was founded, before 1914, mainly as a defence against the economic encroachment of the Chinese. At the same time the nascent native movement had been stimulated by the example of the Chinese. The Javanese saw that Chinese agitation had been followed by concessions, and they also saw themselves being pushed farther and farther into the background as the Chinese grew stronger. And in its current form of an active protest against the exploitation of the natives by the Chinese, the new movement gained much sympathy from the Europeans. However, as events developed, it was the Europeans and the Chinese who were to be drawn into an unrecognized, but none the less real, alliance against the developing pretensions of native Nationalism. [476] 668 186

From at least the beginning of the century the Dutch had had in mind the gradual introduction of some measures of self-government in their huge Indonesian territories. It was not an easy matter with such a diversity of administrative units. There were in the period immediately preceding the Japanese invasion eight main units in Netherlands India—three Provinces and five Governments. Of these, three Provinces and two Governments were in Java and Madura. Finally, there were important Native States, covering large areas, within the Province or the Government, which had a certain autonomy of their own. The three Governments outside Java and Madura—Sumatra, Borneo, and the Great East—were constituted only in 1938. These large units were divided into Residencies, each under a Dutch Resident, and in Java these again were divided into Regencies, varying much in size and importance, each under the charge of a native Regent. Usually the office of Regent descended from father to son. The governmental system was one in which the administration was nominally in the hands of the native hereditary Regents, assisted by a Dutch Resident and his assistant. Under the rule of the Company the main function of 631

631 the Resident was to ensure the collection of the produce. In more recent times he was 'charged with securing the welfare of the inhabitants and in exercising "gentle pressure" to secure efficiency in administration'.[1] The Regent had under him a native civil service. The Resident's supervisory influence was great, though the development of the specialist technical departments such as agriculture, public health, labour, &c., had meant a lessening in his responsibilities.

The ultimate unit in Javanese life was the *dessa* or village community in which local affairs were conducted under a council of leaders and a village chief; but here again there had been increasing interference with the *dessa* due to the growth of centralized technical administration.

642 623 In Java a beginning was made towards responsible government in 1903 with the creation of local municipalities, and this system was afterwards extended. The pre-war policy of the Dutch was to provide the provinces of Java and important group communities in the Outer Islands, such as Minangkabau in Sumatra, the Bandjar in Borneo, and others, with Municipal and Regency Councils, mainly elected by a limited franchise, but with some nominated members. The powers and functions of Councils were being steadily increased.

642 646 The government of Netherlands India was in the hands of the Governor-General assisted by the Council of the Netherlands Indies (*Raad van Indië*). In 1941 it had four members, of whom three were Dutch and one was Javanese. Finally, as a measure towards eventual self-government, a parliament, the Volksraad, came into being in 1918. It was an advisory body, but on certain subjects, including the key question of finance, the Governor-General had to act in agreement with it. It had power to amend Government Bills and to initiate legislation.

646 623 Representation in the municipal and legislative bodies was on a communal basis. Of the 61 members of the Volksraad no fewer than 3 and no more than 5 might be Chinese, and they held about the same number of seats proportionately in the provincial, regency, and municipal councils. Since the other seats were about equally divided between Europeans and natives, the Chinese should have held the balance of power in all these bodies, but most 000 of the Chinese were Dutch-nominated. For a few years after 1918,

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[1] *Netherlands Overseas Territories*, p. 26.

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For a few years after 1918 646

when the Volksraad was established, there was a group of Chinese who opposed the acceptance of Dutch citizenship in any form and 668 who opposed accepting representation in the Volksraad. Though many of these were Indonesian-Chinese of the third and fourth generations, they talked of being in the Indies only temporarily. This group of irreconcilables wished to be Chinese subjects and to enjoy a kind of extraterritoriality. Affecting to regard the Dutch as a passing phenomenon, some of them affiliated themselves with the more extreme movement of the Indonesian Nationalists; others held aloof and interested themselves only in the politics of China. A large number, however, demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with the Government. For the most part the Chinese and native movements followed along different though parallel lines. 'Only in 1925 did the Chinese and native movements intersect, when, for a short time, Chinese and Javanese Communists were associated, but the association broke down owing to the difference in their aims.'[1] The association whilst it lasted led to a series of strikes. In the 1930s new parties were formed, and those parties [665] which were based on the association of all races for the common welfare collapsed. Political parties were organized more and more on racial and religious lines.[2]

The question of military service should here be mentioned. 702 Even those Chinese who wanted complete assimilation to the Dutch wanted it without the concomitant obligation of military service. Most of the Chinese who had accepted voluntary assimilation did not answer the call-up, but the Indies Government never pressed the matter. It felt, no doubt, that, as the Chinese outnumbered the Europeans by four to one, it would be dangerous to take into the Army such an uncertain quantity. Greater certainty and reliability would be required in the event of a crisis.

In 1940 there was still a very strong Chinese nationalist senti- 668 ment, although among the Indonesian-Chinese[3] there was a 186 tendency to align themselves on the side of the Indonesian Nationalists. Many Chinese, however, were unable to make up their minds whether their interests lay on the side of the Dutch or of the natives. Those whose resentment of the Dutch led them to

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[1] Furnivall, pp. 241, 242.

[2] Vandenbosch, p. 366 and passim.

[3] I have avoided the commonly used term 'Indo-Chinese' because of its suggestion of natives of Indochina.

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668 186 sympathize with the Indonesians reflected at the same time that as a race they were not liked by the Indonesians, partly for economic reasons and partly because of the 'superiority complex' common among the young Chinese Nationalists, and felt that their interests therefore might not receive as favourable consideration under a native-controlled Government as they did under the Dutch. As regards allegiance to the Netherlands a few Indonesian-Chinese could be found who were *plus royalistes que le roi*. Moreover, these Indonesian-Chinese were more and more being orientated towards Dutch culture. Large numbers received their higher education in the Netherlands. While in Holland they were ardent Chinese Nationalists, but on their return to the Indies they increasingly attached themselves to the Europeans, both because they now felt more at home with them, and also for the protection of their interests against the natives and the Indonesian Nationalists.[1] Very few had a speaking or reading knowledge of Chinese.

871 These considerations pave the way towards a discussion of the key question of education, but before proceeding to this it would be well if we could find a Chinese spokesman to express the Chinese frame of mind in this period. This fortunately can be done in the person of Mr Oey Kang-liu, though it must be borne in mind that his feeling is probably stronger and his expression more articulate than was the case with most of his fellows in Indonesia.[2]

651 'As a community', says Mr Oey, 'the Chinese pay most of the taxes without any representation in the Government Councils. There is on every side discrimination against the Chinese. Every Chinese on arrival in the Indies has to pay fl. 150: if he fails to produce the sum he is promptly arrested and deported. Everyone in the Netherlands Indies pays an income-tax of 8 per cent. On paper the Chinese are treated on an equal basis, but in practice there is a big difference from theory—namely he is required to pay 15 per cent. extra. For example, a Government officer comes to a Chinese merchant to ascertain his annual income. He is told that it is $5,000. On principle the revenue officer refuses to accept the statement of a Chinese, and proceeds to settle the question in quite a simple manner: he arbitrarily fixes the amount of taxable income

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[1] Vandenbosch, p. 366 ff.

[2] Oey Kang-Liu, 'The Chinese in the Dutch East Indies', *China Weekly Review* (7 January 1933).

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by doubling or trebling the amount stated, and his decision is final, 651 for there does not appear to be any way of appealing against this haphazard, even when not unjust, decision. But Chinese merchants [652] who understand the psychology of these officers and their little weaknesses will tell you that more often than not a little "greasing of the palm" will reduce the amount of income to the figure originally proposed by the payer. But here comes the rub. The following year the same officer will as a matter of routine raise the amount of the income of the harassed merchant who must again repeat the process of "palm-greasing". And so the farce goes on from year to year.'[1]

Another grievance is that for the privilege of trading in the Indies the Dutch charge a business licence fee which is determined by the officials in such a manner that the Chinese pay more for their licence fees than the Dutch engaged in similar business. Even a firm registered as a Dutch company and managed by a foreigner has to pay twice the amount charged for an ordinary business licence if the principal shareholders happen to be Chinese.

'The Chinese', Mr Oey concludes, 'are in fact treated as a subject race. 692 The Dutch, in fact, regard all Chinese in the Colony on the same footing as the Javanese, a fact that is clearly indicated in the policy of discrimination against the Chinese and also in subjecting them to the jurisdiction of the courts specially reserved for the Javanese.'[2]

As a footnote to a chapter on Dutch-Chinese relationships it 186 would be fitting to give an extract from the opinions of another Chinese, this time an Indonesian-Chinese educated in Holland and resident there during the German occupation of 1940–4, possessed of an affection for the Dutch and for Dutch civilization, yet at the

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[1] Dr Vlekke comments: 'The assertions of Mr Oey Kang-liu ought to be checked. I cannot do this but I am sure that the tax settlements he complains about were not so arbitrary as he contends. It all sounds (except for the charge of bribery) curiously similar to the complaints I have heard many times of small business men in Holland a few decades ago when strict bookkeeping was not so regularly attended to, who would maintain to their last breath that they really did not earn a worthwhile profit. Once a proper account was made it usually proved that they had enjoyed a considerable income and were most indignant at being taxed on the full amount.'

Chinese human nature is, in fact, not very different from other kinds of human nature.

[2] An eloquent summary of Chinese disabilities in Java is given by Dr Liem Twan Djie, *De Distribueerende Tusschenhandel der Chineezen op Java* (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1947) p. 40.

186 same time fully conscious that he is a Chinese. This is Mr Tjan Tjoe-som, the president of the Chung Hwa Hui, addressing the Association in Leyden in April 1946.[1]

186 The Chinese, says Mr Tjan, had from the beginning of their settlement in the Indies been middlemen. As such they had in the
181 course of time developed qualities of peacefulness, 'a kind of consummation of their inborn instincts', which had gradually made them the perfect type of quiet citizen. In Indonesia the middle-class man, who was *par excellence* the Chinese, enjoyed appreciation for his industry, frugality, and reliability: on the other hand he had been reproached for lacking interest in the country in which he lived, and at the same time, for having an undue interest in the country he had come from. The reproach, however, that the Chinese were indifferent to the fate of their foreign home must be seen and judged against the background of the social and political conditions under which they lived. It was common knowledge that the Chinese, having the status of, and being treated as, 'foreign Orientals', did feel themselves to be foreigners, and did feel that their interests were not sufficiently taken to heart and that their rightful wishes were not regarded. The opinion that as middle-class men the Chinese would acquiesce in any condition provided that it still left them room to earn money gave a highly distorted picture of their character. It is improbable that any human being could be found willing to suffer any sort of humiliating discrimination with gladness if only his mercenary activities were allowed, and with the Chinese it was certainly not the case. Mr Tjan continues:

> As the sons of the culture the age of which is unparalleled by any extant one, of a country the past of which contains long and numerous periods of glory and beauty, of wisdom and richness, and the future of which holds the most immense possibilities, the Chinese may be excused for a pride that does not rest on hollow imagination alone. In their heart of hearts any act of injustice, wrong or inhumanity is resented as an injury to the Heaven-ordained norms of right, justice, and humanity. From across the oceans, China's age-long traditions of morality and ethics still had their hold on its wandering sons . . . .
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> There would have been no Chinese movement in Java if the Chinese had been content with the opportunity granted them to earn their

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[1] *Chung Hwa Hui Nederland*, Brochure no. 2, Lustrum Speech, 15 April 1946, 'Luctor et Embargo', Leyden.

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bread, and in many cases to earn their bread handsomely. It was the failing on the part of the authorities to recognize that the Chinese is not the *homo economicus* all over, which gave rise to much misapprehension, much bitterness, and much resentment. The Chinese came to the conclusion, from their view naturally, from the others' view incomprehensibly, that the Government did not practise the *wang tao*, the kingly way, but the *pa tao*, the way of the oppressors. That they did not in this case feel inclined to abolish their attitude of being foreigners is a thing probably to be deplored but is not altogether unintelligible.

We shall not venture any judgement until we have considered the experiences of the Chinese of Indonesia in the field of education and have ascertained as nearly as possible their economic position at the time of the outbreak of the war with Japan in 1942, both of which are essential factors to a proper understanding of our subject.

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CHAPTER XLV

EDUCATION AND THE CHINESE IN INDONESIA

In this chapter we shall be dealing with three main streams of education—the Western, the Chinese traditional, and the Chinese post-revolutionary. In Indonesia the first two streams flowed side by side for nearly three hundred years, albeit in tiny volume: the second stream, already freshened somewhat by the advance waters of the third stream, overflowed in some quantity in the first years of the present century to fertilize the mind of the Indonesian Chinese. The third of the waterways was a branch of the original river, but changed from it in character, and so reinforced by the freshets of the West that its advent was like the Yellow River once more changing its course.

For many centuries the Chinese traditional system of education had been in a state of stagnation. The written language, which had diverged so long from the spoken word that the two were entirely distinct, had become the preserve of scholars who had turned it into a means more of obfuscation than of information. At the same time an examination system had grown up by which the bookworms with prodigious memories and a morbid reverence for authority were seeded out to administer the vast Flowery Kingdom. Under the impact of the West, Japan had modernized herself whereas China resisted modernization with all her stored up resources of inertia. Reluctantly, however, she consented to adopt Western sources of strength if this could be done without disturbing her own inviolable values. Thus there was a school for teaching telegraphy long before there was any modern school system. But, warned by the threat of China's dissolution if she did not adapt herself to a changing world, the reformers were active before the end of the century, and educational reform marched hand in hand with the Revolution. But in spite of great changes in the curriculum the old written language, *Wenli*, remained an unwieldy obstruction to progress till in 1917 Dr Hu Shih made a startling proposal. He suggested that *Wenli* should be dropped as the medium of primary and secondary instruction, and reserved for advanced study, and that the written form of the mandarin ver-

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nacular should be used in its place. This written vernacular, or 871 *pai hua*, had been used for centuries as a vehicle for romances, was distended and verbose as compared with *Wenli* and had none of its refinements, but was nevertheless easily understandable and far easier to learn. Hu Shih won his way, and in 1920 mandarin, now known in its modified form as *Kuo Yü*, or the National Language, became the official medium of instruction in all Chinese schools.[1]

Everywhere they went the Chinese carried with them their reverence for learning. The pioneers were many of them illiterate, but of the Hokkien merchant class who predominated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it is likely that a high proportion had received some schooling. We have glimpses of the high standard of practical instruction in their more prosperous centres from the pen of Wouter Schouten,[2] and there was in addition to home instruction at least one school in eighteenth-century Batavia with thirty to forty pupils. But all they learnt in such schools was the use of the abacus, to get by rote the Four Books—The Analects, the Doctrine of the Mean, the Great Learning, and Mencius—and to write a conventional letter. The curriculum in a Batavia Chinese household or school was probably not a whit different in the time of the first Captain Bencon in 1620 from what it was in 1890. Even of this kind of schooling it is certain that not more than a very small proportion reaped the benefits—even less so in the Outer Islands than in Java. Nor did they receive instruction in any medium other than Chinese.

Only after the restoration of Netherlands rule in 1816 was educa- 872
tion given any consideration. In 1818 it was decreed that Indo-
nesians should be permitted to attend Dutch schools. This regula- 658
tion, however, was applied in such a manner that only a few natives could take advantage of it because of the very rigid entrance requirements of family background, environment, and tuition. The most difficult requirement was that the applicant must understand sufficient Dutch to be able to follow the instruction intelligently.[3]

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[1] See the present writer's *Problems of Chinese Education* (London, Kegan Paul, 1936), passim.

Wenli is a foreign-invented term formed from *Wen* = literature and *li* = principles.

[2] See p. 461.

[3] Raden Loekman Djajadiningrat, Director of Education and Public Worship in the Netherlands Indies, *From Illiteracy to University, Educational Development in the Netherlands Indies*, Bulletin 3 (New York, Netherlands and Netherlands Indies Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942) p. 10 and passim.

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872 647 658 The Regulations for the Government of the Netherlands Indies of 1854 laid down that the Governor-General should encourage the establishment of schools for the native population. The primary purpose in establishing these schools, however, was to train native officials. The schools when established were divided into native schools of the second class for the children of officials of low rank and for the middle class generally, and native schools of the first class for children of officials of high rank and of well-to-do persons. This system continued until towards the end of the century when, under the influence of the 'ethical' movement in Holland, a policy was laid down for nation-wide education not merely in the interests of the Government.

872 658 Nothing, however, had been done for the education of Chinese children, for the above-mentioned article in the Regulations of ~~1854 was~~ interpreted not to apply to children of peoples assimilated to natives. No subsidies were given to Chinese schools, and Chinese children were permitted to enter the lower native schools only if there was room for them and if they knew sufficient Dutch to follow the instruction, and upon payment of higher school fees.[1] Education in these schools led normally to employment in the Government service, but from even the lowest ranks of this the Chinese were excluded.

872 186 204 [875] About 1900, under the stimulus of the reawakening spirit of China, and stirred to greater self-preservation by the Government measures regarding opium farms and the credit system, the Chinese of Indonesia began to assert themselves to improve their position. Education and the press were the chief means employed. School societies were organized and schools opened. With the knowledge, and even with the support and encouragement, of the Chinese Government, Chinese teachers were sent to Indonesia where Tiong Hwa Hwee Koan schools (schools established by Chinese Associations and by the trading society *Siang Hwee*) were organized with a strong Chinese nationalistic character. Preference was expressed for Dutch as the language medium, but since school societies could not afford the high-salaried Dutch teachers, English was chosen, for the reason that English-speaking Chinese instructors could be cheaply obtained from Singapore, and, in addition, English had the advantage of being the commercial language of the East. The Chinese press in the Indies meanwhile strengthened the unity and

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[1] Vandenbosch, op. cit. p. 358.

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the national consciousness of the community and pressed the Chinese grievances with the Indies Government. 'The Chinese in the Indies', so wrote the press, 'are step-children neglected by the Indies Government, but are once again recognized by their own father, China, who after being asleep all these years, is now reawakened.'[1] 186 204 872

Contemporaneously, several elementary and secondary schools were established in China supported by Government and private funds to which the Chinese colonists were invited to send their children. 872 658

So far, though, the stream was but a trickle. But the Dutch Government, realizing that if it did not take things into its own hands the Chinese almost certainly would, began to make education easier for the Chinese to procure. Chinese were admitted to native schools on the same basis as natives, and the erection of Government schools for Chinese, the so-called Dutch-Chinese schools, was begun in 1908, and in 1909 private Chinese schools were granted Government subsidies.

The curriculum of the Dutch-Chinese schools was the same as that of the European elementary schools, with Dutch as the language medium, but they were intended exclusively for children of Chinese origin. In special cases children of other groups of the population might be admitted, but only with the permission of the Director of Education. However, applications for entry by non-Chinese were rarely made. [191]

In order to meet the demand for a knowledge of English in business, courses in English were included in the curriculum of these schools when so desired by the parents.

As these schools were conducted exclusively for Chinese children, it was not demanded of the pupils that they should have some knowledge of the Dutch language before entry. The only prerequisite was some degree of social standing. Nevertheless, since the courses were given in Dutch, a knowledge of the Dutch language was necessary in order to follow the instruction. Therefore a preparatory Dutch class was included. It was calculated that as the number of Dutch-speaking families increased among the Chinese population, the preparatory classes would gradually disappear, as the children would learn Dutch at home. [191]

It was soon evident that these schools had the support of the 000

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[1] Vandenbosch, op. cit. p. 359.

872 It was soon evident that these schools had the support of the
Chinese community and every year more schools were established.
658 The greatest difficulty was to obtain sufficient teachers, and normal
876 schools were opened to train them. Students of both sexes were admitted to these, and to begin with the number of students applying for enrolment was satisfactory, but then it fell off because the product of the Dutch-Chinese schools were finding it more profitable to enter business. The situation could not be met by increasing the salaries of the teachers because, in the first place, Indonesian teachers trained in equivalent normal schools would demand comparable salaries, thus making the Dutch-Chinese schools too expensive to support, and secondly, because it was impossible to compete with business as an employer, especially in times of prosperity. This placed the authorities in a dilemma. Many Chinese urged that the Dutch-Chinese schools be transformed into national schools open to every Chinese child. This demand could not be granted since the number of teachers necessary was not available. Besides, the environment, development, and culture of different parts of the Chinese community varied greatly. If children of all these different groups were admitted to the same school the student body would be too heterogeneous to maintain education at the desired level. So argued the Dutch education authorities. For this reason Malay-Chinese schools were organized along the same lines as the six grades of the Indonesian schools, with Dutch as a subject. General business courses were included in the curriculum.

872 The establishment of the Dutch-Chinese schools was in the
658 nature of preferential treatment for the Chinese, and the Indonesians were not slow to recognize it. Their schools had nothing like the same facilities for obtaining a Western education.

873 The elementary education in the Dutch-Chinese schools con-
658 nected up with secondary, higher, and vocational training. The graduates of the Malay-Chinese school could, it appears, obtain admission to the secondary system through the continuation schools (for learning the Dutch language), and the connecting schools.[1]

1[i.e. the Dutch-Chinese Schools--Analyst]

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[872] [1] Dr Vlekke comments: 'The Dutch-Chinese schools never reached a large section of the Chinese population. The efforts to spread a knowledge of Dutch among Chinese or Indonesians were only half-hearted and often opposed by lower officials on the spot. In 1930 there were only 8,772 Chinese in the Indies who could write Dutch (*Visman Report*, vol. i, p. 66). Only a very few Malay-Chinese schools were ever in operation. Part of the complicated East Indian school system existed only on paper, that is to say of several 'school-types' there

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One effect of this great and novel expansion of opportunities for 873 a Dutch education was naturally that, as has been mentioned,[1] a much larger proportion of Chinese received higher education in 658 Holland, with the result, very often, that they conceived a warm regard for Dutch thought and European culture generally, but did not necessarily feel more reconciled to the status of the Chinese in Indonesia. A similar fact was noticeable among Indian students who attended the universities of Great Britain. Furnivall remarks that some graduates of the Chinese schools (presumably the Dutch-Chinese schools?) contributed learned articles to European periodicals, and some wrote treatises in Dutch that would stand comparison with the works of their European fellow subjects—for example the standard treatise on the land revenue system was by a Chinese. Many Chinese were trained as doctors in Dutch centres.[2]

What has been gleaned from publications such as Mr Djajadiningrat's *From Illiteracy to University* is illuminating enough, but we [114] should be going far wrong if we assumed that it accounted for the 872 whole of the education of the Chinese in Indonesia. According to Dr R. van Diffelin,[3] of 200,000 Chinese children between the ages 658 of six and fourteen, in the year 1936, about 98,000 received education of some sort. Of these some 45,000 were educated in schools conducted by the Tjong Hwa Hak Tong; 23,000 in public and subsidized Dutch-Chinese schools; 13,000 in native primary schools and Malay-Chinese schools; 2,500 in the European schools (six grades); and 13,500 in the 'special' Dutch-Chinese and other 'wildcat'[4] schools under private management. That is to say, that about 50 per cent. of Chinese youth received education.[5] He further [651 mentions that according to income-tax figures 32,000 Chinese have 434] an income of at least $50 a month—that is to say, the minimum

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existed so few establishments as to make the whole type of no importance. Moreover the statistics are incomplete as schools not coming under Government [872] supervision (e.g. all Mohammedan schools!) were not included in the survey. In [212] 1930, 71·1 per cent. of the Chinese in Indonesia were illiterate.'

[1] See p. 529; also Furnivall, op. cit. pp. 418, 419.

[2] The Yang Seng Hospital in Batavia was the only hospital outside China [743] founded, financed, and administered by Chinese (though there were a number of Chinese hospital foundations (e.g. the Tan Tock Seng Hospital, Singapore)).

[3] Dr R. van Diffelin, 'Het Onderwijs voor Chineezen', *Koloniale Studiën*, nos. 5 and 6 (1936) p. 42, quoting Loe Ping Kian, article reproduced from *Sin Po* (25 April–13 June 1936).

[4] In the Straits Settlements and F.M.S. alone there were 91,534 pupils in Chinese schools in 1938. Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, App. VI.

[5] But compare this statement of Van Diffelin with that of Vlekke, p. 530, fn.

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[651] subsistence limit which entitles them to have their children ad-
[434] mitted to the Dutch-Chinese schools.

No information appears to be publicly available regarding the
872 schools conducted by the Tjong Hwa Hak Tong, but from ex-
658 perience elsewhere in Southeast Asia it is safe to say that, subject to Dutch official inspection and control, the curriculum had a purely
[186] Chinese nationalist character. That is to say, that through the medium of *Kuo Yü*, from text-books produced by the Commercial Press or the Chung Hua Press in Shanghai, the doctrines of Sun Yat-sen (that China is the only country where 'race' and 'nation' are the same, that 'we are the wronged races', 'to save China we must certainly promote Nationalism', &c., &c.) were being inculcated day after day, either in so many words or indirectly, and that, whatever the results for the 52,000, the 45,000 were irretrievably lost to Indonesia and the Dutch as citizens or subjects. And that is in addition to anything the Communists may have been teaching during the same period and of which so little is known.

872 It is not difficult to see that the Chinese in Indonesia were split by reason of their varying educational background. Divided first of
186 all into *Peranakans* and *Sinkhehs*, according to whether they were born in Indonesia or in China, they were further divided into Dutch-, Malay-, or Chinese-educated. There do not appear to be any statistics as to how *Peranakans* and *Sinkhehs* were distributed among these school groups, but while it is safe to assume that children of the former attended the Dutch and Malay schools rather than the Chinese ones, and that the China-born showed a preference for the Chinese type of education, it is probable that, as in Malaya, the Chinese schools had captured many of the children of the *Peranakans*. The reasons for this were partly that the Chinese schools provided nearly half the primary education available to the Chinese of Indonesia,[1] partly the appeal of Chinese

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[1] The statement in *Island India Goes to School*, by Edwin R. Embree and others (University of Chicago Press, 1934) p. 53, in the section on Dutch-Chinese schools, that 'there are also a few schools, outside the Government system, organized and supported by the Chinese themselves with their language as the medium of instruction', does not at all agree with Dr R. van Diffelin's figure of 45,000 Chinese pupils in a total of 98,000 attending such schools. But then in Mr Djajadiningrat's book (which can be taken as official, as he was Director of Education) I can trace no mention at all of these Chinese schools. Such are the pitfalls that beset the path of the investigator.

The Statistical Pocket Book of Indonesia, 1941, gives (table 32, p. 22) the total number of 'Other Asiatic' pupils in all schools in Indonesia as 43,817 for 1933-4

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Nationalism, and partly that the European type of education had 872 produced a surplus of clerks, &c., and the Dutch-Chinese schools 186 did not offer the same economic advantages as before.

Christianity made surprisingly little advance in the Netherlands 797 Indies. *The Netherlands Indies*, by John Rauws and others,[1] gives a total of only 5,841 Chinese Christians for the whole of the islands.

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and 49,695 for 1939–40, and thus appears to ignore altogether the pupils in Chinese schools in which Chinese was the medium of instruction. [872]

[1] (New York, World Dominion Press, 1935) p. 162 and App. X.

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CHAPTER XLVI

PRE-WAR ECONOMIC POSITION OF THE CHINESE

471 RAFFLES writing in 1817 estimated the wealth of the Chinese at ten times that of all the Europeans put together.[1] This, however, must have been very much in the nature of a guess. But the modern investigator is only comparatively in a stronger position than Raffles was, for the extent of the wealth of the Chinese cannot even now be ascertained very closely. Mr Callis estimated the total entrepreneur investments in Indonesia in 1937 at 1,411 million United States dollars (at 40 cents to the guilder), of which the Dutch held 1,040 million, the British 200 million, and the Americans 95 million. He goes on to say:

> It should be expressly said that available information in the case of the Netherlands Indies is such that island-Chinese investments cannot be separated from Dutch holdings. But on the basis of what is known of the Chinese population in the islands, their general economic position, their holdings in neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia, and their family remittances from the archipelago to China, the guess can be made that Chinese business capital is worth about 150 million United States dollars at the present time.[2]

434 In conjunction with this overall figure of investment we may consider the following table of national income according to race for the year 1936:[3]

	Number assessed	*Total income in millions of guilders*
Europeans	65,000	266
Indonesians	27,000	50
Chinese	37,000	82
Other Foreign Asiatics	3,000	9

[257] When the sugar industry was dominating the economic life of Java until the world depression of 1929, when the market almost

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[1] Cited by Furnivall, op. cit. p. 47.

[2] Helmut G. Callis, *Foreign Capital in Southeast Asia* (New York, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942) (in mimeograph). Above 900 guilders per annum is, generally speaking, non-agricultural income.

[3] *Mission Interrupted*, p. 246.

[p.534]

disappeared, the annual income of the island amounted to about [257] 2,500 million guilders. About 450 million guilders of this left the country in the shape of profits and interest and to pay for capital 434 goods, 300 million going to Europeans and 250 million to Chinese.[1] The collapse of the sugar industry greatly altered the picture.

But though the Chinese are consistently charged with a lust for 556 gold, *auri sacra fames* (on the assumption, perhaps, that this is a vice from which other races are exempt), and although many of 511 their number certainly have a talent for acquiring it, it is nevertheless not proven that the gold is equally distributed. Many poor Chinese in Indonesia believe that it is not. Here is what the Federation of Chinese Associations in Batavia has to say about it:

> Chinese living in Indonesia are generally considered as a wealthy group. This is a myth which is easily refuted by tax statistics. A few hundred families have indeed succeeded in amassing wealth, among whom may be counted a few millionaires; on the other hand there exist hundreds of thousands whose income is barely sufficient to make ends meet. Further, the number of Chinese working class and paupers is increasing daily.[2]

The Chinese were to be found in every economic stratum of 441 Indonesian society, as large capitalists, bankers, and agricultural concessionnaires as well as the humblest labourers, but their function 162 in the economic life was *par excellence* that of middlemen. Of 463 the total Chinese population of 1·233 million, 470,000 were in 1930 engaged in a trade or profession: roughly 145,000 in raw material production, 94,000 in industry, 185,000 in trade and commerce, 3,000 in Government service (note the small figure), and 43,000 in other occupations. The Chinese in Java were most numerous in trade; those of the Outer Islands as mining or plantation coolies. Apart from their peculiarly Chinese function of middlemen, the manufacture of rattan and other furniture, carpentry, and, with the Arabs, the extension of small loans, usually at an usurious rate, were some of the occupations which were almost exclusively theirs. In the Outer Islands they were to be found in large numbers as contract labourers in the mines of Bangka and Billiton and the 463

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[1] Vandenbosch, op. cit. p. 28.

[2] *Memorandum outlining acts of violence etc.*, compiled by Chung Hua Tsung Hui (Federation of Chinese Associations) (Batavia, 1947) p. 2.
Only 32,000 Chinese had an income of 50 guilders a month or over. Official income-tax figures are given on p. 567.

[434]

463 European plantations of the northeast coast of Sumatra, and in northwest Borneo as independent farmers. It was here centuries ago that numbers of Chinese came in search of gold, and when gold-mining became unprofitable they settled down to agriculture, which, after all, was the traditional occupation of the Chinese in their homeland.

(It is unfortunate that the figures available are so out of date, for the picture was considerably changed by the trade depression of 1929–32 and again by the Japanese invasion of 1942–5. A similar great change had taken place between 1900 and 1930, a change to which reference is made below.)

With the great development of European trade and banking in the decades preceding 1930 the Chinese had found employment in European firms and as assistants in European shops, and later had become more prominent in professional work as teachers, dentists, and doctors, and in the technical grades of the mining industry. More than most Oriental races, the Chinese have taken kindly to learning modern technical methods, though not so far on a large scale. In journalism they had gained a large share, and this included a share in the control of the native press.

[313] Timber has been exported from Java for centuries, the trade having been mainly in Chinese hands. In 1938 the total value of timber and timber wood products exported amounted to over four million guilders.

Modification in the function of the Chinese in Indonesia 1900–30

556 655 471 426 In 1900 the bulk of the Chinese wealth came from opium shops, pawnshops, and usury. The Government measures abolishing the opium shops and establishing State pawnshops and facilities for credit had a revolutionary effect on the Chinese economy. The Chinese had obviously to look for new outlets for their capital and energy. These they found in a number of less dubious activities with a resulting change in their position within the Indonesian community. This process is characterized by Furnivall as 'From Parasitism to Construction'.[1]

548 426 Having a monopoly of opium, the Chinese vendors were in a position to push the sale of this harmful drug—an opportunity of which they took full advantage. As pawnbrokers they fixed their terms for loans 'with reference to the need of the borrower rather

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[1] See Furnivall, op. cit. pp. 412 ff.

than to the value of the pledge he offered'. The pawnshops were 548
often illicit opium dens. In other forms of money-lending their 426
operation was equally 'unconscionable':[1] they aimed to get the
native officials in their power and used this power to oppress cultivators.
Even when ostensibly engaged in commerce, they were [288]
equally engaged in money-lending, and they had such a stranglehold
on the *batik* industry in particular that the native craftsman
was little better than their bond-slave. Regulations made by the [656
Government to protect the native from these forms of extortion 652
and oppression were rendered largely inoperative by the combination
of the Chinese among themselves through their secret trade 441]
organizations to defeat their ends. It was for this reason that the
Government abolished the monopolies and developed State money-lending.

The first form of popular credit was the Government pawnshop 655
service, which in the more advanced areas maintained some 500 426
shops having a legal monopoly of the right to lend sums up to 100
guilders against the security of movable goods. This was found to [556]
be a useful institution for a population who traditionally kept much
of their wealth in the form of jewellery, gold coins, ornaments, &c.[2]
The rate of interest was high, and the proceeds of the service
formed a considerable item in the Government revenue.

The second measure was the establishment of rural credit banks 652
which were divided into *dessa lumbungs*, or village granaries, lending 426
paddy to be repaid in rice at harvest time, and into *dessa* banks
making small money advances, usually repayable in ten weekly
instalments. Efforts were made to incorporate the co-operative [474]
principle into these institutions, but, up to the time of the Japanese
invasion, with no great success.

The third medium of credit, for the lending of larger sums, was originally organized in the form of Divisional and Regency credit institutions, mainly in Java, under the direction of Dutch and native Government officials, but these were merged in 1934 into

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[1] 'unconscionable' is placed in inverted commas to indicate that the writer does not necessarily endorse the judgement it contains—he merely quotes it from contemporary foreign usage.

A spirited defence of the Chinese trader-lender is in Sim Ki Ay, *De Chineesche Nederzetting in Nederlandsch-Indië*, extra number of *Chung Hwa Hui Tsa Chih* (n.d.).

[2] Mr Phoa Liong Gie, 'De Economische Positie der Chineezen in Nederlandsch-Indië', *Koloniale Studiën*, nos. 3 and 6 (1936) p. 97 and *passim*.

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652 426 the *Algemeene Volkscredietbank*, and after that they acted only as branch offices. The average loan was stated to be 53 guilders in Java and 134 guilders in the Outer Islands.

[474] A certain amount of rural credit was also provided by co-operative societies.[1]

To what extent all these efforts delivered the native out of the hands of the Chinese and other money-lenders is not certain. Speaking of the *Volkscredietbank* in 1938 Dr Th. Fruin said: 'Such large-scale efforts to relieve debt are by no means without attendant difficulties. What the results thereof will be—particularly the lasting results—time alone can show.'[2]

471 454 455 Outside opium and pawnbroking, Chinese investment had hitherto been mainly in sugar and timber and then only on a moderate scale. The first outlet they sought for their idle capital was in land speculation, in the purchase of large private estates (*particuliere landerijen*). These estates had for the most part been granted by Raffles in the first place, and more and more of them passed during the nineteenth century to Chinese. When in 1900 their channels for investment were more circumscribed than before, they sought to increase their holdings. The Fock report of 1904 suggested the repurchase of the estates as one means of enhancing native welfare and diminishing Chinese influence. There were, however, difficulties in the way, and it was not until 1910 that the Dutch Parliament sanctioned the purchase of one estate, and the following year provision was made for the resumption of others at an estimated cost of fl. 400 million of the whole area under this form of tenure. By 1930 648,000 hectares had been resumed at a cost of fl. 81·3 million, leaving 503,000 hectares still in private ownership.[3]

Land speculation, therefore, offered a rapidly diminishing outlet for Chinese capital, but up to 1915 it was still possible to describe the Chinese as investing mainly in sugar, timber, and land speculation. It was only after the First World War that they began to build up a strong banking connexion and to lead the way in the development of local industry. Thus by force of events have they been redirected from often parasitical activities towards constructive ones.

471 454 Before about 1870 the Chinese were almost the only holders of

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[1] Details of credit facilities derived from *Netherlands Overseas Territories*, pp. 35, 36.

[2] Cited ibid. p. 36.

[3] Furnivall, op. cit. p. 314.

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private capital (as distinct from Government undertakings) in the 471 Indies, but after that date they were displaced from their position by the entry of European capital and the establishment of large 454 agricultural and industrial enterprises. For 1921 an estimate shows that of a total investment of fl. 3,200 million (fl. 1,820 million invested in large-scale plantations and fl. 1,380 million in wholesale trade, industry, transport, and banking), the Dutch holding was fl. 2,350 million (73·4 per cent.), the Chinese fl. 340 million (10·6 per cent.), and the British fl. 300 million (9·4 per cent.).[1] Part of the capital belonged to Chinese living in Singapore and Hong Kong.

One of the items of the wholesale trade in which the Chinese 442 predominated was rice, imported from Siam and Indochina, in which countries the Chinese had a practical monopoly of both the 438 wholesale and intermediate trade. Of sugar they bought in 1924 4 million piculs as compared with 8·6 million piculs bought by Japanese and 5·5 million piculs bought by Europeans. After the failure of sugar in the crisis of 1930 the whole picture changed. Other products in which the Chinese traded were cassava, pepper, ground-nuts, kapok, &c., and, in the Outer Provinces particularly, rubber and copra.

Dependent mainly upon the internal trade and consequently 438 affected by even the slightest fluctuation in the purchasing power 458 of the native population, the Chinese of Java suffered a severe setback during the trade depression that set in after 1929. In every branch of Chinese activity—sugar factories, wholesale, intermediate, and retail trade, credit business, the *batik* industry, &c.—the full weight of the depression made itself felt. Moreover the [437] resumption by the natives of old-time methods of production and distribution (barter) in consequence of the crisis also had a bad effect on the Chinese trading interests.[2]

But in spite of their increasing competition with Europeans, 556 accentuated during the years of recovery, the Chinese really did 471 not constitute the political danger that was often made out. For the most part they were content to acquiesce in the powers of government being held by others so long as they had an opportunity to make money. In the words of the metaphor that has become a

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[1] Cited from E. Helfferich, 'Vreemde Kapitaalsbelegging', in *Economisch Statistische Berichten* (1924) p. 859, by Cator, op. cit. p. 64.

[2] ibid. p. 121 ff.

471 556 cliché, they did not mind who held the cow so long as they milked it. And the milking, after all, was not organized as it might be by a great American dairy corporation with mechanical milkers and a chain-belt collection. For the most part the Chinese in Indonesia were in charge only of second-rate businesses. A few families had large interests, but the old Chinese family morality was still strong, and this made the successful operation of a limited liability company difficult. They had not the organizing power of the Europeans, who, moreover, were far better equipped in commercial, scientific, and industrial technique. The Europeans were able to build up firms which grew stronger with the passing years, whereas a Chinese business usually collapsed when its founder died.[1] The result of this limitation was that they did not make the headway that might have been expected in the accelerating tempo of local economic life, a fact which was lamented by the Chinese press of the Indies. Also it meant that in the realms of big business they were losing ground to a new competitor—the Japanese.

167 441 439 A generation ago practically the only Japanese in Indonesia were a few prostitutes, photographers, and barbers; and in the preceding centuries, when the Chinese were circulating and settling in the Nanyang in their thousands and tens of thousands, only an occasional Japanese navigator drifted into these tropical waters. Then when the Meiji Revolution had restored the Emperor to his power and Japan began to gaze outwards with the hard eyes of an imperial ambition, her emissaries came south to see what outposts could be seized by peaceful means. But they came not, like the Chinese, in random multitudes, but in groups of expert trade executives directed from home. Very soon they gained a position analogous to that of the Europeans, but differing from it in the fact that while the latter used the Chinese middleman as their natural complement, the Japanese dealt with the native consumer and producer direct. But before the outbreak of the war in the East this process had not gone very far comparatively speaking, and the small number of Japanese immigrants—farmers, fishermen, and shopkeepers—had to meet competition, especially from the Chinese who were much their superiors as retailers and middlemen.

439 The 'Manchurian Incident' took place in 1931, and the fourteen years of struggle between China and Japan had begun; but in spite

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[1] The story of 'three generations, clogs to clogs', is very common indeed among the Chinese of Southeast Asia.

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of attempts on the part of patriots to organize a boycott of the 439 aggressors, the time for such to be effective was not yet. To the Chinese traders in the Indies business was business: politics were outside their sphere. Thus when about 1931 the Dutch introduced [288] quotas to stem the spate of Japanese textiles which was threatening to swamp the market and to drive the European mills out of business, the Dutch merchants found that the Chinese merchants were still importing Japanese cottons, and they themselves had to import Japanese cottons or nothing.

Chinese Labour and Immigration

The demand for labour in the Outer Islands was met for a long 167 time by indentured labour, i.e. by the engagement of coolies, mainly from Java and China, under contracts enforceable by penal 464 sanctions: that is to say, labourers were liable to arrest and punish- 466 ment if they broke their contract or left their work. This system of contract and recruitment gave rise to severe criticism not only in the 439 world at large, but in Holland also. Some free labour ordinances date from 1911. The tobacco planters gave up the penal sanction in 1931 on account of the new American Tariff Act which prevented the importation of agricultural commodities grown by indentured labour which could be produced in the United States. This excluded tobacco produced by indentured labour in Sumatra but not rubber or other tropical commodities that could not be grown in the United States. (Tobacco growers in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and the South were responsible for this provision, but they failed to gain their objective since the Sumatra planters gave up the penal sanction clause in labour contracts. Even as late as 1941 there were coolies still under penal sanction on non-tobacco estates.)

On the East Coast of Sumatra the recruitment of Chinese coolies 167 for estates was considerable from 1888 onwards, but it ceased entirely in 1934. In east Sumatra the Labour Inspectorate was 464 created in 1904 to prevent abuses on the estates, and much legisla- 466 tion for the protection of labour was enacted in the ten years preceding the war in Asia. Penal sanctions were abolished completely in 1941 before the Japanese invasion of the Indies began.

The regulations divided the coolies into several classes—*Singkhehs* (*Sinkhehs*), or new-comers, who were put on contract for three crop-years, never longer than three calendar years: *Laukhehs*

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167 or old hands who had at least one contract behind them, were 464 given special terms; *Kongsikangs*, or labourers on daily pay, and *Noempangs*, or piece-work labourers who signed contracts for 466 periods not greater than six months, after which they were free to go to other plantations.[1]

[313] One of the activities supervised by the new Labour Inspectorate was the *Panglongs*. These were concerns for the exploitation of timber run by Chinese along the East Coast of Sumatra and in the Rhio Residency—including beam-cutting mills, saw-mills, firewood mills, and charcoal-burning plants. In spite of enactments passed since 1882, Government interference with these undertakings was almost non-existent. They were often in uninhabited regions and extremely difficult of access.[2] Very bad conditions were said to prevail in the Panglongs of Bengkalis in the 1920's.[3] About 3,000 men were employed in this type of work.

In the table below is set out the labour position in the Outer Islands at the end of 1938.

Number of Coolies employed in the Outer Islands on 31 December 1938[4]

	Chinese	Javanese		Total*
		Men	Women	
Sumatra				
Contract labour	7,752	7,733	3,219	18,704
Free coolies	17,400	177,857	96,826	299,753
Borneo				
Contract labour	..	58	..	58
Free coolies	915	7,638	1,248	13,924
Total				
Contract labour	7,752	7,791	3,219	18,762
Free coolies	18,315	185,495	98,074	313,677

* Including other nationalities than Chinese and Javanese.

167 The influx of Chinese into Indonesia, which at one time, when China was very unsettled by civil war, had threatened to become 464 a real invasion that it would be impossible to absorb, was checked by two forces.[5] The excessive flow of labour into the Outer Islands

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[1] *Verslag van den Dienst der Arbeidsinspectie en Koeliewerving*, East Coast of Sumatra (Batavia, 1913 and 1914).

[2] Cator, op. cit. p. 217 ff.

[3] De Kat Angelino, *Colonial Policy*, i, 583.

[4] *Netherlands Overseas Territories*, p. 39.

[5] Ordinances of 1 October 1911 and 20 June 1915, although they did not specify any nationality, were intended in effect to protect Chinese coolies and

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was reduced by diminution of the demand, and the invasion of 167
shopkeepers and other middlemen generally was checked by the 464
imposition of a head-tax which was payable by every Chinese 651
entering the Indies. From 1924 to 1931 the tax was between 50 and
100 florins, and after 1931 it was 150 florins a head.

In Bangka and Billiton where the tin-mining had for so long [316]
been done by manual labour, employing respectively 40,000 and
20,000 Chinese coolies, the mining administration mechanized 167
the industry by the introduction of dredges. Consequently, a few
thousand labourers were now all that was required.[1] In Deli on the [249]
east coast of Sumatra the decrease in the number of labourers
employed by the tobacco plantations was due to a decline in
markets which necessitated a reduction in production. Other 464
plantations, such as rubber, oil-palm, tea, and sisal, used Javanese
labourers even before the tobacco plantations began to employ 466
Javanese in place of Chinese. In the oil industry Chinese labourers and artisans continued to be used in large numbers, but other undertakings became more and more mechanized. In the Outer Islands the large number of contract coolies was becoming a thing of the past.

That the large immigration of Chinese in the years following the 167
First World War was regarded with apprehension by the Indo-
nesians is shown by a resolution, introduced by an Indonesian 651
member in the Volksraad in 1932, to raise the immigration fee to
250 florins. In countering the proposal the leading Chinese member 439
pointed out that the export of Java sugar might suffer through a retaliatory boycott on the part of China. Upon the urgent request of the majority of the members the proposed resolution was withdrawn, and a resolution requesting the Government to undertake a general study of the whole problem of immigration was passed in its stead.[2]

The flow of *new* immigration into Indonesia from 1932 to 1938 167
(i.e. excepting residents returning to Indonesia who are not included)
may be gauged from the following figures (to the nearest thousand).

	1932	*1933*	*1934*	*1935*	*1936*	*1937*	*1938*
Chinese	12,000	9,000	12,000	15,000	19,000	31,000	20,000[3]

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encourage their immigration. *Legislative Aspects of Asiatic Migration*, I.L.O. Geneva. I.P.R. Honolulu (July 1927) p. 19.

[1] An American expert who read this, questions its accuracy.

[2] Vandenbosch, op. cit. p. 368.

[3] Including those whose sex was not specified.

167 Of the 1938 figures, 3,000 were males below 12 years of age and 8,000 over 12; and 2,000 females under 12 and 6,000 over 12.

From 1920 to 1930 the immigration of Chinese into Indonesia had been at the rate of over 40,000 a year. In 1921 it was about 43,000, and in 1928 about 41,000. The average from 1900 to 1930 was rather over 28,000.[1]

Chinese Politics in Indonesia before the Japanese Invasion

668 There were three happenings which had strong repercussions among the Chinese of Indonesia. The first was the Revolution of 1911, the second was the rise of the Kuomintang and the purging of its left-wing elements in 1927, and the third was trouble between China and Japan which began anew in 1931.

668 As we have seen, the Chinese and Javanese Communists came
167 together for a time in an uneasy alliance in 1925. After the purge in
1927 there was a permanent split between Chinese Communists
186 and Nationalists. At this period the Chinese were coming to the
Indies at the rate of about 50,000 a year, and the strongly national-
648 istic quality of the immigrants who were from the provinces round
Canton gave some anxiety to the Government of the Netherlands
Indies. The Kuomintang exercised great influence through its well-
disciplined branches, such as the *Shü Pō Shé* (Cantonese render-
ing) or reading clubs, the Ten Men League, the Boycott Pickets,
and the Iron and Blood Brigades. Fortunately for the Indies
186 Government, the Chinese mentality is little inclined to translate
668 abstractions into deeds, but, nevertheless, overt acts were not lack-
648 ing.[2] During the time that Sun Yat-sen was in intermittent control
of Canton and under the influence of Borodin, there were dis-
turbances in the Indies which reflected the attitude of the militant
Kwangtung Nationalists. Feeling against Japan had been bitter
[439] amongst the Chinese since the Twenty-one Demands which were
made when the European Allies were fully occupied in fighting the
Germans in Europe, and the Sino-Japanese conflict of 1931–2
arising from the Manchurian Incident caused a new wave of anti-
Japanese feeling to run through the Chinese community. A boycott
was instituted and in some places was enforced by terrorist tactics,
but on the whole it was singularly ineffective at this time because
the Chinese merchants and shopkeepers found it very profitable to
deal in Japanese textiles, and their zeal for business confounded

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[1] Cator, op. cit. p. 38.

[2] Vandenbosch, op. cit. p. 366.

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both their own patriots and the Europeans who desired the exclusion of Japanese goods for rather different reasons from those of [439] the Chinese patriots. The Government warned several Chinese 668 newspapers against articles inciting to violence and took precautions against outbreaks against the Japanese. 186 Luckily the number 648 of Japanese in the Indies was small, so that the opportunity for demonstrations was limited.

The Imperial Government of China had awakened, towards the 648 end of its existence, to the advantages of cultivating China's settlements overseas, and the Nationalist Government intensified these 186 efforts to obtain sympathy, support, and, not least, money from China's exiled children. It sent numerous missions to the Nanyang with variously described objectives but with one unvarying motive. In the 1930s it was demanding a new consular treaty with the Netherlands which should ensure the assimilation of Chinese to Europeans in the Indies. A point of friction between the Governments was the registration of overseas Chinese. Every new consul arriving in the Indies received instructions from his Government to register all Chinese in the Indies—*Peranakans* as well as *Sinkhehs*, the residents of three hundred years as well as the China-born. The Government of the Netherlands Indies sent circulars to the residents prohibiting the practice, and repeatedly informed the consuls that this was not permissible under the consular treaty. Such protests regularly brought forth the apologetic explanation that a mistake had been made and that they had intended to register only the *Sinkhehs*. As Mr Vandenbosch remarks, a partial explanation for the practice can probably be found in the fact that the Chinese consuls received their salary irregularly and the registration fee was a welcome source of financial support.[1] Another source of conflict between the Government and the Chinese consuls was over the display of flags at half-mast on the anniversary of the Twenty-One Demands. The Netherlands India Government had prohibited the display of flags at half-mast on these and similar days on the ground that it could not within its territory permit an act that would constitute giving offence to Japan, a Power with which it was in friendly relations.

With the renewal of the war with Japan in 1937 the politically 648 inclined Chinese of Indonesia intensified their efforts to enforce an 186 effective anti-Japanese boycott. This time they were assisted by a 668

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[1] op. cit. p. 369.

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648 more widely spread patriotism among Chinese retailers and by the fact that Japan having shifted over to a war economy, was no 186 longer able to supply the market. The result was that the supply of 668 Japanese goods fell considerably. At the same time the Chinese Government now called for financial aid from the Chinese abroad. 439 The Government of the Indies permitted the sale of Chinese bonds, but it did not permit public auction or propaganda for the sale of war loan. The Chinese in the Indies bought war bonds to the amount of 1¼ million florins during the first year alone, and 4½ million florins were contributed to Chinese relief in the same period.

128 The above is an outline sketch of the course of Chinese politics in Indonesia up to about 1941. A more comprehensive account of Chinese politics as they affected Southeast Asia as a whole is given in Chapter XXXI in relation, in particular, to Malaya.

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CHAPTER XLVII

VALUE OF THE CHINESE TO INDONESIA

In our survey of the Chinese in Indonesia we are constantly coming back to the question as to whether or not their presence in any particular country is beneficial or detrimental to that country. The trouble is that the person giving the opinion, usually a European, is almost inevitably an interested party. Consciously or unconsciously he is telling us whether the presence of the Chinese in the country is in accordance with his own interest or otherwise, or of that of his group. Thus when he expresses indignation at the exploitation of the native by the immigrant (and this applies to Malaya equally with Indonesia) he is almost certainly to some extent deceiving himself as to his sentiment and his motive: equally likely it is that praise of the Chinese springs from their usefulness to the speaker or his group in business or politics. 121

It is not the intention of the writer to attempt to sum up the case for or against the Chinese in Southeast Asia until the evidence available from all the countries in the area has been assembled. When this has been done he will venture to give his views in a concluding chapter. In the meantime, however, it might help the reader to form his own opinion if we were to state some of the pros and cons as they have been exhibited in this one large country of the area. A convenient way of doing this would be to summarize the balance-sheet of Chinese activities in Indonesia as drawn up by Mr J. S. Furnivall, using his terms as far as practicable, and interpolating comment only when it seems necessary.

After a career as a member of the Indian Civil Service in Burma, Mr Furnivall went to Netherlands India to make a protracted study of the Dutch system of administration. He would agree, I think, that his sympathies are with the Indonesian native, but he is at the same time anxious to give the Chinese their due, and such shortcomings as they display in the Indonesian system he is inclined to ascribe to the shortcomings of Dutch policy rather than to any essential vice in the Chinese race. Let us see, then, what Mr Furnivall has to say. 114

Although in 1925 the Chinese and the Javanese Communist 181

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181 were associated for a while in an uneasy alliance, it broke down owing to the difference in their aims. Chinese interests are capitalist and European rather than Nationalist, and the introduction of representative institutions has strengthened their position by drawing them into an alliance with Europeans against the numerical superiority and separate interests of the natives. In spite of the measures taken to assimilate the Chinese to Europeans in legal status, they continue a race apart and their contact with other sections of the community remains strictly economic. In 1900 the Chinese were rich and powerful but were inferior in status, confined to their ghettoes, ignorant of European languages and often illiterate in their own, and the activities from which they gained their wealth were parasitic rather than constructive. It was thought unquestionable that they exercised a pernicious influence over the natives, and only the cynical suggested that the righteous indignation of Europeans against the exploitation of the natives might be explained by the diversion of profits from the European to the Chinese middleman.

181 The present[1] position of the Chinese is, however, very different
(says Mr Furnivall). The liberation of the Chinese from their
186 ghettoes, the abolition of the pass system, the recognition of the
Dutch-Chinese schools, and the improvement in their legal status
471 have given the Chinese new opportunities. These they have turned to good account. The Chinese have always been wealthy in comparison with the natives, and even in comparison with most Europeans. But a new feature of the present century is the use to which they put their riches. Now they are intimately associated with capitalist production, and this has brought them into close alliance with the European community. The new combination of Chinese and European interests, together with the improvements in the schools and the changes in the legal status of the Chinese, have given the Chinese community an increase in power greater than in proportion to its growth in numbers. And the Chinese community is now more Chinese, just as the European community is more European. National aspirations and the improvement in means of communication have strengthened the Chinese and their home country. The Chinese of 1900, if he received any kind of education, had usually been to a Dutch or native school: now he had been to a Chinese school under Chinese masters with a strong tradition of

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[1] *c.* 1936.

·2: Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia
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Chinese culture, and read periodicals which kept him in touch with his fellows in Singapore and China.[1]

The diversion of the Chinese to banking and to the development of local industry in late years has, however, meant that their economic life is no longer parasitic but constructive. Nevertheless, continues Mr Furnivall, they still form a sectional, isolated community competing on rigidly economic lines with the European and native sections. Despite their diversity of race and occupation, taken all together, they form one section of a plural community with interests common to some extent among themselves and in many ways opposed to the interests of other sections. It is true that as middlemen they serve both the Europeans and the natives, but they also compete with them, and on advantageous terms.[2] In some cases they are strong enough to tax European firms for the benefit of Chinese schools.[3] They can handle goods which allow too small a margin of profit for Europeans, and can undertake more risky ventures (because the penalties of bankruptcy are lighter for the Chinese than the European), thus sharpening the edge of economic corruption and tending to lower the standard of commercial morality; again, it was the Chinese who broke the European ring against Japanese exports. Natives cannot find employment in a Chinese shop or other business,[4] and the attempts of natives to develop industrial activities are strangled by Chinese competition; it was the natives who first started kapok factories, but within a few years they were ousted by the Chinese; again, when the natives built up a new industry in the manufacture of native cigarettes, there was a long struggle before they could secure their ground against Chinese rivals who imitated their methods. In the economic

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[1] This, I feel, is too sweeping considering that only half the Chinese children attending school received an education through the medium of the Chinese language. It would have been truer of Malaya.

[2] The Europeans reproached the Chinese for ruining their market by offering articles similar to theirs at a much lower price (which they were enabled to do by a far less expensive way of living). G. Angoulvant, 'Les Indes Néerlandaises, leur rôle dans l'économie internationale', *Le Monde Nouveau* (Paris, 1926) i. 192.

[3] i.e. by putting a 'cess' on some commodity they control, e.g. rice. This was true of Malaya also.

[4] 'It is only very recently that non-Indonesian enterprise, including Chinese capital, has accepted Indonesians into higher administrative posts.' *Recent Developments in the Netherlands East Indies*, speech delivered 16 September 1942 by Dr Charles O. van de Plas, formerly Governor of East Java, Netherlands, and N.I. Council, I.P.R. But still on a very small scale, I fear. V. P.

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In the economic

181 471 477 186 sphere the Chinese are encroaching on the European world and they are building up an even more formidable barrier against native aspirations. Yet the cultural contact between the Chinese and the Europeans is no closer than before and nationalist sentiment is widening the gap, while the conflict of economic interest places an increasing strain on the plural society to which they belong.

471 Finally Mr Furnivall quotes Dr Boeke[1] on the subject of the Western and the Westernized element of the economy of the Netherlands Indies:

> There is a materialism, rationalism, individualism and a concentration of economic ends far more complete and absolute than in homogeneous Western lands; a total absorption in the Exchange and Market; a capitalistic structure with the business concern as subject, far more typical of capitalism than one can imagine in the so-called 'capitalistic' countries which have grown up slowly out of the past and are still bound to it by a hundred roots.

114 181 The above analysis[1] seems on the face of things to be a fair one, except that the writer would quarrel with the word 'parasitic' as describing the activities of the Chinese in Indonesia prior to 1900. They were merely acting as revenue agents of the Dutch Government. The function, then, of the Chinese in Indonesia is mainly the creation of Dutch policy. This fact will be of the first importance when we come to consider the developments during the Japanese occupation and after the war when the Indonesian Republic came into being.

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[1] 'Dualische Samenleving', in *De Economist* (1935) p. 773, quoted by Furnivall at p. 452.

1 [See category 116, pp. 548-549 -- Analyst]

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CHAPTER XLVIII

AFTERMATH OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Up to 1949 there seemed remarkably little material available 727
to write the history of the Chinese in Indonesia during the
Japanese invasion and during the occupation. As regards
the occupation, when Indonesia was cut off from the observation of the world, the Europeans, who are usually much more interested to record what they see than are the Oriental races, were isolated in concentration camps. No doubt a fairly connected story could be constructed from the narratives of individual Chinese and Indonesians, but the state of the country in 1949 did not facilitate efforts in this direction. The people were too engrossed in their attempts to repair war damage and to reconstruct their economy to dwell on the years of the occupation.

The following main facts, however, emerge.[1]

All the efforts of the Japanese up till August 1943 were aimed at the organization of the indigenous population of Indonesia in aid of their own war effort. The non-indigenous Orientals, first and foremost the Chinese, were left unregimented. As the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies depended on the fully developed Western capitalism in the islands, it can be readily seen that this section of Indonesian society, which was predominantly middle-class, was heavily hit when the Japanese occupation of the Indies was completed. Resentment of the Japanese which had been acute for many years was not reduced on this account.

The Japanese established an office for Chinese affairs called the 727
Kakkio Han (in Chinese Hua Ch'iao Pan) in Batavia. This was
directed by a single Japanese, one Toyoshima: the remainder of 656
the staff were Chinese. In Batavia and every other Chinese settle-
ment there was a Hua Ch'iao Tsung Hui, a Chinese association, 651
which was responsible to the local Japanese commander and which 486
through its headquarters in Batavia was a channel for the communication of orders by the Kakkio Han. The Japanese used this organization to convey their new regulations which included (1)

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[1] Here is followed the doctoral dissertation, *Political Development in the Netherlands East-Indies during and immediately after the Japanese Occupation*, by Dr Janus Poppe (Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.) p. 95.

727 656 651 486 the reintroduction of the internal passport system which had been abolished by the Dutch, (2) the payment of a registration fee of $100 for Chinese males and $80 for Chinese females, (3) the establishment of the Chinese guards (police) for protection of their community against possible violence on the part of the Indonesians, and (4) collection of money from the Chinese for war purposes.

727 669 Before the occupation there were practically no Chinese who supported the Nanking puppet Government of Wang Ching-wei: most Chinese support was for the Kuomintang and its leader Chiang Kai-shek whose regime was recognized by the Netherlands Government. The Japanese had interned a large number of prominent Chinese, both *Peranakans* and *Sinkhehs*, under the impression that the backbone of resistance would thus be broken. This assumption proved to be mistaken; dissatisfaction among the Chinese residents became so great that another attitude had to be adopted. After observing signs of a resistance movement, the Japanese in August 1943 induced a few pro-Nanking Chinese to form an organization with the intention of bringing all Chinese activities under its surveillance. Its directors were without exception appointed by the Japanese authorities. A similar course was adopted with the Eurasian community in the following month. These measures at least may have had the effect of preventing the resistance movement coming to a head and resulting in an uprising.

729 648 Allied intelligence concerning Indonesia during the occupation was more meagre than in the case of any other area in Southeast Asia. No Office of Strategic Services (OSS) or Allied intelligence teams were operating in the larger islands. After the surrender, Dutch internees and prisoners-of-war were either too biased or too out of touch to offer a fair index of the real state of affairs; unbiased Indonesians were as difficult to find, and the Chinese and Eurasian minorities were too afraid of either the returning Dutch or of the Indonesians to speak freely.[1]

727 579 There is, however, a document extant which, when due allowance is made for the circumstances under which it was written, affords some evidence of the experiences of the Chinese during the occupation.[2] This document (to which further reference is made

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[1] Charles Wolf, Jr., *The Indonesian Story* (New York, John Day for the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948) p. 10.

[2] *Memorandum outlining acts of violence and inhumanity perpetrated by Indonesian bands on innocent Chinese before and after the Dutch police action was en-*

later in this chapter) states that when the Japanese landed in Java 727
Chinese residents were the main victims of robbery by the natives. 579
In the majority of cases the trouble started with the robbing of one
or two houses by a few bandits. When no police appeared and no
resistance was encountered, the whole of the inhabitants of the town
or village, who in the past had never committed robbery or any
other criminal act, participated in the looting. Moreover, now that
civilized controls were removed, a number of excesses occurred
and there was murder and rape.

During the Japanese occupation Chinese-Indonesian relations 727
were adversely affected by the memory of the looting in the early
stages, by the economic offensive undertaken by the Indonesians, 579
with Japanese support, to supplant the Chinese, by political differ- 648
ences due to the fact that the Chinese were pro-Ally while the
Indonesians were 'completely pro-Japanese', and by the haughty 609
attitude of certain Indonesian officials who gained favour with the
invaders.[1] When the Japanese capitulated and the Indonesian Republic was proclaimed, the Indonesians suddenly assumed a conciliatory attitude towards the Chinese. In the *bersiap* (preparatory) period following the proclamation of independence, when Dutch nationals were being hunted down and killed, a Chinese flag, displayed in front of a house or worn on the chest, proved a sufficient protection in even the most isolated spots.

After the Japanese surrender, the British Commander-in-Chief, 727
who was sent by the Supreme Allied Commander to disarm the 648
Japanese in Java, did not side with either the Dutch or the Indonesians, but confined his occupation to a few enclaves—Batavia, Bandoeng, Samarang, Sourabaya—and from there tried to contact the rest of Java which was in the hands of the Republicans. The situation was similar in Sumatra where only Medan, Palembang, and Padang were occupied by the British, the remaining territory being left under Republican authority.[2]

The Chinese in Southeast Asia generally had anticipated that

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forced on July 21, 1947, compiled by the Chung Hua Tsung Hui (Federation of Chinese Associations in Batavia) (September 1947).

More than one person who read this section in manuscript (including Dr Tsoa Sik-ien), described the Chung Hua Tsung Hui as 'pro-Dutch', and an American authority remarked that it was 'an extremely non-objective and partisan source'.

[1] ibid. p. 3.

[2] *The Political Events in the Republic of Indonesia* (New York, Netherlands Information Bureau, 1947) p. 8.

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727 the liberation of these countries would be carried out by Chinese
troops. It was widely rumoured that Chiang Kai-shek had made a
648 radio speech in which he had promised to give armed support to
those countries which had not yet won their independence. The
fact that it was British and Indian troops who entered Indonesia
was a disappointment to many Chinese Nationalists, and the
Mohammedan troops were later accused by the Dutch of siding
with their fellow Muslims against the re-established Dutch regime.

727 The Indonesian attitude towards the Chinese began again to
undergo a change. The 'neutrality' adopted by the Chinese did not
186 satisfy the Indonesians who wanted the Chinese to carry out an
609 economic boycott of the Dutch. When the Chinese began supplying
goods to the Dutch, and some others received monetary and other
438 aid from the Dutch Government and began working in Dutch
offices, the community as a whole began to be regarded as definitely
siding with the Dutch.[1] Resentment at this supposed partiality soon
produced a number of 'incidents'.

726 At first a few Chinese were kidnapped or their dwellings were
looted. The Chinese flag no longer afforded protection but instead
609 incited animosity, and was often torn to shreds. Then the members
of Chinese families who had thus been victimized 'took an understandable,
579 but regrettable, course: they enlisted in the Dutch forces
702 in order to wreak vengeance'.[2] Thus Chinese-Indonesian relations
became exacerbated. Yet Indonesians who were alienated from the
Republican cause through ill-treatment on suspicion of helping the
Dutch, and who had in some case also joined the Dutch forces,
were many times greater in number than the Chinese who enlisted
[436] under the Dutch flag. There was ill feeling, too, over the Chinese
use of the new currency issued by the Dutch in March 1946—but
then, as the *Chung Hua Tsung Hui Memorandum* points out, Indonesians
living in Allied-occupied territory also used it.

726 During the hostilities that were destined to continue intermittently
for some years to come, the Chinese were in a particularly
609 unfortunate position. Suspected by the Indonesians of pro-Dutch
sympathies and by the Dutch of pro-Indonesian inclinations, they
662 received harsh treatment on both sides, especially from irresponsible
Indonesian groups. The Indonesians seem to have overlooked
the fact (says the Memorandum) that as business men it was im-

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[1] *Memorandum outlining acts of violence etc.*

[2] ibid. pp. 3 and 4.

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possible for Chinese living in Allied territory to boycott the Dutch, 726
as this would have amounted to economic suicide. In the same 609
manner, Chinese living in the Republic have closely co-operated
in economic matters with the Republic, for they had no other course 662
to follow if they were to maintain their position.

To prevent unpleasant repercussions for the Chinese living in the islands, China sought a middle-of-the-road position which would antagonize neither the Dutch nor the Republic.[1]

In December 1945 a punitive expedition against the village of 726
Bekasi was undertaken by the British in consequence of atrocities
committed against R.A.F. personnel and Indian troops. The 579
greatest sufferers by the expedition were the Chinese. Some of 609
their houses were inadvertently burnt with the rest of the village, and when the Indonesians returned the Chinese were subjected to intimidation and violence.[2] But the first really serious incident occurred in June 1946 in a Chinese settlement west of the Tangerang River.[3] The *New York Times* of 6 June reported that 600 Chinese, suspected by the Indonesians of co-operation with the Dutch, had been slain and their villages set on fire. The massacre did not end until 8 June. On 10 June the Chinese Foreign Office was reported as having protested to both the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic.[4]

The *Chung Hua Tsung Hui Memorandum* says that according to the minutes of a meeting held in Tangerang on 28 May, prepared by Djoenadi, executive member of the Indonesia Republic Cabinet, the People's Band had conceived a plan of carrying out a holy war (*Perang Sabil*) in disregard of the instructions given by the T.R.I. (Republican Army) Commander to establish a no-man's-land, in line with the agreement reached with the Dutch.

As might be expected in the emotional stress, the Chinese accounts are elaborated with details of horrible atrocities, including the burning alive of women and children. The mere fact of the massacre, however, is terrible enough. 'In short', says the Memorandum, 'the suburbs of Tangerang have been turned into a hell for the Chinese who for many years had lived so amicably with the Indonesians and adjusted themselves to their environment so well that foreigners could hardly distinguish them from real Indonesians.

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[1] Charles Wolf, op. cit. p. 160, 161.

[2] David Wehl, *The Birth of Indonesia* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1948) p. 80.

[3] About 20 miles from Batavia.

[4] *New York Times* (6 June) p. 8, col. 5; (8 June) p. 9, col. 1; (10 June) p. 14, col. 6. Refugees reported more slain (17 June) p. 9, col. 5.

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726 As the Chinese of this area have practically become assimilated, it is incredible that they were so treated.'

579 609 According to the report received by the Jang Seng (Red Cross) in Batavia, 653 Chinese were murdered in Tangerang and neighbourhood, including 136 females and 36 children. There were approximately 25,000 refugees in Batavia from the area. 1,268 Chinese dwellings were burned down, and 236 otherwise destroyed.

A further massacre was reported on 18 September at Bagan Si Api Api when 200 Chinese are said to have been killed,[1] 20 more were killed at Bangko, 34 at Telok Poelau, and 75 at Djembra. Another outbreak at Palembang in Sumatra in January 1947 resulted in the death of another 250.[1]

The correspondent in Indonesia of the *Christian Science Monitor*, Mr Nathan Broch, in a report to his newspaper of the Tangerang massacre and its aftermath,[2] remarks that the fact that the Chinese decided to put themselves under Dutch protection seemed to confirm Indonesian suspicions that the Chinese had co-operated with the Dutch in the affected areas.

727 609 Mr Broch says that during the Japanese occupation many Chinese were arrested for black-market activities. He himself was actually in the Indies at the time of the liberation, and his first-hand impressions of the cause of the feeling between the two races is therefore of special value. He relates that

> during the Allied landings at Tarakan on May 1st, 1945 and at Balikpapan on July 1st, 1945 I gained the impression that the natives of these liberated areas deeply resented the attitude of many Chinese during the Japanese occupation.
>
> In Tarakan, where the 26th Brigade of the Australian 9th Division landed right in the biggest Chinese settlement on the island at the small beach city of Lingkas, liberated natives told me that the Chinese had collaborated on a large scale with the Japanese occupation forces. In Balikpapan, the once famous oil port of eastern Borneo, I found a similar attitude among the non-Chinese part of the population.
>
> In these two liberated areas, however, the anti-Chinese sentiment among the natives was mitigated by the strong feeling of having endured together some of the heaviest naval and air bombardments of the Pacific war, and the fact that the Chinese, along with other population groups, had suffered severe losses.

To follow the same account, in Java, which was occupied after

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[1] *Memorandum*, p. 6.

[2] *Christian Science Monitor* (12 June 1948).

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Chinese

the Japanese surrender, the situation was different. The establishment of a strong Nationalist Government with its own armed forces 727 609 and the subsequent and still-continuing fight against the return of Dutch rule over the Indies had resulted in the practical annihilation of all organized trade. For the Chinese, the cessation of trade was a heavy blow. They held the Indonesian Nationalists responsible for this, and were now obviously backing the Dutch whom they saw reconquering one big city after another, and they felt that the restoration of some Dutch rule over Java, even in a form that would give substantial rights to the Indonesians, could restore in some measure the pre-war prosperity of the Chinese communities on the island. Indonesian Nationalists, however, in common with the Annamites of Indochina, apparently refused to appreciate the versatile political character of the Chinese, whom they accused of having acquired real power to influence politics through extensive trade.

There were moments, Mr Broch considered, when, after the end of the Pacific war in 1945, powerful Chinese interests in both Indochina and Indonesia backed the natives in their revolt against the return of the white man. This support, however, did not outlast the substantial reinforcements in men and material with which the French and the Dutch proved able to combat the native revolts in their possessions.

It does not seem that there was any large-scale massacre of 726 Chinese before the Tangerang outbreak. Indeed no murder of individuals either appears to have been reported. A broadcast from 579 the Government station in Republican territory, from Solo (Soerakarta), Central Java, in February 1946 stated that the Chinese 609 consul-general, Tung (Chiang Chia-tung), had declared at a conference that the Chinese in Indonesia had no reason to complain.[1] The Chungking radio, on the other hand, a few days later said that it was learned from Batavia that the Chinese found themselves in a most unpleasant predicament. This was particularly true in Bandoeng where the attitude of irresponsible Indonesians towards the Chinese was very hostile. Allied troops had intervened to stop the eviction of Chinese and Eurasians north of the railway line. Investigations were also being made regarding alleged ill-treatment of Chinese in Samarang.[2]

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[1] Radio Free Indonesia, in English (13 February 1946).

[2] Chungking Radio, in English (18 February 1946).

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From the evidence available the conclusion to be drawn is that after the Japanese surrender and before the Tangerang incident hostility towards the Chinese was confined to treating them with suspicion and making repeated demands upon them for financial help. Those who were not responsive were branded 'Dutch spies'. Donations were solicited for Republican funds—the contribution might take the form of money, furniture, or commodities. At Paalmerah all Chinese house-owners had to pay a 'special tax'. After all, the Chinese were traditionally considered, both by Indonesians and Europeans, as the wealthy people of the country and it was inevitable thay they should have been expected to contribute liberally to 'The Cause'. Professional extortionists naturally were not slow to add their private demands to the official ones, and the victimized Chinese naturally made no very clear distinctions between the two kinds of demands.

Chinese sympathy for the Republic had begun to be replaced by a feeling of anxiety and misgiving. This resulted in an exodus of the more well-to-do from the interior to Dutch-held territory. Those who could afford to bribe their way to Batavia did so. But the number who could be received was, of course, limited by the food and housing available.

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A graphic account of the turn of events as they affected the Chinese is given by Mr David Wehl:[1]

> 579
> The Chinese suffering began with the collapse of Dutch rule in the East Indies.
>
> The poorer Indonesians turned with the anger of jealousy upon the more prosperous Chinese, and the full storm of sudden freedom and revenge fell upon the helpless minority. To robbery, murder and rape, was added the additional horror of forcible circumcision and the Mohammedan faith, and it was not until the Japanese discovered that they could not do without Chinese help in trade and commerce that the Chinese people found some respite for their trials.
>
> In China, the Japanese were supporting the puppet Government of Wang Ching Wei at Nanking, and in an endeavour to please Nanking they considerably alleviated the lot of the Chinese in Java, and when Chinese experience, industry and ability, were also found to be of profit to the Nippon, they were officially proclaimed the friends of the Indonesians as well as of the Japanese, worthy to share in the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and to be regarded as members of the 'Three A's'—'Nippon the

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[1] David Wehl, *The Birth of Indonesia* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1948) pp. 18, 19.

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Leader of Asia, Nippon the Light of Asia, and Nippon the Protector of Asia'. 727

After the Japanese surrender, however, the position of the Chinese became slowly worse again. They were completely unprotected. In the free and easy time that followed the collapse of all controlling power the Chinese were an easy prey. Their shops were looted, their houses were fired, their people were kidnapped and murdered. In the fighting at Soerabaya, or Bandoeng, or Semarang, they lost lives and property. At Bekasi some of their houses were accidentally burnt, and when the Indonesians returned, much revenge was meted out to the innocent Chinese. 609 579

Incidents such as these were multiplied throughout Java and Sumatra, individually tragic, and historically important in that they added to the general unrest and influenced to a certain extent military moves and political feelings. British and Indian soldiers, endeavouring to keep the peace, became involved in attacks on Chinese, sometimes there were casualties, and then a local riot became an international incident.

Meanwhile, in November 1946, the Linggadjati Agreement, which was to have settled the differences between the Netherlands and the Republic, was negotiated and was signed by both parties on 25 March 1947. This agreement never became effective, and each side accused the other of violating its terms. Finally, 'in order to put an end to the intolerable chaos and to create conditions for the building of a State that would bring renewed hope and fulfilment to the Indonesian people', the Dutch from the night of 20–21 July 1947 until 4 August undertook military action.[1] 728 726

The Dutch Army and Marines advanced in the following directions—in West Java from Krawang to Tjikampek, from Tjiandjoer to Soekaboemi, and from Bandoeng to Cheribon; in mid-Java from Samarang to Oengaran, Toentang, Ambarawa, and Salatiga; in east Java from Sourabaya to Bangil. The Marines landed at Banjoewangi and Pasir Poeti. 726

Long before this 'police action' was started it was common knowledge that the Republic would adopt a scorched-earth policy to hamper the Dutch operations. Knowing that the Chinese community would be endangered if fighting occurred, the Chinese consul-general had, as early as December 1946, endeavoured to establish safety zones where the Chinese could gather in times of danger. The Republic wanted to know what guarantee could be 726 648

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[1] *The Political Events in the Republic of Indonesia*, p. 30.

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726 given that these zones would not be used to the disadvantage of the
Indonesians, and when the reply was given that such guarantee
648 would only be given if the Chinese were armed adequately to up-
hold the neutrality of the zones, the Republic objected to such a
course. Another proposal to establish safety zones to be guarded by
a mixed force of Indonesian-Chinese-Dutch police was disapproved
by both the Dutch and the Indonesians.[1]

When the situation deteriorated and the outlook became critical, the Chinese consul-general, Mr Chiang Chia-tung, issued instructions to Chinese residing in Republican territory that they should decline to be evacuated outside the city limits, and when they were in immediate danger they should gather together in the buildings of schools or associations hoisting both the Chinese and the Red Cross flags.

726 According to the *Chung Hua Tsung Hui Memorandum*, between
21 July and 21 August 1947, 293 Chinese were killed and over 6,000
579 were missing. Reports received up to mid-September showed that
912 houses and factories had been burned. As a rule, prior to the
609 arrival of the Dutch troops, Chinese living in Republican territory
were unharmed, although they were exposed from time to time to
arrest on spy charges. In the face of the Dutch advance, looting and
arson were carried out by the Indonesian troops. In the process of
effecting the scorched-earth policy industrial plants, official and
private offices, and big buildings in general were the 'preferred
[471] objectives'. Most privately-owned big buildings belonged to
Chinese. In addition to the destruction carried out under orders
from the Indonesian High Command by special squads, native
freebooters joined in the burning and looting. The *Memorandum*
recites in considerable detail the separate acts of murder, rape,
kidnapping, and destruction of property, usually with the names
of the victims. The places named are Krawing and Tjikampek,
Tjibadak, and Soekaboemi, Cheribon District, Tegal, Pekalongan
District, Banjoemas and environs, Salatiga, Loemadjang, Djember,
Singosari, Lawang, Malang, and Kaban Djahe.[2]

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[1] *The Voice of China* (Chinese (official) News Service, short-wave radio) (Nanking, 6 February 1947) reported that the Netherlands authorities had agreed in principle to establish zones for the Chinese in Indonesia and to give emergency relief to Chinese who suffered losses in the armed conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesian troops from 1 to 5 January in Palembang.

[2] Mr E. N. Van Kleffens on 26 August 1947 in addressing the Security Council of the United Nations said: 'Ten days ago, intelligence reached our

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On 25 July a memorandum expressing the Chinese Government's regret at the outbreak of hostilities in Indonesia and its grave concern as to the welfare and safety of the Chinese nationals in the Dutch East Indies was handed to the chargé d'affaires of the Netherlands embassy by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this memorandum the Chinese Government asked what effective measures had been taken to safeguard Chinese lives and property.[1] On 31 July Dr George Yeh, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, made a statement in which he said that the Chinese Government viewed with grave concern the repeated acts of arson and violence inflicted on innocent Chinese nationals by the Indonesian Army which constituted a serious offence against international law and humanity. It might be recalled, he continued, that, during the hostilities that took place prior to the conclusion of the Linggadjati Agreement, the Chinese communities in the Netherlands East Indies had already sustained irreparable losses in lives and property. This had occurred in spite of the fact that throughout the period of fighting the Chinese communities, in accordance with instructions from the Chinese Government, had observed strict neutrality, and that the Chinese population there had been intimately associated with the development and prosperity of those islands for over three hundred years.[2] 726 648 579 609

The Indonesian Republic, of course, took a different view of the Chinese question from that of the Dutch. The Chinese, for their part, living as they did partly in Dutch and partly in Republican territory, tended naturally to adapt themselves to the situation as far as was expedient and to be conciliatory towards those exercising authority. [662]

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lines in northern Sumatra that Republican elements had herded together in a cemetery near a place called Pankalan Brandan approximately four thousand Chinese, without food, without water, without shelter of any kind, who were thus exposed to certain death.' *The Other Side of the Medal* (New York, Netherlands Information Bureau, 1947).

Most of the information relied upon above, it must be emphasized, is from Dutch or pro-Dutch sources. As against this, Dr Tjoa Sik-ien, a Chinese of standing from Java who supports the Indonesian point of view, expressed to the author his disagreement with the *Chung Hua Tsung Hui Memorandum* and stated that in his view it distorted or misinterpreted the facts. The Indonesians harboured no ill will against the Chinese. In normal times the latter lived peacefully in the Republican area without molestation. It was only during military operations that they suffered. The Dutch had magnified the differences between Indonesians and Chinese for their own purposes. He did not think that the Dutch affection for the Chinese was sincere. [726 579 609 471]

[1] *Voice of China* (25 July 1947).

[2] ibid. (31 July 1947).

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authority. *Indonesian Information* of 25 October 1947[1] stated the Republican position in the matter:

> Chinese nationals are the largest minority in the Indonesian Republic. Out of a population of about seventy millions, Chinese make up approximately one and a half millions. Naturally, therefore, they have to a certain extent shared in the general misery of the country, and in spite of all the efforts of the Republican Government, have suffered a certain amount of privation as a result of the two years' blockade. However, official Chinese sources have recognized the fact that the Republic is doing all in its power to help the Chinese communities.

The same publication at different times gave examples of the good feeling existing between the Chinese and the Republic, e.g. the Chinese deputy consul-general had stated at Kediri in east Java that the living conditions of the Chinese nationals in Republican territory were quite satisfactory 'except when Dutch provocations succeeded in provoking strife'; on the occasion of the Chinese National Day (10 October) Chinese planes had been given permission to fly over Republican territory to drop leaflets and pamphlets bearing goodwill messages to the Chinese inhabitants of the country; the Chinese inhabitants of Moentilar, near Djocjakarta, had contributed 18.000 rupees (Republican currency) for the defence of the Indonesian Republic, &c.

During a press interview in Singapore on 28 October 1947 Hadji Agoes Salim, Foreign Minister of the Republic, explained the position of the Chinese in the existing situation in Indonesia.

> To all appearances [said Hadji Salim] it seems that it is the Chinese who are suffering most from the scorched-earth policy which is being forced on the Republic by the Dutch military action. However, if we know our Indonesia, we realize that in places such as Malang and Sourabaya, for instance, it is the Chinese who own most of the property, and so, when there is an assessment of damage in these places obviously the Chinese seem to be the ones most affected. We tend to forget, as we contemplate the figures of damage done to Chinese properties, that the few Indonesian properties have suffered just as much, and the Indonesian owners feel the loss just as keenly as the Chinese owners.[2]

Chinese property, the Foreign Minister insisted, was not singled out for any special attention, and so long as the conditions of war

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[1] Vol. i, no. 4, published by the representative in Britain of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia.

[2] *Indonesian Information*, vol. i, no. 12 (12 November 1947).

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demanded the application of the scorched-earth policy, economic 726
scruples must be sacrificed to military advantage. The only way to
end the damage to Chinese property was to end the war. 609

This, of course, was cold comfort to the Chinese to whom the 204
continuance of the civil war meant only loss of life and property.

In west Borneo there had been no conflict between the interests of the Chinese inhabitants and those of the other groups of the population for several years—not even in the agrarian sphere which was in many respects common ground. Nor was there any outbreak during the time of the serious incidents elsewhere in Indonesia.[1]

After the 'police action' was completed and the troubles of the Chinese community had died down, both the Chinese and the Indonesian Government made practical demonstrations of their sympathy with the victims. The Executive Yuan appropriated one million florins for the relief of the sufferers,[2] and the Republican Government five million rupees for the same purpose.[3] Republican leaders such as Sjahrir and Sjarifoeddin made broadcast speeches regretting the massacre of the Chinese and expressing sympathy for the sufferers from the scorched-earth policy. Though the Republic of Indonesia Information Service made no attempt to hide the extent of the Chinese casualties (it quoted the Chinese consul-general, Chiang Chia-tung, as stating in Singapore that 1,000 Chinese had been killed and 100,000 rendered homeless since the Dutch opened hostilities in Indonesia[4]), it stressed that the incidents had occurred only in the areas of military operations. Sumatra and other islands were quiet and the Chinese consul-general had visited Djombang in east Java and had stated that he was now satisfied with the living conditions of the Chinese in all the Republican areas.[5] The Republicans made much of the fact that the Chinese within the Republican area had demonstrated their sympathy with the Republic and their General Association had even made a collection of comforts for dispatch to the Republican troops at the front.[6]

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[1] *Economic Review of Indonesia* (Batavia, Department of Economic Affairs, October 1947) p. 171.

[2] *Thien Sung Yit Po* (Batavia, 12 August 1947).

[3] *Sin Po* (Batavia, 15 August 1947).

[4] Indonesian News Service (New York, 25 September 1947).

[5] ibid. (3 October 1947).

[6] ibid. (5 October 1947).

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Controversy now turned on the subject of the establishment of *Pao An Tui*, or Chinese protection corps. These bands of armed Chinese were intended to protect the Chinese community during times of trouble. The Dutch sanctioned their formation. Some Chinese newspapers actually recommended that China should send troops for the protection of the Chinese in Indonesia, but would the Dutch (one paper asked rather naïvely) permit them to land?[1] The supporters of the Kuomintang were in favour of the *Pao An Tui*, but the Leftist papers were not. The Djocjakarta authorities compared them with the military forces maintained by the Western powers in the old treaty ports in China, and characterized them as an attempt to create a Chinese extraterritoriality in Indonesia. In this attitude they received Leftist support, and Mr Gromyko attacked the *Pao An Tui* in the Security Council. The controversy was taken up in the Convention of Chinese Associations held in August.

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The *Sin Po* of 6 September quoted two views on the situation—one that the scorched-earth policy of the Indonesian troops had been carried out with the intention of destroying the economic foundations of the overseas Chinese, and the other that the Dutch wished the two peoples, the Chinese and the Indonesians, to hate one another.

The misfortunes of the Chinese during the Dutch-Indonesian hostilities were not sufficient to create a solid pro-Dutch anti-Indonesian attitude on the part of the community, though it is likely that a majority favoured the Dutch. Nevertheless, there were then and still in 1949 several Chinese holding important positions in the Republican Government itself, such as Mr Tan Ling Djie, the secretary of the Socialist Party, and a leading Komitie Nasional figure, and Mr Ong Eng Djie, former Vice-Minister of Finance and director of the Republic's Banking and Trading Corporation.[2]

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The *Sin Po*, in an editorial of 13 September, reported that among the international volunteers who had come to Sumatra to fight for the Republic of Indonesia there were some overseas Chinese. 'This action is not welcome to us', commented the newspaper. 'When the Indonesian rioters choose to murder the Overseas Chinese and burn their property what will the volunteers do then? Will they look on or take part in the atrocities?'

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[1] *Seng Hwe Pao* (8 August 1947).

[2] Charles Wolf, Jr., *The Indonesian Story*, p. 161.

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Many Indonesian Chinese, too, felt that their community was 727
isolated from other Chinese communities in the Nanyang. Although
there had been all these murders of Chinese in the Indies, there 204
had not been a single voice of sympathy from the Chinese newspapers in Malaya.[1]

When the Security Council's cease-fire instructions had failed to 728
end hostilities in Indonesia the Council on 25 August appointed a Committee of Good Offices to do its best to mediate between the parties. The Committee and its staff arrived in Batavia on 27 October. They chose as a neutral meeting ground U.S.S. *Renville*, a Navy transport, which sailed into Batavia bay on 8 December. The truce was accepted by both parties on 17 January with acceptance of six additional principles two days later.[2]

The *Sin Po* reported on 13 March that since the signing of the [204]
Renville agreement the Chinese in the interior of Java had been living at peace.

A well-known authority on Far Eastern politics states the posi- 728
tion as follows:

> The Indonesian Republicans have shown almost as much antagonism 648
> to the Chinese as to the Dutch. . . . Local Chinese organizations have 609
> appealed to the Chinese Government for protection, but though China is at the moment too weak to take any drastic action, the attitude of China in the United Nations is by no means so favourable as that of India towards the claims of the Indonesian Republic. China, indeed, is the most directly affected third party in the Dutch-Indonesian dispute and, if the Chinese civil war were to be brought to an end, Chinese concern with events in Southeast Asia would be manifested much more strongly than it is now.[3]

Chinese living within the Republican territory had to be ex- 727
ceedingly adaptable in order to maintain their position. When
the Republican currency was put into circulation in October 1946 436
Chinese trade was temporarily paralysed. Many Indonesians 438
thought that the Chinese advantage in trade had at last been destroyed and that the Indonesians could now meet them on equal
terms, but they reckoned here without Chinese resilience. The [256]
Japanese had transferred to the Republic many economic assets,
but quite a large number of rice-mills still remained in Chinese
hands.

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[1] Editorial in *Thien Sung Yit Po* (Batavia, 25 August 1947).

[2] *United Nations Bulletin*, vol. iv, no. 5 (March 1948) p. 163.

[3] G. F. Hudson, 'Chinese in Southeast Asia', *Eastern World* (October 1947).

000 hands. The Indonesian politicians then introduced new laws of
727 citizenship with disabilities for aliens, whose object was to absorb
641 a great quantity of Chinese man-power and to obtain control of
609 Chinese property and other wealth.[1] The Chinese, too, were forced
471 (so said the *Seng Hwo Pao*[2]) to buy Republican national loan.
439 Trade restrictions of every sort were introduced into the Republic, one after the other, but still the Chinese traders managed to make money by reason of their knowledge of the Indies. Later a number of them became rich by running the Dutch blockade to Singapore. This blockade would have been more effective had it not been for these Chinese blockade-runners whose activities aided the Republicans.

648 The split in China between the National Government and the
575 Communists tended to cause a similar, though naturally not quite so obvious a split in the ranks of the overseas Chinese of Indonesia. It was noticeable over the *Pao An Tuis* and it was noticeable again over Chiang Kai-shek's announcement of his anti-Communist drive. In Macassar, in November, there was an uproar in the local Kuomintang branch over a birthday cable to the Generalissimo. Mr Ong of the Chang Wang Hwee Kwan refused to sign the cable endorsing the drive on the ground that he must consult his association members first: the chairman of the Chinese Youth Association signed without consulting his members, which aroused great public indignation. Only 31 out of 60 associations signed; there was a banging of tables, breaking of glasses, and resort to blows!
[204] There was a similar disturbance in Cheribon. The *Seng Hwo Pao* published an attack on Dr Kan Yun, the director of the Overseas Affairs Commission of the Chinese Government, for saying: 'The Overseas Chinese were dispersed and murdered by the Indonesians and their property was burned because they did not support the Chinese Government and make sacrifices for it in their struggle against the Communist bandits.'

727 The entirely new situation in the Indies following on the Japanese surrender had profoundly shaken the position of the Chinese, but it had not in many essential respects altered their relative position in society, especially in the Dutch-controlled areas. In these areas, which were still much greater than the ones over which the Republic held sway, the old institutions remained intact.

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[1] *The Sing Ming* (monthly) described the law as a 'mortal blow to the Overseas Chinese'.

[2] 1 January 1948.

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At this point we must take leave of the Chinese of Indonesia and 600 pass to an examination of the fate of their brethren in other countries of Southeast Asia. We have followed their career—rather patchily and spasmodically at times be it admitted—for over three hundred years, and we have seen them suffer many vicissitudes.

*Income-tax Assessments and the Assessable Net Annual Income for Indonesia** 651

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Groups of income (annual income in guilders)	Assessments			Net annual income in 1,000 guilders		
	Europeans	Indonesians†	Chinese and other Asiatics	Europeans	Indonesians†	Chinese and other Asiatics
900‡–1,200	5,931	11,621	10,241	6,112	11,937	10,532
1,200–3,000	25,732	19,990	26,897	51,921	35,377	48,544
3,000–6,000	22,208	3,667	7,320	93,930	14,341	29,567
6,000–12,000	13,135	577	2,298	106,979	4,387	18,369
12,000–30,000	3,124	140	699	52,214	2,087	11,985
30,000–60,000	400	8	97	16,119	307	3,789
60,000–120,000	76	2	22	6,110	206	1,690
Above 120,000	19	1	..	3,370	137	..
Total 1938	70,625	36,006	47,574	336,755	68,779	124,476
900–1,200	6,018	11,953	10,889	6,224	12,359	11,191
1,200–3,000	26,080	19,324	27,202	52,549	34,327	49,145
3,000–6,000	23,679	4,053	7,251	100,338	15,871	28,997
6,000–12,000	13,947	648	2,044	113,629	5,028	16,258
12,000–30,000	3,110	127	572	51,709	1,920	9,797
30,000–60,000	323	4	82	12,832	151	3,324
60,000–120,000	76	2	16	5,687	192	1,189
Above 120,000	14	1	..	2,013	125	..
Total 1939	73,247	36,112	48,056	344,981	69,973	119,901

* Reproduced from *Statistical Pocket Book of Indonesia* (1941) p. 134.

† In this group the income from agriculture is exempt from income-tax.

‡ The number of persons assessed at an income under fl. 900 per annum is not stated in the table because the wages tax that became effective as from 1 January 1935 covered the taxes payable by those whose income did not exceed fl. 900 per annum.

They have been admired for their qualities, but more often tolerated for their usefulness and frequently blamed for the role they 181 have played. But it cannot be too much insisted that the Chinese had no part in establishing the system as it was. They took things as they found them, and when the pernicious tax farming was abolished and the credit system reformed they took readily to the healthier conditions of private enterprise. As society is reformed the Chinese, so it seems, will reform with it: by reason of their comparatively small numbers and their middle position they cannot

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181 take the lead. Their misfortune is that they have too often been made the scapegoats for the mistakes and the whipping-boy for the crimes of others.[1]

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114 [1] Mr George McT. Kahin points out certain omissions from this chapter
(due to the fact that the necessary information was not available to the author).
There is no mention, for example, of the relationships between the Chinese
426 dispenser of agrarian credit (the 'Tjina-mindering') and the Indonesian peasant
and of the important political currents generated thereby. An understanding of
665 this (Mr Kahin believes) is really basic to a realistic insight into post-war
Chinese-Indonesian relations. Nor is there mention of the important relation-
641 ship between the pre-war Partai Tiongwha Indonesia and the Chinese (*Pera-
nakan*) backers of the Republic. Mr Kahin also points out that a discussion of
the Republican citizenship law as it relates to the Chinese and the problems
raised by it would have been very desirable. Here again the author is limited by
the information accessible. There is undoubtedly room for a great deal of further
research. This survey aims merely at providing a framework.

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PART VIII

THE CHINESE IN THE PHILIPPINES

CHAPTER XLIX

DEMOGRAPHY

659 162 IN the 380-odd years that have elapsed since the Europeans first settled in the Philippines a great many enumerations of the Chinese community have been made, and within the last century and a half there have been periodic censuses of the entire population. Since the Chinese were at all times the object of suspicion on the part of the authorities, were subject to a poll-tax for centuries, and had often entered the country illicitly, they had every reason to conceal their numbers, and doubt has therefore been thrown on the accuracy of the counting of their heads. Moreover, since they suffered periodic purgings on a grand scale during the Spanish regime their numbers fluctuated violently, and during the present century they have been subjected to varying economic stresses and to war. Nevertheless, the estimates of so many independent observers do reveal a general truth, and if rectification is made for some obvious errors, figures not too far removed from the actual ones can be arrived at.

The above remarks apply in particular to the first century or so of the Spanish period, when the Chinese were to be found in a limited number of centres, especially Manila, and had not spread to every corner of the islands; but, in spite of the doubt cast on the more recent census figures by many authorities, it does not seem that an upward correction of more than 10 per cent. at the very most is necessary in the case of the more recent censuses. In support of this view the intercensal figures of the Philippines Bureau of Health, which are included in Table IV below, are from an unpublished report based on house-to-house investigations reported on by the district health officers of the provinces and the chief of police at Manila. Whatever the reliability of the method used at the censuses, it seems unlikely that an enumeration conducted on such principles should be grossly wrong.[1]

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204 [1] One rough pointer to the size of the Chinese community is the circulation of newspapers. In 1937 among the daily newspapers of the Philippines 8 were in

[p. 569]

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659 None the less, it would be well to indicate that misgivings as to the reliability of the censuses were widespread, even among experts, 162 and were encouraged by the fear, ever present in the Philippines, of a Chinese inundation. Mr H. L. May, the authority on opium, says:

> So little is known of the extent of the Chinese problem that the following estimates were given me by various official and semi-official sources: 40,000; 60,000; 70,000; 96,000; 130,000. From one source I learned that there were about 10,000 Chinese a year coming into Manila by means more or less legal, and almost 6,000 to 8,000 a year by that port. . . . The figure of 96,000 came from a Chinese source, but I am inclined to believe that the actual figure is somewhat larger.[1]

[167] There can be little doubt that illicit immigration was in 1949 higher than it has ever been, partly owing to the application of the quota of 1940, the refusal of the Philippine Government to 162 receive back Chinese displaced by the war, and (very probably) to the drive after the Second World War to get Chinese Leftists into the country in order to exercise political pressure and to prepare for overt acts of revolution. But the numbers were undoubtedly reduced by the war, and it does not seem likely that there were in 1949 many more Chinese in the Philippines than there were towards the end of the Spanish period. In any case, the proportion of Chinese to Filipinos is only about 1 to 150. In Malaya the Chinese are the most numerous community; in Siam there may be one Chinese to every four or five Siamese and other races; in Indonesia the ratio is about 1 to 50 or more. Therefore, the 'Chinese problem' in the Philippines is not one of threatened swamping by pure numbers of the indigenous peoples (even if the three-quarters of a million mestizos were included with the Chinese proper—which is not politically or otherwise justified), but arises from other factors.

In 1590 there were 3,000–4,000 Chinese in the Chinese quarter of Manila, not counting the 2,000 visitors during the trading season,

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[204] English (total circulation 85,000); 9 were in Spanish (total circulation 62,000); 2 were in Tagálog (total circulation 47,000); *5 were in Chinese (total circulation 32,000)*; 2 were in Japanese (total circulation 2,290); and 2 were in English and Spanish (combined circulation 1,800). J. R. Hayden, Ph.D., LL.D., *The Philippines: a Study in National Development* (New York, Macmillan, 1942) p. 611.

[64] In the Philippines the *jus sanguinis* was applied—even mestizos were regarded as foreigners until the third generation.

[1] H. L. May, *Survey of Opium Smoking Conditions in the Far East* (Opium Research Committee of Foreign Policy Association, 1927) p. 22. Walter Robb, 'The Chino in the Philippines', *Asia* (December 1921), says that the Chinese population was 70,000 to 80,000 *c.* 1920.

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with a total of 6,000–7,000 for the islands and by 1602 the number had increased to 30,000; the revolt and massacre of 1603 reduced the number to very few, and it did not revive to 8,000 until 1609; just before the second revolt and massacre of 1639 the total had increased again to 20,000–30,000 but the community was once more reduced to an extremely small figure when blood had ceased to flow. In 1662 there was once more a settlement of 15,000 in the Chinese quarter of Manila, the Parián, and although the ultimatum delivered to the Spaniards by the Chinese pirate, Koxinga, resulted in a drive against the Chinese, a large-scale massacre was averted, and some thousands were left in the Parián when the trouble had died down. In 1740, 20,000 were reported in Manila. A royal order for the expulsion of all Chinese was received in 1741 and again in 1747, but the orders were suspended in both cases. When in 1755 the order was renewed attempts were made to put it into effect, and after the British had occupied Manila many of the Chinese remaining in Luzon were massacred in 1763 for having sided with the enemy. In 1778 the expulsion order of 1769 was revoked and in 1804 it was decreed that only Chinese who were agriculturists or artisans should remain. Massacres, albeit on a much smaller scale than the wholesale killings of 1603 and 1639, continued as late as 1819 and 1820, and by 1828 Spanish policy had reduced the number of Chinese in the Philippines to 5,708, exclusive of mestizos, of whom 5,279 were in Tondo. By 1850, however, they had surpassed their former numbers, and there were said to be over 50,000 in the whole of the Philippines, including nearly 30,000 in the capital. The next great increase was between 1876 and 1886 when the figures rose from about 31,000 to 94,000.

It is at this point, however, that controversy intervenes. The Spanish census of 1886, as we see from Table IX, p. 580, showed 93,567 Chinese in the Philippines. Reyes Lala, *The Philippine Islands* (New York, 1899) pp. 104–6, says that there were at that time about 100,000 Chinese in the Philippines of whom 40,000 were in Manila. As against this, *The Census of the Philippines, 1903* (Washington, 1905) states as follows (pp. 38–9):

> Carlos Palanca, a Christian Chinaman, the most prominent Chinese merchant in the islands, and for forty-three years a resident, stated that he had twice been appointed Chinese captain, or headman of the Chinese, and prior to American occupation was acting Chinese consul; and that he had 40,000 Chinese under him, which included all in the

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162 Philippines, of whom 23,000 were in Manila at that time, June, 1899. As every Chinaman who arrived in or left the Islands was registered by the Chinese captain, these figures were probably correct.

Only four years after this the Americans conducted the census of 1903 which gave the number of Chinese in the Philippines as 41,035, and the census report remarked (p. 38), 'it is probable that the margin of error in the number of civilized Filipinos, Chinese, and other foreigners does not exceed a fraction of one per cent.'

When the United States Army took over control of the islands, the exclusion laws applying to Chinese in the United States were almost immediately extended to the Philippines and were continued after the end of the military period when the civil government took over in 1902. The effect of these laws was to prohibit Chinese immigration except for such groups as merchants and students, who were allowed temporary stay; but Chinese residents could bring in their families, and 'family' was liberally interpreted. Thus, when in 1940 a new immigration law was passed limiting to 500 a year the number of aliens of any one nationality to be admitted, the new law was regarded as much more restrictive than the old.[1]

The census of 1903, the first under the American regime, gave the number of Chinese in the Philippines as 41,035; that of 1918 placed their total at 43,802. If these censuses were anything like correct, then the estimate of 100,000 at the end of the Spanish period must have been very much out. It is scarcely conceivable that the Chinese population dropped by nearly 60 per cent. in the space of five years. The census of 1939 put the Chinese at 117,487 and, for reasons already given, it can be accepted as being not very far short of the truth. At the end of 1947 an official estimate of the Bureau of Immigration put the number at 100,971, a reduction of nearly 17,000 since before the Japanese war.[2]

In 1939 the Chinese consulate-general in the Philippines carried out a general registration of all Chinese resident in the islands. The registration fees were to have been used in the construction of

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[1] The exclusion laws were repealed in the United States in 1943. See K. S. Latourette, *The Chinese: Their History and Culture* (New York, Macmillan, 1906) p. 508.

[2] Mr Paul McNutt, former United States ambassador to the Philippines, said that in August 1947 there were 200,000 Chinese in the Philippines, but he gave no evidence in support of his estimate. *North China Daily News* (14 August 1947).

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a new consulate and therefore the registration was considered to have been more or less complete. The total Chinese counted are said to have been about 130,000, including 50,000 in Manila.[1] 162

Miss Catherine Porter says that at least a million Filipinos have Chinese ancestors.[2]

There has at all times been a large amount of illicit immigration into the Philippines, some of it via Borneo, and some via the northern tip of Luzon, as well as by other routes. After the Japanese surrender, UNRRA assembled and examined Chinese displaced by the war from Southeast Asian countries, and of these 7,600 were certified by them and by CNRRA as bona-fide pre-war residents of the Philippines. However, it was contrary to the policy of the Philippines Government (which was completely independent from 4 July 1946) to allow the mass entry of displaced Chinese who had, therefore, to take their turn on the small annual quota of 500. A good many of these persons have made their way back to the Philippines by devious and illicit means, and there is reason to suspect that Chinese Communists in considerable numbers were smuggled into the islands between 1946 and 1949 to soften up the political ground as a prelude, if possible, to revolution. 167

In addition to the illegal entry, there is a considerable amount of passing to and fro via the recognized ports. The following abstract gives a good idea of the outward flow of migration in the years 1930–46.

Data were presented in the 1939 census report for the brown, yellow, and white races. Separate data were also given for American negroes, negritos (aborigines), and mixed (mestizos). The census enumerators were instructed to classify as mixed or mestizos only persons whose fathers and mothers belonged to different races. The Chinese of mestizo parents were to be reported not as mestizos but according to their predominant race.[3] 162

For centuries the Chinese intermarried freely with the native community (following the general practice in the early days in

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[1] This information I received from Mr Chu-pei Chen who tells me that he himself checked the figures at the consulate in 1939. V. P.

[2] *Crisis in the Philippines* (New York, Knopf, 1942) p. 97.

[3] J. R. Hayden, Ph.D., LL.D., *The Philippines: A Study in National Development* (New York, Macmillan, 1942) p. 695. Through the centuries many Chinese mestizos have Hispanicized their names, e.g. Limjap, Cojuangco, and Golayco. The name of the President of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 1948 was Alfonzo Z. Sycip.

The great patriot and martyr, José Rizal, was of Chinese mestizo origin.

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TABLE VII

167 *The Philippines. Aliens coming from Foreign Countries by Nationality, 1930–46*[1]

	Total	*Immigrant*	*Non-immigrant*	*Total*	*Immigrant*	*Non-immigrant*
		1930			*1931*	
Total	26,622	12,323	14,299	20,348	7,036	13,312
Chinese	20,878	8,143	12,735	16,878	5,525	11,353
		1932			*1933*	
Total	21,389	7,427	13,962	20,293	7,155	13,138
Chinese	18,271	6,079	12,192	16,727	5,641	11,086
		1934			*1935*	
Total	19,596	7,381	12,215	19,727	6,046	13,681
Chinese	15,458	5,533	9,925	15,017	4,127	10,890
		1936			*1937*	
Total	25,649	8,445	17,204	30,036	10,620	19,416
Chinese	18,717	5,485	13,232	20,242	5,170	15,072
		1938			*1939*	
Total	22,998	9,551	13,447	13,002	2,670	10,332
Chinese	16,316	6,064	10,252	7,830	750	7,080
		1940			*1941 (1 Jan to 30 June)*	
Total	13,124	2,169	10,955	7,848	634	7,214
Chinese	9,138	1,382	7,756	5,669	422	5,247
		1945			*1946*	
Total	3	2	1	400	8	392
Chinese	2	2	..	216	4	212

162 Siam, Indonesia, and Indochina) and produced large groups of citizens of Filipino-Chinese blood which have been absorbed into the general population of the country. The number of Filipinos with a notable mixture of Chinese blood amounted in 1949 to at least three-quarters of a million.[2]

The residents of the islands were in the 1939 census report classified according to the country of which they were citizens. That is to say that, since the Philippines did not claim a Chinese as a citizen, there were none of the complications of dual nationality such as we encounter in Siam and Indochina, for the description deriving from the *jus sanguinis* is ethnic as opposed to national. But it must be

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[1] Abstracted from *Yearbook of Philippine Statistics, 1946* (Manila, Bureau of Printing, 1946) p. 231.

[2] The distribution of Chinese in the Philippines in 1918, 1933, and 1939 is set out in Table X, pp. 580–1.

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added that Philippine law recognizes the husband or wife of a Filipino as a Philippine citizen except when the spouse's native State has a law to the contrary. A Chinese remains a Chinese even after marriage until the Ministry of the Interior approves his or her application to renounce citizenship. (Such approval, if it has ever been given at all, must be very rare.)

In 1939 over 39 per cent. of the total Chinese population in the Philippines was resident in Manila, and 45·4 per cent. in Manila and the surrounding area. The only other communities over 3,000 strong were in Cebu, Davao, Iloilo, Leyte, Quezon (Tayabas), Rizal, and Zamboanga; in twenty of the other provinces the figure was from 1,000 to 2,000, but smaller communities were dotted all over the islands, and only one of the fifty-two provinces, Batanes, is shown to be without Chinese in the censuses and estimates from 1918 to 1947.

In 1939 citizens of China constituted the largest group of non-Philippine citizens, and they accounted for 70·9 per cent. of all foreigners in the Philippines. A large proportion of the group being males, most reported as married were married to Filipinos.[1]

The Chinese in the Philippines were about 75 per cent. Hokkiens (Fukienese) and about 25 per cent. Cantonese. The former predominated in all lines of business except grocery stores, hotels, and restaurants, in which undertakings the Cantonese were in the forefront.

In the Philippines the proportion of Chinese females to males was smaller than in any other country of Southeast Asia. In Siam in 1939 it was roughly 1 : 3, and in Malaya about the same; in Indonesia in 1930 it was 1 : 1·6 but in the Philippines it was only one female to every 3·3 males. Table VIII sets out the position.

Though the sexes of the Chinese were unbalanced, the ratio had greatly improved in the preceding two decades. In 1918 it had been about 1 : 13; in 1933, 1 : 5, and in 1939, 1 : 4. But while this could be described as a definite 'improvement' in the sex ratio in the case of,

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[1] Mr Chu-pei Chen remarks: 'Actually most Chinese in the Islands, though reported single, are married and have a family in China. With them early marriage is a common practice. In pre-war days, many Chinese bachelors in the islands went back to China to be married and then returned to the Philippines bringing their wives. It was generally believed that this practice was due to the fear of their parents, or close relatives, that if they married Filipino women their ties with the family would be loosened.'

162 say, Malaya, where there was practically no intermarriage between the races, and the preponderance of males had produced unstable social conditions, the increase of Chinese females was a very doubtful improvement in the case of Siam, Indonesia, and the Philippines, where there had been considerable intermarriage for centuries and assimilation was now being diminished by the importation of Chinese brides, and by the rise of nationalism which tended to discourage marriage with other races. This, as we now know, is very much a repetition of the story for the remainder of Southeast Asia.

TABLE VIII

Citizens of China classified by age-groups and sex for the Philippines, 1939

Age-group	*Both sexes*		*Males*		*Females*	
	No.	*Per cent.*	*No.*	*Per cent.*	*No.*	*Per cent.*
Total	117,487	100·0	90,007	100·0	27,480	100·0
Under 5 years	11,224	9·6	5,872	6·5	5,352	19·5
5–9 ,,	10,083	8·6	5,756	6·4	4,327	15·7
10–14 ,,	9,360	8·0	6,050	6·8	3·310	12·0
15–19 ,,	12,495	10·6	10,001	11·1	2,494	9·1
20–24 ,,	13,774	11·7	11,516	12·8	2,258	8·2
25–34 ,,	31,022	26·4	26,009	28·9	5,013	18·2
35–44 ,,	19,205	16·3	16,463	18·3	2,742	10·0
45–54 ,,	5,004	4·1	3,826	4·3	1,178	4·3
55–64 ,,	3,588	3·1	2,957	3·2	631	2·3
64 plus ,,	1,708	1·5	1,536	1·7	172	0·6
Age unknown	24		21		3	

TABLE IX

Chinese in the Philippines. Their Numbers at Different Periods[1]

(B & R = Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*)

Year		*Authority*
1570	'In the town lived 40 married Chinese and 20 Japanese', (i.e. in the native town of Manila).	Anonymous contemporary account, B & R. iii. 101.
c. 1572	'In Luzon the Chinese, all of them, number about 150.'	B & R. iii. 167.
1588	'Over thirty vessels have come here from that land China, bringing so many people that together with those living here, there are over 10,000 Sangleys now in this city.'	Letter from Manila Audiencia to Philip II, 25 June 1588, B & R. vi. 316.

[1] Compiled by the present writer.

1589	'About 4,000 men of that land [China] are here as a general rule, including merchants and workmen.'	Santiago de Vera to Philip II, 13 July 1589, B & R. vii. 89.
1590	'The Sangleys who live in this Parián number ordinarily between 3 and 4,000, not counting the 2,000 and more who come and go in ships. These, together with those residing in Tondo, and the fishermen and gardeners who live in this neighbourhood, number, according to the Dominican fathers who have them in their charge, from 6 to 7,000 souls.'	Bishop Salazar to Philip II, 24 June 1590, B & R. vii. 230.
1591	'The Chinese quarter of Parián contained some two hundred shops and a population of about 2,000.'	Report of the Encomiendas in the islands in 1591, B & R. viii. 97–8.
1597	'. . . the large number of Sangleys here (somewhat over 10,000)' (i.e. in Luzon).	Letter from Francisco Tello to Philip II, B & R. x. 259.
1599	(re the Parián) 'Its growth has increased to such an extent that more than three hundred houses of wood and cane have been built, and in them are more than 3,000 Sangleys.'	id., B & R. x. 42.
1600	'more than 15,000 Chinese live outside its [Manila's] walls.'	Oliver van Noordt (information obtained from a Chinese pilot) 24 October 1600, B & R. xv. 305.
1603	'There are always 8 to 10,000 of them.'	Benavides to Philip II, B & R. xii. 108.
	'The Chinese were more than 16,000; and these, added to those in the fleet, when it came from China, amounted to 20,000.'	Two letters from ecclesiastics, 15 December 1603, B & R. xii. 253.
	'Although it was agreed that there should not be more than four thousand Sangleys, yet there were found in the rising more than 18,000.'	Don Pedro de Acuña, 23 December 1603, B & R. xii. 168.
	Deaths in the insurrection '22–24,000' according to anonymous contemporary Spanish account. (Acuña, attempting to explain away the massacre in a letter to the Viceroy of Fukien, says the number killed was less than half the 30,000 alleged. B & R. xiv. 45.) Argensola, *Conquista de las Malucas* (B & R. xvi. 295) says 'more than 23,000 Chinese died and only five hundred are left for the galleys'.	B & R. xxix. 249.
1602 and 1622	Laws of these years limit the number of Chinese in the Philippines to 6,000 and that of Japanese to 3,000.	

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1605	1,500 'infidel Chinese' allowed to remain for rebuilding the burnt part of Manila. 'This number not to be exceeded.'	The licentiate Manuel de Madrid y Luna, 5 July 1605, B & R. xiv.
1606	'Not over 6,000 Chinese in the Parián.'	Ramon Jordana y Morera, *La Inmigración China in Filipinas*, 1888.
1609	'in the Alcayceria "more than four hundred shops and generally 8,000 men who trade therein".'	Argensola's *Conquistas*, published 1609, B&R. xvi. 296.
1621	'there are now more Chinese in the country than there were sixteen and a half years ago, when they revolted.'	Serrano to Philip, 30 July 1621, B & R. xx. 96–7.
1627	'Fire caught at one o'clock at night on March 13, in the Parián or Alcayceria of the Chinese, where more than 12,000 Chinese live.'	Relation of 1628–9 (unsigned), B & R. xxii. 211.
1634	'. . . between one of the churches (which is called Minondo [Binondo]) and the church of the Parián is generally a settlement of 20,000 or more Sangleys during the year.'	Salamanca to Philip IV, 10 August 1634, B & R. xxiv. 328.
1635	'in one village alone, which they call Parián, an arquebus-shot from the said city, more than 20,000 Chinese Indians called Sangleys have all come out from Great China and Japan.'	Juan Grau y Monfalcon to the King, 1635, B & R. xxv. 49.
1637	'so many Chinese are now in Manila that there are two villages: one that of Vinondoc [i.e. Binondo], which is near the city, and composed of married Christians, and the other the Parián in which live those who bring merchandise.'	id., memorial of 1637, B & R. xxvii. 114.
1638	'4–5,000 Chinese now paying the general licence fee of nine pesos less one real now living in the islands.'	Corcuera to Philip IV, 10 June 1638, B & R. xxvi. 140.
	In Parián 'usually 10,000 Chinese and at times as many as 20,000'.	Aduarte's *Historia*, B & R. xxxii. 76.
	25,000 to 30,000 in the Philippines (see under 1644).	Fiscal Don Sebastian Cavallero.
1639	Second great Chinese insurrection. 'Those who make the most careful estimate of the deaths of both sides state that the number of Spaniards who died in the war were about 40 or 45, and of Indians 300 . . . on the side of the enemy, they make the deaths approximately 22,000 to 24,000—including those who died in the provinces.'	Anon. Nov. 1639, B & R. xxix. 249.
1644	The privilege of remaining on the islands 'brings his Majesty according to the number of the Sangleys now, 120,000 pesos annually; in the years 1638 and 1639, when there were 25 or 30,000 Sangleys . . . these licences amounted to 230,000 pesos'.	Fiscal's Report on Sangley licences, 1644, B & R. xxxv. 190.

			Total population
c. 1649–61	'Usually 15,000 Chinese live there in the Parián.'	Bartolomé de Letona, *Description of the Philippine Islands*, La Puebla, Mexico, 1662, B & R. xxxvi. 200.	
c. 1678–90	'the number of Sangleys is less than ever . . . for it is supposed that their numbers do not reach the 6,000 which the royal decrees allow.'	*The Augustinians in the Philippines, 1670–1694* (Manila, 1718), B & R. xlii. 252.	
1662	Koxinga's ultimatum. Third insurrection, large-scale massacre averted by Governor; 2,000 Chinese pursued and killed in six months by Spanish and Tagálogs.		
1686	Insurrection. Wealthy Chinese remain loyal.		
1693	3,000 in Parián; formerly 4,000(?).[1]	Giovanni Gemelli-Careri.	
1740	'in the city of Manila it is said that there are at least 20,000 Chinese who constantly reside there.'	Anson's *Voyages* (Walter).	1,000,000 (1735) (Fray Juan de San Antonio est.)
1745	'Insurrection' falsely reported.		
1747	Royal order for expulsion of Chinese received, but suspended.		
1755	Order for expulsion reissued (515 Chinese Christians plus 1,000 who 'pretended to be studying the Chinese doctrine' exempted).		1,350,000 (Arguelles, est.)
1762–4	British occupy Manila.		
1763	Massacre of Chinese for supporting the British.		
1766	Chinese survivors rounded up for expulsion.		
1769	Many Chinese expelled under order of this year.		
1785 (25 Feb.)	New order for expulsion of the Chinese.		
1785 (1 April)	Order approving Chinese colonization in certain islands.		
1790 (14 May)	Capitation tax of six pesos ordered for Chinese.		
1788	Order of 1769 revoked.		
1804	Order that only Chinese who are agriculturists or artisans may remain in the Philippines.		
1807	4,700 Chinese on the registers, but with those 'wandering about' the total was estimated at 7,000.	Thomas de Comyn (1820).	
1828	5,708 Chinese in the Philippines: 5,279 in Tondo, the rest in Cavite and other parts of Luzon.	Manuel Buzeta, cited by 1903 Census Report, 135.	1,741,000 (Census 1805) 2,593,000 (Acafo 1818, est.)

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[1] Very likely an under-estimate, but is included as by a contemporary observer. But see footnote 1 on p. 604 regarding Gemelli-Careri's credibility.

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1842	10,000 Chinese in the Philippines and 240,000 Mestizos de Sangley.	Sinibaldo de Mas, *Informe sobre el Estado de las Islas Filipinas, en 1842*, p. 138.	3,815,878 (Census 1850) 4,500,000 (est. 1860)
1876	30,797 Chinese in the Philippines.	Ramon Jordana y Morera.	4,712,000 (Census 1870)
1886	93,567 Chinese in the Philippines.	Census.	5,985,000 (Census 1886)
1899	40,000 Chinese in the Philippines; 23,000 in Manila. Census Report 1903, p. 39, says these figures were probably correct', but Reyes Lala, *The Philippine Islands* (New York, 1899) pp. 104–6, says 40,000 in Manila and 100,000 in the Philippines.	Carlos Palanca (Chinese captain) cited in 1903 Census Report (pub. 1905) i. 38–9.	
1903	41,035 Chinese in the Philippines.	Census.	6,988,000 (Census)
1918	43,802 (40,704 males: 3,098 females).	Census.	10,314,000 (Census)
1933	71,638 (59,054 males; 12,584 females)	Bureau of Health.	
1939	117,487 (90,007 males; 27,480 females).	Census.	16,000,000 (Census)
1947	100,971.	Immigration Bureau.	19,511,000

Total population is given in round figures.

Table X

Chinese in the Philippines. Distribution 1918, 1933, 1939, and estimated total for 1947

Provinces	*1918*		*1933*		*1939*
	Males	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*	*Both sexes*
Abra	18	1	29	3	66
Agusan	59	5	154	25	351
Albay	1,153	82	1,063	210	1,895
Antique	124	2	291	146	215
Bataan	21	..	30	3	55
Batanes	..	..	..	..	..
Batangas	318	15	420	64	741
Bohol	255	29	360	109	840
Bukidnon	5	..	34	2	106
Bulacan	207	13	329	64	464
Cagayan	692	53	1,082	441	1,404
Camarines Norte	1,037	38	301	109	1,220
Camarines Sur			990	207	2,087
Capiz	284	41	408	100	715
Cataduanes	227	4	210	28	..
Cavite	456	17	509	36	1,204
Cebu	1,509	153	2,215	482	6,117
City of Baguio	•	•	343	101	•
Cotabato	146	5	567	75	1,591
	6,511	458	9,335	2,205	19,071

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Provinces	1918 Males	1918 Females	1933 Males	1933 Females	1939 Both sexes
Brought forward	6,511	458	9,335	2,205	19,071
Culion I. Colony	†	†	36	2	†
Davao	743	19	1,706	213	3,595
Ilocos Norte	105	4	284	31	424
Ilocos Sur	245	6	472	66	717
Iloilo	1,560	133	3,578	321	3,511
Isabela	472	29	635	72	1,778
La Union	160	18	297	84	458
Laguna	946	21	1,171	269	1,939
Lanao	117	27	169	51	567
Leyte	2,147	99	1,986	571	3,070
MANILA, City of	16,136	1,624	23,357	5,502	46,233
Marinduque	189	20	263	114	557
Masbate	184	19	299	68	731
Mindoro	108	1	248	49	513
Misamis Occ.	621	71	483	74	1,049
Misamis Ortl.			686	142	1,512
Mountain Province	180	10	54	14	1,212
Negros Occ.	824	34	1,481	129	2,679
Negros Ortl.	385	7	637	127	1,125
Nueva Ecija	442	34	761	134	1,361
Nueva Vizcaya	10	..	69	14	273
Palawan	128	1	142	36	368
Pampanga	473	28	588	70	1,301
Pangasinan	643	50	823	180	1,800
Quezon (Tayabas)	1,208	66	2,117	627	4,069
Rizal	623	22	1,529	226	5,431
Romblon	113	6	158	48	214
Samar	1,451	57	1,052	135	1,956
Sorsogon	892	26	854	178	1,451
Sulu	687	67	666	391	1,294
Surigao	395	17	522	108	1,115
Tarlac	326	34	677	112	1,359
Zambales	395	30	143	74	581
Zamboanga	1,280	60	1,776	147	4,167
Total	40,699	3,098	59,054	12,584	90,007 males 27,480 females
	43,797		71,638		117,487

1947 Total Chinese in the Philippines 100,971.

* Included in the Mountain Province. † Included in Palawan.

1918, 1939 figures from census of these years.

1933 figures from an unpublished report of the Philippines Bureau of Health, based on house-to-house investigations reported upon by district health officers in the provinces, and the chief of police, Manila.

1947 total from an official estimate of the Philippines Bureau of Information.

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CHAPTER L

THE CHINESE UNDER THE SPANISH REGIME, 1570–1603

648 CHINESE intercourse with the Philippines goes back at least 700 years.[1] The *Ming Shih* (chap. 323, p. 11a) relates that in 1405 the Emperor Yung Lo sent to Luzon a high officer who was to govern the country. Berthold Laufer remarks, 'How long Yung Lo's delegate remained in the island and what character his jurisdiction was are not narrated, but it is not at all incredible that the ambitious Yung Lo exercised a kind of supremacy, or at least claimed a prerogative of protection, over the Philippine Islands; for since its establishment the rule of the Ming dynasty had been characterized by a tendency towards expansion, from a desire to extend its fame over land and sea to the furthest extremities of the world.'[2] Laufer also says that there can be no doubt that there was a colony of Chinese on Luzon before the arrival of the Spaniards, as is clearly stated in the *Ming Shih* (chap. 323, p.11b)[3] and indeed (see Table IX, p. 576) a small colony of forty Chinese is noted in Manila by a Spanish eye-witness of 1570. However, the nature and extent of Chinese pre-Spanish connexion with the Philippines are a matter of dispute among the experts, and it is convenient for us to start our narrative with the arrival of the Spaniards.[4] Our

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[1] Hayden, op. cit. p. 692.

[2] Berthold Laufer, 'The Relations of the Chinese to the Philippines', *Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections* (quarterly issue) (Washington, 13 September 1907) l. 257.

[3] ibid. p. 258.

174 [4] The following extracts from the booklet, *Early History of Philippine Relations with Foreign Countries, especially China*, by H. Otley Beyer, Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, University of the Philippines (Manila, National Printing Co., 1948), will be of interest to the student of this question, for Mr Beyer has been able to rely, *inter alia*, on archaeological work done in the Philippines in the twenty years preceding 1948.

> 'It is improbable that many Chinese ships were engaged in this trade during the early period (at least before the late 11–12th century part of it), and it is unlikely that there were any Chinese resident in the islands at that time . . .' (p. 4). [re 12th–14th centuries] 'Chinese merchant colonies began to establish themselves in a few places where a fairly strong or well-organized native government gave prospect of protection' (p. 5). 'With the death of Cheng Ho, however, and the passing of the Yung Lo regime, this Chinese attempt at dominion overseas also passed away . . .' (p. 6). [re A.D. 1430–50]

sources are to be almost exclusively European, mainly Spanish, 648 from the establishment of Manila in 1571, for, in the words of Professor C. R. Boxer:

> Confucian scholars would have scorned to chronicle the adventures of stray coolies or fisher-folk amongst the hairy barbarians of the West so we cannot expect to find anything of importance in the Chinese annals. It is to European sources that we must turn exclusively for information about the doings of the Celestial waifs and strays in the Outer World during the late Ming and early Manchu periods.[1]

Which is no doubt an exaggeration (as we see from the writings of Laufer, Duyvendak, and others), but it correctly reflects the indifference of the Chinese mandarinate to the unfilial and (to them) impersonal emigrants.

Miguel Lopez de Legaspi landed at Cebu on 27 April 1565 and established the city of Manila in June 1571. The first conflict between the Spanish and the Chinese was at Mindoro in May 1570. The Chinese junks came out side by side with their foresails up, beating on drums, playing on fifes, firing rockets and culverins, and making a great warlike display. But they were defeated in the affray and about twenty of the Chinese were killed.[2] In November 1574 the Chinese outlaw, Lim Ah Hong, usually known as Limahon,[3] in command of sixty-two war junks, captured a Chinese merchant vessel off the coast of Luzon. From the crew he gained information about the wealth of Manila and its military weakness due to the temporary absence of the Spanish forces on a distant expedition. The Chinese landed at Parañaque, eight miles south of Manila,

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'As Mohammedan influence spread eastward through the southern Philippines, and northward from Borneo into Luzon, the Siam and Indo-China trade was at first cut off, while the Chinese merchant vessels were forced to seek new trading routes leading around the eastern side of Luzon, and into the eastern Visayan Islands etc., where Islamic beliefs had not yet penetrated'. . . (p. 7). 'While the Chinese settlers intermarried freely in the country, built good houses, and taught their families better ways of living, they were not otherwise interested in converting or spreading new ideas among the native folk. Their influence was chiefly economic, and aside from the brief period of Yung Lo's empire, they made no attempt to meddle or interfere with native political institutions, social customs, or beliefs . . .' (p. 8). 174

[1] C. R. Boxer, 'Notes on Chinese Abroad in the late Ming and Early Manchu Periods, compiled from Contemporary European Sources', *T'ien Hsia Monthly* (1939) p. 447–8.

[2] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. iii. 75.

[3] His name was (in the mandarin dialect) Lin Tao-K'ien or Linfung; Lim Ah Hong was the form of the latter in the Amoy dialect. Laufer, op. cit. p. 259.

surprised and killed the Spanish captain Goiti, and were prevented from taking Manila only by the arrival of the Captain Juan de Salcedo who relieved the Spanish garrison besieged in the citadel. Limahon established himself in a fortified camp in the delta of the Agno river in the province of Pangasinan but he was driven out by Salcedo. Through mismanagement, the Spanish failed to follow up their success and the Chinese eventually departed from Luzon.[1]

The following year (1575) two ships arrived from the Viceroy of Fukien with an envoy named Omocon. The mission was received by the Spanish Governor, Labezares, who considered it his principal task to entertain peaceful and amicable relations with an empire whose very pirates were able to rock the Spanish power in Asia. Laufer says that the commander (Omocon), charmed with the chivalrous character and generosity of the Spaniards, offered to take Spanish envoys over to China in his ship. The embassy sent in consequence of this invitation consisted of two military officers and two Augustinian friars, Martín de Rada and Jerónimo Marín. They were, however, unsuccessful in their mission although they humiliated themselves so far as to perform the kowtow before the Viceroy, and they returned to Manila in October 1575 accompanied by the Chinese envoy, Omocon, and three Chinese captains who had come to take Limahon back to China in chains. These officers brought rich presents for Labezares, but as he had now been succeeded as Governor by Francisco de Sande the Chinese refused, without due authority from their Viceroy in China, to hand their gifts over to de Sande. Offended at this, he from that day showed such an antipathy towards everything Chinese that he endangered the interests of the Spanish crown by his narrow-minded policy.[2]

Labezares said that the Chinese were 'mean, impudent, importunate, and deceitful'. Omocon wanted de Sande to write to China saying that Limahon was dead, but the Governor replied that the Castilians did not know how to lie, and that he could not discuss such trivial matters.[3]

[1] W. Cameron Forbes, *The Philippine Islands* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1945) p. 24. Francisco de Sande himself, in his Relation of 7 June 1576 (Blair and Robertson, op. cit. iv. 38 ff.) gives an account of the Limahon affair from which the last statement above is extracted.

[2] op. cit. p. 260–1, apparently following Gaspar de San Augustan, *Conquistas de las Islas Filipinas* (Madrid, 1698) via F. Blumentritt, *Die Chinesen auf den Philippinen* (Leitmeritz, 1879).

[3] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. iv. 49.

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The Chinese were known to the Spanish at a very early period as 439 Sangleys, which (according to Laufer) is from the Amoy word *Seng-li*, meaning 'trade'.[1] They had been carrying on trading voyages with the Philippines for many years before the Spanish occupation, but the number of these greatly increased as a result of the arrival of the Spaniards. Bishop Salazar, writing to Philip II of Spain in 1590, stated that the Parián, or Chinese quarter, contained a population of between 3,000 and 4,000 in the ordinary way, not counting the 2,000 and more who came and went in the annual shipping season. The total in city and suburbs was from 6,000 to 7,000 souls.[2]

The Chinese were the principal artisans and labourers and built 463 many of the old churches, convents, and forts which were still standing up to the closing phases of the Second World War, while Chinese carpenters, tailors, cobblers, and craftsmen were mainly responsible for supplying the daily household wants of the Spanish community. It is probable, too, that a Chinese was the first printer in the Philippines.[3]

Bishop Salazar's *Relación*, or Report to his royal master, of the 439 609

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[1] But the author has seen a fine Spanish manuscript volume of 1590, the property of Professor C. R. Boxer, in which, obviously by a Chinese hand, there is a coloured picture of Chinese with the title 'Sangleys' and in Chinese 常來, which means 'frequently coming'. See C. R. Boxer, 'A Late Sixteenth Century Manila MS.', in *JRAS*, Pts. 1 & 2, 1950.

This alternative explanation, however, though based on this undoubtedly contemporary evidence, does not appear a reasonable one to the author, while the one given in the text above is certainly so.

[2] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. vii. 32.

But from Table IX it will be seen that writing in 1588 the bishop had estimated the total Chinese, during the trading season, at over 10,000.

The Chinese were transferred to the Parián by Diego de Ronquillo, Governor *ad interim* 1583–4.

[3] Boxer, op. cit. p. 458–9, says: 'Books printed included works in Spanish, Chinese, and local dialects such as Tagal.' See also under *Doctrina Christiana* in the List of Authorities at end of this survey.

Salazar (letter of 24 June 1590, Blair and Robertson, op. cit. vii. 226) says: 'What has pleased us all has been the arrival of a bookbinder from Mexico. He brought books with him, set up a bindery, and hired a Sangley who offered his services to him. The Sangley secretly, and without his master noticing it, watched the latter bind the books, and lo, in less than [blank space in original] he left the house, saying that he wished to serve him no longer, and set up a similar shop. I assure Your Majesty that he had become so excellent a workman that his master has been forced to give up the business, because the Sangley has drawn all the trade. His work is so good that there is no need of the Spanish tradesman. At the time of writing, I have in my hand a Latin version of Nabarro, bound by him, and it could not be better bound, even in Seville.'

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439 609 year 1583, illustrates the narrow policy of the civil authorities in a striking manner, as may be seen from the following extract:[1]

> Commerce with the Sangleys has always been considered of the first importance, on account not only of its value in supplying provisions to this town and for maintaining its foreign connexions, but also because of the expectations for the future to which it gives rise, namely, that through it we may even obtain a foothold in that great realm [China] which is the end desired by us beyond all other things. This commerce has, however, failed so dismally that we fear that next year the Sangleys may not return, or if they do, it will not be in such great numbers as heretofore, or that even if they do come they will not want to sell their merchandise at the same prices as before because of the ill-treatment they have suffered here—and because of the disorder there has been.
>
> During the last two years they have become more and more irritated, the reason being that whereas they had paid nothing in taxes before, an anchorage tax was afterwards imposed on them. This tax was imposed more as a recognition of their presence than with any hope of gain. Last year and this they were required to pay three per cent, from which demand has proceeded many of their grievances. The long and the short of it was that they were ordered to repair a palisaded house which was turned into a tax-collecting office. They went there very much against their will, and were made by the shops to pay higher prices than they would have had to have done outside. A warder was placed over them with power of punishment, and in this place, according to what they say, they suffered many wrongs, and were much molested; indeed, for very little cause they were put in the stocks and fined, and they were fined furthermore for going out to buy provisions by night, or for not keeping their quarters and equipment clean. Under the pretext of exacting dues for Your Majesty, they were forbidden to sell anything without first registering it, and since the best of what they had was taken away from them when they went to register it, and they were compensated for this at prices fixed by the inspector or his registrar, they hid some pieces of silk in order to sell them at a better price or to persons to whom they had been promised. As a result they were heavily penalised as if they had been under this obligation for many years instead of being only the first or second time they had heard of it.

609 The bishop goes on to refer to a case when Don Antonio Yofre, the Treasurer, ordered a Chinese who had hidden certain pieces of

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[1] Based on a translation of *Relación de las cosas de Las Filipinas hecha por Fr. Domingo de Salazar, Primer obispo de dichas islas, publicada ahora por primera vez* (Madrid, 1847), by H. D. Purcell, compared with that in Blair and Robertson, op. cit. v. 236 ff.

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silk to be arrested and then sentenced him to a hundred lashes and a fine of 75 tostons. The brother of the Chinese had gone to the bishop, and upon the latter's plea the lashes had been remitted, but the Chinese had had to pay the fine before he could leave the prison. 'So many suffer from personal wrongs', says the bishop, 'that I am sorry for them.' Other impositions suffered by the Chinese included the forcible confiscation of their merchandise by officers who kept it for themselves; other Chinese were given in exchange for their goods official *vales*, or promissory notes, which were later dishonoured. The result of all this was that although twenty Chinese junks had arrived that year, a larger number than had been seen in Manila for some time, China goods were available only at excessive prices. A piece of satin which used to cost 10 to 12 tostons had fetched up to 40 or 45, and even at that price had not been easy to come by, even for the church, which was in dire need, for it had not been possible to get enough silk to make ornamental hangings. And it was the same with all the other things that used to come from China and were sold freely in the streets.

The evil (said Bishop Salazar) did not stop here, for the Chinese traders were compelled to perform sentry duty, just as the soldiers did, and in order not to leave their goods to be stolen they paid a soldier 1 toston (the equivalent of 4 reals) for his services as sentry. The latest imposition, which was really the last straw, occurred when a galley was being sent to Japan and the Spaniards seized twenty or thirty of the Chinese who had come to Manila that year and put them forcibly to the oars. Many went to the bishop to complain, saying that they had come to Manila in order to earn something wherewith to feed their children, and, since they were not allowed to do so, could they please go back to their own country. 'But this talk', says the bishop, 'profited neither myself nor them, for though they went back to China they soon returned.' With all this the prosperous settlement of Chinese which used to be on the other side of the river had practically ceased to exist.

As Jan Pietersen Coen, the founder of Batavia, did half a century later, the Spaniards impressed Chinese into their service just as it suited their convenience. The Governor, Santiago de Vera, in a letter to Philip II, dated 26 June 1588,[1] reporting that he had had a galley built, stated that he had tried to keep up its crew by hiring men, but the natives were such a despicable lot of people that they

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[1] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. vii. 52.

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609 were of little use for the purpose, nor had they sufficient strength for rowing. On hearing the report of an arquebus they threw themselves on the ground, and did not even rise at the sting of the lash! De Vera then selected 300 Chinese, who were stronger, and who, if allowed liberty to quit this work at their pleasure, would nevertheless bind themselves to work in the galleys. 'But', he adds, 'though earnest endeavours have been made to teach them, they row very badly and have as little energy as have the natives of these Islands.' (A case, it seems, of sixteenth-century Chinese ca'canny.)

De Vera's enlistment of Chinese was, according to him, not forcible, but his successor, Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas, a year or two later, having a large army ready for the conquest of the Moluccas but not enough rowers for his galleys, seized by force any Chinese he could lay hands on in the Parián, and had them chained to the oars of the galleys.[1] Later on, however, these Chinese working under the lash rose to a man, and the Governor and his companions were all killed.[2]

The Chinese, resorting to Manila in such numbers and expanding their trade among the natives of the Philippines, soon aroused the anxiety of the Spanish authorities. Governor Dasmariñas (who later came to so sad an end), writing to King Philip in June 1592, said: 'With Your Majesty's permission, I must state that I regret the trade of the Chinese, for it seems to me injurious. It might be forbidden them on the ground of the great sums of money taken from the islands to foreign countries.'[3]

439 Most of the trade was in cotton stuffs, the raw cotton being taken from the Philippines to China and brought back woven. The Governor had already confirmed an ordinance issued by the city of Manila forbidding the 'Indians' (Filipinos) to wear Chinese stuffs.[4] In justification it was pointed out that when the Spanish discovered the islands the natives wore no other garments than those made there, planting cotton for their own use, and continued to do so for many years. But they now used Chinese stuffs and silks. Formerly, where the Chinese carried away in payment for their clothing 30,000

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[1] Antonio de Morga, *The Philippine Islands* (London, Hakluyt Society, 1868) p. 35.

[2] The *Ming Shih* (History of the Ming Dynasty) under the 8th month of the 21st year of the period Wan-li (1593) records that a Chinese, P'an Ho-wu, stabbed the Philippines Governor, Dasmariñas. Laufer, op. cit. pp. 261, 262.

[3] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. viii. 269.

[4] ibid. p. 78.

pesos annually, they now took annually 200,000 pesos. 'This money 439 leaves the realm of His Majesty, and is carried to a foreign country, in violation of the royal edicts.' This could all be prevented if the natives were forbidden to clothe themselves in these Chinese textiles. Native stuffs, it was argued, were in any case better woven and more economical than the Chinese. Moreover, if the natives were to apply themselves to other things instead of producing raw cotton for the Chinese, there would be something for the Spanish to export. This was the purport of the evidence of Filipino witnesses examined in relation to the new ordinance.

The difficulty (said Dasmariñas) in dealing with the problem of the Chinese trade was the interference and obstruction of the bishop and the clergy.[1] No sooner was it decreed that the 'Indians', in order that they might cultivate and weave their own cotton, since it was so abundant in the country, should not wear Chinese silks and other stuffs, than the bishop declared that 'nothing could be worse'. No sooner was the excise, or the 'merchant's peso', or the 2 per cent. duty imposed, than the bishop would declare the order to be against the Papal bull *De Cena Domini* ('Of the Lord's Supper'). It was a hard life for a Governor in a State where the clerical arm was so powerful.

When Bishop Salazar arrived in Manila he found that in Tondo, 441 then a village across the river from the Spanish town of Manila, many Chinese were living, some of whom were Christian but most infidels. In Manila itself there were some shops kept by the Chinese, but these people had no special quarter assigned to them and were scattered among the Spaniards until Don Gonçalo Ronquillo allotted them a place to live in, built under the guns of the fort. It contained four 'great quarters' to be used as a silk market (the Alcayceria), and it was called the Parián.[2] All Chinese, except such as were married to Filipino women, were required to live and conduct their business there. Here many shops were opened, commerce increased, and more Chinese came to the city. 'Anxious for the conversion of the people', says the bishop, 'I soon cast my eyes upon them, and took precautions to see that they were well treated.'[3]

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[1] Dasmariñas says, of the Bishop, 'I have never seen a man more peculiar or inconsiderate and obstinate in his opinions, who even does not hesitate to oppose the right of patronage, the jurisdiction, and the exchequer of Your Majesty.' Blair and Robertson, op. cit. viii. 276.

[2] Alcayceria (silk market) was often used by metonymy for the whole of the Parián.

[3] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. vii. 220.

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439 The early writers are fond of repeating that from China came not only finished silks and costly wares which in part were destined for the trade to New Spain and Europe, but also cattle, horses and mares, foodstuffs, metals, fruits, and even ink and paper. 'And what is more', says Chirino, 'from China come all who supply every sort of service, all dextrous, prompt, and cheap.' The Chinese were everything from physicians to bakers and porters; they were the tailors and shoemakers, the metal workers, the silversmiths and sculptors, the locksmiths, the painters, the masons, and the weavers, and they performed 'every kind of service in the commonwealth'. They made chairs, bridles, and stirrups of so good a quality and so cheaply that some merchants wished to load a cargo of these articles for Mexico.[1] They baked bread at low cost, and also sold fowls, eggs, and fish, and wood split for fuel.

609 The story as it unfolds in the Philippines is one that will be repeated in essence throughout Southeast Asia: that is to say, of an initial welcome to the Chinese, on the part of the metropolitan Power because of their undeniable qualities of energy and skill, followed by fear and suspicion; the two attitudes afterwards alternating or being adopted simultaneously. Bishop Salazar, as we have seen, favoured the Chinese, and, before him, Salcedo, on his first punitive expedition to Mindoro, when he found a Chinese junk which had gone ashore on the west coast, was careful to rescue the voyagers and return them to their own land with a friendly message inviting trade relations. Governor Labezares invited Chinese friendship and intercourse, but the hostility of de Sande, his successor, was engendered against them for reasons above related.

In 1597 we find the Governor, Francisco Tello, writing to the King:

> When I came to the government I found the Sangleys had been given a free hand and jurisdiction on the administration of the *cabildo* [municipal council]. Considering the troubles that might result and the large numbers of Sangleys here (somewhat over 10,000) I took away and withdrew their power in the administration, leaving, however, a governor among them as was formerly the custom. I have expelled from the country a large number of Sangleys who were here, and I shall soon order others to go, leaving only 3–4,000 men who are necessary for the service of the country.[2]

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[1] Bishop Salazar, letter of 24 June 1590. Blair and Robertson, op. cit. vii. 212–38.

[2] In the same letter (29 April 1597, Blair and Robertson, op. cit. x. 42) the

In May 1603, not long after one of the numerous great fires in the Parián, three Chinese mandarins arrived at Manila. (Usually thirty ships or more came during the season, but this year there were only fourteen.) The mandarins sent a letter to the Governor stating that a Chinese named Tio Heng had told their Emperor that in the port of Cavite there was a hill of gold which had no owner, and the Emperor had sent them to ascertain the truth. They landed on 23 May, wearing all their badges and other signs of office as they were accustomed to do in China, and were attended by alguacils, executioners, and other officers with wands and cords, and when they landed they received much reverence from the Chinese population. They also had a box in which they carried their seals and patents of their appointments.[1] The three mandarins behaved exactly as if they were on Chinese territory and administered a flogging to any one of their race they considered deserving of it. However, the Governor was angry with Jerónimo Salazar y Salcedo, the Fiscal, for petitioning the Audiencia to stop the mandarins flogging Chinese.

This absurd mission inflamed the already active suspicions of the Spaniards, who expected that the arrival of the mandarins foreshadowed a Chinese attempt to oust them from the Philippines, while the Chinese in their turn felt that the Spaniards were on the point of attacking them.[2] On the eve of St Francis's Day, at about 11 p.m., the Chinese of the Parián revolted. Banners were raised and war gongs were beaten. The rebels chose for a leader a Christian Chinese named Juan Untae, or Juan Bautista de Vera. That night the pueblos of Quiapo and Tondo were burned and many Spaniards were murdered. Chinese gathered on the other side of the river to the number of 10,000 to 12,000. They burned several houses and the orchard of a citizen, Estevan de Marquiña, killing him and his wife and four children, and several servants. Two Spaniards, Luis Péres Dasmariñas and Tomás Bravo, who had been across the river to quell the revolt, and about one hundred other Spaniards were slain. Drawing lots to ascertain whether their attack would succeed, the Chinese insurgents decided to advance

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Governor mentions that about two months before the Parián had been burned with a large amount of property in it. Fires were frequent in the Parián during the Spanish period.

[1] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xii. 83.

[2] See Charles Burke Elliott, *The Philippines to the End of the Military Regime* (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill Co.,

against the city. But their assault was thrown back (the priests said it was owing to the apparition of St Francis on the walls), they were dislodged from their earthworks, and a general slaughter ensued. About 23,000 Chinese are said to have been killed.[1]

Immediately their blood lust had subsided, the Spanish dispatched letters to the Chinese Emperor explaining away the massacre, stating that the Chinese revolted without provocation. These letters were apparently sent through the Portuguese at Macao, but it seems that they were not delivered. Later the Emperor demanded redress, but he did not seem to attach too much importance to the loss of a few thousand disloyal exiles. By February 1605 we find that the Spaniards had recovered their self-confidence (if they had ever lost it), for a formal complaint was made against the Chinese by Archbishop Benavides, supported by the depositions of several witnesses. The Parián, it appears, had now been rebuilt, and was again peopled by 'infidel Sangleys'. The Chinese (said the complaint) were idolatrous and exceedingly licentious and vicious, and in both these respects were demoralizing the natives and drawing them away from the Catholic faith. The Chinese, moreover, were inclined to avenge themselves on the Spaniards for the slaughter of 1603, and this was a constant source of danger. The Archbishop recommended that they be driven out of the city except that they be allowed a space where they could live during the months while the ships for the Mexican trade were being unloaded and reloaded, but that they should not be allowed to hold intercourse with the natives. The Japanese (the complaint adds), who lived not far away from the Chinese, were equally vicious and dangerous.[2]

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[1] See Table IX, p. 577. The authorities for the rebellion are notably Antonio de Morga's *Sucesos* (Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xv. 273) and Argensola's *Conquistas* (ibid. p. 295). See also *Relación verdadera del levantamiento de los Sangleyes en las Filipinas, y el milagroso castigo de su rebelión*, &c., by a soldier who found himself in these islands at the time, retold by Miguel Rodríguez Maldonado (Seville, 1606).

[2] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xiii. 271.

Colonel Fernandez de los Rios, who in 1603 was in China as the ambassador of the Governor of the Philippines, wrote the following to Manila, '. . . it seems that every Sangley is a fiend in human form, for there is no fraud or evil deed to which he will not stoop. This is brought out in my daily experience.' Ramon Jordana y Morera, *Inmigración China en Filipinas* (Madrid, G. Hirandez, 1888) p. 26. De Morga, on the other hand, is sensible of the value of the Chinese and says that 'after the end of the war the need of the city began, because of not having Chinese who worked at the trades, they had no food, no shoes to wear, not even at excessive prices'.

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Backing up the extreme view of the flagitious nature of the 609
Chinese and their deleterious influence, a contemporary Spanish writer says that the Sangleys are the people who, 'the less they are admitted, the better will it be for us in every respect'.[1]

Archbishop Benavides, however, later relented, and in June 1605 appealed to the Audiencia to accede to the demands of the Chinese Emperor (which apparently had now been made) by making restoration to Chinese merchants of their property which, left in Manila at the time of the insurrection, had been sold to the Spanish, and by sending back to their own country those Chinese survivors of the rebellion who had been sentenced to the galleys. At the same time a letter sent to Acuña in March 1605 'by a Chinese official' was now answered by the Governor in a letter in which he blamed the Portuguese for not having delivered the letter containing excuses after the insurrection and massacre. The Governor renewed the excuses, emphasized the kindness of the Spanish Government to the Chinese, and asserted that they revolted without provocation.[2]

After the massacre of 1603 the Spaniards felt the loss of the Chinese, not only because they relied on them for all trades and services, but also because the Filipinos (as de Morga lamented) were unable to replace them even in agriculture, and had forgotten much of their husbandry, the rearing of fowls, flocks, and cotton, and the weaving of clothes, which they used to do in the time of their paganism.[3]

Soon the Chinese in the Parián were nearly as numerous as before.

A word or two may be said here regarding the Chinese in the 797
Philippines and the Christian religion.

To the Spanish, as to the Portuguese, the conversion of the heathen in their eastern possessions was second not even to their hope of worldly gain. Thus (as Bishop Salazar states in his letter to Philip II, quoted above) the Philippines were important, not only for the opportunity that their possession afforded for saving the souls of the natives, but also as a stepping-stone to the 'great kingdom' of China.

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[1] *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas* (Mexico, 1609). Translated in Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xvi. 173.

[2] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xiv. 45.

[3] Laufer, op. cit. p. 278.

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797 In 1588 the Governor, Santiago de Vera, complained that the friars had neglected his commands to learn the Chinese language and to instruct the Chinese who lived in these islands in Christianity. The Dominicans alone had entered this field and had achieved great results; there was already among the Chinese 'a village of Christians', and many more would be converted (said de Vera) if it were not for the bishop's order that the long hair of the converts should be cut off.[1] Only a few years after the foundation of Manila the Augustinians had made a bold attempt to gain entry into China to preach the gospel. They had, indeed, as proof of their zeal, offered to become slaves to the Chinese merchants visiting Manila in return for being given a chance of entry into China. Not one of their attempts, however, being successful, they prayed God to reveal to them a better way of achieving their purpose.[2]

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[1] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. vii, 304, 308.

[2] *Histoire du Grand Royaume de la Chine situé aux Indes Orientales*, translated from the Spanish of Juan Gonzales de Mendoza of the Order of St Augustine (Paris, Veuve Gabriel Buon, 1600) p. 111. (Reference is to the voyage of Jerónimo Marín and Martín de Rada, 1575.)

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CHAPTER LI

THE CHINESE UNDER THE SPANISH REGIME, 1605–1700

THE Chinese trading with, or emigrating to, the Philippines 167 caused anxiety not only to the Spanish but also to the authorities at home. The *Tung Hsi Yang K'ao*, published in 1618, states:

> Our people at home were anxious lest the emigrating class might be too numerous there, and after their return home breed rebellion. It was ordered that each junk should carry only 200 men, and that the number of junks sailing should not exceed a fixed number. Returning home and sailing out again, the number of men increased to 400, the number of ships remaining the same. When our people put out to sea many gave a false name, and figured only as a number. While their investigation was going on they suddenly escaped in the midst of it and went back to that country.[1]

These measures, like many others, proved ineffective as regards the Philippines, as did similar measures to restrain Chinese from resorting to the other countries of Southeast Asia.

In the Philippines the Chinese were subjected to many restrictions. 609 They were, for example, not allowed to travel in the islands, nor to go two leagues from the city without a written licence, nor could they remain overnight in the city after the gates were closed, on penalty of their lives. They had their own alcalde, judge, tribunal, and gaol. Infidel Chinese were separated from the converts as much as possible. On the north side of the river Dominican friars who had learned the Chinese language had erected a mission and a hospital. There was a separate Barrio (district) for the baptized Chinese and their families to the number of about five hundred.[2]

At different times laws for the regulation of the Chinese were enacted or decreed, and the following is a summary of the more important of them:[3]

(In chronological order)

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[1] *Tung Hsi Yang K'ao*, 'Investigations regarding the Eastern and Western Oceans' (1618), cited by Laufer, op. cit. p. 279.

[2] Barrows, op. cit. (London, Harrap and the World Book Co., 1924) p. 158.

[3] Based on Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xxii. 151 ff. and a translation by

[p. 595]

Law III

(Philip II, Madrid, 11 June 1594)

609 Since the bishops do not permit Chinese who have been converted in the Philippine Islands to our Holy Catholic faith to return to their own country, so that intercourse with and living among the gentiles [infidels] may not cause them to suffer the danger of apostasy, and recognizing that these same Christian Chinese have no means of livelihood other than their dealings in the local market, buying provisions in order to supply the community, and that the Governor does not allow them to leave Manila without a pass, which is a great stumbling-block to the conversion of others; we now order that the said permits shall be issued to them free of charge, and moreover that the Governor should show great consideration and care in preventing inconvenience or obstruction to them in their free passage through the Islands.

Law IX

(Philip II, Madrid, 1594)

Whereas Sangleys who come to trade in the Islands are subject to having their goods valued and a wholesale price fixed for them by officers deputed for the purpose (which is called *pancada*) and these goods are then left with them under guarantee that they will not dispose of them without the Governor's order, no price being attached to the goods that are classified as 'various' (except in the case of some of the more important and costly kinds); we order that those Chinese who return to these Islands shall be subject to all the laws and regulations that may be in force with respect to these and other matters, but that the *pancada* shall be applied to them only in the gentlest fashion so that they may have no grievance and no reason for ceasing to come here to trade.

Law X

(1596)

That no wrong or injury be done to any Sangley in the Philippines, and that they be well treated in every way, especially by Spaniards and officials.

Law XIII

(1598)

That the Governor and Captain-General shall not allow any inhabitant of Manila to have Sangleys in their houses, that he should forbid them to sleep inside the city, and that the judge of foreigners should severely punish all who disobey this law.

H. D. Purcell from *Biblioteca de Legislación Ultramarina en forma de diccionario alfabético* (Madrid, published for Don José Maria Za[illegible]ora y Coronado, 1844) v. 398–401.

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Law VI

(1603 and 1614)

That the alcaldes-mayor of Manila shall try the suits and causes of the Sangleys jointly with the Governor.

Law VI

(1614)

Insomuch as the alcaldes-mayor of Manila have claimed the right to try suits and causes of the Chinese who live in the Parián, jointly with the Governor, we consider it fitting to order the ruling of ley XXIV, titulo iii, libro v, which concedes the first instance exclusively to the governor of the Parián with appeal to the Audiencia. Now it is our will, and we order the President, Governor, and Captain-General, and the Audiencia, not to allow any ordinary judge or one who has received a commission, to try civil or criminal suits or causes of the Sangleys in the first instance, even if they be auditors of that Audiencia, who shall be performing the duties of criminal alcaldes; neither shall they try cases regarding the locations or inspections of shops or their trade (for it pertains exclusively to the governor of the Parián to try such), except it be a case so extraordinary, necessary, and requisite that it becomes advisable to limit this rule.

Law XI

(1619)

That the practice of forcing the Chinese to give so many fowls a year to the judges and members of the Audiencia at a price lower than the market price be discontinued.

Law IV

(1620)

That no personal services be demanded of the Sangleys.

Law VIII

(1620)

That Chinese converted to Christianity who are married to Filipino women be given grants of certain uncultivated lands in the suburbs.

Law I

(1606 and 1622)

That the number of Chinese in the whole of the Philippines be limited to 6,000, and that of the Japanese to 3,000.

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Law II

(1625)

604 That licences issued by the Government of the Philippines to Chinese shall be issued under the authority of the royal officials, that the money obtained therefrom shall be paid into the royal treasury, and a separate account of the payments shall be kept.

Law VII

(1627)

That Sangleys converted to the Catholic faith shall not be liable for the payment of tribute for the first ten years after their conversion, and that after that time they shall be required to pay at the same rate as natives.

Law XII

(1627)

The Sangley Chinese of the Philippines have a treasure-box with three keys in which each Sangley deposits 12 reals a year in order to create a fund from which dues to the royal service shall be paid. The King commands that any balance there may be at the end of the year shall not be withdrawn but carried forward to the credit of the Sangley for the following year.

By this last decree of 10 September 1627 the King ordered that a Protector of the Chinese be appointed who should not be the Royal Fiscal.

The royal decrees and the report to the King by which the decrees were inspired were vigorous or tolerant according to whether the policy of the mailed fist or the velvet glove was in the ascendant. A further decree of 1627 (19 November) referred to the oppression that the Chinese in the Parián suffered by the compulsory cutting off of their hair when they became Christians and by the levying on them of an extortionate tax, and ordered that 'both these vexations be abolished'. The Governor Tavora advised that the Chinese should be tried and punished by the methods in vogue in their own country, and that they should not be allowed to appeal to the Audiencia. This was followed by a decree of the following year (1628) ordering the Governor of the Philippines to protect the Chinese from extortion and forced contributions, and directing that permission be granted them to travel in the islands.

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At the same time the King referred back for the Governor's consideration a demand made by the Manila Spaniards that all Chinese except the married Christians should be strictly confined within the Parián. In 1629 the King ordered the Governor to ascertain whether the Chinese needed a protector, and, if so, to send him a list of persons from whom an official might be chosen by the Council of the Indies.[1]

The Chinese paid annually at that time 64 reals in silver to the King for the privilege of living in the islands, plus 5 reals as the ordinary tribute, plus 12 reals for the King's Treasury, 'spent in assessments for affairs of my service'.[1]

In 1639 occurred the second Chinese revolt. It lasted nearly four months and caused a great loss of property to the Spaniards and of lives among the insurgents. Most of the Chinese population of Luzon were exterminated, thanks to their lack of firearms and to the 'special protection of Our Lord over the army'. Twenty-two to twenty-four thousand Chinese were killed as against 45 Spaniards and 300 Filipinos. The Chinese were armed with spears or with bamboos hardened by fire, and on these were fastened the knives with which they were wont to harvest the rice. After the suppression of the rebellion the *Te Deum* was sung in the churches of Manila; there was a great pageant of victory headed by the Governor Don Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera, with drums, trumpets, and halberdiers of the guard, and with a standard bearing an image of the blessed Christ from Antipolo mounted on a staff. There had been a sickening record of slaughter, caused by a blind panic, fear of the house servants and other Chinese of Manila, and there were also several thousands of Chinese killed in Cavite.[2]

After another period of depopulation the Parián again miraculously renewed itself as from a Fortunatus's purse of Chinese. In 1644, less than five years after the second rebellion, we find the Royal Fiscal reporting on the licences granted to the Chinese allowing them to reside in Manila. The amounts payable for the licences had apparently been increased by the Governor,

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[1] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xxiii. 287. The King, we observe, already in 1627 had given orders for the appointment of such an official.

A colonial administrator is bound to remark on the wide range of matters that had to be referred back to the King of Spain for decision, which, especially considering the very long time required for an answer to a dispatch or a memorial, must have been a great handicap to the Philippines administration.

[2] See Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xxxv, Preface, 17, 208.

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Corcuera, as a punishment for the rising of 1639. The increase, the Fiscal reported, was not justified. He said that the new taxes had damaged the entire colony, since they had prevented the Chinese from leaving the Parián to cultivate the rice fields and to engage in similar productive occupations. In support of his charge he cited the great increases in price of both commodities and labour due to the new tax on the Chinese.[1]

Corcuera again came in for censure from His Majesty's Fiscal in the Royal Audiencia of Manila, Don Sebastian Cavallero, when he recommended that the issue of licences called 'fortification licences' (an increase of 11 reals to be added to general licences) be suspended as the Governor had no authority to impose the increase.[2]

Mistrust in the Spanish mind continued regarding the irrepressible Sangleys who insisted, in spite of everything, on filtering into the pool of the Parián as it was periodically drained. There were insurrections among the Filipinos, too, and the Chinese were blamed for supporting them. 'It cannot be denied', says the historian of the Discalced Augustinian Fathers, 'that the nation fomented and maintained with aid and cunning the rebellions of the Indians which we have just related.'[3] One had occurred in Pampanga and the other in Pangasinan. When the alcalde-mayor, Don Francisco, was killed in Pangasinan, there were found among the rebels some Sangleys who contrived that under cover of the small boats they might capture the large vessel in which the alcalde-mayor was defending his life very gallantly, and on the arrival of the Spanish fleet to explore the beach at Lingayen there were many armed men consisting of Sangleys and Indians.[4] The complicity of the Chinese was further proved by many bodies of Sangleys which were found in the field whenever there was an engagement with the rebels, for on all occasions (says Fray Pedro) they served the Indians as auxiliaries.[5]

China itself by this time had been for many years in a state of great and increasing disorder, the empire having passed into the throes which portended the end of the Ming dynasty and the

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[1] ibid., Preface.

[2] ibid. p. 185.

[3] Fray Pedro de San Francisco, *General History of the Discalced Augustinian Fathers* (refers to 1661–90) (Zaragoza, 1756), Blair and Robertson, xli. 85.

[4] Father Santa Cruz, *The Dominican History of the Philippines*, Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xli. 85.

[5] This refers to the rebellions of 1661–2.

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Manchu conquest. Piracy and buccaneering expeditions, by which thousands in the maritime provinces flourished exceedingly, gave the Spanish colonists an idea that the Chinese were dangerous fellows to be watched and repressed wherever they settled. Added to this fear on the part of the Europeans was the jealousy of the native Tagals who found themselves ousted from every lucrative pursuit the moment they were subjected to competition by the Chinese.[1]

We are now past the middle of the century and the next notable event, the ultimatum of Koxinga to the Spanish, is imminent. It would be well if we paused here for a moment to take one of our periodic glimpses at the Chinese in the Parián of Manila, since from such successive glimpses we can convince ourselves how little the tragic upheavals we have described affected the ordinary life of the capital, or that of the Chinese community within it. Here is what the Franciscan, Bartolomé de Letona, saw about the year 1661.[2]

> On the Eastern side of the city, but outside of it and in front of its walls, at the distance of a musket-shot, is a silk market which they call Parián. Usually 15,000 Chinese live there; they are Sangleys, natives of China, and all are merchants and artisans. They possess, allotted among themselves by streets and squares, shops containing all kinds of merchandise and all the trades that are necessary in a community. The place is very orderly and well arranged, and a great convenience to the citizens. It is an indication of their [the Towkays'?] greatness that although they are so few, they have so many workmen and servants assigned to their service. The Sangleys live in wooden houses; they have a governor of their own nation, and a Spanish alcalde-mayor and other officers of justice, with a notary, and also a gaol. They have a parish church where the sacraments, the divine word, and the burial rites are administered to the 4,000 Christians among the Sangleys; the rest of them are heathen.

Koxinga (his real name was Cheng Cheng-kung, 1624–62), the famous corsair and supporter of the Ming dynasty, now in process of being driven out of China by the victorious Manchus, had expelled the Dutch from Formosa. In 1662 he sent a letter to the Spanish Governor of the Philippines, de Lara, in which he accused the Spanish of oppressing the Chinese, and demanded that they should submit to his rule immediately or be wiped out. The demand, as was to be expected, was rejected by the Spaniards, and the Chinese in Manila, fearing evil to themselves, and hearing of their intended expulsion from the islands, began to flee from the Parián and other neighbouring settlements in a blind endeavour to save their lives. The Jesuit missionaries at Santa Cruz hastened to the Government to secure pardon for the Chinese, and other priests seconded their efforts. Meanwhile, the other Sangleys in the Parián were so terrified that many were drowned in trying to swim across the river, others committed suicide, and most of those who remained fled to the hills. The Spanish in Manila, in fear of attack from the Chinese, were ready to slay them all, and a repetition of the horrors of the Chinese insurrections of 1603 and 1639 was averted only by the good sense of the Governor, Manrique de Lara, who, with mingled firmness and humanity, calmed the fears of the Chinese and the anger of the Spaniards. Granting protection to all who returned to Manila by a certain day, he ordered a specified number to remain there for the aid and service of the Spanish residents, and obliged the rest to return to China. Fugitives who did not take advantage of the amnesty and return to Manila were hunted down and slain by Spanish troops aided by the natives. The Chinese leaders of the Sangleys in their flight were captured and executed in public. Forced labour was being used in the feverish fortification of Manila and Cavite when news was received of the death of Koxinga.[1]

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[1] Frederick Wells Williams, 'The Chinese Immigration in Further Asia', *American Historical Review*, vol. v, no. 3 (April 1900) p. 503.

[2] Description bound in with author's *Perfecta Religiosa* (Mexico, La Puebla, 1662), Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xxxvi. 189.

After the seventeenth century the Philippines were declining in prosperity and the Chinese preferred the Dutch colonies for the investment of their capital and for trade and residence. Nevertheless, they remained numerous in the Philippines, especially in Manila, where they continued to monopolize the trade and commerce of the place. This was quite contrary to the original intention of the Spaniards, who had allowed them to enter the islands only to cultivate the soil or to work in the handicrafts.[2]

Most of this history is derived from Spanish documents and very little from Chinese, so the *tu quoque* which is such a healthy

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[1] *Academia Real de la Historia, Madrid*, Blair and Robertson, op. cit. vol. xxxvi.

[2] ibid. li. 228.

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corrective to the opinions of one race as expressed by another is altogether absent. Nevertheless, the Spanish themselves in their voluminous documents and histories provide some of the qualifications to their own charges. An excellent illustration of this is to be obtained from the exhaustive and meticulous index to the fifty-five volumes of Blair and Robertson's monumental collection of books and documents on the Philippines, where the opinions of the Chinese are classified and references given to the pages of the text. The 'mental (negative)' qualities (as the index puts it) take up about double the space of the 'mental (positive)' qualities. Here are some of the former:

> barbarous, mean, impudent, importunate, deceitful, unwarlike, cowardly, avaricious and greedy, addicted to sodomy and secret sins, tyrannical, ignorant, superstitious, vicious, intemperate, lustful and sensuous, polygamous, disloyal and faithless, evil-minded and wicked, mercenary, covetous, timorous, suspicious, cautious, cunning, unchaste, treacherous, shameless, vile, addicted to gambling, addicted to bribery, unscrupulous, rascally, cruel (in tortures, penalties, etc.), conscienceless, nomadic, fond of litigation, commit perjury, have tendency to revolt, inconstant, proud, talkative, extortionate, not spiritually-minded, inclined to sorcery. . . .

With this must be contrasted the 'mental (positive)' qualities of which the following is the complete list:

> civilized, humble, polite, ingenious, intelligent, imitative, careful of women, industrious, valiant and spirited, shrewd (generally in trade), generous, able and discreet, kind, honourable, tractable and docile, simple and unsophisticated, clever, possess good memories, not hostile to foreigners, grateful, religious, respect old age, legally minded, sensible and prudent, energetic, enterprising, fond of learning, cultured, respectful, sober, patient, peaceable.

It will be seen that the two lists are to a large extent contradictory and cancel one another out. Some epithets are favourable or derogatory descriptions of the same thing, e.g. fond of litigation, legally minded. In any case they convey the opinions of the Spanish regarding the Chinese over a period of 335 years, and are a warning to those who tend towards downright judgements of races other than their own.

As the seventeenth century draws to a close we will round off our impressions of it by a final glimpse at the Chinese in the

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Parián—this time more in paraphrase than in quotation. Our authority is a wealthy Neapolitan dilettante, who made a voyage round the world in 1693–9 (his figures of the numbers of the Chinese in the Parián are, however, not to be trusted).[1]

> . . . within a musket-shot of the gate of Parián is the habitation of Chinese merchants called Sangley, who in several streets have rich shops of silk, purcellane and other commodities. Here are found all the arts and trades, so that all the citizens are worth runs through their hands, through the fault of the Spanish and Indians who apply themselves to nothing. There are about 3,000 in this suburb, and in many more about the Islands; which is permitted them, if not as Christians, at least in the hopes that they may become such, though many are converted for fear of being banished. There were formerly 4,000, but abundance of them were put to death in tumults they raised at several times, and particularly that on St Francis' Eve in 1603, and they were afterwards prohibited staying in the Islands by his catholic Majesty. The order is very little observed, for there always remain behind hid many of those who come every year in forty to fifty *Chiampans*, loaded with commodities; the profit being very great at Manila, which they could not find in China, by reason of the small prices the manufactures bear. The merchants or Sangleys of Parián are governed by an *alcalde*, to whom they allow a good salary, as they do to the solicitor their protector, to his steward, and other officers. Besides all the duties and taxes to the King, they pay His Majesty 100,000 pieces of eight a year for the privilege of playing at *metua*. . . . The Spanish keep these Chinese very much under, not suffering them to be in Christian houses at night, and obliging them to be without their houses or shops, to break them of the abominable vice that nation is inclined to.[2]

We see, then, the Chinese in Manila submitting to conditions of life which would have been intolerable even to a people used to a capricious despotism in their own country had it not been that

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[1] Giovanni Gemelli-Careri, *A Voyage Round the World*, published in *Churchill's Voyages* (1744), C. R. Boxer, op. cit. p. 405.

Gemelli-Careri was a very credulous person. He believed the estimates of the Jesuit missionaries in China which placed the population of Nanking at 32 million, and in the Philippines he saw leaves 'which when they come to a certain pitch of ripeness, become living creatures with wings, feet, and tail' (see Michael Macmillan, *The Globe Trotter in India two hundred years ago* (London, Swan Sonnenschein, 1895)).

[2] C. R. Boxer, op. cit. p. 459.

The ascription of unnatural vice to Orientals by Europeans is very common, e.g. Sir Thomas Herbert so accused the Siamese and Admiral Stavorinus the Chinese in Java.

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the rewards were very high. The question of national or personal dignity did not, however, come into the reckoning. The Chinese, like all other Orientals, understood and accepted the rule of power, and had as yet but faint glimmerings of the idea of the rule of law. It was still a far cry to the Three Principles of Nationalism, Democracy, and People's Livelihood.

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CHAPTER LII

THE CHINESE UNDER THE SPANISH REGIME, 1700–1898

THE question as to whether the Chinese were a blessing or a menace to the Philippines had agitated the Spaniards throughout the seventeenth century and the consensus of opinion was that they were the latter. What the critics of the Chinese particularly disliked was the silk trade. As far back as 1628 it had been argued that it was pernicious to allow the importation of the silk of China, both to the Indies and to Mexico, for although not more than 250,000 pesos 'of Tipuzque' were allowed to be taken from Mexico to the Philippines annually, an incalculable sum in pieces of eight was exported in addition. The Chinese would accept no other currency, nor would they exchange their silk for other merchandise. Consequently, they managed to carry away annually the greater part of the eight-real pieces that were coined in New Spain in exchange for 'grass, which is the substance of that coarse and hard silk which is so plentiful among the Chinese. . . . Thus they weaken our strength and increase their own; and consequently, they can make war on us whenever they wish, without any cost to them as far as we are concerned.'[1]

The controversy continued into the eighteenth century. The people of Seville urged severe restrictions on the Manila–Acapulco trade on the ground that the wealth of Mexico was being drained off by the Chinese. In consequence of this agitation the King, in 1718, decreed that the trade in Chinese silk goods be thenceforth prohibited. But the following year the Viceroy of Mexico, de Valero, remonstrated against the prohibition on behalf not only of the Filipinos but also of his own subjects, most of whom were too poor to purchase Spanish piece-goods from which to manufacture the clothes they wore, and who therefore depended on Chinese

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[1] Juan Velasquez Madrco, *Economic Reasons for Suppressing the Silk Trade of China in Spain and its Colonies* (7 October 1628). Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xxii. 279.

The reference (say Blair and Robertson) is probably to a plant called 'China grass' (*Boeheria Nivea*), a shrub indigenous to India. China grass is considered a textile substance of the first rank. (Swatow-grass cloth is a famous product of China, outwearing linen by years. V. P.)

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materials. Memorials ensued from Manila and Cadíz respectively, each endeavouring to justify its own side in the controversy. At one stage Cadiz offered Manila the spice trade of Mexico as the equivalent of the latter's traffic in Chinese textiles. A decree of 27 October 1720 addressed to the Marquis de Valero, Viceroy of Mexico, laid down that two ships only should go annually from the Philippine Islands to Nueva España (Mexico), each of 500 toneladas. The value of the lading which the said ships were to carry to the port of Acapulco might be up to the amount of 300,000 pesos which must come invested strictly and solely in the following kinds of merchandise: gold, cinnamon, elephants, wax, porcelain, cloves, pepper, cambayas and linens woven with colours (*lienzos pintados*), chitas, chintzes, gauzes, lampotes, Hilicos blankets, silk floss and raw spun silk, cordage, and like commodities. These ships were prohibited from carrying silken fabrics. Manila protested against the injury done to the islands by this decree, and eventually on 8 April 1734 a decree was promulgated increasing the amount of trade permitted to Manila to 500,000 pesos of investment and 1 million of return.

In the long run Manila interests had triumphed over those of Cadiz and Seville.[1]

Spain was involved with England in the 'War of Jenkins' Ear' (1739–42), and again in the Seven Years War (1756–63). In the former the celebrated Admiral Lord Anson appeared in these waters on his circumnavigation of the globe and captured the Mexico–Manila treasure ship. His chaplain, Richard Walter, who was to become the historian of the voyage, has left on record his information regarding Manila, which can be regarded as substantially accurate:

> The trade carried on from this place to China and different parts of India is principally for such commodities as are intended to supply the kingdoms of Mexico and Peru. These are spices, all sorts of Chinese silks and manufactures, particularly silk stockings, of which I have

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[1] Blair and Robertson, xliv. 227 ff., 266, 286, xlv. 57–8.

The arguments recorded in Blair and Robertson to the effect that the China trade ruined the Philippines are almost equalled in number by others to the effect that the trade benefited the islands.

Meanwhile in 1709 many Chinese had been banished from Manila on the charge of carrying off the public wealth, and prosecutions of this kind led to their settling in smaller places on Luzon during the eighteenth century. In 1747 a royal order was received for the final expulsion of the Chinese but the execution was suspended.

heard that no less than fifty thousand pairs were the usual number shipped in each cargoe; vast quantities of Indian stuffs, such as calicoe and chints, which are much worn in America, together with other minuter articles, as goldsmith's work etc., which is principally wrought in the city of Manila itself by the Chinese, for it is said that at least 20,000 Chinese constantly reside there, either as servants, manufacturers, or bakers. All these different commodities are collected at Manila, there to be transported to the port of Acapulco in the kingdom of Mexico.[1]

Walter remarks that Chinese silks coming directly to Acapulco could be sold there considerably cheaper than any European commodities of equal goodness, and, he adds, 'the cotton from the Coromandel coast makes the European linens useless'.

Governor Don Gasper de la Torre, whose governorship generally was an unfortunate one, became affected with melancholy and chronic dysentery (perhaps the order should be reversed) which were aggravated by the news that the village of Balayan had revolted, and finally a supposed revolt of the Sangleys caused him to depart this life. There was a rumour that the Chinese were about to enter the city of Manila and, despite his illness, he prepared to go out to meet the insurgents. The rumour turned out to be a fabrication put abroad to vex him, but the Governor became so feverish from the shock that he died a few days afterwards on 21 September 1745.[2]

When a new Archbishop of Manila, Don Fray de la Santísima Trinidad (Pedro Martínez de Arizala), arrived in the Philippines on 27 August 1747 he brought with him a decree by which His Majesty the King committed the Government to the expulsion of the Chinese from the islands. The expulsion already ordered had not yet been effected on account of the personal interests of the Governors, but Pedro de Arizala thought it well not to make the decree known until a better opportunity offered because he found that Señor Arrechedera, the Commissary of Inquisition, who had been acting Governor *ad interim*, was himself greatly devoted to the Chinese.[3]

Then once more, on 30 June 1755, Governor Arandía, in obedience to instructions received from the King, ordered that all

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[1] Richard A. Walter, *A Voyage Round the World in the Years 1740–44 by Lord Anson*, 3rd ed. (London, Dent (Everyman's Library), 1930) p. 220.

[2] Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xlviii. 142–3.

[3] ibid. 146. 'Events in the Philippines 1739–62, compiled from Martínez de Zúñiga, Concepción, and Montero y Vidal.'

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Chinese should be expelled from the Philippines, excepting 515 Christian Chinese, and a thousand more 'who pretended to be studying the Christian doctrine'.[1] The Christian Chinese could remain so long as they confined themselves to agriculture—actually most of them engaged in trade notwithstanding. After Arandía's death in 1759 Chinese immigration and residence were again allowed.

A few years after this new order for expulsion, when Spain was involved in war in Europe, the English captured Manila in 1762 and held it until 1764. At the time of the capture the Chinese who still remained in the Philippines took sides with the English, whereupon Simón de Anda, the Lieutenant-Governor, ordered that all Chinese in the islands should be hanged. This order was to some extent carried into effect by the Spaniards in 1763.[2]

In that same year 6,000 Chinese are said to have been massacred by the Spaniards in Pangasinan alone for siding with the Filipinos in a conspiracy to oust the Spanish regime.[3]

In 1766 the survivors were rounded up and in 1769 the order of expulsion was put into effect.[4] Yet soon after Le Gentil is saying: 'I do not know any Spaniards who did not sincerely regret the departure of the Chinese, and who did not frankly admit that the Philippines would suffer for it, because the Indians were not capable of replacing the Chinese.' (This an echo of de Morga's lament after the insurrection of 1603.) In 1778 the order for expulsion was revoked, but only Chinese workmen were encouraged to immigrate.

A decree of 17 April 1766 ordered that all Catholic Sangleys who had committed excesses during the time when the British had occupied Manila should be expelled from the Philippines, only true Christians being allowed to remain. The latter were not to be allowed to carry weapons of any sort and were to be employed only

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[1] *Census of the Philippines, 1903* (1905, Washington, United States Bureau of the Census) i. 319.

[2] Laufer, op. cit. p. 273.

[3] See Li Mei-ping, 'A Historical Survey of the Development of Sino-Philippine Relations', *The New Age in Asia*, vol. i, nos. 7–8 (December 1947) pp. 16–22 (in Chinese). (This journal is considered authoritative in this field of study.)

[4] 'By a Royal Warrant of 17 April 1766, all the Sangleys in the Islands, including Christians, were to be expelled. For, during the occupation of the town by the English they committed infidelity, apostasy, and other ugly abominable excesses. Only the true Christians were to remain.' D. Roman Jordana y Morera, *La Inmigración China en Filipinas* (Madrid, G. Hernandez, 1888) p. 16.

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in agriculture and the trades. They were not allowed to leave their respective villages without permission of the police, governor, or alcalde-mayor, under penalty of perpetual exile from His Majesty's dominions.[1]

The order of expulsion of the Chinese was revoked in 1788.[2]

Most of the interest in the Chinese during the Spanish period centres on the residents of Manila, but their compatriots were also present in considerable numbers in other parts of the Philippines.[3]

In 1775 (says Captain Forrest) many Chinese resided in the town of Selangan, near the mouth of the Mindanao or Cotabato river; many also resided on the tongue of land between the Matampay and the main stream. They were mostly carpenters, arrack distillers, and millers. They ground the husk off the rough rice (paddy) between two stones much more expeditiously than the Maguindanao (Mindanao) people were able to do in a wooden mortar. In that part of the town of Coto Intang which borders on the Melampy lived a few Chinese, but there were many Mindanao mechanics, vessel builders, and merchants. The Chinese in Mindanao were not allowed to settle higher up the river than Boyan, the Mindanoese being jealous of their superior abilities in trade.[4]

Captain Forrest explains that the coarse Chinese cloth ('kangans') used in the Pulangi delta generally came via Sulu to Cotabato, for the Spanish had long hindered Chinese junks bound from Amoy to Mindanao from passing Zamboanga. This was the cause of there being so little trade at Mindanao, no vessels sailing from India thither, and the little trade that there was being confined to a few 'country' Chinese, called 'Orang Sangley', and a few natives of Sulu who came here to buy rice and paddy, bringing with them Chinese articles, for the rice crop at Sulu could never be depended upon. (Rice was the usual currency in the market at Mindanao,

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[1] Blair and Robertson, l. 253.

[2] ibid. l. 65.

[3] Joaquin Martínez de Zúñiga, O.S.A., in his *Historia* (Sampaloc, 1803) p. 19, says that in some districts Indians (Filipinos) are found who are whiter than others '. . . doubtless descendants of some Chinese or Japanese who were shipwrecked on these coasts, the Ygorrotes (Igorotes) in particular. Their eyes, similar to those of the Chinese, prove that they were mingled with the companions of Limahon who fled to the mountains when Juan de Salcedo had besieged him in Pangasinan', Blair and Robertson, op. cit. xliii. 113.

[4] Captain Thomas Forrest, *A Voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas Performed on the Tartar Galley Belonging to the Honourable the East India Company, During the Years 1774 and 1776* (London, Scott, 1780) p. 179 ff.

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and it used to be reckoned that a prow, a house, &c., was 'worth so many slaves'. But Chinese cash was also used at Mindanao, though Forrest found it scarce.) Many Chinese articles, especially 'kangans',[1] beads, gongs, Chinese basins with red edges, deep brass plates—five in a set, deep saucers—three and four inches in diameter, brass wire, and iron were carried from Sulu to Mindanao.

The Sulus told Forrest (and their claim has been repeated often since) that their island was formerly part of the ancient Borneo empire founded by Chinese. It was the Chinese, many of whom were settled among them, who had taught the Sulus the art of grafting and improving their fruits, but the fruits of Mindanao, on the contrary, had remained of indifferent quality.[2] The industrious Chinese used teak leaves and leaves of a fruit called *madang* to line the baskets of cane and bamboo in which they packed the 'swallo' (bêche-de-mer) which they exported in great quantities from Sulu. 'The Chinese must gain handsomely from their trade thither', Forrest remarks, 'else they would not put up with the rough usage they sometimes received from the sturdy barons, the Datoos' (i.e. *Datoks*).[3]

List of articles that generally compose the cargo of a Chinese junk, of which two come annually from Amoy to Sulu (January 1776)

	Cost in China in dollars	*Sell for* (*sic*) *in Sulu*
2,000 galangs (salvers of brass) seven to a picul	40	70
100 piculs iron, in small pieces, like Bengal iron .	4	8
Sugar candy, a quantity, per picul . . .	7	10
50 raw silk, ditto	400	600
3,000 pieces black kowsongs, a kind of nankeen, per piece	0½	1
5,000 pieces of kampow, white strong linen . .	0½	1
500 Kangans, 25 in a bundle, called gadangs per gadang	7	10
200 quallis, an iron pan, 3 foot diameter each .	1	2
500 nests of quallis, 3 in a nest	1	2
One million pieces of chinaware, consisting of small 'terrenes' and basins in nests, big and small, plates and basins with red edges for Mindanao, etc., etc., per hundred	1	2
800 pieces of flowered silks, per piece . . .	6	10

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[1] One kangan was equal to 160–180 cash.

[2] op. cit. p. 323.

[3] The student of Eastern economic history may find interest in the above. Forrest, op. cit. p. 325.

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The merchandise taken from Sulu was in the shape of the following articles:

	Cost at Sulu	*Sell for in China*
Black swallo per picul	15	30
White swallo ,, ,,	10	20
Wax	15	25
Teepye, or pearl oyster shells	1½	5
Birds' nests per catty	6	9
Tortoiseshell, price uncertain	..	..

Also agar-agar, carooang oil, clove bark, black wood rotans, sago, various barks for dyeing, cassia, pepper, native camphire (camphor), sandal wood, curious shells for grottos, pearls, etc., and spices.

There was a law both at Mindanao and at Sulu, that no Chinese could be made a slave, but at either place for a sum advanced by a *Dato* (chief) to a Chinese (and such advances were often forced on them) they were obliged to pay every twelve months a high rate of interest, perhaps 25 or 30 per cent., the lender often refusing to receive back the principal at the end of the year, unless indeed the Chinese made it appear that he was going to return to his own country, in which case repayment was never refused.[1] 'The industrious Chinese [says Forrest] seems to be excluded from the benefit of law.'[2]

Another of our peeps at the Parián of Manila is afforded by de Guignes, Resident of France in China in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The year of this visit was 1797. There were then, he says, about 3,000 Sangleys there. A very strict watch was kept over them, and an alcalde and a number of Spanish officers had the superintendence of police and exacted from the Chinese, it was reported, considerable sums of money, chiefly at Chinese New Year, the licence for playing *metora* (or *metua* ? = fan-tan?) alone being purchased by them at the rate of $10,000 a year. San Sebastián likewise, says de Guignes, had some good houses. In this suburb there was a large causeway, raised by the Government as a promenade for the inhabitants, whither Spanish ladies, in particular, resorted in their carriages. The Chinese were said to have defrayed the expenses of making this causeway or wall with money extorted for exemption from certain disabilities imposed upon them by the Spaniards; the wall was a pleasant one, shaded

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[1] Forrest, op. cit. p. 327. He accuses the Chinese *per contra* of defrauding pearl fishers.

[2] ibid. p. 277, fn.

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by a number of areca trees, and commanded a fine prospect over the country. 609

'The Chinese who inhabited Manila [our French informant continues] profess Christianity, but this is only for form's sake, for when they leave Manila they throw their images and chaplets into the sea and cease to be Christians as soon as they lose sight of Mirabel Point.'[1]

Spanish policy in the early nineteenth century was to confine the Chinese as far as possible to agricultural pursuits. In 1804 it was ordered that only Chinese in the provinces who were agriculturists or artisans should be allowed to remain in the islands.[2] Later on, in 1828, various royal decrees were obtained for the promotion of agriculture, manufactures, and other industries, and for obliging the Chinese to be grouped under headmen (as were the Filipinos) whose function was to collect the taxes. (This 'headman' system was, however, not acceptable to the Chinese, as will shortly be seen.) As regards clothes, the Filipinos could manufacture cotton goods themselves, providing they knew how to dye them properly and had the machinery necessary for manufacturing cotton thread, and Chinese imports could then be dispensed with.

Meanwhile, the influence of the Chinese immigrant had already been felt in Filipino cultivation, for their plough was of Chinese origin, having one handle, no coulter or mould-board—the upper part of the share, which was flat, being turned to one side to perform this function.[3]

The Chinese in the second decade of the nineteenth century paid a poll-tax of 6 dollars (48 reals) each; the mestizos paid 3 dollars (12 reals). The tax was generally farmed out. In 1817 the Chinese paid $30,000 in a total revenue of $1,449,760 of which $639,000 came from poll-taxes, and $811,000 came from rentals (monopolies, opium farms, &c.).[4]

By this time the Philippines were in none too happy a state. Robbery and piracy were rampant in the neighbourhood of Manila; justice was neglected or corrupted. The Church insisted on so many holidays that the farmers neglected their fields. 'Until very recently [says the Englishman—a naval officer—cited above,

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[1] M. de Guignes, *Voyages à Pékin, Manille [etc.], faits dans l'intervalle des années 1784 et 1801* (Paris, Imprimerie Impériale, 1806) iii. 401.

[2] *Census of the Philippines, 1903* (1905) i. 320.

[3] *Remarks on the Philippine Islands by an Englishman* (Calcutta, 1828). Blair and Robertson, op. cit. li. 128.

[4] ibid. pp. 120, 121.

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writing of the period 1819–22] these rich islands have been a constant burden to the crown of Spain, money having been annually sent from Mexico to supply their expenses.' As in the case of the Moors in Spain, blame was laid mainly at the door of the Chinese for drawing off the wealth of the country. How much they had in reality 'drawn off' is, however, uncertain. De Comyn estimates that between 1565 and 1820 Spanish America exported to Manila 400 million silver dollars. 'The Sangley mestizos [de Comyn goes on] have amassed immense sums in specie; but it would be impossible to point out the amount, distribution, or the secret places in which they are hoarded.'[1] The Chinese merchants were, moreover, accused of fraudulent practices.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Chinese in the Philippines paid each a capitation tax of 6 pesos a year.[2] In addition each had to pay to the public treasury a surtax to cover the expenses of maintaining the hospital, the church, the police, and other administrative expenses connected with the Parián.

A new agitation against the Chinese got under way in 1828. There were (says Crawfurd) only 5,708 Chinese in the whole of the Philippines, of whom 5,279 were in Tondo. By a new decree of 6 April the Chinese merchants, shopkeepers, and artisans were divided into three classes—I, merchants of the first class who paid an annual tax of 120 pesos; II, merchants, &c., who paid 48 pesos annually; III, smaller merchants, &c., who paid 24 pesos annually. A fourth class, paying 12 pesos annually, was introduced in 1830. When the taxation was applied it was found that there were only 7 Chinese merchants of the first class, while 166 belonged to the second class, 830 to the third class, and 4,509 to the fourth class. On account of age, 191 were exempted from taxation altogether. The Chinese were to be gathered into villages, as were the 'Indians'

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[1] Tomás de Comyn, *Estado de las islas Filipinas* (Madrid, 1820) translated from the Spanish by William Walton (London, 1821) p. 76.

Charles Robequain, *Le Monde Malais* (Paris, Payot, 1946) p. 97, says: 'De Comyn estime que, de 1571 à 1821, l'Amerique Espagnole a exporté à Manille 400 million de dollars d'argent, *dont la moitié peut-être est passé en Chine.*' Which does not appear to represent de Comyn correctly. M. Robequain seems to have copied Laufer's version of de Comyn (op. cit. p. 277) which is from the *Chinese Repository*, viii. 173.

[2] The royal decree ordering this was dated 14 May 1790 (Blair and Robertson, l. 65), 'Events of 1764–1800' compiled from Montero y Vidal, *Historia de Filipinas*. But *The Census of the Philippines, 1903* (1905) says (p. 359) that the tax, which had hitherto been 8 pesos, was reduced to 6 pesos in 1799.

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(Filipinos). Their 'heads of barangay' were to collect the tribute due from them.

These taxes, it appears, were payable in addition to the capitation tax of 6 pesos.[1]

According to Crawfurd, when these new rates were approved the Chinese refused to accept them or to be concentrated in villages. Eight hundred returned to China; 1,083 fled to the mountains, where they were hospitably received by the native population; 453, not having the means of defraying the cost of their passages back to China, were seized and condemned to penal labour as defaulters. 'The effect of this action', says Crawfurd, 'is observable a decade or so later when the Chinese enrolled did not exceed 6,000, while their capitation taxes amounted to over $100,000 per annum, and those of the native inhabitants, exceeding 3,000,000, did not equal eight times that amount.'[2] The intendant, in view of the difficulty of collecting the taxes, explained to the government the expediency of modifying the enactment and this was done in 1834.[3]

Chinese engaged in agriculture were taxed on a different scale. In 1834 Chinese were allowed to engage in any occupation under permit. In 1849 the regulations were elaborated and amended by Governor Corcuera. Transient Chinese could now remain only three months: residents could stay as long as they liked.

Already in 1843 a Spanish official of standing had recommended that, since capitalists and workers were needed in the Philippine Islands, there must be governmental and administrative reforms in order to attract them, and that the heavy tribute exacted from the Chinese must be reduced to not more than 12 reals per annum for those engaging in agriculture. Europeans, Chinese, and mestizos should be encouraged to go and live in the islands in greater numbers.[4] In 1850 Chinese agriculturists were granted the same

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[1] I am not certain about this. V. P.

[2] John Crawfurd, F.R.S., *Dictionary of the Indian Archipelago*, p. 97. Commenting on this, Mr Ifor B. Powell (to whom I am indebted for a most careful scrutiny of this Part and for the correction of a number of mistakes, both my own and those of my authorities) remarks: 'Buzeta says regarding the 800 odd that they were "prepared" to go to China, and another Spanish writer says that they "opted" to go. But did they ever go?' Though I have consulted Sinibaldo de Mas (from whom Crawfurd draws much of his information) I have not yet found the answer.

[3] See Blair and Robertson, li. 53–4 and ibid. 53 fn.

[4] *Communication from the Intendant of the Army and the Treasury* (*Intendente*

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609 privileges as Filipinos of the same class and paid only a tax of 12 reals a year.[1] After 1852 every Chinese, except tillers of the soil, paid a head-tax of $6, and, in addition, an industrial tax of $100, $60, $30, or $12.[2]

After 1852 Chinese mestizos paid a poll-tax of $3 a year. The Filipino woman married to a mestizo of this class paid the same tax as he did during marriage, but if she became a widow she paid only at the same rate as a Filipino widow. But mestizos who cultivated the soil with their own hands paid only the same amount as the natives. (The mestizos formed their own 'Barangays' where 25 or 30 of them lived together.)

It was recommended in some quarters that dowries or marriage bonuses be paid by the Government at the following rates—to a Chinese mestiza marrying a Filipino, a sum of 100 pesos; to a Filipino woman marrying a Chinese mestizo, 100 pesos; to a Chinese mestizo marrying a Spaniard, 1,000 pesos; to a Spaniard marrying a Chinese mestiza, 2,000 pesos; to a Spanish woman marrying a Filipino chief, 3,000 to 4,000 pesos. This was regarded by reformers as an impulse towards the amalgamation of the races! But it does not seem that these recommendations were adopted.

The Spanish Government maintained almost to the end the theory (it was hardly more than an empty theory) that Chinese immigration to the Philippines was being regulated to constitute a stimulus to agriculture.[3]

To prevent illegal entrance via the Sulu Archipelago and Borneo, and to remove the lucrative Moro trade from the hands of the Chinese who fairly monopolized it even in the first half of the twentieth century, a decree of the Governor-General of January 1886 forbade the Chinese to live permanently in the provinces, and absolutely prohibited them from engaging in trade with the Moros; a further decree of July 1886 forbade all Chinese to live in Mindanao.[4]

Notwithstanding the liberal counsels of officials and publicists, the opposition to the Chinese continued to be strong. In 1859, when Señor Norzagaray gave up his command in the Philippines,

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de Ejercito y Hacienda) *of the Philippine Islands, Don Juan Manuel de la Matta*, Blair and Robertson, liii. 91.

[1] ibid. lii. 53.

[2] ibid. p. 58.

[3] James A. Leroy, 'The Philippines 1860–1896', Blair and Robertson, op. cit. lii. 144.

[4] *Census of the Philippines, 1903* (1905) p. 491.

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he wrote an extensive paper on the Chinese question in which he argued that it would be better for Spain to be impoverished by taking energetic measures against the Chinese than that the Philippines should be ruined by foreign absorption.[1] In 1866 a new campaign for Chinese exclusion was started by Spanish merchants and business men, together with a programme for fostering immigration of Spaniards into the Philippines, especially into Mindanao and Palawan. The campaign continued with varying intensity, but with no practical effect so far as reducing the numbers of the Chinese went, right to the end of the Spanish period. It was backed by strongly-worded articles in the local press, and in the controversy that ensued the sole champion of the Chinese was the newspaper *El Commercio*, while against them were *El Boletin de Avisos*, *El Diario de Manila*, and *La Oceania Española.* A writer of the 1880s says[2] that the extraordinary increase in Chinese immigration into the Philippines during the previous few years had with great force attracted the attention of people of thoughtful habit and patriotic sentiment who saw in this a grave peril to Spanish interests in the region. He quoted a pamphlet of two years previous to this,[3] to the effect that after deduction of the mortality applicable to each case the Chinese population of the archipelago had grown during the period 31 December 1876 to 23 May 1886 from 30,797 to 93,567, this being a multiplication by three in one decade. Another Spanish writer says of the Chinese:

> The Chinese, whose peculiar racial characteristics allow them to resist successfully climatic rigours without number, are notwithstanding a terrible threat to peninsular immigration. . . . They multiply at a startling rate and not content, as they were once, with the trade in certain specified articles, they now want to embrace the whole scope of the traffic. If this goes on it will not be surprising if they also want to handle the plough and the hoe, monopolizing agriculture to the detriment of the natives who get their living in this way.[4]

At the present moment (the writer continues) the Chinese con-

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[1] *Report of the Philippine Commission to the President* (1899–1900), i. 151.

[2] D. Ramon y Morera, *Inmigración China en Filipinas* (Madrid, G. Hirandez, 1888) p. 10.

[3] Series of articles in *La Oceania Español*, published in pamphlet form as *Los Chinos en Filipinas* (Manila, 1886).

[4] Eduardo Casal y Ocha, *Questiones filipinas: Estudio Politico-Social* (Madrid, 1888) p. 24.

I think that 'peninsular immigration' must refer to the Iberian Peninsula. Or am I wrong? V. P.

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609 sidered his position insecure and he was not therefore an element to inspire fear, but later on, if his immigration were guaranteed, he would become almost the only immigrant, especially as he was willing to work at a wage so low that no European could compete with him.

Such remained the suspicion and fear of the Chinese among the Spanish up to the day when Commodore Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay in 1898 and the regime which had lasted for well over 300 years was about to come to an end. There were at that time estimated to be 40,000 Chinese in the Philippines, though one Spanish writer at least places it at 100,000. For reasons stated in Chapter XLIX, the writer is inclined to accept the former figure as being nearer the truth.

As a tail-piece and a rounding off of this review of the Chinese in the Philippines under the Spanish regime, it might be well to insert a description of a cock-fight in Manila in the eighteen-nineties which demonstrates in a striking manner how the Spanish civilization had communicated something of its colour and its aplomb to the stubborn institutions of the Chinese.[1]

> The great cockpit of Manila at the 'Fiesta del Pueblo' is one of the most remarkable spectacles in the world. Imagine a huge circus with an arena raised to the height of the faces of those standing; behind them tier upon tier gradually rising; above the arena, which is enclosed in fine wire netting, is the red draped box of the farmer—the leading Chinaman of Manila, named Señor Palanca; and a packed audience of four thousand people. Squatting on the earthen floor of the ring, inside the wire netting, are the habitués, half Chinese and half *mestizos*, while the officials walk about—the *juez de justicia* or referee, the *sentenciador* or umpire, the *casador*, 'go-between' or betting master, and several others. The two men enter the ring, each carrying a bird whose spur is shielded for the moment in a leather scabbard. One wears his hat—he is the owner of the challenging bird—called *llamado*; the other, hatless, is the outsider or *dejado*, who takes up the challenge. . . . An official calls out the sum for which the challenger's owner backs it, and how much is still lacking to make up the sum. Then comes the most extraordinary scene of all. The moment the words are out of his mouth, it rains dollars in the ring, apparently from everywhere dollars pour in, without method, without ownership, without a bargain, so far as one can

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[1] Henry Newman, *Peoples and Politics of the Far East*, p. 177 (1904) New York, Scribners.

judge in the deafening clamour. . . . When the sums on the birds are equal the betting master shouts *Casada* 'matched', literally, 'married', the farmer from his box on high yells '*larga!*', 'loose them,' and the fight begins. Sometimes it lasts ten minutes, sometimes only a second, the first shock leaving one bird a mangled corpse. . . .

Asked how betting could possibly be carried on, Señor Palanca said that none would put out his hand for another's money when pay time came. It was never done. If anyone were detected doing it, a dozen knives would be in his body at once.

These habitués, remember, are not hot-blooded Spaniards but Chinese and mestizos engaged in their age-old pastime of gambling with an Hispanic twist and flourish. The farmer, the while, we can be sure does not allow excitement to dull his eye for business.[1]

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[1] An authority on the Philippines who read this passage in manuscript objected that it was not at all in keeping with the nature of the Manila Chinese whose interest in cock-fighting was purely commercial. The writer, therefore, obediently deleted it. Subsequently, however, while this study was in proof, he came across confirmation of Sir Henry Newman's impressions in H. N. Moseley, *Notes by a Naturalist Made During the Voyage of H.M.S. 'Challenger'* (re 1872–76), (London, Laurie, 1944, p. 356). '. . . The great business of life in the Philippines, of the men of the various tame Malay races, the half-castes, or the Chinese, is certainly the sport of cock-fighting. . . . It would be hard to say whether the Chinese coolies . . . are the more eager spectators, or the darker skinned Malays . . . . (p. 357) The Chinese shopkeepers usually keep a pet cock tied up by a string to a peg outside the door, and slip out and have a friendly set-to with a neighbour's cock, in the intervals between the arrival of customers.' The writer is thus encouraged to restore the passage, leaving its appropriateness or otherwise to be fought over by the experts.

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CHAPTER LIII

THE CHINESE UNDER THE AMERICAN REGIME, 1898–1946

642 War was declared upon Spain by the United States on 25 April 1898. On 1 May Commodore Dewey steamed into Manila Bay; by noon he had put the weak Spanish squadron out of action, and by August hostilities were over. At the peace conference a few months later Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States, and $20 million were paid by the United States to Spain for public works built in the islands during the three centuries of her occupation. Until 1902 the Philippines remained under a Military Government and by that year most of the Filipinos who had declared their own republic had yielded to American arms, but the Moros continued under military government until 1913. In 1934 the islands became a Commonwealth, and, after the Japanese occupation of them from 1942 to 1945, the Philippines were declared absolutely independent, as the Republic of the Philippines, on 4 July 1946.

609 As is always the case in Southeast Asia, the Chinese in 1898–9 suffered from native animosity while disorder continued. The Tagálog leaders Braganza, Vicente Ursua, and others ordered the killing of all Spanish and Chinese at Minalabag, Pasacao, Libmanan, and Calabanga.[1]

167 To the Americans who took over the reins of government in 1898 the Spanish laws in force for the control of the Chinese seemed inadequate, for they were thinking in terms of Pacific Coast sentiment, and within a month after the occupation of Manila the laws relating to the admission of the Chinese into the United States were by an order of the Military Government under Brigadier-General Otis made applicable to the Philippines.[2] In 1902 Congress extended the Chinese exclusion laws to the island territory under jurisdiction of Congress, and directed the Philippines Commission

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[1] Dean C. Worcester, *The Philippines Past and Present* (New York, Macmillan, 1930) p. 181.

[2] Charles Burke Elliott, Ph.D., LL.D., *The Philippines to the End of the Military Regime* (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1917) p. 438, 439.

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to make necessary regulations under the law effective.[1] These laws amounted to the exclusion of the Chinese from the Philippines.[2] 167

Before the American occupation the records of arrivals and departures of Chinese showed an increase in the number of residents of 36,250 in the years 1889–93. In the first five years of the United States occupation, 1899–1903, the excess of arrivals over departures was 8,624. The census of 1903 (published in 1905) gave the total number of Chinese as 41,035 (though private estimates put it at over 100,000 in 1898 and at a similar figure in 1903). Between the Spanish and the American figures there is an obvious discrepancy.

Under Spanish rule, as we have seen, an effort had been made to admit Chinese only for unskilled labour, the lower kinds of service, and agriculture. Immigrants were forbidden to engage in any trade. Chinese brought in for tobacco-growing were not taxed. But the fact was that the Chinese did not like agriculture (though so many of the immigrants had been peasants at home) for the simple reason that it did not pay as well as trade. 462 464 167

Opinion was divided as to the wisdom of the exclusionist policy, though anti-Chinese feeling was far more vocal and influential than advocacy for the encouragement of the race. Señor Gabriel Garcia Ageo, in his memorandum to the Schurmann Commission of 1899,[3] said that he believed that the leniency of the Spanish Government towards the Chinese in the past had been to the detriment of both the Spanish and the Filipinos.[4] He suggested that heavy duties be imposed on Chinese goods, and that the Chinese should be prohibited from engaging in agriculture. The Philippine Commission of 1900–3 thought it would be unwise to admit Chinese skilled labourers to the islands in unlimited numbers. It admitted, how- 464 167

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[1] Elliott, op. cit. p. 72.

Wu Ting-fang immediately protested against this action on behalf of the Chinese Government.

For the pros and cons of the Chinese immigration question as argued in 1899 see *Report of the Philippine Commission to the President* (Schurmann Commission), (1899–1900) i. pt. 10. 150 ff., *The Chinese in the Philippines*.

[2] The laws were based on the limited treaties of 1880 and 1894 between the United States and China, both of which modified the general treaty of 1868. The 1868 treaty was for the reciprocal immigration of Chinese and Americans into America and China respectively. But the agitation of the 1870s led to a limited suspension of the treaty of 1880.

[3] Report of the Schurmann Philippine Commission (Washington, 1899) ii. 432.

[4] The Spanish policy towards the Chinese may have been weak and vacillating, but it can scarcely be said to have been lenient.

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464 167 ever, that there was not sufficient skilled labour among the Filipinos to meet the construction immediately necessary for the development of the islands. The introduction of a limited number of Chinese for a period of five years, during which a Filipino apprentice should be employed for every Chinese admitted, would secure a sufficient number of skilled labourers among the Filipinos at the end of that period.[1] When the United States Senate was debating the future of the Philippines the question came up again for discussion. The following extract from the record will give an idea of how these arguments tended, and will throw some light on the economics of the Philippines.[2]

> *Senator Rawlins*. If the Chinese are admitted that will be a phase of the question.
>
> *Governor Taft*. The commission has expressed the opinion as to what ought to be done in the matter of the admission of the Chinese. It is a very definite political question in the Islands, not due to competition in labor, but to competition in trade.
>
> *Senator Hale*. Do you think it a possibility or probability that in expending this large amount of money on public works you will be driven to the necessity of bringing in the Chinese?
>
> *Governor Taft*. That is what the contractors say.
>
> *Senator Hale*. You think it may come to that?
>
> *Governor Taft*. I hope not. Some of the quartermasters of the army think it is possible by care to secure labor and teach it constancy. But if you will talk with the business man in Manila, who is usually not very friendly towards the Filipino, he scouts the idea; and I think possibly you have already had a petition from the American Chamber of Commerce of Manila to allow the entrance of Chinese, because the labor of the Filipinos is so unsatisfactory. . . .
>
> *Governor Taft*. The Chinaman comes into this country and labors, say, at 12 silver dollars a month. Out of that, the local saying is, he saves $16 or $18. At any rate, he is not there for more than three to four months before he has capital to set up a store, and when he sets up a store the Filipino who has a store next to him is driven out of business.
>
> *Senator Carmack*. Is it not true that one of the greatest obstacles to the pacification of these Islands has been and is, the fear of bringing Chinese labor to the country, and the fear of sudden and excessive

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[1] U.S., Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, *Reports of the Philippine Commission, the Civil Governor, and the Heads of the Executive Departments of the Civil Government of the Philippine Islands* (*1900–1903*) (1904) p. 291.

[2] U.S., *Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate in Relation to the Affairs of the Philippines* (1902) p. 96 ff.

exploitation, and the belief that the United States want the Islands purely for the purpose of such exploitation? 464

Governor Taft. Certainly there has been, if one can judge by the proclamation of the insurgents and by the statements of the insurgent leaders, a very considerable attempt to make the public believe that it is the purpose of the Americans. Now, with respect to the effect of Chinese importation, possibly that goes with it. 167

Pressed by Senator Carmack as to whether it would be necessary to throw open the doors to Chinese immigration in order to secure a supply of efficient and helpful labour for the development of the country, Governor Taft replied that he was 'profoundly hopeful' that this might not be the case. In certain parts of the archipelago, he said, the admission of Chinese labour without permission to trade, keeping the immigrant a labourer and requiring those who brought him in to take him out again, would doubtless aid the development of islands like Mindanao where the population was sparse, but in Luzon, Panay, and Negros, the thickly populated islands, he was hopeful that they could gradually give the people a motive for labour and that, so encouraged, the labour might become more efficient than it was. Asked whether all Filipinos were opposed to Chinese immigration, Governor Taft replied that generally they were, but that the Tabacalera, the largest company in the Philippines and controlled by Spaniards, had been pressing the Government to allow them to bring in Chinese *skilled* labour for the construction of warehouses and other buildings on the tobacco installation.

'The burning question of the hour', Dr Doherty proclaimed in his pamphlet printed by order of the United States Senate, 'is this: shall Chinese labour be brought into the Islands or not? The Manila papers which are printed in English howl for it, and the foreign commercial interests of Manila and Iloilo beg for it, but the civil government is averse to it, and the Filipino people are opposed to it, and look on in dumb despair as they see the net slowly drawn around them.' It was, thought the Doctor, a wrong to the Filipino people, and they should make the question their Thermopylæ.[1]

In public life the importation of Chinese labour had few advocates, but some individuals outside the Philippines urged that favourable consideration be given to the idea. Thus at the very

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[1] U.S., 50th Congress, 2nd session, David M. Doherty, M.D., *Conditions in the Philippines*, Senate Document no. 170 (27 February 1904).

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464 167 beginning of the American regime an article was written 'in the sincere hope that the preceding lines may help in influencing legislation to encourage Chinese immigration', and quoted Sir John Bowring as saying, 'There is no colonizer who, under intelligent control, may be more useful than the Chinese.' His advocacy, however, was for the importation of Chinese *agriculturists* (though they had hitherto shown little inclination towards this type of employment) and he pointed out that the Philippines had a very similar temperature to that of the fields they generally immigrated from round Amoy, Swatow, &c. 'The Archipelago', he declared, 'would soon turn from an uncultivated field to an El Dorado.'[1]

Another British writer quoted Jenks's report of 1902 to the Secretary of War in favour of the admission of Chinese labour on the ground that the measure would result, with here and there an individual exception, not at all to the disadvantage of the Filipino, but indeed to his benefit through the improved conditions in the islands which would furnish him not only with a better market for his produce but also a better opportunity of engaging in the kind of work for which he was best suited and which most closely accorded with his tastes.[2]

These arguments are here set out at length because they give the pros and cons of the whole Chinese question in Southeast Asia, and they are not likely for long to get out of date. But the anti-Chinese labour advocates won the day in the Philippines, and the exclusion laws remained. In 1909 Mr Russell M'Culloch Story sums up the situation by saying that to admit the Chinese at this stage 'would be to invite a disturbing social, political, and economic factor into the life of the Islands'. The existing number of Chinese, however (he continued), was not a menace to the peace and industry of the archipelago and would soon be absorbed into the population of the islands. The danger lay in the coolie class, who in their struggle to advance themselves would hinder the upward course of the Filipino.[3] (Mr Story, like most others, did not foresee the rise of Chinese nationalism!)

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[1] Juan Mencarini, 'The Philippine Chinese Labour Question', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, China Branch, vol. xxxiii (1899–1900) p. 157.

[2] Alleyne Ireland, *The Eastern Tropics* (New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1905) p. 232.

[3] Russell M'Culloch Story, 'Problem of the Chinese in the Philippines', *The American Social and Political Science Review*, vol. iii, no. 1 (February 1909) p. 30.

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We have no means of knowing how far the Spanish censuses or 162 the American census of 1903 were out in their enumerations, but, assuming the latter to have been nearly correct, the number of 167 Chinese in the Philippines tripled between 1903 and 1909. This is certainly a striking commentary on the effectiveness of the 'exclusion' laws, for the second figure cannot have been mainly due to natural increase. There can be little doubt that the unquestioned multiplication of the race has been due to illicit entry. One common route was by way of the Borneo coast;[1] another, more direct, via the northern tip of Luzon.

The history of Chinese admixture with the native community 162 follows much the same general pattern as for other parts of Southeast Asia. For centuries the Chinese intermarried freely with women of the country and produced mestizos of Chinese-Filipino blood whose descendants were absorbed into the general population of the country. The number of Filipinos with a noticeable admixture of Chinese blood probably amounted in the 1940's to more than three-quarters of a million. These Chinese mestizos formed 'one of the most capable, prosperous and powerful elements of the Filipino people'.[2] Yet, as we have remarked in the case of Siam, a high proportion of Chinese blood in an individual is no guarantee of his sympathy with the Chinese community, and, as Filipino nationalism developed, the leaders who declaimed against the Chinese most violently had almost invariably Chinese blood in their veins.[3]

It is probable that the Chinese benefited from the change-over 609 from Spanish to American control more than any other element of the population of the Philippines. The exclusion laws may have prevented the mass immigration of the race, but it managed, nevertheless, to multiply its numbers by about three. In the time of the Spanish control the legal disabilities imposed on the Chinese were arbitrary and unpredictable; under the Americans these disabilities were removed, and the reform of the administration meant that the Chinese were not subjected to exactions, except in some localities

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[1] The Moros of Zamboanga are said before the war to have charged 150 pesos, or $75, for each Chinese they took in their *vintas*. Florence Horn, *Orphans of the Pacific* (New York, Reynall & Hitchcock, 1941) p. 147.

[2] Hayden, op. cit. p. 695.

[3] 'There may well be over 1 million Chinese mestizos, including the very politician who wants to legislate the Chinese out of business.' Florence Horn, op. cit. p. 143.

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609 where they still had to pay a certain amount of tribute to minor political authorities.[1]

In 1904 a Chinese Commercial Council was established, which 441 later developed into the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce.[2] This was to become the centre of Chinese business and social organization. Members were divided into two types—the score of rice merchants, grocers, second-hand dealers, &c., into which the Chinese Manila business community is divided, and Chinese business firms and individuals. The activities of this powerful organization were divided again into two categories, business and civic. On the business side the chamber collected and disseminated information about trade conditions, investigated and guaranteed the credentials of Chinese business men, arranged for the display of Chinese products, conducted research into the problems and methods of business, and in any crisis or critical period provided a forum for discussion and machinery for action. On its civic side the chamber organized the collection of funds for charitable purposes, with an emphasis, no doubt, on causes favouring the Chinese, and after the outbreak of war with Japan relief for 'China distress' was the major object of the collections. But at the same time it raised funds on a considerable scale for Philippine undertakings such as the Red Cross, hospitals, &c. For the Chinese community itself the chamber maintained a school system,[3] a social club, a modern hospital, and a cemetery.

208 With the Chinese consul-general and the Philippine branch of the Kuomintang the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce formed a trinity of organs for voicing views upon questions affecting the Chinese community to the Chinese Government as well as to the Philippine authorities and the public.

441 It is estimated that, before the systematic invasion of this field by the Japanese after 1932, the Chinese in the Philippines con-
452 ducted between 70 and 80 per cent. of the retail trade and a large
471 percentage of the internal commerce of the islands. Approximately the same proportion of the commercial credit facilities was like-

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[1] Hayden, op. cit. p. 695 ff.

877 [2] ibid. (Hayden is relied on in this chapter except where indicated.)

[3] Many Chinese children in the Philippines suffered under the double system whereby they learnt history, geography, arithmetic, &c., through the medium of Chinese in the morning, and the same, or similar, subjects through the medium of English in the afternoon. The strain was great and the minds of the children were confused and dulled in the process.

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wise in their hands. Regarding the situation immediately preceding 452
the war with Japan, Mr Helmut G. Callis provides information 471
which may be summarized as follows:

> Chinese predominate in the retail trade with U.S. $25 million investment; they own 75 per cent. of the 2,500 rice-mills which are scattered throughout the islands. They control ten per cent. of the capital invested in the lumber industry. Their influence in banking is not negligible. The total resources of the China Banking Corporation in Manila was $27 million in 1937, representing mainly capital of Chinese residents. About fifty new Chinese companies came into existence in 1937–9, with a capital of 1·5 million pesos—surpassed only by new registrations of American and Philippine companies. A great sum of money is said to have been invested by the Chinese in immovable property during this period, probably representing investments of Chinese profits which were not sent to China because of the war. Though statistical data are not available, it has been estimated that the total Chinese investments in the Philippines reach U.S. $100 million, which would give them the second place among nations doing business in the islands, Americans holding first place.[1]

The Chinese commercial and credit system covered virtually 441
every business, and reached from Manila to the remotest corners of 452
the archipelago. The trade organizations (which were members of 476
the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce) were the old Chinese guilds adapted to Philippine laws and conditions. As has happened in other Southeast Asian countries, the control of these guilds over wages and conditions of labour has been replaced by State legislation, and trade secrets have also largely disappeared, but the associations have a wide scope for their activities in enforcing agreements regarding competition, credit, and wages, and for the promotion and protection of the interests of their members.[2]

Chinese wholesale business, with its salesmen and buyers covering every corner of the Philippines, supplied the Chinese provincial merchants and the smallest Chinese retailers.

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[1] Helmut G. Callis, *Foreign Capital in Southeast Asia* (mimeograph) (New York International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942) p. 21.

Mr Callis estimates the total foreign investments in the Philippines, other than Chinese, at about U.S. $315 million (p. 21). In 1932 the Bureau of Insular Affairs estimated Chinese investments in the Philippines at 162,932,000 pesos, exclusive of real estate. This figure, says Hayden, was probably a great deal too low. At about the same time the Chinese consul-general put the figure at 201 million pesos (U.S. $100,500,000).

A good deal of Chinese money was lost in the Stock Exchange collapse of 1937, most of it invested in worthless mines. Florence Horn, op. cit. p. 210.

[2] Hayden, op. cit. p. 698.

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453 merchants and the smallest Chinese retailer. Behind the business
471 houses, which were conducted either by an individual or by a family, were two Chinese banks, one of them, opened in 1939,
441 being a branch of the Bank of Communications owned by the Chinese National Government. There were also two other Manila banks in which a large amount of Chinese capital had been invested. In normal times there were approximately 15,000 Chinese mercantile and industrial firms in the Philippines, though in the years preceding the war with Japan, Japanese and Government-subsidized Filipino competition had reduced the number of Chinese firms. As in Siam and Indochina the Chinese largely financed the growing of rice, and to a great extent controlled its milling and distribution. This was a hold that the Philippines Government was trying to break. Chinese, too, practically controlled the retail trade in lumber and cut 40 per cent. of the timber put on the market annually.[1]

As the undeveloped country in the Philippines was opened up
166 the Chinese were in the van of those seeking for new commercial
443 opportunities. In Cotabato, at the mouth of the Rio Grande de Cotabato, which drains an enormous territory in fast-developing
438 Mindanao, most of the firms were Chinese. Chinese had traded throughout the Sulu Archipelago centuries before the Filipinos voluntarily entered that area. 'From these and other centres [says

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[1] Hayden, op. cit. p. 699.

439 The following figures of Sino-Philippine trade will have meaning in the present context only to those who can say roughly what the share of the Philippine Chinese in this trade was!

	Imports from Philippines		*Exports from China to Philippines*		*Total trade*	
	Haikwan taels	*Index no.*	*Haikwan taels*	*Index no.*	*Haikwan taels*	*Index no.*
1868	280,700	100·0	163,197	100·0	443,897	100·0
1878	112,842	40·2	242,499	148·6	355,341	80·1
1888	68,402	24·4	314,249	192·6	382,651	86·4
1897	75,887	27·0	132,095	80·9	207,982	46·9
1898	14,133	5·0	85,718	52·5	99,851	22·5
1908	1,806,726	643·6	175,078	107·3	1,981,804	446·5
1918	3,193,324	1,137·7	2,153,227	1,319·4	5,346,751	1,204·3
1928	5,775,932	2,057·7	5,848,357	3,583·6	11,624,289	2,618·7
1933	2,730,000* (*U.S. $4,254,000)	972·6	3,497,000* (* $5,449,000)	2,141·6	6,228,000* (* $9,903,000)	1,403·0

From Ho Ping-Yin, *The Foreign Trade of China* (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1935) p. 569.

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Hayden, p. 699] Chinese traders penetrate to the uppermost 166
reaches of jungle rivers, travel the remotest forest trails, and reach
the most isolated coastal villages. Carrying in cotton and assorted 443
trade goods, they bring out copra, hemp, gutta percha, and other 438
native products.' They did not take up land partly because public land is not alienated to foreigners and partly because Chinese agricultural immigration was now forbidden.[1]

The Americans continued the land policy of the Spanish, so that 423
in 1940 the Filipino still owned 90 per cent. of the land of the
islands. At the same time it was observed that the Chinese were 425
increasingly anxious to obtain possession of soil which had yet to be tilled. As evidence of this an article in the *China Economic Journal* of January 1941 called attention to the opportunities that would be offered to Chinese investors and settlers by an independent Philippines, and also to the ease and cheapness with which Chinese born in the islands could obtain land there even now. In Mindanao the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian tribes warned that the Chinese were already adopting a device which the Japanese had successfully used in Davao, namely, marrying pagan or Moro women and acquiring public land in the names of their wives.[2]

Accentuation of the Chinese Question

It was not to be expected that the substitution of the go-ahead, 178
democratic control of the Americans for the languid, semi-feudal, and semi-clerical regime of the Spanish would dispose of age-old problems in a night. Indeed, when the United States had terminated its rule of forty-eight years at least two notable problems

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[1] Hayden, op. cit. pp. 699, 700 says: 'Only very courageous men would live the lives of many of these Chinese traders. In 1931, the author travelled by river boat, horseback, and on foot across Mindanao from Cotabato to Davao over a route now traversed by a modern road. Through the centre of the Island the trail, which in places had to be hacked open by Bolos, wound through virgin forests inhabited by primitive peoples. Philippine officials insisted upon providing a constabulary escort for the expedition. In the heart of this wild country was found a small *tienda*—just a counter, a dozen shelves and a place to sleep. The proprietor, a Chinese, was absent, but we met him on the trail, returning from Davao with two Manobo *cargadores* who carried on their backs his slender stock-in-trade. Few Americans, Japanese, or Filipinos would have been willing to face the isolation and danger to which he was cheerfully returning. This pioneer merchant was typical of the enterprise and determination which have brought such a large proportion of the trade of the frontier areas of the Far East into their hands.'

[2] ibid. p. 703.

178 of the Philippines, the agrarian question and that of the Chinese, were still far from solution.

579 Outbreaks against the Chinese occurred under the American Government, but there was, of course, nothing to compare with the holocausts of 1603 and 1639. The ruling power took no part in instigating or carrying out attacks on the Chinese, but, on the contrary, was stern in their repression. Minor outbreaks of this sort were a feature of Philippine life, but the most serious disorder between 1898 and 1950 occurred in 1924. It is said to have originated in a rumour, entirely without foundation, to the effect that a number of Filipino students had been killed by Chinese in Canton or Hong Kong, and the feeling excited in the Philippines brought forth one more story, that a Filipino baby had been killed by local Chinese and parts of its body used as charms or medicine—a counterpart, in reverse, of the Tientsin rumours of 1870, when similar allegations were made by Chinese against Europeans. The first riot was at Cabanatuan in Luzon, where the Chinese control of the business and agriculture of a great rice region had made the area ripe for demonstrations of resentment. Further outbreaks took place in Manila and in other Chinese centres, and the Philippine constabulary had to be used to restore order. Another attack upon the Chinese of more than average seriousness took place at San Pablo in February 1931.

186 But quite apart from their immediate causes or excuses these
661 disturbances were indicative of the widespread feeling of hostility
579 towards the Chinese, based on the conviction that they were an alien people endangering the livelihood of the Filipinos by their competition and against whom an occasional display of spleen was both legitimate and a temperamental necessity. The ordinary people required the moral support of indignation derived from a fable or alleged sharp practice before they would attack the Chinese, but Filipinos of the better-educated classes were constantly aware of the Chinese as a sort of nagging pain in the Philippine economy. Many officials considered that redress through exactions from the Chinese shopkeepers and merchants in the shape of special licence fees by municipal councils or by demanding 'open-date credit' from them was not at all unreasonable, and when the Chinese acquiesced in the exactions as the price of their being left alone they were publicly accused of corrupting Filipino officialdom!

Much more serious than the sporadic outbursts of popular 451
feeling were the Book-keeping Act of 1921 and other legislation
directed specifically against the Chinese business community. The 656
Book-keeping Act required that every merchant in the Philippines
should keep accounts of his business in English, Spanish, or a local
dialect.[1] The aim of this legislation was officially declared to be to
put an end to the defrauding of the public treasury of millions of
pesos annually by the 15,000 small Chinese shopkeepers, which
had been made possible because of the inability of Filipino officials
to check their books. The Chinese, quite naturally, were immediately
'up in arms'. The effect of the legislation, they declared,
would be to compel every little Chinese barrio to employ a Filipino
clerk and to reveal to their competitors all their trade secrets. Its [661]
motive, they said, was to feather the nest of certain politicians by
forcing the Chinese to bribe them to prevent the law being carried
into effect. The last allegation, ironically enough, was responsible
for dissuading Filipino politicians who regarded the law as unjust
from voting for its repeal since, if they did so, their opponents
would say that they had been bribed by the Chinese!

The Chinese business community of the Philippines, regarding the Book-keeping Law as the test case *par excellence* of their right to carry on trade under conditions of justice, marshalled their forces to fight the matter and to their aid rallied their compatriots in China, the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, and in the business centres of Southeast Asia. European counsel were employed to state the case against the Act with all their resources of legal argument. At the request of Governor-General Leonard Wood, the Philippine Legislature postponed the execution of the statute, but refused to modify it in any substantial degree. Failing to secure the repeal of the law, or its annulment by Congress, the Chinese took the case to the Supreme Court of the United States, which declared the Act unconstitutional.

In their official memorandum for the information of the 451
Supreme Court, the Philippine Chinese declared that the matter
was vastly more than local, more than a domestic regulation. It 656
had, they said, an international character of profound importance. 648
If the law were allowed to go into effect (the memorandum continued)
it was not unreasonable to suppose that retaliation would
result. China might pass a law requiring American merchants to

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[1] Hayden, op. cit. p. 705 ff.

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656 keep their books of account in Chinese, which would be an end of
648 American business in China.[1]

451 The Philippine Legislature was, however, not prepared to accept the Supreme Court's decision as a final defeat. In 1926 it enacted
656 a new Book-keeping Law, drafted so as to meet constitutional requirements; but Chinese opposition again made it inadvisable to enforce it, nor did amendments passed in 1934 make the measure workable. In 1935 the Philippines became a Commonwealth, and the following year the Government, resuming the battle, introduced a new amendment to the law which permitted commercial books to be kept in a language other than a native language or English or Spanish, but required that all entries therein should be translated into one or other of the three recognized languages, and certified under oath by the book-keeper or manager of the company concerned. Again, the Chinese through their Chamber of Commerce intervened to delay the bringing into force of the law, with the result that President Quezon prevailed upon the Legislature to grant a year before it should become effective.

475 Legislative acts to keep the Chinese under control were one set of weapons against the Chinese; the Government-stimulated or
186 subsidized organizations to compete with them were another set,
441 and, on the face of it, much more promising of results. For years previously, privately sponsored organizations had sought to stimulate Filipino production for Filipino consumption. The Ang Bagong Katipunan in 1930–1 and later the National Economic Protective Association conducted campaigns to this end. Early in 1940 the National Trading Corporation was established and provided with capital from Government funds. This activity was an extension of the provisions of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines (article xii, section 1) which limited the exploitation of the islands to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations of which at least 60 per cent. of the capital was owned by such citizens, and (article xiii) which made similar provision with regard

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[1] 'What [asks Hayden] would the suggested retaliation have been if the outraged Chinese had been dealing with an independent Philippine Republic instead of the United States of America?' (Chinese accounts, I can state from experience when I was official assignee and liquidator of companies, Penang (1926–9), kept by shopkeepers and small traders are not complicated. There are a day-book and a ledger and (usually but not invariably) a stock-book. The Chinese are very jealous of their trade secrets, and in Malaya were opposed to registration of partnerships. V. P.)

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to public utilities.[1] The object of the National Trading Corpora- 186
tion was, as its president declared, to 'break the stranglehold of 441
foreign retailers' upon the Philippine trade.

Action closely parallel to that taken in Siam in 1947 was taken 473
in the Philippines in 1941 when the Manila Municipal Board
passed an ordinance prohibiting all persons from engaging in any 656
form of business in the public markets except citizens of the Philip- 648
pines or United States, three years' grace being granted to alien
holders of market stalls. Chinese were the holders of practically all
these stalls, and the ordinance was therefore immediately followed
by a protest from the Chinese consul-general to the United States
high commissioner, declaring that the ordinance violated treaties
between China and the United States and would throw thousands
of Chinese out of work. Although supported by a suggestion from
the high commissioner that apart from its legality the ordinance
'might have an unfavourable effect in the field of international
relations', the protest was disregarded and the law remained.

It must not be concluded, however, that the attitude of the 441
Commonwealth was altogether uncompromising. So far as estab-
lishing the Filipino trade went, it was resolute in its principles, but 471
it strove to avoid provocation of the Chinese. President Quezon ex- 186
plained in a speech that 'foreigners, aside from their rights recog-
nized in international law and our own laws . . . have the further 656
right to be treated with equity and justice, because they have
helped in the development of our country when our own people
were not engaging in business enterprises'.[2] What, however, the
Filipino business men had the right to expect from their Govern-
ment, and what it was creating for them (President Quezon went
on) were banking institutions, facilities for trade and communica-
tion, and new opportunities to engage in trade and industry. But
the Filipino must stand on his own merits. He must make his way
through earnest, intelligent, and determined effort; he must be
prepared to meet fair competition. At the same time the Govern-
ment could not adopt a policy that in any way might be interpreted
as antagonistic to foreigners.[3]

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[1] Hayden, op. cit. pp. 838, 840, appendix ii.

[2] Address at the inauguration of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce (29 July 1938). Hayden, op. cit. p. 708 and p. 945, fn. 20.

[3] In 1933, when Tomas Confesor, Director of the Bureau of Commerce, had 186
stated that if Filipinos were to supplant the Chinese by 'legitimate' (i.e. non-political) means they would have to develop the economic efficiency of the

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443 In his annual message to the National Assembly in 1941 President Quezon found himself able to state that Filipino participation in the retail trade of the country had increased from between 15 and 20 per cent. at the time of the inauguration of the Commonwealth to approximately 37 per cent. in 1939. Filipinos, he declared, now outnumbered the merchants of all other nationalities in the retail trade and controlled a greater number of retail stores.[1]

186 As has been remarked, and should be repeated, the Filipino
politician who finds himself impelled to declare that 'something
661 must be done about the Chinese' is very likely to proclaim by his
461 eyes and by the bone structure of his face that one or more of his
ancestors was Chinese. The same anomaly is found in Siam. But
511 what may be an historical or philosophical irony may also be a
512 practical irrelevance, since racial antecedents are of small importance beside national sentiment and political expedience. Pressed as
471 to his case against the Chinese, the Filipino politician would say
441 that the Chinese were too numerous, that they had more than half
of the retail business in their hands, that they charged too high prices, cheated in weights and measures, and made high profits. Should it be objected that if this were so all the Filipino had to do was to open up a *tienda* on his own and put the Chinese out of business in the village, the politician would probably shift his ground. He would now say that the Chinese standard of living is deplorably low; the owner of a Chinese *tienda* is willing to live in a small corner of his store, he eats almost nothing and works day and night; so does his family and his assistant as well if he has one. The Chinese in Manila, he says, persistently disregard the eight-hour law. In fine, the charge now is that the Chinese runs his business with too little, not with too great, overhead expenses and
[441 profits. If this is true, then the Chinese give excellent service to the
435] community as distributors. The Filipino can buy cheaply because
the Chinese live so meagrely.[2]

000 This argument is followed up by an appeal to the fear in the

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[186] Chinese and perform for the community the services now performed by the Chinese, he had brought upon his head a storm of Filipino indignation. See Hayden, op. cit. p. 700.

[442] [1] On the other hand, the provincial commercial supervisor of Pangasinan, a rich province of central Luzon, reported that in December 1938, only 2 per cent. of the retail trade and of the wholesale dealing in the staple crops was in the hands of Filipinos. Hayden, op. cit. p. 711.

[2] The above is summarized from Florence Horn, op. cit. p. 142–3.

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This argument is followed up by an appeal to the fear in the listener of the Chinese power. If they used their control of the 186 retail trade as a weapon they could paralyse the economy of the 661 country in a single night. (This does not seem actually to have 471 happened in the Philippines, but it did happen in Bangkok in 1910.) 441

Then there is the charge of usury. The Chinese who keeps the local *tienda* lends money to the Filipino at extortionate rates of 426 interest. The result is that the Filipino is everlastingly in debt to 452 the Chinese. That the Filipino is always in debt to the Chinese is undoubtedly true, but the evidence is all to the effect that the Filipino *cacique* is even more oppressive and usurious.

Finally the politician's charge is that the Chinese own the 256 country's rice-mills. It is probable that before the Japanese war 75 per cent. of the Philippine rice-mills were owned by Chinese. The 426 *tao* (peasant) sells rice to the mill which often acts also as a banker 452 and money-lender. Frequently the Chinese mill is the only buyer of rice in a given locality and the price given is what the mill will pay.[1] The cure for this, in any case, would not be Filipino-owned rice-mills but something in the nature of marketing co-operative organizations set up with Government aid and encouragement.[2]

In this vexed question of the Chinese domination of the rice 435 trade, there is some expert evidence forthcoming which tends to refute the assertion that the excessive profits of the middleman 441 explain the low returns to the grower and the high cost of rice to the consumer. In a study of the marketing of rice in Nueva Ecija 256 conducted by the college of agriculture at Los Baños not long before the war with Japan it was found that comparing prices paid to farmers by Cabanatuan mills with the wholesale price of rice in Manila the difference, on margin, was relatively small. In terms of the wholesale price of rice in Manila, the farmer in Nueva Ecija received on the average 87 per cent., while the Chinese rice merchants received a margin of 13 per cent. Of this margin 4 per cent. represented milling costs, and 3·9 per cent. railway freight, 2·1 per cent. marketing costs, and 3 per cent. profit to the miller or wholesaler.[3] The same authority continues:

> The results of the survey show that the Chinese merchants are per-

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[1] The same complaint would apply to tobacco areas where the Tabacalera is the sole buyer.

[2] Florence Horn, op. cit. p. 145.

[3] H. H. Miller, *Principles of Economics Applied to the Philippines* (Boston, 1932) p. 198–9, cited in *The Rice Economy of Monsoon Asia* (California, Food Research Institute, Stamford University, 1941) p. 182.

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435 441 256 forming essential marketing services at a fairly low cost. It is therefore evident that for the Filipinos to displace the Chinese in the rice trade they must be able to render marketing services at margins equal to, or still lower than, those now received by them. For co-operative marketing by farmers to be successful the same condition obtains.

181 The Chinese engaged in the business even before the Spanish regime in the Philippines. They have the experience and trade ties with other Chinese in neighbouring countries. It seems that the Filipino is not by nature so good a business man as the Chinese. though Government officials, from President Quezon down, have been optimistic regarding the ability of the Filipino to learn the rice business within ten years from *c.* 1941 after which complete nationalization was foreseen.[1]

444 511 Considering how popular fury had so often been worked up against the Chinese retailer 'drawing off the riches' of the country and squeezing out the native Filipino by his relentless competition, it is curious to note how unimpressive the ordinary Chinese *tienda* is. This is also true of the country shops and booths of the Chinese in other parts of Southeast Asia. The average Chinese shop in the Philippines is a miserable little *nipa* shack[2] with small stocks of food and cheap household articles. (There is an aroma, too, about it [515] of shrimp paste, kerosene oil, and dried fish.) The Chinese shopkeeper does not look at all prosperous and he cares less for his clothes and his cleanliness than does the average Filipino. Yet it is certain that he is not as poor as he looks, and it is probable that a large percentage of the villagers owe him money.

441 471 The balance-sheet of the value or detriment of the Chinese to the Philippine Islands, so far as we can ascertain it, consists of debit or credit items presented by detractors or apologists. Each item calls for careful scrutiny in the light of the facts and the motive of the person stating it, and at the end the reader should be able to decide whether the balance should be written in black ink or red.

The Chinese memorandum to Congress on the occasion of the appeal against the Book-keeping Act does not neglect the appeals of rhetoric, of which the basis was derived from the Chinese themselves and which was given by expert American advocates the form

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[1] In 1936 the National Rice Corporation (NARIC) was created.

[2] So Florence Horn observes, but a critic, commenting on this, remarks, 'This is going much too far!'

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nd finish that would appeal to American elder statesmen. Here is an example: 441

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> The Chinese merchants are not newcomers. They are as much a part of the Philippine Islands as the hills and valleys and streams of that beautiful archipelago. No one knows when they came, as they came at a ime when the memory of man runneth not to the contrary. . . . When the Spaniards came to the Islands first, in 1520, they found Chinese merchants doing all the commercial business of the Islands. It is hardly possible to call them foreigners—they are a part and parcel of Philippine life. They have never failed to answer any call for public service. They constitute the commercial class of the Islands just as the Filipinos are the official and the farming class. The existence of one is just as essential as that of the other for a proper functioning of the life of the Philippine Islands. Each has his task to perform. The officials govern; the farmers produce; but it is the merchants who pay the bills, because the greater part of the taxes for the maintenance of the Government comes from them. . . . The Chinese merchant is more than a merchant; he carries on the commercial end of the Philippine industrial life. These merchants, thus scattered throughout the provinces, loan money to the Filipinos to aid them in growing and marketing their crops. The Chinese merchant buys their crops. He exports them and brings to them in return the commodities they need. Chinese merchants constitute the very essence of the commercial life of the Islands. No complaints are heard of their dealings. They are universally recognized as fair, honest, and square. Their reputation is higher than the reputation of any similar body of merchants to be found elsewhere in the world. . .

The memorandum pointed out that the Chinese merchant is not peculiar to the Philippines. He is to be found throughout Oceania, in the Netherlands Indies, in Malaya, in French Indochina, and in other quarters of the globe. In no other instance than this 'had sovereignty presumed to enact such an unconscionable and unendurable law'.[1]

So much for the very understandable Chinese point of view. Sympathy, however, must not altogether be denied to the Filipino statesmen in their avowed political goal of the creation of a representative democracy. 'The domination of the business of the country [says Dr Hayden] by a powerful and unassimilable foreign element in the population does not make this admittedly difficult task any easier.' This outstanding authority on the politics of the

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[1] Hayden, op. cit. p. 709–10.

441 471 Philippines before the Second World War continues in these words:[1]

> What would be the effect upon American local, state and national government, were three-quarters of the 'business men', including the bankers and the 'produce merchants' engaged in the distribution of the basic foodstuffs of virtually every city, county, town, and village in the land, aliens who had no votes, no interest in government save to protect themselves from it or to use it, and no devotion to the political institutions of the nation? What would American politics be were 75 per cent. of all taxes on business to be paid by this same group of aliens who possessed no legitimate control over government agencies for levying and collection of taxes and the regulation of business? Few, indeed, would say that the prospects of good government or democratic government would be bright under such conditions. Yet in the Philippines, which until three decades ago, was an autocratically governed Spanish colony, precisely such conditions exist.

661 186 In the Philippines the Chinese were, and are, the easiest political target. The Americans and the Spaniards had a far larger share of the profits from the islands, but concerning them the Filipino politicians were generally silent; it was the Chinese who were the scapegoats for oratory and the objects for discrimination. In November 1939 Manuel Quezon devoted an entire speech to threats against the Chinese and to promises to set up the Filipinos in business. At just about the same time Quezon was offering haven to 10,000 Jewish exiles from Europe! They were to be settled in an agricultural colony in Mindanao. The Chinese wondered at this generous hospitality. They knew, no doubt, that, like themselves, the Jews ended up in trade no matter how they started life in any country.[2]

661 186 Finally, the Chinese (as elsewhere) were accused of drawing off capital from the country. After the outbreak of war between China and Japan they contributed to Chiang Kai-shek's war chest as well

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471 [1] Hayden, op. cit. p. 711–12.

[2] See Florence Horn, op. cit. p. 146.
This was speedily exemplified. The following is an extract from the *North China Daily News* of 29 January 1947: Jews who came to the Philippines before the war as refugees from Nazi rule were recently found to have violated the conditions upon which they were admitted. A Department of Justice official said that these Jews were admitted into the country by the late Commonwealth President Manuel L. Quezon on condition that they settle down only in sparsely populated areas and engage in agricultural pursuits. Contrary to this condition, the official said, most of them settled in Manila and other commercial centres and are at present engaged in business other than agriculture.

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as to the support of their families at home. It was estimated that 661
sums exceeding U.S. $6 million had gone out of the Philippines to
China between 1937 and 1941. One close observer of Philippine 186
affairs remarks that these remittances appear to have been the only 471
real drain which the Chinese have made on the economy of the Philippines and a control of them not only would prevent the Chinese sending wealth from the country '*out of proportion to the economic benefits which their presence brings*,' but also would provide a simple, indirect, and (at least on the surface) non-discriminatory means of controlling immigration. The difficulty would be to make the estimation required by the phrase italicized.

On 2 May 1940 the Philippine National Assembly passed an Act providing that not more than 500 'quota immigrants of any one nationality' might be admitted into the islands in any one calendar year. This law established a national 'non-discriminatory' immigration policy designed to protect the Philippines from mass immigration. The Filipino action was taken in face of 'grave warnings' from the Government of Japan issued directly to the Commonwealth (and, it was reported, repeated to Washington) and a milder protest from the Chinese consul-general in Manila. President Roosevelt, ignoring Japanese objections, granted approval to the law.[1]

In reading books and other publications on the Philippines the 114
student is struck by how little is known of the domestic life of a Chinese community. This is scarcely less true of Indonesia and Siam, of Burma and Indochina. In Malaya the veil has been lifted much more, though even there there is a great deal left to be known. In Southeast Asia generally there is a mass of material regarding the relations between the Chinese and other communities but very little about the relations between Chinese and Chinese. Thus the complex social and political life of the Chinese is often dismissed with reference to 'secret societies' or 'Tong wars'.[2] In the Philippines this observation applies equally to the Spanish and the
American periods. No one (so far as the present writer is aware) 668
has written on the history of the Kuomintang or of the Chinese
Communist Party in the Philippines, though the first at least has 648

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[1] Hayden, op. cit. p. 691.

[2] For example, in 1910 deportation orders were served on twelve undesirable Chinese who belonged to the *Tongs*. These *Tongs* were usually beneficial and formed for co-operative assistance. W. Cameron Forbes, *The Philippine Islands* (New Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1928) i. 309. [575]

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648 been active since its formation.[1] Before the war with Japan the Philippines were not such fertile soil for Chinese Communism as
668 the other countries of the area because the Chinese community was comparatively small and in its make-up merchants and retailers preponderated. There is thus practically no information available about Chinese Communist activity in the islands prior to the Japanese war. After the liberation, we shall see, the Communists made up for lost time in organizing themselves and in attempting to seize power in the community.

[131] The Philippines are nearer to the China ports than other Southeast Asian countries. In the old days migration between the
[167] Philippines and China was not so frequent as it has since become. Many of the richer Chinese used to maintain one household in Canton or Amoy and another in Manila or Cebu, but in the immediate pre-war years this was ceasing to be the case, and China was becoming the sole family centre with increased ties with the ancestral country, and more and more Chinese merchants retired
[871] to China. It was estimated, too, that before the Japanese war more than two hundred children of Chinese business men were sent annually to the mainland for education. Chinese nationalism was
648 thus increasingly claiming the Philippine Chinese as its own,
144 though the majority of them were still born of Filipino mothers and most of their descendants continued to be absorbed eventually into the Filipino people.[2]

609 No view of the Chinese which tries to take in both sides of the medal will find favour either with the Chinese or their critics. The former regard themselves as persecuted or unreasonably differentiated against, and will accept no other solution than that they should be subjected to no restrictions or regulations of any sort which do not equally apply to Filipinos. The Filipinos, for their part, have no difficulty in finding a moral as well as a legal justification for their legislative or administrative action. These rigid

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[1] Mr Chu-pei Chen is now supplying this omission.

[2] Hayden, op. cit. pp. 697, 712.

[554] Mr Claude A. Buss in his article on the Philippines in Lennox A. Mills and associates, *The New World of Southeast Asia* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1949), p. 21 says: 'For some unaccountable reason, the
[848] children of mixed marriages between Spanish and Filipinos (like Quezon) or between Chinese and Filipinos (like Sergio Osmena) have come to be regarded as distinct social assets, while children of mixed marriages between Americans and Filipinos or illegitimate children of the liberation are often faced with unpleasant social barriers.'

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partisan attitudes (as is always the case in politics) cut across the human instinct for compromise. In the villages, the peasant who 609 regards the Chinese traders as his oppressors and the authors of his misfortunes is yet, consciously or subconsciously, aware that they provide a distribution service which he himself could not reproduce either in this generation or the next, and, while he resents the Chinese proprietor of the *tienda*, he would think himself very lucky to obtain him as the husband for his prettiest daughter, for with him as *pariente* the whole family would never be in want. He knows [454] him to be frugal and economical where he himself is shiftless. In the words of Hayden (p. 712), 'A permanent settlement of the issues involved can be reached only by applying the principle of equity, as well as of law; by exercise of patience and caution; and by a mutual recognition of conflicting points of view.' Unfortunately such a solution is likely to be found only when a completely impartial authority is holding the scales of justice. But even when 661 under the Commonwealth the Americans still had a large measure of final control, they were able only to soften the impact of the Filipino offensive; after July 1946, when the complete independence of the Philippines was promised, the tribunal of power was likely to be influenced by political considerati and the Chinese were likely to be in a worse plight. Politicians are never their own masters, at liberty to obey the dictates of their own consciences or to adopt the abstract standards of justice and humanity; to remain in power they must play up to the prejudices of their electorates. It did not seem then that the Chinese had very much to hope for from the advance of democracy.

CHAPTER LIV

DURING THE WAR WITH JAPAN AND UNDER THE REPUBLIC, 1941–1948[1]

178 THE war with Japan created an entirely new pattern in Southeast Asian politics—so much so that the observer who was fairly closely in touch with the situation in 1940 would, if he did not return to Southeast Asia until 1948 and had not kept himself up to date with a close study of reports, find himself almost unable to recognize what he saw. The basic elements, perhaps, had not changed, but some of them had developed so disproportionately, and the arrangement was so different, that the change amounted in effect to one of kind.

In the Philippines the situation of the Chinese may conveniently be described under three heads, (*a*) political, (*b*) economic, and (*c*) the immigration and repatriation questions.

668 Before the war the activity of the Chinese Communists in the islands was slight. The Chinese 'left-wingers' had their centre in Manila known as the Tion Hwa Tian (China Hall) located in Alvarado Street. It was believed that their membership did not exceed 1,000. They denied that they were Communists. Their mouthpiece was the *Kim Kuo Press* (bi-monthly) with a minute circulation. During the first year of the Japanese occupation the Chinese Communists began to get to work and created anti-Japanese organizations without at first revealing their political
668 affiliations. They had at least one underground newspaper, and organized students and young shop assistants, especially the latter
669 who were disgruntled because the shops in which they worked were closed. Later on they filtered into the neighbouring provinces

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[1] Mr. Chu-pei Chen was in 1949 preparing a study of *The Chinese and the War in the Philippines* for the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. This study, of which the writer has seen some of the first chapters, will provide valuable material to supplement this chapter.

One very remarkable assertion concerning the Chinese in the Philippines in Mr Chu-pei Chen's study is that while the *majority* of the Chinese living in the Islands are adherents of the Roman Catholic faith, ancestor-worship is also carried on in the average Chinese family. On All Souls' Day Chinese Christians, Catholic or Protestant, join their relatives in ancestor-worship at the Chinese incemetery, and are distinguished from the non-Christian Chinese only by not burning incense and not kneeling before the tomb or shrine.

[p. 642]

and started a military training base. Classes on guerrilla warfare were held. A considerable group of officers who later organized the 668
Hwa Chi combat units and joined the Hukbalahaps and the United 669
States armed forces during the liberation were products of these military training classes. During the occupation a Communist guerrilla unit travelled Luzon playing hide-and-seek with the Japanese.[1]

Meanwhile the Kuomintang also organized three guerrilla units, 669
namely the Philippine Chinese Volunteer Corps under the command of Sy Yat-sien, the head of the Kuomintang, the COHEM (*Hsüeh Kan Tuan*) headed by Li Hai-jo, and the Philippines Chinese Youth Corps under Lin Cho-mei. Li and Lin had been sent to the Philippines to organize the San Min Chu I Youth Corps shortly before the war. However, these three Kuomintang units did not co-operate very well and were not engaged in active combat. They were mostly occupied in underground anti-Japanese propaganda activities. Only after the liberation were some of Sy Yat-sien's and Li Hai-jo's men incorporated into the U.S. armed forces in mopping up Japanese remnants near Baguio and other regions.

During the battle for Manila in the last phase of the war both the Communist and Kuomintang guerrillas aided the Americans, acting as guides and providing guards for bridges against Japanese dynamiters. The two units each set up a headquarters, but that of the Communists had much the more militant appearance. Both units obtained recognition from the United States Army by sending new forces to the front, but both soon incurred the displeasure of the high command by engaging in rival political action within the local community.

With the Japanese removed from the scene, the Communists 668
came into the open, taking over the campus of the Philippine Chinese high school as headquarters of the League of the Philippine Anti-Japanese and Puppets, and they placed all Communist-affiliated organizations under their control. This was now the centre of left-wing activity in Manila. At the same time a 'people's court' was set up to try persons accused of collaboration. The first persons summoned before it were Yu Khe-thai, pre-war supreme

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[1] The commanders of the left-wing guerrilla forces were Uy Kiaf, Chua Kien-hua, Tan Chon-sien, chief of staff, and Ong Seh-hsiün, commander of the Hwa Chi 48th Unit, later incorporated into the Hukbalahaps.

668 leader of the Chinese community and President of the Resist-the-Enemy Association, and Justo Cabo Chan, the last puppet president of the Chinese Association, who had survived the assassination drive of the Communist guerrillas. Yu, however, did not answer the summons, and Chan, being under the custody of the Americans, could not come.

In the post-war Chinese community of the Philippines, the most vexed issue was that of war-time 'collaboration' with the Japanese. It was precisely similar to the situation in other Chinese communities in the Nanyang, notably Malaya. In the long period of three years under the Japanese many prominent, law-abiding Chinese had been forced to join the puppet Chinese Association. It is true that most of them were inactive and reluctant to participate in any activity under the association, such as Yu Khe-thai, the Sycip brothers, and others; but in the eyes of the left-wingers they were all collaborators and should be punished accordingly. Between the *Great China Daily News*, the post-war Kuomintang paper, and the *Chinese Guide*, the Communist official organ, a desperate press war now ensued. The Communist organ also attacked Roxas and a number of other Filipino officials.

Meanwhile the Communists were intent on taking the law into their own hands. In the early days of the liberation a ring known as the Hing Han Chu Chien Tuan, whose aim was the liquidation of Chinese collaborators, swung into action. It was believed that Tan Tien-hon, secretary of the Chinese Association, Go Co-lai, first president of the association, and Ty Han-kee, Go's successor, were victims of this ring. The leader was an unidentified bloodthirsty Communist military leader who was known as the 'Flying Tiger'. Other victims of the ring were Chan Chin, a student consul of the Chinese consulate in Manila, who was believed to have been a collaborator in the Japanese 'buy-and-sell' scheme, and Uy Ken-sien, connected with Nishimura's Kempei Thai (military police), who were assassinated immediately after the liberation.

During the occupation the Chinese Communists had established contacts with the Filipino Communists. After the liberation, the Hwa Chi 48th Combat Unit, commanded by Captain Ong Seh-hsiün (who was believed to have been connected with the 8th Route Army in China, and who was a very able man) was incorporated into the Hukbalahaps, the Filipino agrarian insurgents who were now in a state of open rebellion against the Govern-

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ment.[1] In Batangas, in Luzon province, the constabulary seized a number of Chinese Communists in one raid. It is believed that they had 'cells' in other parts of Luzon, especially in the northern tip, which is the landing point of junks smuggling Chinese immigrants into the islands as well as into other islands of Southeast Asia. 668

Young men and girls were organized and indoctrinated through a 'research society', a 'debating society', a 'library society', and other branches. These novices were required to live in the premises of the organization so as to be completely under its influence and without any outside contamination.

Besides these activities, the Chinese Communists were suspected of assassination and terrorism. A clerk of the Chinese consulate, who worked for the Japanese during the occupation and was one of the only two survivors of the Japanese massacre of the Chinese consular staff, was shot within two weeks of the liberation—by Communist agents, it was alleged. The same body assassinated two wealthy Chinese who had served as chairmen of the Chinese Association during the occupation.[2]

These internal dissensions in the Chinese community continued with increasing bitterness. When the Philippines became an independent republic there would be a reorientation of policy, and, though the Philippines would remain within the American diplomatic and economic orbit, it was likely that the Government would be more vigorous than before in dealing with disturbances among the Chinese in the Philippines. In September of that year, sixty-one Chinese were detained some hours for questioning, and raids

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[1] 'Philippine economy is rooted in the feudal economy of sixteenth-century Spain, which the conquistadores implanted on Philippine soil. The half-century of American occupation brought about a substantial advancement in education, public health, self-government, and an increasing national income, but it did not create a middle class of any size, and the bulk of the newly created income went to the Government, the landlords, and the urban areas. In spite of large schemes for nationalizing land, little was done in effect to ameliorate conditions among the feudal peasantry or to replace the backward agricultural economy.' So says Hernando J. Abaya, *Betrayal in the Philippines* (New York, A. A. Wyn, 1946) p. 206 ff. During the Japanese occupation there came into being the Hukbalahaps or militant peasant army of the resistance movement. The name is from the Tagalog *Hukbo Ng Bayan Laban Sa Hapon*, or People's Anti-Japanese Army. 829

[2] The report of Mr Arthur M. Goul, United Press correspondent in the Philippines, published in the *North China Daily News* of 7 April 1948, has been closely followed in the above account.

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were conducted on the *Chinese Guide* and the *Chinese Commercial Bulletin* (newspapers that termed themselves independent), the Chinese Labour Federation office, a Chinese Y.M.C.A. school, the Hung Kwong Institute, and the Chinese Union high school. This action the police called 'crime investigation'.[1]

These raids threw the Chinese community into an 'apprehensive furore', since they were the climax of a long period of acute political tension among the Chinese of the Philippines which reflected divisions in the Chinese homeland. It seemed that each of the two, or several, factions had been 'informing' the police against the other or others. Certain Chinese generals living in the Philippines were declared by ultra-conservative Chinese groups to be subversive, and these groups requested Zulueta, the Secretary of the Interior, to deport them. Other elements in the Chinese community decried such a move. Right-wingers also charged the Chinese left-wingers with aiding the Hukbalahaps, but at that time no responsible authority in the Philippine Government could confirm the charge. On 7 September it was reported that indiscriminate raids by the military police on the Chinese were halted by President Roxas because of the possibility that they might be misinterpreted by the Chinese or by their sympathizers abroad. A Government spokesman explained that the raids resulted from complaints that some individuals frequenting the offices of Chinese newspapers were connected with lawless elements, and with a kidnapping ring which had been preying on prominent members of the Chinese community.

Although for the first two years, or thereabouts, after the liberation no positive evidence came to light of any association between the Chinese Communists and the agrarian revolt, it was clear that the Communists in general intended as a policy to support and make use of every dissident movement in countries which were not under a Communist Government. But until such evidence was forthcoming, the foreign observer of liberal mind was inclined to regard the charge as part of an attempt in Southeast Asia to identify all nationalist or liberation movements of whatever sort with Communism. In the Philippines it was well known that the agrarian unrest was to some extent the natural and justifiable result of the grievances arising from an obsolete system of land tenure inherited from the Spanish regime, and one which the Americans had not

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[1] *New York Times* (6 September 1946).

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succeeded in replacing. But in the latter months of 1947 reports that the Chinese Communists were in league with the Hukbalahaps were not easily dismissed.

Early in September Major Napoleon Valeriano, commander of the military police commandos widely known as the 'skull unit', and acting military commander of Pampanga, declared that he had positive proof of the existence of an all-Chinese Hukbalahap squadron acting in and around Manila.[1] It was believed that most of the arms possessed by the Communists and the rebels were obtained from the Japanese, though some were served out by the U.S. forces.

The taking of justice into their own hands by the Communists and their 'people's court' after the liberation had, as in Malaya, prejudiced the action that the properly constituted authorities were in the meantime undertaking or contemplating. In Communist eyes any person who accepted employment or public appointment under the Japanese was a 'collaborator'. The effect of this attitude was that almost every Chinese who had been at all prominent or had held any property before the war was put in this class, for the simple reason that only those who had no stake in the country and had no family to protect or support could take to the hills and join the guerrillas. The Communists were ready besides with accusations and 'evidence' against anyone they happened to dislike, and of their charges authorities were naturally suspicious. The net result was that many who had been guilty of collaboration escaped punishment. But action against suspected collaborators did continue in a desultory way, and in November 1947 fifty Chinese-born persons, naturalized Filipinos, were 'screened' to decide whether or not they should be prosecuted for treason during the Japanese occupation. In the following January the screening by the Philippine constabulary was extended so as to cover, it seemed, the whole of the Chinese population; but how far this action had anything to do with suspected collaboration with the Japanese, and how far it was a round-up of Communists and others is a matter of opinion. In the meantime, in November, a clash between Chinese Communists and Kuomintang supporters was expected at any moment.[2]

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[1] *Manila Bulletin* (2 September 1947).
The present writer passed through Hukbalahap country in November 1947 when attending the United Nations Conference at Baguio. The Government provided a heavy military escort, for ambushes were fairly frequent.

[2] *North China Daily News* (2 November 1947).

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About this time Alfonso Z. Sycip, president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, was ordered to conduct a census of Chinese residents, and to submit a report. Five Chinese, black-listed by the provincial (? Pampanga) command, were already under investigation. Faction fights among the Chinese Nationalists, who had indiscriminately accused their opponents of being Communists, had stirred the constabulary to action. There were, however, enough genuine Communists in Manila and elsewhere to keep the police busy. In March 1948 Senator Salipada Pendatun, speaking in the Philippines Senate, and quoting a secret report of Government intelligence agents, asserted that there were now 10,000 Chinese Communists in Manila and the provinces. He accused them of the murder of 200 Chinese since the liberation. He mentioned incidentally that 45 Russians were registered with the Bureau of Immigration, and that 150 other Russians were classified as 'Stateless'. He claimed that the purely Russian group was under the control of 'an invisible hand' in Manila, and he asserted that during the meeting of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, held at Baguio in November and December, the Russian Communists in Manila had made contact with the Russian delegates to the Conference.[1]

It seemed inevitable, with the transition from underground to open action by the Communists in Malaya, Burma, and in Indonesia in the middle months of 1948 that, if these operations were successful, or even if they were not, the Philippines would not in the long run be omitted from the campaign.

This Communist activity belongs to what might be called the horizontal splitting-up of society according to affiliations of its layers with either the bourgeoisie or the proletariat, as distinguished from the vertical splitting which arose from differences of race, tribe, and clan. The Philippines authorities were conscious of this grid interaction, and, while they could depend on some support from the Chinese trading class in their offensive against the Communist elements, they were hostile to the Kuomintang which was still angling for power. Thus it was that when the old question of holding elections among the Chinese residing in the Philippines in connexion with the elections in China, which had been a source of friction for years between the Governments of Southeast Asia and the National Government of China, came again to the fore, the

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[1] *North China Daily News* (18 March 1948).

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Philippines Government was prepared to take a strong line. In October 1947 Quirino, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, advised a Chinese delegation that the Philippine Government would not allow local Chinese to hold elections.[1] The Chinese minister to the Philippines, Mr Chen Chih-ping, advised the Nanking Government to this effect, and on 22 October Dr George Yeh, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, told a press conference at Nanking that new regulations covering the participation of overseas Chinese in the coming national elections would shortly be published, as a result of protests from the Philippines, Siam, the United States, and other countries. It had been represented in the diplomatic exchanges (Dr Yeh said) that China's attempt to hold its elections on foreign soil constituted an infringement of the sovereignty of these countries. China, he said, had a particular problem because of the overwhelming number of Chinese nationals who would be represented in the National Government. The question of dual nationality had already been raised, and no Chinese would be allowed to vote unless he had already been registered at the Chinese consulate and had formally renounced his citizenship of he country he was living in.

Simultaneously 'a well-informed Foreign Office source' confirmed that a notification had been sent to the local Chinese legation to the effect that the holding of an election by Chinese nationals in the Philippines would be regarded as an infringement of the sovereignty of the Philippine Republic. However, the same spokesman said, the Philippine Foreign Office would have no objection if local Chinese nationals were to conduct their elections in the same manner as the United States armed forces in the Philippines cast their votes at the Presidential elections. The course that would be acceptable to the Philippines Foreign Office would be for the Chinese Government to send their nationals the ballots and forms to be filled in, and that these should be sent back to China for counting. The Philippines Government, it was understood, would not countenance the local holding of election meetings, rallies, and campaigns by Chinese nationals for their forthcoming national elections.[2]

It is doubtful, however, whether Filipino public opinion took these political questions half as seriously as it did the economic pressure of the Chinese. It was always possible to arouse the intens-

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[1] *Manila Bulletin* (23 October 1947).

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186 441 471 est resentment by any mention of the latter subject. As early as October 1945 a trade nationalization bill aimed at the Chinese was stopped only by the Presidential veto. The Press Secretary, Mauro Mendez, explained that President Osmena had favoured the measure, but had been forced to reject it because he 'couldn't afford to antagonize the Chinese Government so long as that Government remains friendly to the United States, which controls our foreign policies'.[1]

Though Brigadier-General Manuel Roxas, when candidate for the Presidency of the Philippines Republic, disavowed any anti-Chinese animus in his statement to the representative newspapers, one of his own organs, the *Daily Star*, was an outspoken baiter of the Chinese, indicating the likelihood of this sentiment becoming a campaign issue.[2] One newspaper correspondent stated at this time that 'a miasma of Axis ideology still hovers over ground ostensibly liberated nearly a year ago' and was responsible for a rising tide of animosity against resident Chinese and other national minorities, and suggested that the traditional Filipino aptitude for study had not been dormant during the three years of the Axis indoctrination.[3] Scarcely a day passed in Manila without some expression of resentment against alien participation in the social and economic affairs of the nation. Though the Chinese were the primary target, the aim was spreading in the use of such expressions as 'foreigners' and 'aliens'. The next most openly attacked group after the Chinese were the Jewish refugees.[4]

648 441 471 In March 1947 a proposed Sino-Philippines treaty of amity was halted on the verge of signature. The question of sovereign rights came into the dispute, but the rights of Chinese nationals to engage in trade within the Philippines was the real sticking-point between the two countries. Vice-President Quirino had sought to eliminate a reference to this type of trade, reserving it for inclusion in a separate treaty of commerce, but in reply to this, the Chinese Minister, Mr Chen Chih-ping, said that the right of Chinese to

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[1] *Christian Science Monitor* (12 January 1946).

[2] Assemblyman Sato, whose grandfather was pure Chinese, started an anti-Chinese league. During the post-war Presidential elections he was a strong supporter of Manuel Roxas. When the latter became President he entered the National Assembly and introduced several anti-Chinese Bills including one to reduce the immigration quota for Chinese from 500 to 50. His league, supported by Filipino lawyers, had a membership of over 1,000.

[3] ibid.

[4] Cf. p. 153.

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engage in trade in the Philippines could not be classified as international 648
commerce, and properly belonged to a treaty of friendship 441
rather than a commercial pact.

The treaty was finally agreed upon and signed on 18 April 1947. 471
It did not meet the Chinese demands for the raising of the immigration 467
quota nor for protection against discrimination, but provided
in rather vague terms for peace and friendship, exchange of 186
diplomatic and consular personnel, and for the right of the nationals
of either party to travel and reside in the territory of the other, but
only in conformity with the existing laws. The treaty was ratified
by the Executive Yuan in China, but only with difficulty by the 439
Philippines legislature. A proposed treaty of commerce and navigation
was postponed.

In spite of all the agitation and the measures taken against them,
the Chinese continued to retain their hold on the trade of the
islands. The figures for trade in the Philippines for 1947, showing 439
a percentage of trade done by traders of different nationalities,
indicate the share of the Chinese in the total commerce.[1]

	Imports	*Exports*	*All trade*
Americans	28·00	42·97	33·59
Chinese	39·14	24·08	33·51
Filipinos	23·48	21·38	22·70
Others	9·38	11·57	10·20

Tied up with the resentment of Chinese possession of the lion's 662
share of the Philippines internal trade was the long-standing charge
that the Chinese corrupted Filipino officials. This charge was frequently renewed, and in March 1947 the executive secretary of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce gave an interview in reply to it. It took two, he said, to accomplish bribery. If the Filipino was susceptible to Chinese bribes it was hardly the responsibility of the Chinese. He quoted the New Testament in pointing his argument—'As Peter said, with the exception of Jesus Christ all men are sinners.'[2]

The highest feeling ensued from the action of Manila municipal 443
authorities in ejecting Chinese from the stalls in the Manila
markets. The ban was to become effective on Monday, 12 January 656
1948. The Chinese Market Vendors' Association, on hearing of the

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[1] *Manila Post* (11 March 1947).

[2] 'A.S.B.O.', 'The Philippine Islands', *The World Today* (November 1948).

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443 656 proposed move, had immediately petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition against the city treasurer. A move to evade the measure by the construction of private markets was frustrated by the refusal of the mayor, Manuel de la Fuente, to approve applications for permits to establish such businesses. While the application of the Republican Act No. 37 (giving the Government power to take action against the stallholders) was suspended during the hearing of the petition by the Supreme Court, the Chinese minister complained that the city of Manila had put its own ordinance into effect. The Chinese stallholders in Manila were compelled to leave their places of business. Even if the Supreme Court should decide in their favour, said the minister, the damage done to them would hardly be reparable. His own solution was, that Chinese who were already holding stalls (some had been doing so for twenty years) should be allowed to continue to do so, but that no new applications should be entertained.[1]

While the Manila city authorities were resolutely persevering in their measures against the Chinese stallholders, an obstacle to the complete fulfilment of their programme was the lack of Filipino applicants qualified to take over the stalls. Contrary to general opinion, the running of small retail businesses of this sort was an expert job. The city treasurer, Mr Sarmiento, said that the (City ?) Department of Finance had ordered 1,400 stalls to be vacated, but only 1,000 would be available for raffling to Filipino applicants by 12 January, the date set.[2]

167 The third burning Chinese question was that of immigration. The Chinese population of the Philippines had dropped from 117,000 in 1939 to 101,000 in 1947; 7,600 Chinese certified by UNRRA and by CNRRA to be bona-fide pre-war residents of the Philippines were at China ports waiting for permission to return to the Philippines. The President of the Philippines now refused to accept the repatriation of these Chinese as a group because of the 'acute housing, food, and unemployment problems confronting the country'. Permission for re-entry would be considered on the merits of each individual case by the Philippine consul at Amoy, where the majority of displaced Chinese were assembled.[3] Chinese who were refused reconsideration of their cases by the consul could return to the Philippines only as a part of the 500 annual

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[1] *Manila Bulletin* (7 February 1948).
[2] ibid. (8 January 1948).
[3] *Voice of China* (23 May 1947).

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quota. In April the Immigration Commissary, Mr Engracio Fabre, had reported to the President that it would not be advisable to allow these 7,600 Chinese to 'acquire *en masse* residence in the Philippines ... considering the present housing and food problems, the high cost of living, and the number of unemployed'. The return of the Chinese, he said, would mean competition in the Philippines, especially among the labouring classes who were now struggling for a livelihood.[1]

This attitude was based on economic grounds (reinforced, no doubt, by political considerations) but the Government of the Philippines supported it by the legal argument that since the Chinese, driven out of the country by the enemy, had failed to return to Manila within the time prescribed by law, they had automatically forfeited their right to come back.[2] Nor could the Chinese who were born in the Philippines rely on the *jus soli*, for the Supreme Court decision of 17 September held that this did not apply to the Philippines.

In spite of the *non possumus* attitude of the Philippine Government it was fairly certain that the Chinese community in the Philippines was recouping itself for its losses in numbers by illicit immigration. The official reports gave the number of them now (1947) in the islands as 101,000, but Mr Paul McNutt, former United States ambassador to the Philippines (as we have seen, p. 572) said that their number was 200,000, adding 'thousands have entered during the Japanese occupation'.[3] This estimate, however, was probably in excess of the facts, and Mr McNutt was not giving his opinion as a diplomat but as a private person, he having resumed, or being on the point of resuming, his legal practice in the United States. Nevertheless, it would not have taken very long, if the existing rate of illegal entry were sustained, for the numbers of the Chinese to come up to this figure. The Communists were undoubtedly playing a big part in the smuggling of their supporters into the islands.[4] A grave view was taken by the Philippine authori-

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[1] *North China Daily News* (20 April 1947).

[2] ibid. (3 May 1947).

[3] ibid. (14 August 1947).

[4] Five Chinese were arrested for subversive activities in connexion with the smuggling into the country of 67 Chinese at Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, in August, *Manila Bulletin* (9 September 1947). Another batch of 68 deportees arrested earlier were to be deported to Amoy, and the Immigration Bureau was asking the Chinese authorities to shoulder the expenses of their deportation. *North China Daily News* (4, 10 April 1947). These are but two examples among many.

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167 ties of the increase in smuggling, and in April 1947 President Roxas had told a special Cabinet meeting at Baguio that the Philippines must be firm in their attitude towards illegal entry of foreigners.[1]

642 This brings the story of the Chinese in the Philippines from
the first Spanish settlement in 1565 down to the autumn of 1948
and, in some cases, to early 1949. There have been three distinct
periods—the first, 300 years of Spanish rule; the second, the
American colonial democratic experiment of nearly half a century
(except for the three years of Japanese occupation); the third, the
rule of the independent Republic of the Philippines which came
into existence on 4 July 1946. During the first of these three
periods the pattern of the Chinese community, and indeed of the
whole of the population of the islands, was one characterized by
vertical lines between the races, and one big horizontal line be-
tween the Spanish rulers and the people they ruled. During the
American period, the vertical lines persisted, but the American
administration, to the extent that its action was not restricted by
United States political and commercial policy, was in a far more
detached position than that of the Spanish had been, and held the
balance between the races as impartially as it could. Though the
third period, that of the independent Republic, dates only from
1946, it was already abundantly clear by 1949 that the position of
the Chinese, at least, was much less secure than it was even under
the fickle Spanish regime. The Philippine Republic was a young
democracy fighting to establish its position in a distracted world.
Its government was entirely elective and there was no veto of a
661 metropolitan Power and no appeal to an outside arbiter. To obtain
election and to retain the support which they needed when they
were in office, the Filipino politicians were bound to pay attention to
186 the prejudices and resentments of their electorate. And foremost
among these prejudices and resentments was that against the
Chinese.

668 Nor does the above fully state the situation. Forces outside the Philippines were striving to close inter-racial fissures, and to substitute a horizontal split between the owners of the means of production and the international proletariat. The Philippines had so far been fairly well removed from the great centres where the campaign was in full progress, but it was not to be supposed that this immunity would long continue.

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[1] *North China Daily News* (4 April 1947).

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immunity would long continue. Indeed, the reflections of the situation in China, in Indonesia, in Malaya, in Burma, and in Indochina were already very observable in these islands of Tropical Asia. 000

TABLE XI

Distribution of Real Property declared for Taxation in the Philippines, 31 December 1938, by Filipino, American, Spanish, Chinese, and Japanese Owners[1]

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Type of ownership	*Tax Declaration (Number)*	*Parcels (Number)*	*Area (Hectares)*	*Assessed Value (Pesos)*
Corporations and Associations				
Total . . .	28,248	22,487	388,824	369,050,270
Business Corporations				
Total . . .	18,187	13,699	346,017	267,467,280
Filipino . . .	8,390	7,409	121,096	94,358,540
American . .	5,257	3,424	106,473	85,836,410
Spanish . . .	1,560	1,076	70,981	46,334,080
Chinese . . .	1,876	1,217	7,496	16,232,980
Japanese . .	441	165	33,052	13,559,970
Individuals				
Total . . .	5,356,090	4,722,538	7,969,259	1,792,877,300
Filipino . . .	5,322,620	4,697,386	7,769,668	1,693,4[illegible]60
Chinese . . .	20,915	16,592	57,630	40,803,710
Spaniards . .	2,855	2,318	29,093	24,425,710
Americans . .	6,711	4,626	64,865	19,425,530
Japanese . .	2,016	868	30,472	7,696,880

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[1] From *American Chamber of Commerce Journal*, vol. xx (October 1940). Cited by Hayden, op. cit. p. 702.

CONCLUSION

162 It will have been observed that the Chinese of Southeast Asia
are, in essence, the same people over the entire area, in spite of
198 a considerable diversity in occupation and dialect, and variation
in purity of blood. There is a concentration of Yunnanese in the
Shan States, but this tribe does not occur in any numbers elsewhere,
and the other tribes are unequally distributed. For example,
the Hokkiens and persons of mixed race of Hokkien origin
form the majority community in Malaya and Indonesia, being outnumbered
by the Cantonese, however, in the Malay States. In
Siam the Teochius and the Hakkas are more numerous than the
Hokkiens, and Hailams are also a large community. In the Philippines
three-quarters of the Chinese are Hokkiens, and most of the
remainder Cantonese. In Indochina the Hokkiens, though numerically
seeming to yield first place to the Cantonese, are the principal
Chinese merchants: indeed they were the pioneering tribe in the
Nanyang and they are still, on the whole, the wealthiest.

So much may be said to illustrate the diversity of the tribal distribution
of these Chinese who, but for a few exceptions (such as
a tiny freak pocket of Shantung people in North Borneo) originate
from the southeast corner of China—a small bit of Marco Polo's
162 'Mangi'. Diversity of occupation again is very pronounced among
these emigrants. Hailams, for instance, tend to be pig and poultry
463 rearers, small cultivators, and domestic servants; in Borneo the
Hakkas are the most numerous community and here they are
largely agriculturists. Cantonese and Hakkas supply most of the
181 Chinese labour for tin-mines and rubber estates. Nor should we
accept the naïve statement that 'all Chinese are alike' (which is
but an extension of the unobservant conclusion of the European
tenderfoot that 'all Chinese *look* alike'). There is a notable psychological
difference between, say, the volatile, nimble-witted Cantonese
and the more phlegmatic Hokkien or Teochiu; the Hailams
have usually quite distinct physical characteristics from other
Chinese, being more delicately made and exhibiting marked
cranial differences from their brethren from the mainland. As for
the Hakkas, they are in some ways a people apart, of northern
origin and later immigrants than the other tribes and deriving from
islands of population surrounded by Cantonese or Hokkiens in

their native country; moreover they have a stubbornness of disposition which distinguishes them from their fellow Chinese. 181 (It is worthy of note that the most numerous among the early Communists in the Nanyang were the Hailams and Hakkas.)[1] [668]

Sun Yat-sen said: 'The Chinese people are of the Han or Chinese race with common blood, common language, common religion, and common customs—a single race.' [829] As regards 'blood' in any scientific sense this is manifestly untrue; on the contrary, 141 144

> The modern Chinese people is an amalgamation of many elements originally different from one another. . . . In colour; in stature, above all in cephalic indices, about 42 per cent are mesocephalic and about 43 per cent are brachycephalic, and about 15 per cent dolichocephalic. Even these classes are distinctly subdivided into dolicho-leptorrhinic and dolicho-platyrrhinic. There is also a low-headed type, and, in the South, a trace of a dwarf element. . . . Prehistory points to a race already mixed in the basin of the Yellow River. . . .[2]

In spite, however, of a number of modifications and reservations, the remainder of the statement of the Father of the Revolution, especially regarding religion and customs, could be convincingly maintained. 181 184 Allowing for the numerous variations which have been suggested above, the Chinese of Southeast Asia, drawn mostly from Fukien and Kwangtung, are quite remarkably homogeneous. Not only have they marked physical characteristics in common; their customs, their religion, their attitude of mind have an almost uncanny similarity. What Clement Williams remarked of their shops in Bhamo on the Yunnan-Burma frontier nearly ninety years ago—'the likeness of one Burmese to another is striking, but the absolute sameness of one Chinese shop to another is truly wonderful'—is equally true of the 'sameness' of Chinese temples, houses, ornaments, customs, methods of mining and agriculture, and handicrafts all over the Southeast Asian area, from the city of Cholon to a remote *tienda* in Mindanao, or from the tin-fields of Larut to the pepper plantations of Cambodia. Nor is this merely a superficial impression (such as 'all Chinese look alike'); it derives from their common steeping in Chinese culture, even though the latter's springs of inspiration have ceased to well up from the depths and it has been for long (as Professor Toynbee says) in a state of petrification.

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[1] See p. 370 regarding the Japanese identification of Hailams with Communism.

[2] *China Year Book* [illegible]

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641 The essential nature of the overseas Chinese is, however, one thing: the traits of their character brought out by subjection to differing pressures and influences are another. In particular, the larger part of the area has for a long period been under the domination of European colonial Powers which, in spite of recent developments, to a considerable degree still maintain their hold. In the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, British Borneo, and Indochina the Chinese have been subordinated to the colonial policies of Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain, France, and the United States. In Siam, the solitary country to retain independence throughout (though she, too, was moulded by pressures from the West), the Chinese immigrants contributed to the well-being of the Siamese by their services and the admixture of their blood, but it was always the native aristocracy that held the power and, since 1932, the middle-class native revolutionaries. In post-liberation Burma the Chinese are a small minority who must leave the issues to be decided amongst the Burmese parties and communities; in Indonesia they are often uncomfortably at the point of impact of the opposing forces; in Indochina their plight is much the same. In Malaya the upshot of constitutional experiment and the campaign of Communist terrorists of their own race has placed them in a dilemma.

641 Throughout most of the period of our survey it has been a tenet
of the Chinese that they should leave political policy and adminis-
471 tration to the local Government, and this remains so in principle
in spite of the increasing influence of nationalism and, latterly, of
668 Communism in their midst. The cutworn, but still, until recently, serviceable dictum that 'the Chinese don't mind who holds the cow so long as they milk it' has been true of all purely mercantile communities since the dawn of history, and virtually the same remark is indeed made by Communists of capitalism—that it does not mind who governs so long as it draws the profits. But with the growth of the Chinese communities in the Nanyang and the development within them of political awareness the saying has been becoming less and less true.

641 From the fifteenth to the nineteenth century the Chinese in
Southeast Asia found themselves, first in the Philippines, next
636 in Indonesia, then in Malaya, and finally in Indochina, called upon to adapt themselves to a superstructure of government devised by completely strange and alien nations. These nations

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were almost entirely uninterested in them except as traders, 641
labourers, or agents for dealing with the native peoples. In the
last capacity the Chinese were very useful, for they had a know- 636
ledge of native ways which the Europeans lacked and in any case
had no leisure to gain, being occupied so much of their time in
warfare among themselves. The Chinese, in their turn, were inter-
ested in these white barbarians only to the extent that it was
expedient to know their peculiarities. They showed themselves,
however, much more adaptable to learning about the white race
than the Europeans did to learning about them, for, generally
speaking, the Spanish, the Dutch, the British, and the French
were almost completely ignorant of the Chinese language and
mores, and the Chinese were happy that it should be so. Another
reason for the failure of Europeans to acquire any real knowledge
of the people among whom they lived was that for the European
life in the tropics—at any rate from the seventeenth to the early
nineteenth century—was short, and he either returned home with
a competence within a few years or else perished. Thus it was
found convenient by the Company and early colonial Govern-
ments to leave the conduct of their community affairs to the
Chinese headmen, except in the more serious cases, and this gave
the Chinese much liberty of action. Unfortunately the fears of the 636
tiny minority such as were the Europeans, especially in face of the
increasing numbers of the Chinese, put them in a very anxious 181
and suspicious frame of mind. The Chinese ethos, usually so
serene, was subject to occasional social squalls or typhoons when 669
the community was seized with mass hysteria. This was really
only a means of dispersal of an accumulation of real or imaginary
grievances and the trouble subsided, if handled with reason and
tolerant firmness, almost as quickly as it had arisen. But in the
minds of the Europeans with their tiny garrisons the outbreaks
were often interpreted as signs of rebellion. Indeed in some cases
they were rightly so interpreted, and there can be no doubt that
when fear and distrust had dried up relationship into a tinder a
spark would fire it into a rebellion, as was the case in Manila on
St Francis's Eve 1603, when things had gone so far that it was
either the Chinese or the Spanish who had to be destroyed. It is
equally certain that a greater degree of understanding on either
side would have averted this and later disasters.

Whilst thus simplifying the situation, it must be conceded that 000

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Whilst thus simplifying the situation, it must be conceded that
181 the Chinese social organization overseas early revealed serious
515 deficiencies. It was not a complete unit of China transplanted, but
fragments from various settings placed together in one spot.
674 Different tribes and classes were put into unwonted juxtaposition,
669 and the criminal and unruly element was disproportionately
strong (this last fact needs emphasis). Embryo communal or
548 municipal systems were often taken charge of by the deadly Triad society which used them for its own purposes. At the same time, too rigid a distinction has been drawn between the 'benevolent' *kongsis* and the 'malevolent' *huis*, or secret societies: it seems that the two were not separated in this categorical fashion and in fact were sometimes distinct associations with benevolent functions and Triad societies at one and the same time.[1] The shortcomings of the system became very manifest at certain times, as in Java when Chinese secret societies plotted to seize power from the Dutch, and in the Straits Settlements when these societies under the Triad societies got much out of hand and caused riots and practised intimidation for many years, later extending their activities to Perak where they added to the existing disorder until it approached anarchy.

This, however, is a special aspect of Chinese society in the Nanyang and is by no means typical. By and large, the Chinese were very law-abiding and gave the ruling Powers little trouble. Schlegel was right when he said that the Chinese were 'easy to govern'. Indeed this quality has brought them, at times, into the contempt of rough European individualists who have dismissed
S this tractableness as the characteristic of 'sheep'.

672 Students of the Chinese language who have ploughed through
C the *Tsŭ Erh Chih*, Sir Francis Wade's Documentary Series, will
672 remember a number of memorials in which prefects or intendants

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[1] The writer, after extensive experience of secret societies and district and clan organization, is sceptical of many of the theories advanced by observers. Schlegel (as we have seen in the chapters on the Kongsis of Borneo) has definitely regarded the Kongsis as a transplanting of municipal organization necessary to the functioning of Chinese society. Yet they were certainly 'secret societies' under Triad or Heaven and Earth League control. Only when countries, such as Malaya, began to legislate to control these societies was a distinction made between 'good' and 'bad' societies: the former were granted registration; the latter, if they functioned without registration, were illegal and, of course, definitely 'secret societies'. The writer is of opinion that a great deal more research into the matter is called for. (W. L. Blythe, 'The Interplay of Chinese Secret and Political Societies in Malaya', in *Eastern World*, March and April 1950, adds considerably to our knowledge.)

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of circuit of the Manchu dynasty related the details of criminal cases. There was a common offence which did not seem to come 672 under the specific provisions of the penal code but was nevertheless heavily penalized, and it was known as 'being involved'. It appeared that to 'be involved', even quite innocently, in the felonies and misdemeanours of others, was itself in the nature of a crime. Indeed this feeling of the blameworthiness of being mixed up in any offence, tragedy, or lawlessness went right through C Chinese society. It was not altogether unusual to hear of a Chinese [762] man or woman hanging him- or herself on the doorpost of someone against whom they had a grievance in order to 'involve' him (there would be a judicial inquiry which would, at least, cause the owner of the door great embarrassment), for 'responsibility' is a C far-reaching principle in China. This convention was hostile to [577] the growth of public spirit, for a Chinese who saw a crime being committed, or a person in danger or needing assistance, would very likely do nothing for fear of 'being involved'. C

This characteristic has persevered down to the present day, and, 548 coupled with a willingness to pay for a quiet life, has been responsible 575 for many Chinese difficulties. Chinese secret societies were able to parcel out the towns and villages in the Nanyang and S to exact 'protection money' from shopkeepers and others without 548 effective protest; in a similar way the Chinese community as a 575 whole was willing to conform to all the laws and regulations made by alien Western Governments (whether to them they made sense or not) in return for being left alone. It was the social wisdom of 'Brer Rabbit, he say nuffin''. It was only when regulations proved to be unbearably vexatious that there was an outburst of hysteria followed by calm. This arrangement, convenient to both sides, was responsible for the saying of Gustaaf Schlegel cited above. It is an irony that this very quality, so convenient to European administrators in the past, as we have seen has brought down so much criticism on the heads of the Chinese *Towkays* in Malaya who, unprotected from reprisals, have paid 'protection' money to the S Communist terrorists of their own race. C

It seems true to say, then, that at the beginning of the twentieth century the Governments of Southeast Asia were conscious of 668 the Chinese as a 'useful' element in their economic systems, and though they had some unpleasant social peculiarities they in no way constituted a danger or a threat. Chinese labour was introduced

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in quantity into the colonial possessions and received the praise that is reserved for an efficient and well-oiled machine. But a movement was already incubating which was to change the whole attitude towards the Chinese of Europeans and indigenous peoples alike. The birth of Chinese nationalism coincided with the numbers of the Chinese emigrants reaching a new high level.

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Sun Yat-sen in his *Three Principles of the People* said (as Mazzini had said long before him) that 'nationalism must precede internationalism'. Continuing the passage on race already quoted in part earlier in this chapter he went on:

> But the Chinese have no national spirit; they only know the family and clan groups. Thus China is only a loose sheet of sand. Our position is extremely perilous—if we do not promote nationalism and weld together our four hundred million into a nation, we face a tragedy—the loss of our country and the destruction of our race.[1]

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This warning was taken very much to heart by Young China, though the process towards national consciousness had already gone a long way before Sun Yat-sen crystallized the sentiment in these words. The effect of the intense nationalist campaign coupled with an education drive was to make the Chinese everywhere conscious of their separateness as a race and nation, and, in Southeast Asia, to render the peoples among whom they lived aware that they regarded themselves as a race and nation apart. Almost simultaneously the seed of nationalism had been sown in the hearts of the other races and they were beginning to feel that they, in their turn, faced a tragedy—unless they, too, promoted nationalism and welded themselves into a nation, they might suffer the loss of their country and the destruction of their race.

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The simultaneous growth of two such sentiments within one country meant that the communities grew nationalistic spines which when they were erected pricked their neighbours painfully. It was like Schopenhauer's definition of human beings as 'hedgehogs nestling together for warmth'. And the 'warmth' they sought in common (if such a metaphor can properly be used of countries sweltering in intense tropical heat) was the livelihood that Southeast Asia had, so far, abundantly afforded. But with large-scale immigration came competition, and the growth of economic rivalry between the races was coincident with the growth of nationalism.

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[1] Lecture 1.

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In the course of this survey have been quoted numerous opinions C on the merits or demerits of the Chinese as colonists in Southeast 578 Asia. Many of these views have been highly critical and unfavourable. Yet they are more than offset in the minds of those of us who feel this bias by the recollection of tributes paid to the community by persons well qualified to make them—as, for example, the European ex-internee whom the writer met in Syme Road internment camp, Singapore, at the time of the Japanese surrender and who exclaimed to him, 'After this I shall *swear* by the Chinese.' (He referred to the many acts of kindness rendered by the Chinese to internees, to persons escaping from the Japanese, and others at the risk of their lives.) Again the writer, at the very moment that this paragraph was written, received a letter from an administrator of long standing in North Borneo in which he declared that 'the Chinese of North Borneo are, generally speaking, the salt of the earth'. Apart from enthusiastic tributes of this kind there are many just appreciations of the value of this people in the writings and reports of past administrators. Francis Light, the founder of Penang, said, 'The Chinese constitute the most valuable part of our inhabitants'; John Crawfurd regarded them as 'an intelligent, active, and commercial people'; Raja James Brooke of Sarawak said, 'Without the Chinese we can do nothing'; the Superintendent of the 1931 Census of North Borneo exclaims jubilantly in his report, 'the one bright spot . . . is the increase that is still shown in the numbers of the Chinese who can fairly be regarded as the mainstay of the commercial and industrial population'. And these examples could be greatly multiplied.

But the fact remains that a great deal of criticism has been levelled against the Chinese by persons, mostly Europeans, which can be boiled down to a few specific charges. The Chinese, it is alleged, are 'greedy', 'materialistic', 'parasitic', 'unconscionably usurious and profiteering', 'have a stranglehold on retail trade', 'have built up a wall against the admission of natives to their trade monopolies', 'form combinations obstructive to government', and 'create enclaves of Chinese nationalism within the countries they inhabit'.

Let us consider whether these charges have any weight. S

The Chinese in the Nanyang have never been in political control; [641] they have therefore never had any political responsibility. The laws have been made by others. They have merely performed the functions the Governments have allowed them to perform.

C Sometimes they have been given a choice of activities. The Spanish,
578 for example, wanted them as peasant agriculturists but tolerated
463 them as traders. Similarly, in Indochina the French wanted them for
opening up uncultivated lands, but, since the 'Red Lands' suitable
651 for the cultivation of rubber and other profitable raw materials
were barred to all aliens, the Chinese (although he might have been a peasant at home) refused the hard toil of the fields if he could obtain a position with a Chinese firm. In Java the Dutch found the Chinese useful as middlemen, and middlemen they became, accepting the penalty of the resentment of the Javanese that such a function entailed. The farming of the revenue was allotted to them as the highest bidders by the Spanish, the Dutch, and the British alike. Such occupations are labelled 'parasitic', but it must be remembered that they were the best methods of obtaining revenue available before the Governments felt themselves able to collect it for themselves. When they could do so, the farms were abolished. Also, it should be remembered, it was from the Chinese themselves that most of the revenue of the farms was collected. If we accept Mr Furnivall's epithet of 'parasitic' we must extend it to cover the British, Dutch, and French Governments also.

S Given a large and improvident peasantry, as existed in Siam,
578 Indonesia, Indochina, and the Philippines, there was a demand
463 for credit with uncertain security or none at all. This credit was
most naturally extended by the traders to whom they sold their
452 produce, and it was most conveniently given in the form of goods
426 and paid for in produce at the time of the harvest. Certainly this
gave great power to the Chinese trader; the question is whether
C he abused it. A survey in Siam by Mr James M. Andrews (see
p. 164) does not bear out the widespread belief that the Chinese
578 are unconscionable usurers. 'The Thai farmer [says Mr Andrews],
463 and especially his wife, is much more given to money-lending with
the hope of high profits than the Chinese.' As regards alleged profiteering in the rice trade, the College of Agriculture at Los Baños in the Philippines (see p. 635) conducted a survey and found that 'the Chinese merchants are performing essential marketing services at a fairly low cost'. In Indonesia it is notorious that many Indonesian Hajis and Arabs are far greedier money-lenders than are the Chinese. In Malaya it is the chetty and the Sikh who are the money-lenders; not the Chinese. Cases in which Chinese

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figured as lenders were practically unknown.[1] The charge of 'unconscionable usury and profiteering' is, in the writer's opinion, not proved. 578 463

Professor Raymond Firth has gone into the question of Chinese middlemen in the Malayan fishing industry with considerable care. He says that in this role the Chinese performs important functions. He shoulders a great part of the market risks; he supplies considerable capital, in a liquid form, in consumer's goods, or in producer's goods; and he saves the fishermen much trouble in seeking buyers. On the other hand the same observer adds: [426] 452 471 C 578 463

> The system obviously has great dangers. It gives him a monopoly, with little prospect of the fishermen reaping the advantages of the rising market, or of even getting much more than bare subsistence earnings, and it tends very often to place them firmly in his debt, with little chance of extricating themselves and building up their own capital.

Among the Malay fishermen this relationship with the Chinese is variously viewed. One group told Professor Firth that they liked it 'because they can get hold of cash easily'. In several other places, however, the fishermen complained of the low prices they received from the Chinese to whom they were bound to sell. Up to 1939 the attempt of the administration to meet the situation by encouraging co-operative Malay associations for fish-marketing had had only a moderate success.[2] S

It should be added that the provision of credit on reasonable terms for productive enterprise is finally the responsibility of the Governments. Much progress has been made in some Southeast Asian countries in the establishment of landbanks, co-operative societies, &c., in the last half-century, but these advanced money only for 'productive' purposes, and in Indonesia the people have still to go to money-lenders to obtain money for wedding, funeral, 578 463 452 453 426 C 578 463

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[1] A London solicitor who was for many years in Malaya, where he had a large practice, remarked to the writer on 10 February 1949, 'I have never known a money-lending Chinese.' Nor can the writer himself, who had considerable experience as a magistrate and as official assignee and liquidator of companies, recollect any such case.

The writer, on the other hand, has known Britons (of presumed respectability) lending money to Indian chetties at a minimum of 12–15 per cent., who in turn lent it to Malays, Chinese, and others at a rate of interest that can only be guessed!

[2] *Malay Fishermen: Their Peasant Economy*, pp. 14, 61.

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426 and other expenditure demanded by custom. Moreover, the
C money-lenders are willing to advance money without the security
578 demanded by landbanks and co-operative societies.
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S In the matter of trade monopoly it is true that in Siam, Indo-
S china, Indonesia, and the Philippines the Chinese have a virtual
578 monopoly of the rice distribution and milling trades. The Govern-
463 ments of these countries have, to meet the popular agitation,
441 passed legislation to restrict the Chinese share in this trade. The
fact that the Chinese maintains his position in face of all this
477 legislation and in face of competition, fair or unfair, is simply
461 because he is so much more competent in the business. Florence
C Horn (see p. 634) points out that the Filipino politician who charged
578 the Chinese with having half the retail business in their hands
463 changed his ground completely when the reply was made that all
the Filipino had to do was to open up a *tienda* on his own and put the Chinese out of business. He then said that the Chinese standard of living was deplorably low, he eats almost nothing and works day and night; therefore he subjects the Filipino to unfair competition! At the same time it must be admitted that the Chinese, having obtained virtual control of some trades, do their best to keep them in their hands and usually employ only their own countrymen. This is naturally galling to the native looking for an opening, but there is a sound business reason for it. They employ their own people because they are, on the whole, better at the job. No European merchant would maintain that a firm should be compelled to employ persons of inferior business capacity, thus exposing the firm to the danger of bankruptcy.

If the Governments of Southeast Asia wish to secure a greater share of the trade of their country for their nationals, they are entitled to legislate accordingly—provided, of course, that the law does not operate harshly or unjustly by depriving an alien of one source of livelihood before he has had a chance of acquiring another. (The economic effect on a country of discriminating against aliens who discharge some useful function is another matter.)

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578 In *Fanny's First Play* Bernard Shaw pokes fun at the critics who will not give an opinion as to the merits of the play until they know 'Who wrote it?' The inference is that such a question is an irrelevance, and that the play should be judged on its own merits. But while we have, so far, attempted to consider the charges

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made against the Chinese 'on their own merits', we do not regard it as at all an irrelevant question to ask 'Who made them?' Apart from a late King of Siam, the persons who have taken it on themselves to indict the Chinese for their alleged shortcomings are nearly all Europeans. Some are administrators, or ex-administrators with even more settled prejudices, some are merchants (though these tend, through greater contact with and therefore greater knowledge of the Chinese, to be fairer to them than the first-named), and some (including the most vitriolic) are mere tourists. The author would say that he has never encountered a European qualified by an adequate knowledge of the language and customs of the Chinese and by long experience of them who delivered himself of downright judgements or sweeping condemnation of that race. Indeed knowledge of the Chinese almost invariably induces a sympathy for them and their difficulties, however much it may be tempered by momentary exasperation or by realization of some personal or collective shortcoming. A reason for the anti-Chinese bias is often that the speaker has identified himself completely with some native race afraid of the Chinese and thus he shares and intensifies the natives' fears and resentments. Another common reason, no doubt, for the charges is that the vices ascribed to the Chinese—shrewdness, foresight, business acumen, keeping one's own counsel—are counted as virtues in the City of London, in Amsterdam, Paris, or New York, and that the indictment of the Chinese race is unconsciously inspired by fear of successful competition.

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But when all these counts are disposed of there remain two which, on the face of them, are much more plausible and which deserve careful scrutiny. One is the charge of 'forming combinations obstructive to government' and of 'creating enclaves of Chinese nationalism in the countries they inhabit'.

There is no doubt that the Chinese have a strong protective clannishness which has kept them intact as a community. This in the past, however, did no particular harm to the communities around them and indeed insulated the latter from Chinese internal conflicts. Moreover their intermarriage with the native population meant that the absorption of their descendants into the native community was only a matter of time. But with the advent of Nationalism the position began to change rapidly. An almost physical wall began to raise itself between the Chinese and the
native community.

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S native community. The Chinese National Government manifested
an increasing solicitude for the *Hua Ch'iao*, the overseas Chinese,
578 whom it regards almost as its children; it instructed its consular
668 officials to register all the Chinese within their jurisdiction, and
they sent missions to inspect every activity of overseas Chinese
[871] life. What is more, the Chinese Government took upon itself to
direct the education of Chinese in the Nanyang, laying down the
C curriculum to be followed, and even introducing a system of
578 grants-in-aid in competition with that of the local Government. It
648 often happened that remote officials in Nanking or Chungking,
very likely originating from one of the northern provinces and
668 completely out of touch and sympathy with the Chinese of the
Nanyang, claimed the right to direct their affairs. Even ethnically
speaking the overseas Chinese might be nearer to the Siamese or
Burmese, or (by intermarriage) to the Indonesians, than to a
Chinese from Honam or Kansu. It was no wonder that Siam,
Malaya, and the other countries of Southeast Asia saw an *imperium
in imperio* growing up in their midst and began to fear for their
S own eventual safety.

578 This development, then, we are constrained to regard as in
668 many ways a misfortune for the overseas Chinese and for the
177 countries in which they had made their home or wherein they
C were sojourners. It arrested assimilation and erected a racial wall.
At the same time the simultaneous growth of local nationalism
578 encouraged the Chinese to look to their own country for pro-
668 tection—a protection, it turned out, it was, because of its own
648 internal division and weakness as a Power, in no position to give.
Nor did the authorities in the one country of Southeast Asia
177 where the Chinese now were the majority community offer any
real encouragement to the local-born Chinese to regard Malaya
as their own country and to resist the claims to control their
destinies by a remote Government in a country they had never
seen. The chance to extend the teaching of English to the community was lost and for thousands the only means of receiving an
education of any sort was in the Chinese Nationalist schools; the
doors of the Malayan civil service were opened to Malays but not
to Chinese; the whole policy of Federated and Unfederated Malay
States was, and is still, pro-Malay. It was surely no wonder that
the Malayan-born Chinese who, while proud of their Chinese
ancestry and culture, wished to identify themselves and their

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children's future with Malaya alone, were attracted to, or forced 668
into, the Nationalist camp. 177

Malaya has for long been the 'test case' of Chinese affairs and S
a focus of interest in Southeast Asia. The situation as it was 668
tending was very clearly described by a distinguished traveller 167
many years ago; Professor Arnold Toynbee records the impression
of his visit to the Straits Settlements in these words: 178

> And China is not only enormous already; it is rapidly getting more C
> enormous (if logically that adjective can be put in the comparative 167
> degree). When I touched at the Straits Settlements on my way out east
> I realized that British Malaya is destined, by 'peaceful penetration', to 178
> become a Chinese province, and I fancy, from what I have heard, that 668
> the same destiny may be in store for Burma, Siam, French Indo-China,
> Dutch Indonesia, and the Philippines. In the end the current of Chinese 648
> expansion in the Tropics will meet the current of Hindu expansion over the submerged heads of the smaller and weaker and less efficient peoples in between, who are already fast going under. And, after what has happened, I surmise that the new frontier between China and India will tend, slowly but surely, to travel westward at India's expense and in China's favour.

What happened in Malaya, we cannot too frequently remind ourselves, was not the result of military conquest, not the territorial spoils of a Kublai Khan, but because the British had welcomed the immigration of a couple of million Chinese. For long after the intervention in the Malay States it had been found difficult to attract the British capital needed for the opening up of the country: it was not until a plentiful supply first of Indian and then of Chinese labour was assured that such capital was forthcoming, and it was not until the end of the 1920s that there was any control at all of
Chinese immigration. S

The British Colonial Office and the Malayan Governments must
have seen that the admission of Chinese in such numbers that they 167
would eventually be the majority community was bound to create 178
a problem of tremendous magnitude. Even the degree of assimila-
tion taking place in Siam and Indochina was out of the question 668
because of the barrier of the Mohammedan religion. The only 641
hope now for the future of Malaya in the interest of its diverse C
peoples was to promote a feeling of common Malayan citizenship
to counter the claim, tacit or express, of Chinese Nationalism to 668
consider Malaya as a new province of China. In the pre-war years

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668 this was a policy which the British neglected to pursue with any
S conviction, and the post-war experiment in this direction, the
167 Malayan Union, was abandoned at the first sign of opposition.
178 Unless a true 'Malayan citizenship' can be made effective, the
668 ideal of a Malayan nation forming, as it were, a buffer State be-
641 tween China, Indonesia, and India, with bonds with all three but
belonging to none, will remain a phantom.

S In the present crisis the great and deplorable weakness of the
565 Chinese in Southeast Asia is the absence of effective leadership
554 (and the few notable exceptions to this generalization do not
641 affect its truth). This is due in large part to the fact that there has
grown up no Chinese middle class of sufficient proportions to
provide disinterested, well-educated, and competent individuals
S in the numbers needed to guide their community through the
[556] reefs of politics towards a safe anchorage. The business leaders
are so busy making money (or endeavouring not to lose it) that few
of them have time to devote to public affairs even if they had the
will and the knowledge. In Malaya, at least, the Indian stands in
sharp contrast to the Chinese, and in Singapore Indian representation
on the various bodies is vastly greater in proportion to their
numbers than is the case with the much more numerous Chinese.
This is not explicable solely by Chinese political pique but must
be due largely to the training in politics and administration the
Indians received in their own country during the British Raj. In
Malaya, Indonesia, and Indochina the British, Dutch, and French
have neglected to afford opportunities for the Chinese residents to
acquire a knowledge of affairs. The penalty of this neglect is that
now, when European control is loosening, the mass of the Chinese
S have few leaders to take control and to consolidate their community
668 in face of the Communist advance. The lack of experience and
579 education determines also the quality of the Communist leadership
in these regions. Among the Malayan Communists are no
C Mao Tse-tungs or Chou En-lais and scarcely any individuals with
668 more than the rudimentary mis-education obtainable in Chinese
vernacular schools. The result is that the old professional bandit
(always a feature of Malaya's jungle-fringe) is more prominent
than he would otherwise be, and terrorism is unmitigated by
constructive politics. Is it, therefore, strange that in 1949 the
majority of Nanyang Chinese were 'sitting on the fence' awaiting
the final upshot in China and its repercussions overseas? In such

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circumstances a handful of Chinese Communists, many of them 668
uneducated youths with a strong professional bandit element as just 579
mentioned, had almost complete freedom of action through the C
time-honoured weapons of intimidation and extortion. With this 668
insidious pressure, and with little support or sympathy from the
European Powers or the native peoples, the Chinese of Southeast C
Asia were indeed in a dilemma. S

With the advent of militant Communism came a final complica- 668
tion to the lives of the overseas Chinese. The appeal of the Com-
munists is to the idea of a society horizontally but not vertically
divided—that is, divided into classes, but with a proletariat which
cuts across racial and community divisions. So far this appeal had
been listened to by only a small minority of the Chinese, and with
the Malays and other races it had been an almost complete failure.
But let no one underestimate the attraction it might have for the
masses of Southeast Asia if they were simultaneously convinced of
the sincerity of the Communist professions and of the bankruptcy
of 'bourgeois' promises. S

The only way to stem the advance of Communism in Southeast
Asia is to raise the standard of living. The irony of such a course [511]
for the colonial Powers is that in promoting a rise in the standard
of living they are hastening their own departure. Improved material 668
welfare stimulates political awareness. Whereas in the grand old 178
days of their trading companies they could lord it over a province
with a garrison of a score of soldiers, to-day with armies of a
hundred thousand they remain only on sufferance. It is of no use,
however, their elder statesmen and administrators of a bygone age
urging the Governments to 'go slow'. The idea of representative
government came from the West, but the rate of approach to it
is largely fixed by the peoples themselves. All that the colonial
Powers can aim at is to leave their ex-dependencies able to decide S
their own future and not at the mercy of new imperialisms. C

We take leave of the Chinese in Southeast Asia at a time when
they are undergoing one of the greatest trials in their history. The 178
whole of the Far East is disintegrating as it moves towards a new
and mysterious synthesis. These emigrants belong to a race which
for at least one hundred and twenty generations, through the rise,
flowering, decline, and petrifaction of the Chinese culture, has
preserved a unified attitude of mind towards life and reality, and
they look towards their parent civilization and see it once more in

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a state of flux. This is no new phenomenon: it has happened a score of times in Chinese history and each time China has found a new level of stability. It was (it has been said) like a cube; overthrown by civil convulsion it falls flat on another side and is once more the same solid mass. Will it be so again? This is the moot question. The forces causing the upheaval are more powerful and destructive than ever before. They are the same forces which have shaped and are shaping the materialistic, sceptic, technological method of life that we in the West know as civilization. Can China receive the full impact of these forces and remain essentially the China of all time? The event alone will answer this, though it may be nearer than we imagine in the ever-accelerating tempo of change.

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These are long-term, philosophical questions. The more immediate practical question for the Chinese of Southeast Asia, for the peoples among whom they live, and for the rest of the world that has contact or dealings with this area (which is, in effect, everyone), is how this vital and active people will fit into the dispensation of to-morrow. It is a question that every diplomat, administrator, merchant, or student of international affairs should tax his mind to answer in advance of the event, and for this task a necessary preliminary is some knowledge of the nature, the development, and the aspirations of the overseas Chinese. This is what this work, in small compass, attempts to supply.

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APPENDIX I

THE SOUTHERN DIALECTS OF CHINESE

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WHAT are commonly known as the dialects of Chinese are confined 197 practically to the coastal provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien, Chêkiang, and Kiangsu; but there are not inconsiderable extensions into the adjoining areas of Kwangsi, Kiangsi, and Anhwei. Within the Northern Chinese ('Mandarin') area there are indeed districts in which important differences from the standard speech still exist, but these districts are largely under the influence of the speech of the capital of the later dynasties, Peiping, from which the southern coastal regions have been protected by their distance and by natural obstacles. The same forces have had the effect that within this relatively small part of China the differences from dialect to dialect are in many cases as great as those which divide the dialects as a whole from the standard language; and not less than those which separate distinct national languages in other parts of the world.

It is in fact the case that, apart from the phonetic archaisms by which these dialects are placed closer to Ancient Chinese (the standard dialect of the capital, then at Sian in Shensi, as interpreted by Bernhard Karlgren in 1915), they have little in common which they do not also share with the northern forms of Chinese. The outline of the history of the main groups which follows will make this plain, as well as the causes by which it has been brought about. The archaisms consist in the retention [194] of the old final consonants *-k*, *-t*, and *-p* (throughout a major part of this area); of a fuller form of certain initial combinations in a number of words; of the distinction between final *-n* and *-m*; and of a more complete tonal system. All these features existed in the Ancient Chinese of the sixth century, but have been universally lost in the great Northern Chinese region.

If we exclude from this survey the Wu dialects (spoken in the ancient kingdom of Wu, around the mouth of the Yangtsze), the speakers of which do not contribute largely to the numbers of Chinese emigrants, the remaining forms of speech in this area may be divided into three main groups of dialects: Cantonese, Hakka, and the Fukien dialects.

I. Cantonese, itself with several well-marked sub-dialects, chief 197 among which is the Se-Yap group of the western delta of the Canton 162 River, is commercially the most important of the southern forms of Chinese. It is spoken by the majority of the population of Kwangtung, at least as a second language, though its actual area of usage is not very

[162] great; the numerousness of its speakers is due to its being the speech of the great commercial centres of Hong Kong, Canton, Fatshan, Macau, 197 Wuchow (in Kwangsi), as well as a number of smaller towns; and its speakers have tended to form colonies in the areas of other dialects in the trading ports all over the south, as in Kweilin, Fuchow, and Chiungchow. It is probably the oldest-established form of Chinese in the southern provinces, and has developed independently of the Northern language at least since the tenth century of our era, and in all probability [194] since much earlier. Cantonese has kept the full range of eight tones of Ancient Chinese, and has even added a ninth by subdivision of one of the others, whereas the tendency in the north has been consistently towards their reduction. With a much fuller consonantal system than the Northern dialects, it has had less need to resort to compound words to distinguish homophones, and so expresses meanings with greater economy of syllables. Its divergence from Northern Chinese is mainly due to its preservation of an older phase of the language, its independent innovations being few and chiefly in the matter of tones and vocalism. [192] In vocabulary—differences in vocabulary between Chinese dialects affect mainly the pronouns and particles—it has more affinity with the forms of Northern Chinese in use along the lower Yangtsze than with other southern dialects, except Hakka.

197 II. The Hakkas, speakers of the second most widespread dialect of Kwangtung, entered the province from the northeast about the thirteenth 162 century, leaving on their way a number of now-isolated colonies in Kiangsi and northern Fukien. There is no clear boundary between Cantonese and Hakka, as the two peoples tend to occupy separate villages in the same areas; in urban districts Hakka is losing ground to Cantonese, bilinguals being mostly Hakkas. They occupy a broad belt of country beginning a short distance north of Canton city and running east and west, and many have penetrated into Hainan, adding to the 197 linguistic complexity of that island. Hakka, like Cantonese, differs from standard Chinese particularly in being more archaic, but its archaism is 194 less pronounced, and it distinguishes itself by peculiar tonal developments resulting in a much greater proportion of aspirated consonants than in other dialects, and moreover prefers aspirates to fricative consonants; a number of Hakka words, for example, begin with *kh* (i.e. aspirated *k*) where Cantonese has *h* or *f*. It keeps the final stop consonants, but tends to substitute final *t* for *k* in certain cases. The tonal system is very vigorous, overshadowing even syllable stress.

III. Sharply defined against the two great dialects of Kwangtung are those which, however they differ between themselves, have in common an origin in a very old stratum of Chinese spoken, probably since the Han dynasty, in Fukien province. This older stratum is marked by great

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aversion to fricatives, and so retains the initial *p-* in a large class of words 197 in which all other dialects show a development to *f-*. It is less conservative of final consonants than are the dialects dealt with above, and 194 tends to show a nasalized vowel in place of the final nasal consonants. The local patois of the northern half of Fukien have gone much farther in reduction of final consonants than have the remainder of this group. Common to the whole group is also a peculiar vocabulary; in place of 197 the words for 'son', 'die', 'love', 'house', and many other basic ideas, where the remaining dialects have words which, however different their 192 phonetic evolution, are derived from the same ancient Chinese forms, Fukien dialects have a series of words peculiar to themselves.

The Fukien group is conveniently divided into four sub-groups: 197

1. The most distinctive in many ways are those spoken in the southern 162 parts of the province and, as a result of modern emigration, on the island of Taiwan, as well as in the immediately adjacent parts of Kwangtung. The chief varieties recognized are those of Amoy, Swatow, and Chaochow. The most remarkable feature of this group is a double pronunciation 197 of its vocabulary. An illustration is the case of the English words 'cattle' and 'chattel' on the one hand, 'capital' on the other; these are in 192 origin the same word, but the last may be regarded as a learned pronunciation of the two former (specialized, of course, in meaning). The 194 duplication in the southern Fukien dialects is of this kind, but it extends to the full range of the large Chinese vocabulary to the degree that the words are used in the colloquial language at all. What are called the literary forms are the only forms used in reading, but in the course of time considerable numbers of literary forms have, in certain phrases, spread into the colloquial language, generally with slightly different meanings from those of their popular counterparts. The origin of this wholesale duplication is itself interesting. During the T'ang dynasty (A.D. 618–906) a new standard dialect was introduced into China, having its roots in an area in the province of Shansi, where certain of its peculiarities still survive in the local speech. On the downfall of that dynasty, north China reverted to the old tradition, and it is on this that modern Northern Chinese is based. But it appears that in a resinicization of Fukien towards the end of T'ang its court dialect was imposed as a literary language on the population of the province; and there its peculiar features, chief of which is the substitution of initial *g-*, *d-*, *b-* (in some dialects *k-*, *t-*, *p-*) for earlier *ng-*, *n-*, *m-*, still make the literary pronunciation, and in some few cases (as in the word *be* for 'horse', where every other dialect has something like *ma*) have penetrated into everyday speech.

2. The northern dialects of the province agree in their loss of final 197 consonants, and in little else except their derivation from the early pre- 162

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T'ang stratum of Chinese. Excluding Fuchowese, to be separately treated, the chief among them are those of Kienyang and Kienning.

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3. The Hainanese dialect was obviously carried to Hainan by immigrants from the south of Fukien, as its basis is the old dialect of that province; but in its new home it has evolved peculiarities of its own which place it apart from the rest of the group. Whereas other Fukien dialects avoid fricative sounds, Hainanese develops an *f-* sound from aspirated *p-*; but its strangest characteristic is the radical transformation of initial dentals. Here all initial sibilants have become *t-*, while a new *s-* sound has evolved from the aspirated affricate, *ts-* or *tsh-* (i.e. English *ch-*). On the other hand, the initial aspirated *t-* is represented by *h-*. These changes, which give a very peculiar aspect to the language, are curiously reminiscent of similar changes in the Se-Yap subdialect of Cantonese on the mainland opposite.

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4. The dialect of Fuchow city, said not to be understood farther than some forty miles from Fuchow itself, is isolated among the dialects of the province. Here again a foreign dialect has been superimposed on the original Fukien stratum, but in this case it is the standard Northern Chinese, in a rather antique form, and not the T'ang standard speech with its *d-* for *n-*, &c. This Northern Chinese dialect has been accommodated to the phonetic habits of the northern half of Fukien, with the result that final consonants are seriously reduced, all distinction between the final nasals on the one hand, between final stops on the other, being lost.

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The complicated linguistic pattern of Fukien province, itself due to the difficulty of communications in a country so cut up by natural accidents, probably accounts for the fact that the modern standard Chinese, the 'National Language' (*kuo yü*), has made more progress there than in Kwangtung, where the commercial value of Cantonese as a lingua franca has so far protected it from displacement.

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APPENDIX II

A NOTE ON CHINESE JUNKS

THE writers who treat the Chinese junk with scorn (says Mr Donnelly)[1] 501
are invariably landlubbers. They have not studied the junk at sea, in 502
harbour, and at work, nor the sailorman himself and his prowess as seafarer and navigator.

This is an opinion echoed by other modern European authorities. Here is an example:[2]

> 'As an engine for carrying man and his commerce upon the high and stormy seas' (writes Mr H. Warington Smyth) 'it is doubtful if any class of vessel is more suited or better adapted to its purpose; and it is certain that for flatness of sail and for handiness the Chinese rig is unsurpassed.' He goes on to point out that in scientific fore-and-aft sailing and in the use of centre-boards, windlasses, and labour-saving devices, the Chinese remained ahead of Europe until the middle of the nineteenth century.
> The large five-masted junks of well over a thousand tons, such as used to
> trade with Africa, seem to have disappeared for the same reason that the [505]
> larger Indian vessels disappeared. It was found safer to entrust a large and valuable cargo to a ship that looked like an English ship.

Mr Parkinson, however, gives a somewhat qualified approval of the 502
'Chinese sailorman'. Neither lascars nor Chinese (he says) made bad seamen, both being useful *in fine weather* and the Chinese especially so.[3] The same writer remarks that 'as far as mere physical possibility goes, it must be remembered that a Chinese junk was once sailed to Europe, although it took a European to do it'.[4]

Until less than a century before the Portuguese reached the East, 439
Chinese junks regularly visited the shores of southern Asia.[5] Calicut was
in the fifteenth century a principal centre where they assembled to trade: 487

> Hither came, once a year—for only during the summer months were the Chinese Seas navigable—a large trading fleet from the ports of China.
> The huge Chinese junks, with their fixed sails of matted reeds, never 501
> lowered, even in harbour, and mainly propelled by oars of immense length, and having on board gardens of growing vegetables, and large chambers for the ships' officers and their families, so that each was as it were a floating town, were objects of curious interest to the Arabian sailors. The largest was reputed to carry a thousand persons, and each

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[1] I. A. Donnelly, *Chinese Junks and other Native Craft* (Shanghai, Kelly & Walsh, 1924) p. 5.

[2] C. Northcote Parkinson, *Trade in the Eastern Seas, 1793–1813* (Cambridge University Press, 1937) p. 32[illegible]

[3] ibid., p. 215.

[4] ibid., p. 6.

[5] Edgar Prestage, *The Portuguese Pioneers* (London, Black, 1933) p. 315.

[p. 677]

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501 was attended by three smaller craft for the purpose of loading and unloading.[1]

716 But as war-ships they would not have been of much use against the Portuguese even if they had still been in these waters when the latter arrived. The hard woods used in the construction of Eastern vessels forbade the use of nails, and their heavy planks were rudely made with coco-nut cordage and wooden pins. Steering-gear and ground-tackle were of a rudimentary sort. Even a moderate gale rendered the ship scarcely manageable.

There were several types of Chinese junk of which, in this present survey, we are concerned only with the southern type of sea-going craft. This type had some outstanding peculiarities. The bow is open with two wings or cheeks on either side with a transverse beam fitted between to which the anchor windlass is attached. The junk has great single-fluke anchors twelve or nine feet in length, and weighted very often with stones. Four-fluke iron anchors are also used. Every junk is divided into watertight compartments. No ribs are used at all. The wetted surface of the junk is reduced almost to the theoretical minimum in comparison
501 with its displacement. The stern is always higher than the bow, as it
was in all European ships in former times. In this (Mr Donnelly thinks)
502 the Chinese practice is correct, especially for work round the coast, since the vessel will easily head to wind in a gale, and, moreover, stands a better chance against being 'pooped' by an overtaking wave in a heavy sea. Also, from his point of vantage on the high poop, where he works his unwieldy tiller, the steersman commands a good view over the bow of the boat.[2]

The junks used in the coolie trade with Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century were of about 300–400 tons burden, though they occasionally reached 1,200 tons. The usual junk had a crew of ninety-odd, a number sufficient to man five European vessels of the same size. From the construction of these vessels they could only sail before the wind—the small sail at the stern which allows a modern junk to tack being a recent innovation. At least, this is what is commonly stated, but Sir Roland Braddell says that this probably goes too far. 'At all events (he says) we know that Chinese junks of the 12th century A.D. could use not only a stern wind, but wind off or towards the shore could also be used.'[3]

502 The Chinese had some books on navigation but no charts. Finlayson (quoted by Braddell) writes of the junks which visited Singapore from China in 1821 that

they had neither chart nor book of any description on board, nor any

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[1] E. J. Payne in *Cambridge Modern History* (Cambridge University Press, 1902) i. 27.

[2] Donnelly, op. cit.

[3] *JRASMB*, vol. xix, pt. 1 (1941) p. 49.

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written document to point out their route. They had no means even of 502 ascertaining the ship's way, neither did it appear that they kept an account of transactions on board. They had a rude compass, set in a wooden frame, and divided into twenty-four points, which they did not appear to put great dependence on, and this was probably the only nautical instrument on board.[1]

Junks bound for Singapore from Canton or Amoy crept along the 487 coast until they came to about 112° east longitude, then they steered for a cluster of islands off the coast of Hainan, kept with the coast of that 502 island until they reached the southern extremity, and thence they steered due south for the coast of Cochinchina. They kept in with the land until they made Cape St James, then made for Pulau Condore and after that for Pulau Tioman. Sometimes they kept in with the land until they reached Cape Padaran, from whence they took their departure from land and shaped a course for Singapore.[2] Their track on their return journey was much the same. The voyage took 20–30, sometimes 40, days. The coolies, as we have seen,[3] had a very uncomfortable time, especially during a storm, when they were nailed down under hatches. (Sir Hugh Clifford has a terrifying story of a junk on which cholera broke out.)

When this study was about to go to press the author obtained from 501 Sir Frederick Maze, lately Inspector-General of the Maritime Customs in China, the loan of the draft of his unpublished article, 'Chinese Junks 114 and Notes on Coast and Rivers', with permission to quote it in this work. Time and space do not permit a full utilization of this valuable material, but the following short extract will greatly strengthen this Appendix.

Chinese vessels are generally divided into two principal classes—Northern 501 and Southern. The Northern Craft have bluff bows and flat bottoms. This form of construction was adopted because the ports to which they trade are situated on rivers where grounding on shoals is not infrequent. In South China, where deeper harbours exist, hulls have sharper bows and greater draught. The Chinese have displayed unusual originality in respect of ship construction and mechanical contrivances where sailing vessels and small craft are concerned. One hundred and fifty years ago their appliances for hoisting sails, etc., were superior to corresponding equipment in foreign ships. But they have not progressed with the times and of late years have lagged behind in the field of modern ship-building and navigation. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that their ancient-looking junks (which continue to be constructed in the form followed by shipbuilders of medieval times) are 'box-like' structures unsuitable for sailing in the Seven Seas. The opposite is the case. Their

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[1] ibid. p. 69.

[2] Mr J. V. Mills, who has made a study of these matters, thinks that the former course is the more likely one.

[3] See p. 345.

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501 under-water lines are skilfully designed, and they are unusually dry vessels at sea.

Some characteristic features appear in them all, including the division of hulls into water-tight compartments; the provision of either lee-boards or centre-boards (drop-keels); lug-sails and the ingenious 'multiple-sheet'; a uniform system of manual propulsion; and the balanced rudder. In some districts (e.g. the Fukien Province) the heavy pole masts of sea-going vessels are not stayed, but in other localities stays are fitted as in Occidental countries. The masts of some of the larger junks are 'built-up' or encased with bamboo slats, held in position with iron collars. The idea of a balanced rudder was conceived in China before it was adopted in Europe, and is found chiefly in river boats; in coastal regions the rudder is lowered in deep water and thus forms a sort of drop-keel. They are frequently perforated. This practice permits the leverage to operate further aft, without unduly impeding the movement of the rudder. The sails of junks are made in the form of balanced-lugs, stiffened by battens to each of which a section of the multiple-sheet is bent, thus keeping them flat and enabling vessels to lay as close to the wind as a yacht canvassed by Lapthorne himself, although making more leeway. The multiple-sheet keeps all the battens, including the upper one or 'gaff', at nearly the same angle in relation to the keel as the boom, which is not the case in foreign-rigged vessels, with single sheets attached to the boom only. With this form of sail, reefing as understood in Europe and America becomes unnecessary—in order to shorten sail, the halliards are eased off and the weight of the sail and battens reduces it to the required dimensions between the topping lifts. In some districts sprit-sails are used after the fashion of the Thames barge, and Northern sea-going junks occasionally carry top-sails and other extra sails for light weather, which have the appearance of stay-sails. . . .

Sir Frederick goes on to describe the Chinese system of manual propulsion of craft by means of the so-called 'yuloh' Yuloh or yaolu means 'to scull' and is the expression used by foreigners to describe the Chinese oar, or *lu*. Yulohing is a scientific development of sculling. The mechanics of the yuloh are ingenious. It operates on an iron pivot fixed over the stern which fits into a socket on the oar, thus reducing friction. The line which secures it to the deck or thwart—according to the size of the vessel concerned—balances the weight of the blade, keeps it at the correct angle, and serves to support the oarsman, assisting him, moreover, to feather the oar. An important feature is the elbow or 'kink' on the inboard or loom section of the oar.

501/114 In conclusion it may be said that there could be no better introduction to the study of the Chinese junk than the examination of the splendid collection of large-scale models of Chinese sea-going junks presented to the nation by Sir Frederick Maze and displayed on the second floor of the Science Museum at South Kensington. It includes various examples of Chinese maritime architecture carefully built to scale by skilled Chinese

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craftsmen. The captions affixed to the glass cases have meaning for the layman as well as for the shipbuilder and the seaman.

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The Compass. A short note on the thorny question of the mariner's compass may not be out of place here.

Gibbon in *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, under the page-heading A.D. 532, says:[1]

> ... if the Chinese, with the knowledge of the compass, had possessed the genius of the Greeks or Phoenicians, they might have spread their discoveries over the southern hemisphere. I am not qualified to examine, and I am not disposed to believe, their distant voyages to the Persian Gulf, or the Cape of Good Hope.

But *did* the ancient Chinese have a 'knowledge of the compass'? There has been heated controversy among European scholars on this point for over a century.[2] But there is now little doubt that the claim to have invented the compass formerly advanced in favour of the Chinese is ill-founded.[3] What the early Chinese histories speak about is the 'south-pointing chariot'; not the compass used on a ship. The properties of the lodestone were known to the ancient Chinese, but the earliest mention in any literature of the use of the mariner's compass is in the twelfth century. The earliest unquestionable description of a pivoted compass is contained in the remarkable *Epistola de Magnete* of Petrus Peregrinus de Maricourt, Lucera, 1269.[4] The Chinese, previous to this time, seem to have used the lodestone for geomantic purposes, as indeed they still do. But in the era referred to by Gibbon they do not appear to have been in possession of the mariner's compass.[5]

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[1] Chap. xl (London, Murray, 1846) iii. 506.

[2] For an account of the controversy to date see H. A. Giles, *Adversaria Sinica* (Shanghai, Kelly & Walsh, 1905–9) p. 107 ff.

[3] *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (University of Chicago Press, 1945) vi. 175.

[4] In a treatise entitled *De Utensilibus*, by Alexander Neckam (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, loc. cit.).

[5] See also A. C. Moule, 'The South-pointing Carriage', *T'oung Pao*, vol. xxiii (1924) pp. 83–8, which calls attention to a very important article by M. Hashimoto which is also cited in 'L'origine de la rose des vents et l'invention de la boussole', by Léopold de Saussure in Gabriel Ferrand's *Introduction à l'Astronomie Nautique Arabe* (Paris, Paul Geuthner, 1928) i. 59 ff.; G. Ferrand, *Instructions Nautiques et Routiers Arabes et Portuguais des XV^e et XVI^e siècles* (Paris, Paul Geuthner, 1923, 1925); Chau Ju-kua, op. cit. p. 28 fn. 3; Mulder in *T'oung Pao* (1942) p. 5 fn. and 9 fn.; G. R. G. Worcester, *The Junks and Sampans of the Yangtze* (1947) pp. 91–4. See also Chu Chieh-chin, 'Notes on Ancient Chinese Junks' (in Chinese), in *Journal of the South Seas Society*, Singapore, Dec. 1948.

I am indebted to Mr J. V. Mills for most of my references in this note on the mariner's compass. V. P.

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APPENDIX III

DISPLACED OVERSEAS CHINESE[1]

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THE largest group of externally displaced persons in China after the war with Japan consisted of overseas Chinese. These people, mostly small traders or labourers from the countries of Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, and islands of the southwest Pacific, were born abroad of Chinese parents or had worked abroad for years and had established domiciles in their adopted countries. Some were visiting their families in China and found return to their domiciles blocked after the extension of the Second World War to the Pacific in December 1941. About 3,000 skilled mechanics had gone to China earlier to help in the war effort against the Japanese, and these, too, were cut off from their homes abroad. Some had fled into China before the advancing Japanese and were cut off mainly in Hong Kong, Indochina, and Burma.

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Distribution of Displaced Overseas Chinese in China on 18 April 1946

Domicile	*Szechwan*	*Yunnan*	*Fukien*	*Kwangtung*	*Total*
Burma	873	5,794	20,626	2,098	29,391
Borneo	12	1	1,656	..	1,669
Hong Kong	619	..	879	101,185	102,683
Indochina	274	336	3,736	1,453	5,799
Malaya	737	665	23,426	2,486	27,314
Indonesia	194	181	14,640	167	15,182
Philippines	109	4	19,115	115	19,343
Siam	200	565	913	1,508	3,186
Other countries	344	..	..	..	344
	3,362	7,546	84,991	109,012	204,911

Thus stranded, the displaced overseas Chinese were scattered in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Fukien, Kweichau, Yunnan, and Szechwan provinces, and in Taiwan. The principal concentrations were in or near the southern ports of Canton, Swatow, Amoy, and Foochow, the native districts and traditional embarkation points of most of the overseas Chinese, and in or near Kunming at the eastern end of the Burma Road. According to the Chinese Overseas Affairs Commission, there were, on 1 April 1946, approximately 200,000 displaced overseas Chinese in

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[1] Authorities: Katrine R. C. Greene, 'Repatriating China's Expatriates', *Far Eastern Survey*, vol. xvii, no. 4 (25 February 1948). *New York Times* (6 April 1948). *Rehabilitation of Overseas Chinese* (in Chinese) (Nanking, Government Information Office, July 1947). *Negotiation of Immigration Problems* (in Chinese) (Nanking, Government Information Office, October 1947). *Preparatory Commission for International Refugee Organization*, Prep/32 (25 April 1947). Also information supplied to the writer by UNRRA officials.

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the four southern provinces. About 100,000 were from Hong Kong and most of these would be expected to return by their own resources.

Since the above figures were found to include old registrations of persons who had returned home before the war reached the Pacific, or who had settled permanently in China, the Displaced Persons Division of UNRRA in co-operation with CNRRA undertook downward revision resulting in an estimate of 42,000[1] as the number needing assistance in returning from China to their domiciles abroad. The number actually aided slightly exceeded this estimate, and the work involved in doing so was long and complex.

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For displaced persons going to some countries, especially Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines, there ensued long periods of waiting in refugee camps while permission to land was being sought, and this led frequently to severe hardships. Some persons thus delayed found employment locally or, in desperation, tried to get back to their homes by any means they could, legal or otherwise; others endured privations until the necessary negotiations and arrangements could be concluded.

With some Governments there was no question regarding the granting of permission to return (e.g. Hong Kong), but the Philippines Government refused to receive any displaced persons except as part of the five hundred quota. With other countries there was a variation between these two extremes. In Indonesia and Indochina civil disturbances upset arrangements. Rising nationalism and the desire to establish greater internal control of economic and commercial life produced in some countries resistance to the readmission of overseas Chinese.

The UNRRA visa, recognized by five out of seven of the countries, was devised as a substitute for the consular visa in the absence of consular authorities at the port of embarkation in China. The cost of transport was U.S. $1 million.

Let us now consider the position in reverse—namely, the number of Chinese in Southeast Asian countries displaced from China and awaiting repatriation. The table on p. 684 shows the position on 30 June 1947.

In view of the refusal of the Philippines Government to permit Chinese displaced persons to return legally to the islands (except as immigrants on a strictly quota basis), the considerable number of Chinese returned to China from the Philippines appears outstanding; UNRRA used this figure as a bargaining point in Manila, but without success.

In Malaya, of the 78,502 persons (of all races, but the majority Chinese) *known* to have been sent to Siam by the Japanese to work on the Siam–Burma railway, 23,351 are recorded as having died, 15,987

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[1] The analysis is not available.

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were repatriated, and 39,164 are shown as having absconded or are otherwise not accounted for.

Deaths from this tragic happening could not, therefore, have been fewer than 25,000 and may well have reached 50,000. The death-roll from air-raids and associated causes is variously estimated as being between 5,000 and 10,000; while the number executed is placed at between 10,000 and 20,000.[1]

Repatriation of Displaced Persons to China

From:	*Returned during UNRRA programme (Sept. 1945–30 June 1947)*	*Awaiting repatriation (approx. number on 30 June 1947)*
British North Borneo	15	1,200
Burma	46	50
India	0	562
Indochina	1	280
Italy	171	0
Malayan Union	22	100
Indonesia	692	1,217
New Britain	750	0
Philippines	6,587	0
Siam	65	0
Singapore	300	100
Solomon Islands	0	9
Still 'unscreened' (i.e. examined to decide whether or not they are genuinely 'displaced persons')	..	3,000
	8,649	6,518

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[1] M. V. del Tufo, *Malaya: a Report of the 1947 Census of Population*, p. 29. 1

1 [See 26: del Tufo, AN1 Malaya-- Analyst]

APPENDIX IV

THE SQUATTER PROBLEM IN MALAYA

To a study of the Report of the Squatter Committee (from which extensive extracts are given below) the remarks of Professor Raymond Firth in his *Report of Social Science Research in Malaya*[1] provide a very suitable background. The remarks should be read in their entirety, but the following extract will indicate their scope. 114

Study of a Newly formed Chinese Agricultural Community

Chinese rural communities of fairly recent formation are common in many parts of Malaya, especially on the West Coast.... These communities have several main features in common. The first is that they are essentially of spontaneous establishment on lands not set aside for the purpose, but even already appropriated to other use, as forest reserves or Malay reservations. In this respect as squatters they are apt to be an embarrassment to the Government. The second feature is that it is primarily economic inducements which keep them there now that the fear of the Japanese has gone. They are also in most cases making a successful living through rice as their subsistence crop and tobacco or bananas as their cash crop. All inducements to move, therefore, they counter with the proposition that it must be made worth their while. In some cases, but not necessarily all, they appear to be exhausting the soil fertility by their methods of cultivation. This is in strong contrast to the treatment of the land by Chinese who own it or intend to settle there permanently. It is clearly a reflection of two things—their sense of insecurity in their holdings, and their policy of drawing whatever return they can from the present price inflation without consideration of future land needs. Thirdly they have not been adequately caught up into the system of local government, and proper representation of their views and proper control of their activities from the administrative point of view is usually a matter of *ad hoc* assignment and experiment. This is due in part to their recent establishment. But it is also to some extent due to the inadequate provision as yet made by the government administration of Chinese communities in what has ordinarily been considered as primarily Malay rural areas.... 361 423 241 [311] [631]

In the Malay States all land not held under title is State land and vests in the Malay ruler. Before the war the disposal of the land and the collection of revenue was in the hands of the British Residents. Under the Federation constitution of 1948 land is not one of the subjects on which the Federal Legislative Council can legislate and it appears that the disposal of the land is entirely in the hands of the rulers. 421

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[1] (Singapore, Government Printing Office, 1948) pp. 31, 32.

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421 657 To protect the Malays in the possession of their lands, large Malay reservations were created from 1913 onwards in which the land can be alienated only to Malays and must thereafter remain in Malay hands. The Malay Reservations Enactment of 1913 defines 'Malay' as follows: 'Malay means a person belonging to any Malayan race who speaks the Malay language or any Malayan language and professes the Mohammedan religion.' The term therefore included Indonesians even if they had only just arrived in Malaya.

'These reservations [says Professor Rupert Emerson] appear clearly to have been erected less as a bulwark against European capitalist pressures than against the swarming Chinese, who in filling up the vacant spaces and driving the Malays off the land into virtual serfdom might form an even more serious threat to British political and economic dominance in a not too distant future.'[1] However, the creation of the reservations did not mean that other races were excluded from holding land, and during the decades before Japan entered the Second World War many thousands of acres of excellent State land—just as good as that in the reservations—was alienated to Europeans, Chinese, Indians, &c. In 1933, after a long period of leniency, the administration took firm action to prevent the ingenious devices through which some Chinese were evading the intention of the law. Nevertheless, Chinese in large numbers 'squatted' on State land outside the Malay reservations, and during the trade depression of 1930–2 their numbers greatly increased. [656] It was not considered expedient to interfere with them, though most of them had no title to the land they occupied. During the Japanese occupation many Chinese encroached on the Malay reservations with the connivance of the Japanese. On the return of the British in 1945 there was a great food shortage, and since these trespassing squatters were contributing to the food supply they were not immediately ejected. Chinese squatters had also taken possession of the vacant land created by the cutting down of rubber trees by the Japanese to make more room for growing food crops. But (as indicated in the report of the Squatter Committee) there was a far greater number of squatters on State land, forest reserve, and on land under private ownership than in Malay reservations.

669 656 361 The outbreak of the terrorist campaign in June 1948 brought the Chinese squatter community unto unenviable prominence. Much of the land occupied by them was on the fringes of the jungle and the squatter settlements were made use of for shelter and supplies by the terrorists, who also conscripted man-power from them. Since the squatters were intimidated into silence, the police and the military could not obtain information regarding a terrorist outbreak. The result was that reprisals

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[1] *Malaysia: a Study in Direct and Indirect Rule* (New York, Macmillan, 1937) p. 478.

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were taken against the settlements: huts were burnt down and crops 669
destroyed. Later on a policy was followed of either moving the squatters
from the strategic areas and re-settling them elsewhere, or else repatriating 656
considerable numbers of them to China. The natural result of these 361
circumstances was that the squatters as a community became disaffected
from the Government (even if they had been well-disposed towards it or
merely neutral before) and some were willing co-operators with the
terrorists. Later the squatters were treated with more consideration.

At length, in December 1948, the High Commissioner appointed, to [647]
investigate the squatter problem, a committee consisting of eight persons—three
Europeans, three Malays, and one Chinese—under the 162
chairmanship of the Chief Secretary, Sir Alec Newboult. The report 178
of this committee was dated 10 January 1949,[1] and the following are
extracts from the main findings and recommendations:

> There has always been a certain number of Chinese squatters in this [244
> country and they have in the past served a useful purpose. They have been 464]
> one of the principal sources of supply of fresh vegetables and they have
> served as a reservoir for casual labour. Their present numbers however
> far exceed anything they were before the war and from sample estimates
> of areas in different States may well amount to several hundred thousand.
> The reasons for this increase are various but the main causes are thought
> to be as follows:
>
> (i) The natural increase of population coupled with the influx of Chinese women into Malaya during the last fifteen years.
>
> (ii) The dislocation of labour during the Japanese occupation which resulted from the closing down of estates and mines. Some of this unemployed labour gravitated to the rice-producing areas of the country where rice could be obtained comparatively cheaply. Originally it entered the country for work on estates and mines, but having now left its former employment it has had to find its own livelihood. [727]
>
> (iii) Illegal immigration during and after the Japanese occupation, partly by sea but chiefly over the Siamese frontier.
>
> (iv) The general exodus from the towns during the occupation which resulted from the Japanese pressure for greater food production without any control being exercised over the land opened up for the purpose.
>
> The areas opened up by these squatters fall into several categories. 162
> There is firstly State land which may be occupied legally or illegally. 178
> Many of the market gardeners occupy State land on Temporary Occupation
> Licence. . . . The major part, however, of the State land opened by 423
> squatters is land which has been occupied without permission and which
> has not been made subject to Land Office control.

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[1] *Report of Committee appointed by His Excellency the High Commissioner to investigate the Squatter Problem*, no. 3 (Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 1949).

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162 178 423 Secondly, there is land which has already been reserved for some other purpose and which the State in many cases would not allow to be occupied even for temporary cultivation by squatters. Such areas are, for instance, Forest Reserves and Malay Reservations.

Thirdly, there is land already alienated and held under title by some other party. Such land includes reserves on large rubber estates and areas where rubber was felled during the Japanese occupation for the purpose of introducing squatters to cultivate foodstuffs. The total area occupied under this head is estimated at 70,000 acres. Estates have now included these areas in their replanting programme and require them to be cleared. . . .

[241] [231] The products of cultivation in squatter areas are also varied. Some of them are vegetable gardeners and this is especially the case with those whose occupation of their land is legal. Others grow tobacco as their main crop. Some grow tapioca. . . . Coupled with all these types of cultivation is the keeping of livestock both for home consumption and for sale. Many of the pigs marketed come from this source.

[647] One salient difference between the squatter problem as it existed before the war and as it exists to-day, which the Committee views with grave concern and to which it draws special attention, is the lack of administrative control in present conditions. Before the war it would be true to say that with very few exceptions the Land Offices had control of squatter areas. . . . The position to-day is very different. The attitude of the people themselves is one of denial of authority which they flout with impunity. This impotence of the Land authorities is partly due to the aggravated size of the problem, partly to the legacy of the lack of effective land control during the occupation but chiefly to the general insecurity which has resulted from the conditions left by the Japanese surrender and the present Communist campaign against the forces of law and order. Owing to a number of incidents, extending on occasion to murder, the subordinate officers whose duty it is to enforce land policy and law in the field can no longer be expected to go out, save with large armed escorts which are not available, and in many places Land Offices have perforce had to relax their efforts to bring these areas under control.

162 423 669 [361] The Committee considers that the squatter problem is one that should be regarded from two aspects; firstly the long term aspect of land policy and secondly the short term aspect of security. The factors which constitute the security side of this problem are well known. Firstly the squatter areas serve as ideal cover for the bandits and it is probable that a number of the bandits are in fact squatters at such time as they are not engaged in terrorist operations. Secondly, owing to the lack of administrative control and their isolated location the squatters are necessarily susceptible to pressure from the bandits for the provision of food and shelter. This is not to imply that the sympathies of the squatters lie on the side of the bandits. In most cases in fact they probably have no sympathies either way but necessarily succumb to the more immediate and threatening influence—the terrorist on their doorstep as against the vague and distant authority of the Government of which they are hardly aware

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and which is only represented by a small police station some miles 669 distant. . . .

The squatter community can and in some areas does fulfil a function which is of value to the country; that is in the production of foodstuffs 162 over and above their own needs. This is generally recognised. In Johore, for example, it is estimated that there are 40,000 acres of land occupied 311 by squatters for vegetable growing. These vegetables supply both Johore and Singapore. It is clear however that this cultivation of foodstuffs 241 should be by proper methods of good husbandry. The soil must be properly conserved. There must be no shifting cultivation such as occurs with tapioca and bananas resulting in the land reverting to *lalang*[1] and *belukar*.[2] The land itself must be such as is suitable to the purpose. Occupation of steep hillsides or river banks where clearing will cause soil erosion cannot be permitted. In so far therefore as they contribute to the economic welfare of the community the Committee considers that there is a place in this country which this type of squatter can usefully fill. Without going into numbers, the problem then becomes one of ensuring firstly that they are settled on suitable land and secondly that they [185] pursue a useful livelihood.

It is clear that many of the squatters are not at present on suitable land 166 and the Committee has given some thought to the question of resettlement. The Committee had before it details of the resettlement which had 311 been arranged in connection with the Sungei Siput security operations. These showed that only a minority of the displaced squatters had accepted the offer of resettlement and a larger number had already drifted back to the neighbourhood of the area from which they had been removed. It was apparent however that in that instance the area selected for resettlement had not been adequately prepared and, although good agricultural land, would not in fact be drained and ready for two or three months. The accelerated time of the operation had been dictated by security reasons and the Committee feels that this operation is not a fair criterion for judging the success of a similar operation conducted after proper preparation. Nevertheless, there were certain considerations which the Sungei Siput operations had served to emphasise. Any displacement of this kind, however carefully conducted, could not be accomplished without causing hardship to the people concerned. Furthermore, it could only be accomplished at considerable expense to the Government—an expense which the country could ill afford if it were multiplied by a large number of such operations on an extensive scale. A subsidiary [464] consideration which militates against resettlement in a different area is that a number of the squatters, once they have opened up and planted the land, obtain employment in neighbouring towns and estates and mines and leave their wives and families to look after the land. This is one of the reasons why a raid on a squatter area may find an absence of the able-bodied men. Some may be with the bandits but others are at work in the neighbourhood. In such cases the squatters would clearly be reluctant to move away from their employment.

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[1] Long, coarse grass.

[2] Secondary jungle.

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Chinese

Malaya ANI

166 For these reasons the Committee is convinced that the most satisfactory solution is to settle the squatters, wherever possible, in the areas which

185 they already occupy. . . .

Where such settlement of existing areas is for one reason or another impossible, the Committee recommends that an alternative suitable area should be made available for resettlement.

Finally the Committee recommends that a squatter who refuses settlement or resettlement on the terms offered shall be liable to compulsory repatriation.

[647] Whether the solution is one of settlement or of resettlement the Committee wishes to emphasise that the provision of effective administration is a *sine qua non*. No Scheme can succeed unless the authority of the Land Office is firmly re-established and a proper respect for law and order inculcated. This will entail the provision of adequate communications, police stations, schools and health facilities and the like and will necessarily have to be borne in mind in selecting areas for settlement and resettlement. On these lines the Committee feels that these areas could become part of the settled areas of the country.

[423] One aspect of the problem of approved and recognised squatter areas is that of land tenure. The land in these cases is held on Temporary Occupation Licence either because a permanent title cannot be given or because the occupier is unwilling to pay the prescribed fees. The Committee considers that an alternative form of title would remove some of the difficulties in such cases, and surmount the unsatisfactory nature of a temporary annual tenure. . . .

It is strongly of opinion that necessary emergency measures must be supported by administrative measures such as have been discussed above, and considers that the early adoption of its recommendations will make a start in re-establishing Government's authority and in this way materially assist in bringing an end to the present state of lawlessness.

The Committee's recommendations are designed to meet the situation as it exists at present and after a long period of enemy occupation and the consequent dislocation of the administrative machine. The Committee does not intend its recommendations to apply to cases of unlawful occupation of land in the future.

[685] The Committee is of the opinion that the present remedies at law of the registered proprietors of land are inadequate for the eviction of unlawful occupants and that legislation providing for a simple process of eviction should be enacted but that this should incorporate a period of notice to the unlawful occupants of six months or such other time as may be reasonable in the circumstances. . . .

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Chinese
Indians

APPENDIX V

INDIANS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

THE following note is appended to facilitate comparison between the Chinese and Indians in the area.[1] 162

Ethnic Indians in Southeast Asia

			1947
Burma	1,017,825 (1931)	887,000 (1941)	700,000
Siam	..	..	100,000
Indochina	..	..	5,000
Malaya	624,000 (1931)	744,000 (1941)	600,000
British Borneo	..	..	Few
Indonesia	..	..	30,000
Philippines		..	Very few
			1,435,000

Possibly because of the historic relations of ancient Hindu India with Southeast Asia, the prohibition of travel overseas imposed by the Hindu Shastras has not been taken to apply to Java, Sumatra, and Ceylon. There were early Hindu settlements, too, in Malaya, but these disappeared long ago and Indian immigration into the region dates virtually from the nineteenth century. 162 167

The only country in Southeast Asia in which the Indians are more numerous than the Chinese is Burma. After India and Burma were separated in 1936 uncertainty as to their future status caused thousands of immigrants to return home to India. Indian landlords and moneylenders liquidated their Burma holdings wherever possible. In 1931 there were 1,018,000 Indians in Burma; in 1947, in spite of natural increases, their number was probably not over 900,000. They retained, however, much of their economic importance. In 1931, 200,000 of the Indians in Burma lived in the Arakan Division nearest India. Of the total 618,000 were born in India—566,000 were Hindus; 397,000 were Muslims; the remainder were Sikhs, Christians, and others. Parsees were prominent in the professions; chetties (chettiars) from South India were the leading bankers with a big hold on the peasantry; Muslims from the Madras Presidency ran restaurants; the Gujeratis and Muslim Chooliahs from Madras had a large share in the hardware trade; Hindus from Upper India were the principal jewellers. Most of the common labour was performed by Hindu Telegus or Tamils. [463]

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[1] I am indebted to Mr Edwin Haward for most of the material utilized in this note. V. P.

[p.691]

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Chinese ; Indians
India AW1

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After Burma, the Indians in Southeast Asia are most numerous in Malaya, though here their numbers have dropped from 744,000 in 1941 to 600,000 in 1947. The great majority of them are Tamil labourers on the rubber estates, but there is also a considerable community of merchants and chetties who are the money-lenders of Malaya, lawyers, &c. The Sikhs number a few thousands and are agriculturists as well as watchmen and the like. Before the war Sikhs were more numerous in the Malayan Police than they had become by 1949. They made themselves exceedingly unpopular with the Chinese during the Japanese occupation.

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In recent times Indian public opinion has been exceedingly critical of Indian emigration to Southeast Asia in the form of unskilled labour, alleging unfair conditions. The Indian Emigration Act of 1922 was amended in 1938 to give the Government of India power to prohibit even unassisted emigration (assisted emigration was that which took the place of indentured labour) for the purpose of unskilled work. The result has been the virtual drying-up of India as a source of supply for labour, and many Indians have also returned to their homes. During the Japanese occupation casualties among Tamils were especially heavy. But now that India is independent her policy may develop on different lines—the economic pressure of population on her soil may tend to make her less critical of emigration, and as the most powerful State in the Southeast Asia area she may find it expedient to resort to something like the pre-war 'imperialism' which the party now in power in India was, during its period in the wilderness, so concerned to condemn. But the whole turn of events in Southeast Asia is bound to be profoundly affected by the success of the Communists in China, and in the attempts to oppose or to compromise with them India is bound to be a factor of the greatest importance.

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Chinese

China AF1

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POSTSCRIPT

An article in *Ta Kung Pao*, the Shanghai newspaper, of 28 January 1950 was taken as adumbrating the future policy of the People's Government towards Chinese overseas and the governments of Southeast Asia. It began by saying:

> Now that the People's Republic of China has been established and diplomatic relations have been opened between the Central People's Government and a number of other countries, the more than 10,000,000 overseas Chinese shall and must not be subjected to further abuse.

The article pointed out that it was clearly stipulated in Article 58 of the Common Programme that 'the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China shall do its utmost to protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad'. In pursuance of this principle, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had lodged strong protests with the French and Thai authorities against the abuse of Chinese nationals. The article was particularly concerned to attack the Thai and French governments. 'The Fascist elements in Thailand [it said] have a long record of outrageous action in the persecution of Chinese nationals, and for years Thailand has been a veritable hell to the overseas Chinese there.' Malaya received only incidental mention. 'But [the article continued] going back a little, we find that countless numbers of Chinese have been murdered in the Dutch East Indies during the past few years. All in all, the annals of the struggles of the overseas Chinese may be considered to be written in blood. It must be evident that it is impossible for overseas Chinese to live in peace under imperialistic rule. . . . We know full well that the indiscriminate bombing of Shanghai together with the persecution of Chinese nationals in Thailand, Indochina, and Malaya, are all part of an imperialist plot for both direct and indirect attack against the Chinese people.'

Peking radio thereafter systematically attacked the Southeast Asian governments for their alleged ill treatment of the overseas Chinese. In the case of Malaya it was noticeable that direct mention of the terrorist campaign was avoided in the ensuing months.

The diplomatic position in August 1950 was that Burma and Indonesia had recognized the People's Government of China and representatives were being exchanged, Britain had also recognized the People's Government but negotiations for the terms on which representatives would be exchanged were still in dilatory progress, while France, Thailand, and the Philippines still recognized the Nationalist Government which was then taking refuge in Formosa.

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Burma AP1

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A visit to Southeast Asia during the third quarter of 1950 after an absence of nearly three years brought home to the writer the accelerated tempo of the change that the countries were undergoing, and, in particular, the dominant role which the politics of China were playing therein. As a tailpiece to this survey he has recorded the impressions of his visit, bringing the account as nearly up to date as the exigencies of publishing would allow. The observations are set down in the order in which the countries were visited.

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In his many discussions with statesmen, diplomats, officials, business men, and others in these Southeast Asian countries, the writer became aware of a considerable disagreement among them regarding the number of Chinese in the area. There was, in the case of Siam and Indochina in particular, no figure that was generally accepted. The definition of 'Chinese' was an initial difficulty (as it has so often been in the course of this survey) for many Chinese appeared to possess a dual racial character, discarding one aspect and assuming the other as circumstances suggested.[1] It seemed also that that clandestine immigration into Siam, Indochina, and the Philippines and (perhaps) Indonesia within the last two or three years, had been very considerable, for during this period the immigration laws had been greatly tightened. The writer was compelled, therefore, to revise the estimates he had made in the demographic chapters of the survey to suit the probable facts of 1950 and to adopt a total not very far short of 10 million ethnic Chinese for the whole of Southeast Asia. This estimate, however, does not materially alter the ratio of Chinese to other races in the area and has no very important bearing on the general political and economic considerations which have been described in the text.

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Burma. In July 1950 the Chinese Nationalist ambassador had left Burma, and one other official of the embassy had also gone away, but the remainder of both the embassy and consular staff had agreed to serve under the People's Government of China which was now recognized by the Burmese Government. Two of the staff had already been summoned to Peking for indoctrination. The new ambassador, Dr Yu, was expected to arrive in Rangoon in August. In the meantime the staffs were not being paid and the only income available was that derived from the sale of (Nationalist) passports.

At this time an incident in the Burmese Shan State of Keng-tung near Siam was the subject of a number of rumours. A force of Chinese

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[1] Thus in Siam, the President of the Thai Chamber of Commerce, of very obvious Chinese race or extraction but with a Thai name, denounced vehemently the tactics of business men of acknowledged Chinese nationality in their dealings with the Thais.

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Nationalist soldiers, estimated to number between 1,500 and 3,000, had, in retreating from the Communists, crossed the frontier from Yunnan into Burma. Refusing to lay down their arms, they had dug themselves in against the Burmese Government troops sent to disarm them. Rumour said that the Chinese troops were being furnished with supplies by the Kuomintang supporters in Siam with the approval of the Siamese Government (Siam still recognized the Nationalist Government), and it was further rumoured that the Nationalists intended to use this area as a springboard for a counter-attack on the Communists of China. Marshal Pibul Songkram, in conversation with the writer about this time, agreed that the Chinese Nationalists had been supporting the Chinese troops to the extent of 60,000 ticals a month, but he had forbidden the continuance of this subsidy, and furthermore had refused to allow the sending of supplies to enable the troops to return to Yunnan. Another report in the Burmese press said that Mao Tse-tung had threatened that if the Burmese were unable to disarm the fugitive troops he himself would send a force to do so. This was immediately denied by the Burmese Government.

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Characteristic of this period was the metamorphosis that had been undergone since July 1949 by the Chinese press in Burma. There were in the third quarter of 1950 four Chinese daily newspapers in Rangoon. They were as follows (the approximate circulation being given in parentheses): the *Chinese Commercial Times* (1,000), the *New Rangoon Evening Post* (1,500), the *Zin Min Pao* (People's Gazette) (800), and the *New China Pao* (2,000). Small as their circulations were, the transformation of these papers was very indicative of the mental adjustments then being made by the local Chinese community.

In normal times the *Chinese Commercial Times* had been fairly independent, and since the Communist victories in China it had showed no marked swing towards Communism. Indeed it appeared to maintain as conservative an attitude as was compatible with the sentiment of its readers, featuring the American news of the Korean campaign quite prominently. It took, however, a critical line towards neighbouring Southeast Asian governments when Chinese interests were reported to be adversely affected by local policies. On Martyr's Day 1950 (19 July, the third anniversary of the assassination of the Ministers in 1947), it carried a full-page tribute to the memory of the 'beloved Bogyoke [General Aung San] and other martyrs, who died that we might live'. It was clear from this alone that the paper wished to identify the Chinese in Burma with Burmese national sentiment.

The *Zin Min Pao* and the *New China Pao* were avowedly Communist organs, though the former was of little influence. Both papers took the orthodox Party Line, marching in step with the four Burmese-

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B 204 208 668 language Communist dailies, condemning Western imperialist aggression and using the approved expressions of abuse ('the robber Truman' &c.). On 11 July the *Zin Min Pao* said 'accompanying imperialist aggression in Korea, the British imperialist-sponsored ICFTU has organized a labour delegation to visit the Far Eastern areas. . . . Its object is to work for the destruction of the workers' movement and the drive for national liberation in Asia.' This illustrates the prevailing tone of the Communist papers in both Burma and Siam.

The *New China Pao* had, prior to the recent Communist successes, been on the whole independent but swaying between the Kuomintang and the Communists, but after July 1949 it had begun to develop a pro-Communist tendency. This was still the case in July 1950, but the paper took a noticeably moderate line concerning the question of Hong Kong. 'Some hysterical persons', it said (5 July), 'think that the new Chinese Government will recover the territory from the British. We see that there is practically no sign of this, and indeed we do not feel that it is necessary for China to take this step at the moment. Unless another world war breaks out, Hong Kong, as far as we know, will remain a free port and a free centre for the transit trade—at least for some time to come.' On the other hand, both the *China Commercial Times* and the *New China Pao* attacked the Songkram Government of Thailand for 'illtreatment of the Chinese', while the *New China Pao* reported that the Japanese people as a whole were delighted at the outbreak of war and were hoping to profit from it, being 'great war profiteers'.

B 578 871 Domestic relations between Burmese and Chinese continued to be good, the small number of Chinese in the country preventing the growth of a 'Chinese Problem'. Chinese children attended their own schools and were taught through the medium of Mandarin (*Kuo Yü*), but they learnt Burmese for half an hour a day and English for a similar period. There were three Chinese middle schools in Rangoon, but the medium of the high schools was Burmese so that it was necessary for Chinese who aspired to this standard to know the Burmese language.

T 162 167 *Siam*. Estimates of the number of ethnic Chinese in Siam varied very greatly. The Prime Minister, Marshal Pibul Songkram, told the writer that the number of Chinese in the country was 4 million; a diplomatic authority of many years experience of Siam was unable, on due consideration, to reduce this estimate to under 3 million. It seemed that illicit immigration had been going on on a considerable scale from junks and steamers in the last few years. A recent visitor to Chantaburi encountered by the writer said that he had seen Chinese planting sugar there where there had been none before. As against this, a tin-miner from Prapet in South Siam gave his opinion that the number of Chinese

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on the west coast had not increased in recent years. It was commonly 162
stated by Siamese that there was one Chinese in every four persons in 167
the country. T

The Chinese community in Siam remained the supreme example in
the world of a minority without representation. While on the one hand 641
it still controlled the lion's share of all commerce, it had no share in the 471
government of the country. It was considered by the Thais to be more 441
than ever a potential threat to the security of the Thai nation in view of
the Communist victories in China. T

Within the Chinese community itself these victories had produced C
a curious change. The community remained predominantly mercantile, 204
but the Chinese daily press had turned over to the support of the
People's Government of China and its slant was decidedly pro-Communist. 208
The *Chinese Daily News* (circulation 12,000) and its evening
issue the *Chung Yuan Wan Pao* (10,000) were owned by a group of 668
Chinese business men; formerly it was a KMT paper, but turned Communist
in 1949. The same was true of the *Chuan Min Pao* (10,000) and
its evening edition of the same name (10,000), and of the *Chinese
Overseas Daily News* (3,000) and its evening counterpart (3,000). The
Chuan Min Pao (10,000) was the organ of the Communist Party. The
Sing Sien Jit Pao (Singapore-Siam Daily) and the *Sing Thai Wan Pao*
(the evening edition) were owned by the Straits millionaire, Aw Boon
Haw, and were pro-Communist in tone. (It is interesting to note that
English dailies owned by the same person in Singapore and Hong Kong
were decidedly non-Communist in policy. The truth is that an anti-Communist
Chinese paper in Siam at this period would have failed—
if it had not been closed down beforehand by threats of violence.)

The committee of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Thailand,
when questioned by the writer regarding politics and education, refused
to be drawn, insisting that their interests were purely commercial
and that they knew nothing at all of these other matters, whereas the
representatives of the Chinese press who immediately afterwards interviewed
the writer in the same committee room of the Chamber of
Commerce, were avowedly Communists with a keen interest in all
contemporary questions. As physical and mental types the Chinese
merchants and reporters differed strikingly—the former being middle-aged
and prosperous, urbane, and infinitely non-committal; the latter
being young, lean, unhealthy-looking, bright-eyed fanatics who might
have come straight from the Malayan jungle (which some of them T
conceivably did).

It appeared that the long-standing struggle between the Thais and the 578
Chinese was at that time at a stage of uneasy equilibrium. On 16 February 641
1949 a Royal Decree had come into force whereby aliens were
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578 excluded from certain occupations—forestry, production and distribu-
641 tion of charcoal, the running of ice, soft-drinks, syrup and flavouring
factories, and printing plants (Thai language) and, in the second
609 category, trades—casting images of the Lord Buddha, lacquer, niello,
trishaws, taxis, motor-bus driving, rice cultivation, salt making, barbering, and Thai type-setting. A year's grace in which to find other employment had been given by the decree. In the then prosperous state of Thailand, this new order had not evoked more than the usual protest, and the displaced Chinese seemed to have found other employment fairly easily.

000 Siam in the third quarter of 1950 was the most prosperous and peaceful of the Southeast Asian countries. The peasants were content with the high prices for rice they received and business was good. (The fact that the common people were not communistically inclined is suggested by the fact that the 'gutter' press, dealing in sex and crime, was not Communist—which it would have been if Communism had been popular with its readers.) The Government, though careful to observe democratic forms and constrained to allow a great deal of press criticism of itself (the only pro-Government papers were three heavily subsidized organs with small circulations) was in fact a military dictatorship depending on the support of the army. Another internal coup was always possible, but there did not seem to be any individual or faction strong enough to threaten the rule of Marshal Pibul. His rival, Pridi Panomyong, then in exile, could, it seemed, have a chance of returning only 'on a Communist ticket', and this could not be unless there was a revolution supported by the Chinese minority in Siam or an invasion from Communist China. As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the future seemed so largely to hinge on the fortunes of the campaign in Korea.

Indochina. At this period (August 1950) Indochina was in a very unhappy state. Negotiations between the French and the states of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos were in progress at Pau regarding the future control of the treasury and the customs and other matters, and in the meantime the French were maintaining an uneasy control of, perhaps, two-thirds of the country including the larger towns, while the Vietminh was operating unhindered in the remainder. But within the French-controlled area the Vietminh was able to cause disturbances and it exacted tribute even inside Saigon-Cholon. For every piastre paid to the French-protected Vietnam treasury, half as much again was collected by the Vietminh agents. Rice suffered a three-fold exaction—at the source, in transit, and at the point of arrival. The terrorist activity of the 'underground', bringing pressure to bear on reluctant victims of its demands, was manifested in an occasional bomb explosion some-

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where in the great over-crowded cities. Yet in spite of all this Saigon- 000
Cholon managed to wear an aspect of normality with a busy street and café life, and (ironically enough) with a unique display of flowers in the flower-shops! Saigon during the troubles remained emphatically French in character, with its religious and cultural activities in full swing. What was particularly striking was the conscientious way in which the French officials (who were quite aware of the gravity of the situation) were applying themselves to long-term economic, statistical, and economic programmes. Their inspiration was undoubtedly derived from a faith in the persistance of French methods independent of the regimes that might hold power in the future.

Those entitled to form an opinion on the subject whom the writer 162
consulted (notably Professor Robequain of the Sorbonne) refused to
accept a figure of less than a million as representing the number of 167
ethnic Chinese then in Indochina. In reply to objections it was pointed out that the events in China had within the last year or two greatly increased the illicit immigration. In 1948 alone the *official* excess of arrivals over departures was 41,500 persons. In Cholon alone there were now over 400,000 Chinese in addition to 300,000 Vietnamese. There were said to be approaching 2 million people in Saigon-Cholon, so many having fled from the country-side for the comparative safety of the towns. The Chinese of Cholon who were included within the *Groupements Administratifs Chinois Régionaux* (the successors to the *Congrégations*) consisted of Cantonese 41·3 per cent., Teochius 36·9 per cent., Fukienese 7·8 per cent., Hakkas 10·6 per cent., and Hainanese 3·4 per cent., of which total 55·2 per cent. were men, 34·1 per cent. women, and 10·7 per cent. children under 15 years of age.[1] This concentration of Chinese was also great in the large towns of Soctrang, Bentre, and Cantho in South Vietnam. The problem of housing, food, &c., caused by this influx into the towns was enormous.[2]

Because of their industry, their frugal life, and their carefulness, the Teochius were considered by the French as the 'Auvergnats de Cholon'. Another important group because of their economic power were the Fukienese. Numerically they were only 8 per cent. of the Chinese population, but this minority played a considerable role, particularly in the rice trade.

[[i.e. as of 1950--Analyst]]

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[1] *Bulletin Économique de l'Indochine*, Haut Commissaire de France en Indochine, Nouvelle série, fasc. no 44, May–June 1950, article 'Aperçu sur la vie économique de Cholon'. This article is largely drawn on here and was a valuable source of up-to-date information.

[2] The Cantonese were the most balanced community with the sexes practically equal (19·4 per cent. males, 18·5 per cent. females). The Teochius took the second place numerically, constituting 40 per cent. of the men and 29 per cent. of the women of the Chinese colony.

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669 441 256 The civil war had modified the rice trade in several respects. The lack of security in the provinces had led to the closing of many rice-mills. Also it had accentuated the tendency to the concentration of factories in Cholon (perhaps a fact of great importance for the future). But the principal change was that paddy arrived only irregularly and in very small quantities. Only one-tenth of the pre-war tonnage was exported, that is to say about 150,000–200,000 tons.

The regions in which rice was produced in South Vietnam were divided, generally speaking, into the part where cultivation had been in progress from ancient times, split up into very small fields and coinciding with the Cisbassac, and another part of recent cultivation, in large fields, more rationally exploited, namely, the Transbassac. For military reasons the export of paddy from Transbassac was forbidden; from the other provinces it came only with difficulty. This explained the small activity of the Cholon rice-mills. In five days a month's milling was over. The little rice-mills, with a trifling capacity of about 20 tons, working with out-of-date equipment, but with small overhead expenses, accommodated themselves fairly well to this chaotic regime.

501 505 In 1945 there had been approximately 5,000 Chinese rice junks in this area with a tonnage of 300,000. The destruction of the five years following this had diminished this fleet by about two-thirds and the remainder were not always in a good state of repair. The 5,000 junks of 1945 were distributed among 3,000 owners. In addition to the junks in South Vietnam there were 200 barges and tugs, about half of which were motor-driven and some of which were steam-propelled.

000 The writer visited a rice-mill working at about a quarter capacity (whose proprietor had recently been kidnapped by the Vietminh and released on payment of ransom), a soap-works, a satin cloth-factory (a partnership between a Frenchman and a Chinese), and a housing estate replacing a village destroyed in a recent fire. The mayor of Cholon informed him that three-fifths of the total municipal expenditure was on the police force! The writer also visited the Great World where Chinese were engaged in gambling for large sums (the following evening a bomb was exploded at the entrance to the Great World, wounding four persons, to remind the farmers of the gambling to be more regular in their payments to the 'underground').

000 *Singapore.* In August 1950 the city of Singapore presented to the eyes of the writer, who had not seen it since September 1947, a very striking and even surprising spectacle. For one thing, it had been enormously improved in outward appearance—the mournfulness and delapidation consequent on Japanese neglect during the occupation had completely

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disappeared, the buildings had nearly all been repainted or refaced, 000 many new buildings had been erected, trim, park-like gardens, beautifully kept, had come into being in several parts of the city where there had been only waste ground before. Singapore was prosperous (though the enhanced price of rubber had brought dislocation to some firms as well as riches to others). Yet, as the world knew, the Colony was at the southern extremity of a country which had for over two years been scourged by a Communist terror and in which ambushes and murders were still of frequent occurrence. It was common knowledge, too, that Singapore itself had not entirely escaped involvement in the Communist campaign. Only in April the Governor had narrowly escaped death when a grenade had been thrown at him, and there had been five other grenade throwings during the year. Several attempts at arson had culminated recently in the burning down of a large Chinese rubber store, and about the same time the Chinese Chief Inspector of Schools had been shot in a bus by a young Communist gunman (though happily he was recovering). Communist activity also had been discovered in two of the principal Chinese schools (the Chinese High School and the Nanyang Girls' School) in which there were many pupils over twenty years of age. Yet the impression given to the visitor was one of security and well-being.

Nor was this initial impression illusory. Since the declaration of the Emergency in 1948, the considerable extension of the police force and the creation of a radio police network had resulted in a decrease in crime. Though in social welfare Singapore was still far behind England, there had been some awakening of social conscience and there were many welfare schemes in being, including social centres for poor children of all races run by voluntary workers, free meals for children, T.B. clinics, and provisions for child welfare, and family planning. Housing was still far behind requirements, but blocks of flats for artisans were springing up on selected sites.

The greatest advance, however, was in the field of education. In 1941 87 there had been 72,000 pupils in the schools of Singapore (27,000 in English schools, 38,000 in Chinese schools, 5,800 in Malay schools, and 1,000 in Tamil schools); in 1950 the total was 125,000 (41,500 in English schools, 73,000 in Chinese schools, 8,000 in Malay schools, and 1,600 in Tamil schools). There had since the war been a thirst for education—especially for education in English—which the authorities were extending themselves to satisfy. Schools were being built, teachers trained, and, by 1957, there would be a system of compulsory free education in English for a child population which was expected to have risen from 163,000 to 222,000. It was not a question of mere planning 000 —the scheme was being put into operation with feverish urgency as

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000 part of the measures intended to deprive Communism of its main appeal to the masses.

666 Meanwhile Singapore had progressed a considerable way on the road towards self-government. The elective system had been introduced into the Legislature and further extensions of the principle were announced during the writer's visit. There were now two parties in lively existence—the Progressive Party and the Labour Party—and a third party (the Socialist Party) was about to be formed. When the elections were first introduced, the Chinese had very largely boycotted them with the result that other races obtained representation out of proportion to their numbers, but the number of Chinese enrolling themselves on the electoral registers had now considerably increased. But it was in the Municipal elections (the elective principle had now been extended to the Municipality) that the greatest popular interest was manifested, for 18 of the 27 members were chosen by popular vote on a regional, non-racial basis (as was the case with the elections to the Legislature). Municipal questions were widely canvassed, and the public gallery of the Municipal chamber was full when debates took place.

467 In spite of these encouraging portents, there was no spirit of complacency among those in authority—nor was there room for it. There had been no strikes in 1950 (the Labour Department acting as mediator in disputes), but it was known that the Communist underground 'All Races General Labour Union' had been formed to attempt to infiltrate into the legal unions. During the writer's visit the delegates of ICFTU arrived in Singapore and after discussions with the local labour leaders, announced that they considered Singapore as an especially favourable field for the growth of trade-unionism on the democratic model.

000 *Johore.* Separated from Singapore by a strait a quarter of a mile wide,
crossed by a causeway, Johore had since the beginning of the terrorist
campaign been one of the most disturbed areas of Malaya. Even in days
of peace, north Johore had had more than its fair share of gang robbers.
361 The writer, in mid-August, visited two places in south Johore, where
the resettlement of Chinese squatters was in progress.

727 The first was a squatter-tapper settlement. The inhabitants of the
731 settlement had been brought in from isolated holdings up to five miles
away. This was accomplished almost always with their willing co-
746 operation. They were first of all accommodated in a transit camp while
they were building their new huts, the timbers and thatch for which
166 were supplied at cost price, transport free, and a sum of $30 was paid
656 to each family as a displacement allowance. (This allowance was about
to be increased.) In addition $3 a week for two weeks was paid to each
individual while he was settling down in his new home. Round the

settlement a barbed-wire fence was to be built and outside it a road. 361
A village with shops and a Chinese school were adjacent to the settlement. 727
An administrative headquarters and a police station had also 727
been built. The squatters were tapping rubber in a nearby estate and 731
because of the high price of rubber their wages were good. The principal 746
attraction of the settlement was that the squatters would receive 166
permanent titles to their land. This innovation ensured settled cultivation 656
whereas the old temporary occupation licences (or no licences at all) had led to shifting cultivation involving erosion and other consequences of wasteful methods.

The second settlement was of a different kind. It was for smallholders who were engaged in market-gardening for the Singapore market. In addition to vegetables, a number of the squatters grew pepper. Pepper is a crop requiring considerable capital outlay and minute care and the vines do not bear until two years after planting. It was clear from this that the pepper-planters regarded themselves as permanently settled. The officers in charge of the resettlement were concerned not only to ensure security without dislocation of the squatters economy but also to assist them to improve their methods of cultivation and animal husbandry. For example, pedigree boars had been bought at Government expense to improve the breed of pigs of the settlements. The second camp had no fence around it, the object being, when feasible, to ensure the protection of the squatters from the exactions of the bandits by good administration alone.

Although there had been an 'incident' in which a police station had 000
been attacked (without casualty) in a neighbouring village two nights before, and a bandit collecting subscriptions had been killed in another area, the writer saw no sign of perturbation among the squatters or in the villages through which he passed. The attitude of the squatters towards European visitors was one of friendliness. It was quite clear to a person of long experience of Malaya that whatever the propaganda of the Communist terrorists, there was no feeling of hostility towards Europeans (still less towards the officials who were helping them) among these hard-working agriculturalists, taking them as a whole. All they wanted was security. The bandits, knowing this, had on more than one occasion attacked and burnt down a squatter settlement purely to demonstrate to the inmates that the authorities were unable to ensure their immunity from violence. This utter disregard of the interests of their fellow Chinese was typical of the ruthless and impersonal nature of the Communist campaign.

The writer after his visit was convinced that any final solution of the 'Squatter Problem' must be on the lines of these well considered and humane experiments in resettlement.

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16 *Federation of Malaya.* By 30 June 1949, the total population of the Federation was calculated to have increased to 5,081,848—Malaysians 2,511,520, Chinese 1,952,682, Indians and Pakistanis 550,684, Others 66,962. The growth of the population by excess of births over deaths and by immigrational surplus (the immigration of Chinese was virtually stopped) continued to be high and was calculated to have been 1·89 per cent. between 30 June 1948 and 30 June 1949. The Malays were now increasing even faster than the Chinese.

000 From his viewpoint in the United Kingdom, the writer, in common with other observers, found his attention preoccupied with the Emergency, with the increase or decrease in 'incidents', and the dismal list of casualties. Now that he was visiting the Federation and had been to areas from which murder, extortion, and sabotage were reported every few days—or sometimes daily—it was brought home to him with painful acuteness that for Malayans this senseless violence, untinctured with justice, was as much a feature of everyday life as were (say) armed robbery, road casualties, or death from cancer or tuberculosis in England. People here were more grimly aware of the sore of the terrorist campaign and of the appalling financial burden it entailed than were people in Britain of the drain of disease or of the road, but they tended to accept them in very much the same spirit as they did their own inflictions from these sources. This was true of the large towns and of aggregates of people, though it did not, of course, apply to isolated groups in country districts or to planters and miners in their floodlit fortress bungalows surrounded by sentries and barbed wire. Yet recognition of the Emergency seemed largely relegated to the sub-conscious, while the wakeful mind occupied itself with more positive matters in which the individual felt he still could exercise some measure of free will. It was in this spirit that the Annual Report of the Federation of Malaya for 1949 dealt with Public Finance, Currency and Banking, Social Services, Legislation, Public Utilities, Communications, &c., in the text proper and reserved the Emergency for an appendix of a few pages. No doubt this attitude was prompted by the will to carry on in spite of everything, but it was none the less true that the atmosphere was one of workaday serenity in the larger towns, and there was nothing of that undercurrent of tension which the writer had discerned during his short visit to Saigon.

The impression of recovery and normality was as instantaneous to the writer in Kuala Lumpur as it had been in Singapore, and the subsequent revelations of inflation, political uncertainty, and the selfish behaviour of some individuals could not greatly impair it. It was, of course, not the Federal capital of 1939, but it was none the less a thriving town, which had in some respects if not in others, progressed beyond its pre-war self. The Federation had now adopted a Draft Development Plan for the

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Social Services, National Resources and Utilities, and Trade and Industry. During 1949 the total School Enrolment had increased by 10 per cent. to 547,000; the birth-rate had increased from 40·7 per mille to 43·8, while the death-rate had dropped from 16·4 to 14·2—figures which were eloquent testimony to the health and standard of living of the community at large. The Annual Report, in recording these figures, added: 'Indeed, the implications, no less than the size, of the net annual increase (births less deaths) which amounts to 150,370, or nearly three per cent. per annum on the mean estimated mid-1949 population, are almost breathtaking.' In the field of Social Welfare, quite apart from steady progress, 1949 witnessed the coming into force of special legislation for the treatment of juvenile delinquents; and, in spite of financial stringency, $7,000,000 was set aside during the year for housing. 000

In the text proper of this study the Emergency in Malaya has been dealt with up to about the middle of 1949: it will be appropriate in this Postscript to add some details which will bring the account up to the end of the same year. From the middle of February until the end of 1949 the number of weekly incidents averaged 26. The lowest number on record during the year was in the first week in August when only 12 incidents occurred.[1] The nature of bandit attacks also changed and it was noticeable that they were reluctant to attack targets which were guarded or where they had not the element of surprise. As a result they failed completely in their expressed objectives of disrupting the administration and the economy of the country, and of establishing 'liberated areas' over which they had full control. A new feature of the bandits' campaign was the creation of a 'Min Yuen Organization' whose duty it was to arrange for the collection of food-supplies and money from the local population, and for the dissemination of communist propaganda. The bandits announced during the year that on 1 February their forces had been formed into the 'Malayan Races Liberation Army'. This was an attempt to disguise the movement as nationalist and to imply that it incorporated all races. To give further weight to this argument they also formed a so-called 10th Regiment of Malays in Pahang. During the latter part of the year this Regiment was particularly harried by the Security Forces, and, by the end of the year, had almost completely disintegrated. The movement continued, as it had begun, to be based almost entirely on the Chinese. 669 668

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[1] The number of 'incidents' is, of itself, no guide to the situation. 'Incident' might include anything from the dropping of a leaflet to a bomb outrage. Moreover, an increase in incidents might well betoken the success of the Security Forces since increased pressure would bring the bandits to battle, while the withdrawal of the Security Forces from an area would result in a cessation of 'incidents'. As the Security Forces progressed in their plan it was certain that the number of 'incidents' would increase.

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000 During 1949, 618 bandits were killed and 337 captured, and 1,392 jungle camps were discovered and destroyed. In September it was announced that bandits who surrendered would not be prosecuted on a charge carrying a mandatory death penalty provided that they had not been guilty themselves of a violent crime. The total of surrenders for 1949 was 216, of whom 116 surrendered after the announcement was made. Casualties during the year numbered:

	Killed	*Wounded*	*Missing*
Civilians . .	334	200	162
Police . . .	164	170	..
Military . .	65	77	..

[433] It is significant that in spite of the Emergency the value of the gross external trade of the Federation advanced by 6·7 per cent. to no less than M$2,113 million. The production of tin increased by over twenty per cent., the acreage under paddy reached an all-time record, and 670,000 tons of rubber (a 3·8 per cent. drop on the 1948 figure, but almost all of it accounted for by small-holding production where declining yields were also a factor) were produced. These figures were matched in other branches of trade. As the Introduction to the Report remarks, 'In 1949 the economic heart beat more vigorously than ever.'

668 208 186 609 In August 1950, the state of mind of the Chinese in the Federation was not easy to gauge. It seems that with the Communist victories of 1949 and the establishment of the People's Republic of China, apprehension as to their possible effect upon Malaya was tempered among the Malayan Chinese generally by a feeling of satisfaction that China was established once again as a Power. Subsequently, however, reports received by those who had relatives in China of the consistent ill-treatment of these relatives, whether or not they belonged to the better class, and of large capital levies, had greatly modified this sentiment and there was a growing hostility towards the Mao Tse-tung regime. There was, however, a considerable range of opinion even among the Chinese merchants, miners, and planters and the community was by no means a united one. One group of Malayan-born Chinese tended towards making common ground with the Malays, another group of China-born were in favour of Chiang Kai-shek and an intransigent attitude towards Mao. A few even openly speculated on the effect of a possible Communist over-running of Malaya and on whether it would not be possible to maintain business as usual under such a regime. But, on the whole, the writer found an increase in 'Malayan-mindedness' among the Chinese since 1947. The greatest force for unity among the Chinese remained the Malayan Chinese Association under the Straits-born Dato Tan Cheng-lock of Malacca (his recent (Johore) title of 'Dato' was in itself a symbol of Chinese *rapprochement* with the Malays) while the 7

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Communities' Liaison Committee (Mr Malcolm Macdonald's child) 186
continued its efforts to reconcile the differences between Chinese and 609
Malays.[1]

Whereas in Burma and Siam the entire Chinese press had swung 204
towards Communism, in Malaya there were only two papers with Communist leanings. The remaining Chinese papers were either decidedly 668
anti-Communist or merely non-Communist. Daily newspapers in the 186
anti- or non-Communist categories included the *Sin Chew Jit Pao* and
the *Nanyang Siang Pau* of Singapore, the *Kwong Wah Jit Poh* and the 609
Sing Pau Jih Pao of Penang, the *China Press* of Kuala Lumpur, and the *Kin Kwok Daily News* of Ipoh. The two papers sympathizing with Communism were the *Nan Chiau Jit Pao* of Singapore and the *Modern Daily News* of Penang. Both the latter sailed as close as they dared to the wind, condemning the United States action in Korea, presenting the news of the campaign in such a way that the reader would always draw a conclusion favourable to the North Koreans, and, in internal affairs, encouraging the defiance of the authorities by Chinese pupils of the Chinese High School and Nanyang Girls' School. By inference, if not in actual words, the terrorist campaign in Malaya was endorsed by these papers. The tolerance which these Communist papers received no doubt reflected Whitehall policy, for in London the *Daily Worker* and the (monthly) *Malayan Monitor* openly supported the Malayan terrorists and condoned their murders. This spirit of democratic toleration completely mystified Malayans—Chinese, Malays, and Indians alike—who could not, of course, in view of the nature of Asian history, be expected to understand the philosophic niceties of democracy. It is even to be feared that they regarded the tolerance as evidence of weakness.

The income tax reports of the Federation and of Singapore for 1948 434
and 1949, published in August, provide some evidence as to the wealth of the Chinese as compared with other races. It should be borne in mind, however, that the great majority of Chinese escape taxation since the allowance is much higher than in Britain or America. The assessed incomes for 1948 were as follows:

Federation of Malaya

	No. of individuals	*Assessed income*
Chinese	3,238	M$41,414,100
Indians	710	7,370,928
Malays	345	3,288,593
Other Asians . . .	356	3,071,770
Non-Asians . . .	4,304	54,121,592
Non-Residents . . .	768	3,591,309

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[1] This is a convenient place to record that further investigation of the murder of Dr Ong Chong-keng (see p. 402) confirms that the motive was entirely political.

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Singapore

	No. of individuals	*Assessed income*
Chinese	4,159	51,904,293
Indians	751	9,387,794
Malays	44	366,471
Other Asians	531	5,927,929
Non-Asians	3,694	49,423,327
Non-Residents	1,180	6,175,598

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[162] *Indonesia*. The Minister of Information for Indonesia placed the number of Chinese in that country in mid-1950 at about 2,000,000. 609 Informed Indonesians generally spoke of the local Chinese as constituting one of the most difficult and frustrating of contemporary ques- 197 tions. Since the Republic was established, the law of Indonesia regarded 177 all persons born in the country as citizens of the Republic. Thus the Chinese born there (*Peranakans*), had dual nationality. While the great majority of Chinese in Indonesia were now Indonesian-born, often did not speak Chinese but only their own particular brand of Indonesian, and most preferred an Indonesian way of living and Indonesian amusements (such as the theatre), the Chinese community nevertheless remained apart and unassimilated. Among Indonesian politicians there were two schools of thought—that which chose to regard the Chinese as a minority, and that which preferred to consider Chinese born in the country as part of the Indonesian people. Notwithstanding the desirability of the latter policy as an objective, the psychological tendency both among the Indonesians generally and the Chinese community as [471] a whole favoured the former view. The Chinese still controlled 95 per cent. of the industry and internal trade of the country (it was said that in Sumatra they had actually extended their influence at the expense of the Europeans), and all efforts to extend the participation of Indonesians in these fields had so far had little success.

641 One Indonesian spokesman expressed to the writer the view that within living memory the Chinese in Indonesia had successively appealed to the protection of six foreign flags—the Dutch, the Chinese Imperial, the Chinese Republican (KMT), the Japanese, the Australian (the Australians were among the first to liberate Indonesia), the Dutch again, and now that of the People's Republic of China! In August 1950 the Ambassador of the People's Republic had arrived together with his own and the new consular staff. Indonesian officials were, in September 1950, awaiting with interested curiosity the first indications of the policy of the People's Government of China both towards their own Government and towards the Chinese community in Indonesia. It was felt that it would be difficult to adopt a line in keeping both with Chinese nationalist sentiment and with Communist propaganda towards Indo-

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nesians. When in due course the Soviet Embassy arrived, new cross-currents would still further agitate the already highly charged political atmosphere.[1] 641

The Chinese press in Indonesia had undergone a change of front following on the Communist successes in China, but there had not been the same landslide in favour of the People's Republic as had taken place in Siam. The *Sin Pao* of Jacarta had the largest circulation and published one edition in Chinese and another in Indonesian which differed from one another somewhat in content and attitude. The paper had first of all 'sat on the fence', but had subsequently come out in full support of Mao Tse-tung. The *Keng Po* (Jacarta, in Indonesian), on the other hand, pursued a policy of real liberalism and independence of judgement. The *Seng Hwo Pao* (Jacarta) was avowedly Communist, while one paper, the *Thien Seng Yit Pao*, still supported the KMT, but had a very small circulation. Chinese newspapers were also published in other parts of Indonesia, notably in Surabaya and Medan. 204 668

While the Indonesians proceeded with forming their unitary government and creating their institutions on a basis of nationalism, the Chinese *Peranakans* were uncertain as to their future. They had, in common with other minorities, been given two years in which to decide whether they would become Indonesian citizens or remain aliens in Indonesia. Those who did not within the stipulated time register themselves as aliens would be considered to have chosen Indonesian citizenship. Like the other minorities (in particular the Dutch) they were awaiting an assurance from the Government that they would receive equal treatment with other Indonesian citizens before making their choice. Under the Dutch, aliens were not permitted to own land—the question now was whether the Chinese would be allowed to do so if they became Indonesian citizens. The opinion among high Indonesian officials was that there would be no discrimination between the various races of Indonesian citizens. 641

The extent of the control of Indonesian industry was brought home to the writer in the course of his visit to villages where domestic weaving was being carried on in the neighbourhood of Bandung. Since the weavers had insufficient working capital, they were compelled to obtain their cotton thread from the Chinese who purchased from them the woven article at a price very considerably below that at which it would be sold. 288 441

Members of the Djocjakarta Gadja Mada University, founded during 874

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[1] It may be noted here that in Indonesian opinion the conflict in Indochina between the French and the Vietminh was regarded as on all fours with the Dutch–Indonesian conflict in Indonesia. This was of importance in assessing the potential strength of Communist and democratic support in Indonesia.

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874 the Revolution in 1946, expressed the view that their university had much more right to be considered the national university than the Dutch-founded University of Indonesia. It was pointed out that a majority of students in the latter institution were aliens. (The writer was informed in Jacarta that some eighty per cent. of the students in the splendidly equipped Faculty of Medicine were Chinese.) The proportion of Chinese students was no doubt due to the superior economic position of the Chinese fathers who could thus afford better than Indonesian fathers to give their children a university education.

578 609 Whatever hardships the Chinese had suffered during the Revolution, it seemed that in September 1950 they were living at peace. The writer, in the course of an extensive journey through Java and Bali as a guest of the Indonesian Government, during which he had the opportunity of meeting the representatives of the local minorities, was satisfied that the special circumstances which during the Dutch–Indonesian hostilities had brought the Chinese often into collision with the Indonesians had ceased to exist.[1] There were, indeed, still glowing embers of resentment against the Chinese for the part which they were asserted to have played during the Dutch–Indonesian conflict, but educated Indonesians affirmed that they bore the Chinese no abiding ill will since it was Dutch policy which had forced the latter into the position of middlemen between the Dutch and Indonesian communities. At the same time (as has been stated above) the Indonesians regarded the Chinese as, perhaps, their major 'problem'.

000 Java and Bali, in the third quarter of 1950, presented to the visitor a general appearance of calm and normality not to be expected in view of the reports of disorder circulating in the European and American press. It was indeed true that in some areas there were lawless bands in operation and that murders and violence were from time to time reported, but these were quite insufficient to interrupt the normal functioning of Indonesian society. The dispute between labour and foreign-owned estates, though it was causing heavy loss to Indonesia, was not considered by the Indonesian ministers and officials to be more than a dispute over wages, and they dismissed any suggestion of 'Communism'. At this period it was undoubtedly the case that Indonesia was short of trained administrators, technicians, and professional men (especially doctors), but it was none the less true that the people were getting down to work with resolution and confidence. Their newly found freedom was still having a tonic effect on their outlook. In Djocjakarta alone was there any sign of the tiredness and reaction from the recent struggle.[2]

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[1] The Chinese had, however, suffered casualties in the recent conflict in Macassar.

[2] In Chapter XLVIII the writer was compelled to rely almost exclusively

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The Philippines. The figure for Chinese in the Philippines in mid-1950 commonly accepted among those qualified to form an opinion was about 250,000, though the Chinese Embassy was said to place it rather higher. Illicit immigration was undoubtedly in progress on a fairly considerable scale. The annual legal quota for alien immigrants had now been reduced to 50 per nationality. (This was, in effect, a discrimination against nationalities other than Chinese, for the illegal immigration of the latter was, of course, unaffected by the order.) Previously the quota had been 500 per nationality, and the quota for Chinese had been allotted to congressmen for disposal. This had given rise to a scandal, for it was alleged in the press that up to 3,000 pesos had been paid to congressmen by or on behalf of each Chinese immigrant who wished to immigrate into the Philippines with legal sanction. An official inquiry into these allegations had been held but the report (the Natividad Report) had not by September 1950 been released for publication.[1] 162 167 [661]

The majority of Chinese in the Philippines were still ostensibly supporters of the Nationalist regime in China and the Chinese Ambassador represented the Kuomintang Government based on Formosa. The Chinese press of Manila (with a small total circulation of about 30,000) was careful to observe the official requirements. Of the five Manila Chinese daily newspapers the *Fookien Times* was by far the most important and produced a summary in English. Its policy appeared to be to try to steer a middle course between the Nationalists and Communists. The *Kong Li Po*, the *Great China Press*, and the *Chinese Nationalist Daily* were all Nationalist, but the *Chinese Commercial News* presented the Chinese Communist point of view. 668 204

Altogether the Chinese community in the Philippines was extremely cautious in its behaviour. Any act which might be considered by the authorities to be politically undesirable might be followed by the expulsion of the offender. 609

In September 1950 the greatest problem of the Philippines was one of finance. It seemed inevitable that the Government would have to obtain urgently a sum of at least 250,000,000 pesos from the United 000

upon Dutch or Chinese sources. Some Indonesian authorities are now becoming available and should be consulted in conjunction with this chapter—e.g. *Minorities in the Republic of Indonesia* (Jacarta, Ministry of Information of the Republic of Indonesia, 1949).

[1] Since the official test for 'Chinese' in the Philippines seems to be ethnic in a restricted sense, the writer in reviewing his statistical chapters feels that he has been influenced by this to exclude many persons whom he would in the other countries of Southeast Asia have included among ethnic Chinese. On his return to Manila in September 1950 he was impressed anew by the number of prominent Filipinos of Chinese blood, and often with Chinese names, barely disguised by Filipinization.

000 States to offset the adverse trade balance, but the opinion commonly held was that this amount would be forthcoming only if the Philippine Government was prepared to appoint a person of the United States Government's choice with authority over economic affairs.

The Hukbalahap insurgency was said to have got stronger within the last year and there was evidence of participation by the Chinese. The movement, however, remained an indigenous agrarian one with a considerable element of pure banditry.[1]

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[1] Figures of interest to the student of the Chinese in the Philippines are contained in *Facts and Figures about the Economic and Social Conditions of the Philippines 1948–1949* (Manila, Bureau of the Census and Statistics, 1950). Some of these are as follows:

Retail stores owned by Filipinos 53,260, Americans 140, Chinese 11,321, Hindus 188, Spanish 43, others 71.

Foreign trade by traders January–June 1949 (in pesos), American 308,312,471, Chinese 258,951,724, Filipino 211,738,543, British 51,219,588.

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[1] See also bibliographies in J. L. Christian, *Modern Burma*; Virginia Thompson, *Thailand: the New Siam* and *French Indo-China*; Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*; W. J. Cator, *The Economic Position of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies*; J. S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India: a Study in Plural Economy*; Amry Vandenbosch, *The Dutch East Indies*; Blair *and* Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*; H. Cordier, *Bibliotheca Indosinica*; and (in particular) *Far Eastern Bibliography 1947* and supplements to it in *The Far Eastern Quarterly*.

Despite its length, this list is selective only, for a complete compilation would occupy volumes. The majority of the authorities listed here are cited in the text, but some have been added for the sake of greater comprehensiveness.

From a superficial examination of the Chinese provincial and district histories (copies of which are in the British Museum and the Library of Congress), the author is of the opinion that a great deal of material useful for the study of the overseas Chinese is available therein.

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
ETHNIC CHINESE
Principal areas of Chinese concentration
Other areas of Chinese concentration
CHINA
YUNNAN
FUKIEN
Foochow
Amoy
Formosa
Swatow
KWANGTUNG
Canton
Hong Kong
Macao
Kwangchowan
Kiungchow
HAINAN
TONGKING
Haiphong
BURMA
Bhamo
SHAN STATES
Rangoon
Moulmein
THAILAND
Bangkok
FRENCH INDO-CHINA
ANNAM
CAMBODIA
Pnom-Penh
Saigon-Cholon
COCHINCHINA
KRA ISTHMUS
Puket
PERLIS
KEDAH
PERAK
SELANGOR
KELANTAN
MALAYA
Kuala Lumpur
NEGRI SEMBILAN
JOHORE
Singapore
Singkawang
Pontianak
SUMATRA
Medan
Padang
BANGKA
Palembang
BILLITON
BRUNEI
Br. N. BORNEO
SARAWAK
TARAKAN
WEST BORNEO
BORNEO
Banjermasin
NETHERLANDS INDIES
Batavia
Semarang
MADURA
Surabaya
BALI
LOMBOK
JAVA
CELEBES
Menado
Macassar
TERNATE
MOLUCCAS
AMBOINA
TIMOR
PHILIPPINES
LUZON
Manila
Iloilo
Cebu
MINDANAO
Zamboanga
Davao
500 MILES
500 KILOMETERS
100
110
120
130
20
10
0

GEOGR. REVIEW, APR. 1944

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
SOUTHEAST ASIA
PACIFIC OCEAN
PHILIPPINES
UNITED STATES TRUSTEESHIP
East China Sea
Taiwan
CANTON
HONG KONG
CHINA
TONGKING
INDO-CHINA
CAMBODIA
SIAM
BURMA
INDIA
TIBET
MALAYA
SINGAPORE
Sulu Sea
Celebes Sea
NORTH BORNEO
SARAWAK
BRITISH
Borneo
Moluccas
Banda Sea
Flores Sea
Java Sea
BATAVIA
Timor Sea
New Guinea
AUSTRALIA
INDIAN OCEAN

[end map B]

/For a discussion of the Chinese in British Borneo see 2: Purcell, AL1 Southeast Asia, category 116, pp. 415-439. /

563 Malaya AN1

/For a discussion of the Chinese in Malaya (including the postwar period) see 2: Purcell, AL1 Southeast Asia, category 116, pp. 269-414./

563 Indochina AM1

/For a discussion of the Chinese in Indochina see 2: Purcell, AL1 Southeast Asia, category 116, pp. 209-268./

175 Indonesia OB1

/For comprehensive information pertaining to the history of the Chinese minority in Indonesia from the pre-Dutch era to 1942, see 2: Purcell, AL1 Southeast Asia, category 116, pp. 448-525./

563 Indonesia OB1

/For a discussion of the Chinese in Indonesia, see 2: Purcell, AL1 Southeast Asia, category 116, pp. 441-568./

/For a discussion of the Chinese in Burma see 2; Purcell, AL1 Southeast Asia, category 116, pp. 55-101./

563 Philippines OA1

/For a discussion of the Chinese in the Philippines see 2: Purcell, AL1 Southeast Asia, category 116, pp. 569-655./

Philippines OA1

/For comprehensive information pertaining to the history of the Chinese minority in the Philippines from 1570 to 1946, see 2: Purcell, AL1 Southeast Asia, category 116, pp. 576-620./

563 Thailand AO1

/For a discussion of the Chinese in Thailand see 2: Purcell, AL1 Southeast Asia, category 116, pp. 103-208./